




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SOUTHERN

Historical Society Papers.

VOLUME I.

JANUARY TO JUNE, 1876.

RICHMOND, VA.:
REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.
Secretary Southern Historical Society.

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SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY TRACTS.

Vol. I.

Richmond, Va., January, 1876.

No. 1.

Origin of the Late War.

By Honorable R. M. T. HUNTER, of Virginia.

The late civil war which raged in the United States has been very generally attributed to the abolition of slavery as its cause. When we consider how deeply the institutions of southern society and the operations of southern industry were founded in slavery, we must admit that this was cause enough to have produced such a result. But great and wide as was that cause in its far-reaching effects, a close study of the history of the times will bring us to the conclusion that it was the fear of a mischief far more extensive and deeper even than this which drove cool and reflecting minds in the South to believe that it was better to make the death struggle at once than submit tamely to what was inevitable, unless its coming could be averted by force. Men, too old to be driven blindly by passion; women, whose gentle and kindly instincts were deeply impressed by the horrors of war, and young men, with fortune and position yet to be won in an open and inviting field, if peace could be maintained so as to secure the opportunities of liberty and fair treatment, united in the common cause and determined to make a holocaust of all that was dear to them on the altars of war sooner than submit without resentment to the loss of liberty, honor and property by a cruel abuse of power and a breach of plighted faith on the part of those who had professed to enter with them into a union of justice and fraternal affection.

When this Union was originally formed, the United States embraced too many degrees of latitude and longitude, and too many varieties of climate and production, to make it practicable to establish and administer justly one common government which should take charge of all the interests of society. To the wise men who were entrusted with the formation of that union and common government it was obvious enough that each separate society should be entrusted with the management of its own peculiar interests and

that the united government should take charge only of those interests which were common and general. To enforce this necessary distinction, it was provided that all powers, not specially granted, should be reserved to the people and the States, and a list of the granted powers was carefully and specifically made. But two parties soon arose in regard to these limitations. Those who wielded the powers thus granted became interested to remove these limitations as far as possible, whilst the minority, who belonged to the governed rather than the governing party, early learned to regard these limitations as the best and surest defences against the abuses and oppression of a despotic majority. A tendency soon became manifest in the non-slaveholding portion of the union to constitute themselves into that governing party. Endowed with the greater share of power in the commencement, that preponderance was increased by the course of events. The famous northwestern ordinance, to which the old Virginia fathers were driven by their abhorrence of slavery, without looking too closely to its probable consequences, made the predominance of the non-slaveholding section in the government irresistible. The abolition of the slave-trade, after a time, by the constitution and the northwestern ordinance, left the growing superiority of that section not even doubtful. But the acquisition of Louisiana made another order of growth in political power possible as between the two sections. The bare possibility of such a result kindled a violent opposition in some portions of the non-slaveholding section. In New England it was particularly angry, and there sprung up for the first time in the history of our government audible threats of separation. The "land hunger" of the Anglo-Saxon race, as Theodore Parker calls it, soon quieted the opposition to the acquisition of territory, but a far more bitter strife arose as to the equal rights of the two sections to settle the vacant territory of the Union and grow possibly *pari passu* in power. So fierce was the strife, and so loud its tumult, that for the first time it broke upon Mr. Jefferson's ear like "a fire bell in the night." The contest between the two sections over the limitations in the constitution upon the governing party under it began with the commencement of its history, and ended only, as I shall presently show, with the revolution which destroyed the old form and established the despotism of a majority of numbers. It is in the history of this contest we must look for the true causes of the war, and the use made of the victory by the winning party will show the object and nature of that contest. When it became obvious that the only protection of

the rights of the minority against the encroachments of the majority was to be found in the limitations upon the power of the governing party, a death struggle arose between the two parties over the constitutional restraints upon this power. The struggle between the two parties commenced at the beginning of the government. These were respectively led by Hamilton and Jefferson, the one with an avowed preference for monarchy, the other the great apostle of democracy—men of signal abilities, and each conscious of what would be the consequence of complete and perfect victory on either side. The party of power showed a constant tendency to draw all important subjects of jurisdiction within the vortex of Federal control, and an equally persevering effort on the other to limit that control to the strict necessities of a common government. A great leader, who came into the contest and figured in it until it was well nigh ended, used to say that in all good governments there existed a tax-consuming and a tax-paying party, between whom a constant conflict existed, and in the history of that conflict the history of party strife would be found to consist; but when the first acquired complete supremacy the nature, if not the form of the government—if it was originally republican—was sure to change. The leaders of the States rights party, aware of this tendency, as the contest went on, became more and more anxious to preserve their constitutional defences, and loudly proclaimed the danger of yielding them up. Time and again they proclaimed that the worst of all governments was that of a majority of numbers with absolute and unrestricted powers. Despotism of all sorts was bad, but the despotism of a majority of numbers in a democratic form of government was the worst of all—particularly was that the case in regard to slavery, as was often asserted. In February, 1790, when two abolition petitions, one of them signed by Dr. Franklin, were presented to Congress, that body “resolved that Congress had no authority to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or even the treatment of them within any of the States, it remaining with the several States alone to provide any regulations therein which humanity or true policy may require.” Congress thus clearly declared its view of its power over the subject. Congress was petitioned to do all in its power to discourage slavery, of which a Massachusetts man, in an able history of the long contest, has said: “Congress could not move a hair’s breadth towards discouraging it, either lawfully or honestly. The powers of Congress being defined and nominated by the constitution which framed the government, all it could do in

regard to any specific subject was to act upon it, if within its province, and if otherwise, 'to touch not, taste not, handle not.'" (Lunt's *Origin of the Late War*, p. 25.) In the debate upon the subject, one Southern gentleman objected to the commitment of these memorials as containing "unconstitutional requests," and said "he feared the commitment would be a very alarming circumstance to the Southern States; for if it was to engage Congress in an unconstitutional measure, it would be considered an interference with their rights, making them uneasy under the government, and causing them to lament that they had ever put additional power into their hands." Another declared "that the States would never have entered into the confederacy unless their property had been guaranteed to them, and that we look upon this measure as an attack upon the *palladium* of our property"—meaning the constitution. Another said if he was to hold these slaves in eternal bondage he would feel no uneasiness on account of the present menace, "*because he would rely upon the virtue of Congress that they would not exercise any unconstitutional authority.*" This same historian well says "the impression made upon the southern members of Congress at the earliest period is also significant. Although evidently considering it of no practical importance, they yet clearly made it known they regarded such action as in violation of the constitution, and that without the guaranty for their rights of property in slaves, permitted by that instrument, the States which they represented would not have assented to it, and hence the plan for the Union must have failed. No one can doubt that if they had deemed the guaranty afforded insufficient they could have obtained pledges of a still more precise character, either then or at a later period, since the object of the Union was one of paramount interest to all. But neither they nor their northern compatriots entertained any question of the fidelity of their successors to engagements so solemnly undertaken both express and implied." (Lunt, p. 27.) The history of this transaction shows how early the South was taught to look to the constitution for the defences of their rights in regard to slavery, how fully, too, and clearly the Congress admitted the existence of these defences, and that the South disregarded the unauthorized menace of these "anarchic Quakers," as Carlisle calls them, because they "*relied upon the virtue of Congress that they would not exercise any unconstitutional authority.*" Their property in slaves was guaranteed by the constitution; they felt authorized to say so by a solemn declaration of Congress made at the time; and they had

too much confidence in the northern majority, who were soon to control that body, to believe that directly or indirectly they would impair or destroy a right so solemnly guaranteed. To have anticipated such an attack upon their property and peace, would have been to suppose that they had been made the easy victims of a perfidy, which, under all the circumstances, under all the traditions of common sufferings and exertions, was characterized by a wealth of deception which would have excited the envy even of a Carthaginian. Especially would that be the case if the deceit was to be covered up by a constant course of perjury on the part of the officials of the government, who were to be sworn as a qualification for office to support the constitution which contained that pledge. How justly our fathers relied upon that instrument to protect their rights, subsequent history has shown. Nothing could be more clearly established than the right on one side to reclaim fugitive slaves, and the obligation on the other to return them—an obligation which surely ought to have rested lightly enough on those who brought them here and sold them. Nor is it easy to see how the remorse for having sold them could be relieved by inveigling them away from those who had bought them. But so it was, that during the existence of slavery there was an ever-living contest between the slave and the free States on this very subject; the former seeking to enforce, and the latter to evade the constitutional obligation for the return of fugitive slaves. Long before the secession of the slave States, it had become almost impossible, without the assistance of armed forces, to reclaim a fugitive slave openly in the free States. Lunt, p. 320, says: "At length fourteen of the sixteen free States had provided statutes which rendered any attempt to execute the fugitive slave act so difficult as to be practically impossible, and placed each of those States in an attitude of virtual resistance to the laws of the United States." When Mr. Toombs, in the Senate of the United States, during the session in which he withdrew from that body, referred to these laws and taxed the free States with their violations of constitutional obligation, in evidence of which he produced these statutes, it was pitiful to hear the excuses by which the representatives of these States sought to squirm out of the difficulty—a difficulty for which the executives of Ohio and Iowa would scarcely have cared to apologize, if it be true, as doubtless it is, as Lunt states, that "at a somewhat later period those officers refused to surrender to justice persons charged with participation in the John Brown raid"—see note, p. 320. At the era of secession the

constitution had not only ceased to be a palladium for these rights of secession, but was hardly recognized to be binding at all.

If, then, this instrument was to be relied upon by the slave States to protect them, it was only in the event that they could arm themselves with enough political power to enforce its provisions. So obvious had this become by 1819-'20, when the State of Missouri was struggling for admission as a slave State, that the slave States at that time solemnly asserted their right to settle the unoccupied and unappropriated territory of the United States with their slave property, under the protection of its laws—a right which was as vehemently denied by the free States. So bitter and fierce was this contest, that its agitations shook the very foundations of American society. It was settled for a time by a compromise excluding slavery from the United States Territories north of a line 36° 30' north latitude, and admitting it south of that line. Even this line left the South in a condition of hopeless inferiority, which was but little helped by the acquisition of a portion of Texas as a slave State. When the vast territory obtained from Mexico at the close of the war was organized, the Missouri compromise line was set aside, and the non-intervention principle was adopted, by which it became between the sections a mere question of the ability to colonize—a question in regard to which there could scarcely be a doubt, with the superior resources in wealth and population of the free States. It had become manifest that the South had no protection for its rights but the constitution, nor could it hope to avail itself of that protection without an increase of power in the government. Its hopes for acquiring that were daily becoming less, whilst sectional animosities were constantly becoming more angry and bitter. A party had sprung up which proclaimed the constitution to be “an agreement with death and a covenant with hell.” This party was daily becoming stronger and more dangerous in spirit. It began at first by taking part in the contests between Whigs and Democrats, and grew upon the agitations in Congress and the newspaper press. This war of petitions for abolition was commenced by John Quincy Adams in 1831, when he presented a petition from Pennsylvania for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, but at the same time declared that he could not vote for it. He who was so denounced when he left the Federal party, on account of its disunion tendencies, and joined the Democratic under Mr. Jefferson, became the “old man eloquent” when he fanned the smouldering spark of sectional division with the burning breath of hate and anger

which was yet to burst out in flames and consume the house with the fire whose initial spark he consented to bear and apply to the family dwelling, ever nursing the fire until the building was fairly ablaze. And what was now, in 1860, the worth of the reliance which kept the South quiet in 1790, because it "relied upon the virtue of Congress that it would exercise no unconstitutional authority?" In regard to the right to recapture fugitive slaves, it was at that time obviously a dead letter. The free States had violated that obligation by their personal liberty statutes, which were consonant with the general spirit of their people. The abolition party, which denounced the constitution as a "covenant with death and an agreement with hell," was fast growing in power and influence in the free States, and threatened to become the most powerful political organization within their borders. Massachusetts had adopted resolutions by her legislature, with the assent of her governor—if his message represented his opinions—resolutions which were denounced at the time as being of a disunion character. Her senator, Bates, presented them in silence, and Colonel King, of Alabama, regretted that a proposition should come from Massachusetts to dissolve the Union. (See Lunt's *Origin of the War*, 128-9). All hope of acquiring any additional political strength by the South to defend their rights was gone. The free States had announced their determination to exclude slavery from the territories of the United States, and they had the strength to do it, if they believed, as they affected to do, that the constitution was no obstacle in their path. The right of growth was thus denied to the power of the slaveholding States, and with the state of feeling then existing and cherished, they had nothing to expect but to be dwarfed and oppressed, judging of the future by the past. Indeed, an armed invasion of Virginia had been just made by John Brown, with the avowed purpose of exciting servile insurrection, and although suppressed by the United States and State forces, it excited no such outburst of horror and denunciation at the North as it might reasonably be expected to have done. On the contrary, he seemed to have been considered more as a martyr perishing in a great and holy cause, than a criminal seeking to excite a servile war, whose victims were to be women and children. "The tolling of bells and the firing of minute guns upon the occasion of Brown's funeral; the meeting houses draped in mourning, as for a hero; the prayers offered, the sermons and discourses pronounced in his honor, as for a saint—all are of a date

too recent and too familiarly known to require more than this passing allusion." (Lunt, 328). Was there anything in all this calculated to discourage such attempts for the future? On the contrary, would it not be apt to stir up still more deeply excited minds, and the next attempt would probably have caused much more suffering. To expect that the attempt to cast a lighted match into a powder magazine would fail more than once, would be chimerical indeed. In considering the value of his defences under the constitution, a Southern man could not well forget that Mr. Seward, the leader of the party in power, had not only declared the conflict between freedom and slavery to be "irrepressible," but had affirmed there was a higher law than the constitution, to which the latter must yield, or that the famous *Helper* book, endorsed and recommended generally by the Republican members of Congress, declared that "our own banner is inscribed: 'no co-operation with slaveholders in politics; no fellowship with them in religion; no affiliation with them in society; no recognition of pro-slavery men, except as ruffians, outlaws and criminals.'" Again: "we are determined to abolish slavery at all hazards." With such a history of the administration of the constitution by the party in power, there was no very pleasant outlook for the slaveholder in the future. Had he any hope from amendments? That no effort to save the Union should be spared, Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, introduced certain resolutions proposing amendments to the constitution, which would have saved the Union, and which received every Southern vote except the South Carolina senators, who had withdrawn. They proposed to adopt, in effect, the Missouri compromise line, to prohibit Congress from abolishing the slave trade between the States, or slavery in places where the United States had exclusive jurisdiction, or in the District of Columbia, without the consent of Maryland and of the slaveholders, and proposed a more effectual provision for the recovery of fugitive slaves. For these, a substitute was offered by Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, declaring, amongst other things, that the provisions of the constitution are ample for the preservation of the Union, and the resolutions of Mr. Crittenden were voted down, and the substitute adopted by a united vote of the Republicans. Says Lunt: "The vote of the Republican members of the Senate was a blank denial of the necessity of compromise, and showed, of course, that they had deliberately made up their minds to refuse any negotiation." (Lunt's *Origin of the War*, p. 411). The adoption of Mr. Crittenden's resolutions, it was said by Mr. Douglass, would have

saved every Southern State except South Carolina. Undoubtedly such would have been the effect of a general agreement upon these resolutions between the two sections. But did the Republicans desire it? It would seem not from the postscript to Mr. Chandler's letter to Governor Blair: "Some of the manufacturing States think *that a fight* would be awful. Without a little blood-letting, this Union will not, in my opinion, be worth *a curse*." This was from a senator from Michigan, a man of much influence in his party. Virginia, not yet giving up her hope of preserving the Union, interposed to call "a peace conference." Resolutions were adopted by this body, composed of able and eminent men from the different States, very similar to Mr. Crittenden's, which met with no better success. Under these circumstances what were the slaveholding States to do? In 1790 they kept quiet, because they "relied upon the virtue of Congress that they would do nothing without constitutional authority." Was such a faith any longer rational? Had not the conduct of the free States proved that the guarantees of the constitution upon the subject of slavery were no longer of the slightest avail to them? Upon that subject the majority in Congress, who were from these States, assumed whatever power they wanted. Could the minority rely upon the constitution to protect any of their rights, if it suited the passions or the interests of the majority to invade them? Our government was fast being revolutionized, and becoming one of a despotic majority of numbers; the limitations of a written constitution fast proving themselves to be without the defence of the political power to enforce them. Had the South the slightest hope of attaining any increase of that power? It had proved itself unable to do this in the past: what was the hope for the future? Lunt (p. 363) says with justice: "That it is impossible to regard the proceedings of the Chicago convention in any other light than as equivalent to a proclamation of absolutely hostile purposes against the Southern section of the country. They were not, technically, a declaration of war, to be conducted by arms, simply because they proposed only to use the *pacific* force of superior numbers, in order to deprive the minority of its rights under the constitution." (Lunt's Origin of the War, p. 362). Indeed, one of its resolutions was amended so as to declare: "When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with one another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God en-

title them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the cause which impelled them to the separation." This amendment was introduced by a Pennsylvanian (Lunt, p. 358), and passed unanimously by the convention. (Ibid). To what did this look but secession and separation? Did it not argue the consciousness of a purpose to drive the South to those extremities? What else could the South do but separate, if possible, from the majority which ruled the government, and were animated by such feelings? Mr. Webster, the great apostle of Union in 1851, had said: "I do not hesitate to say and repeat, that if the Northern States refuse wilfully or deliberately to carry into effect that part of the constitution which respects the restoration of fugitive slaves, the South would no longer be bound to keep the compact. A bargain broken on one side is broken on all sides." (Lunt, p. 321). Had not the precise case occurred? Had not the North deliberately and persistently refused to carry into effect that part of the constitution? Was the South bound any longer to keep the compact, according to this high authority? In this opinion of Mr. Webster, Mr. Jefferson undoubtedly concurred. Says Lunt, p. 203: "Mr. Jefferson took a different view of the subject, and it is proper to give his opinion as stated by Mr. John Q. Adams (who appears to have agreed with him) in his eulogy on Mr. Madison. Mr. Adams said: 'Concurring in the doctrines that the separate States have a right to *interpose* in cases of palpable infractions of the constitution by the government of the United States, and that the alien and sedition acts presented a case of such infraction, Mr. Jefferson considered them as absolutely null and void, and thought the State legislatures competent, not only to declare, but to make them so, to resist their execution within their respective borders by physical force, and to secede from the Union, rather than to submit to them, if attempted to be carried into execution by force.'" On the 2d of March, 1861, Mr. Greeley declared: "We have repeatedly said, and we once more insist, that the great principle embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, 'that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,' is sound and just, and that if the slave States, the cotton States, or the gulf States only, choose to form an independent nation, they have *a moral right to do so*." (Lunt, p. 388-9).

Is it strange that those States concurred in this opinion? They believed that the government was now in hands which were fast converting it into one of a majority of numbers with unlimited

powers. Did the South enter into any such Union as that? Had not her leaders constantly declared that in their opinion this was the worst of all forms of government, and if she was willing to stake life, liberty and property on the effort to escape it, did she not thereby demonstrate the earnestness of her conviction of her right to escape, and that her faith had been plighted to a very different instrument, by which she refused any longer to be bound to those who were seeking under its name to destroy the rights which it guaranteed to her, and force her to subserve the purposes of those who were seeking to ruin and degrade her own citizens, her men, women and children. Who drove the South to these extremities? The very men who accuse her of treason. When she accepted the contest, to which she was thus virtually invited on terms of contumelious threat and reproach, she was threatened with being wiped out and annihilated by the superior resources of her antagonist, with whom it was vain and foolish to contend, so unequal were the strength and resources of the two parties. It is true that the South parted in bitterness, but it was in sadness of spirit also. She did not wish—certainly, Virginia did not desire it—if she could maintain her rights within the Union. Probably few men foresaw the extent or the bitterness of the war. Surely it was a mighty contest to have been waged by two parties of such unequal strength in numbers and resources, with such a promise of success to the weaker for nearly four years, and doubtless there were periods during that time when those who provoked that trial by battle regretted that they had done so. The South at last fell from physical exhaustion—the want of food, clothes and the munitions of war; she yielded to no superiority of valor or of skill, but to the mere *avoiirdupois* of numbers. Physically, she was unable to stand up under such a weight of human beings, gathered from wherever they could be called by appeals to their passions or bought by a promise to supply their necessities. It is said that after the battle of the Second Cold Harbor, where Grant so foolishly assailed Lee in his lines, and where his dead was piled in thousands after his unsuccessful attack, the northern leaders were ready to have proposed peace, but were prevented by some favorable news from the southwest. They did not propose peace except upon terms of unconditional submission. The South being forced to accept those terms to obtain it, the North was not afraid to avow its purposes and carry them out. Slavery was abolished without compensation, and slaves were awarded equal rights with their masters in the government. It was the fear of

these results which drove the South into the war. Experience proved that this fear was reasonable. The war was alleged as the excuse for such proceedings; but can any man doubt that the North would have done the same thing if all constitutional restraints upon the power of the majority had been peaceably removed. To submit peaceably to the unlimited power of the majority was plainly to submit to these consequences or any other action which this majority may strongly desire to take. It is sought to be excused, I know, by assuming that these things were done with the assent of the South. That these constitutional amendments represent the well considered opinion of any respectable party in the South, there is none so infatuated as to believe. They were accepted as the terms of the conqueror, and so let them be considered by all who desire to know the true history of their origin.

To introduce hostile and conflicting statements in the formation of the public opinion, by which the action of the South was to be regulated, might, indeed, weaken and injure that section, but how it would help or benefit the North is yet to be seen, if it should so turn out. I think I have shown that the South had good reason to believe that the North meditated the infliction of these things, and that there was but little hope of finding any defence against them in the constitution. The alacrity with which she put these designs into execution so soon as our conquest enabled her to do so, proves that we did not suspect her wrongfully. The South had either to acquiesce in this oppression tamely and submissively, or fight to avert it. According to Mr. Webster, she had the constitutional right to do this; according to Mr. Greeley, she had the moral right to do this. She fought to avert these injuries, and because she was unwilling to remain under the government of a majority with unlimited powers. What this latter change threatens remains to be seen. Congress has already undertaken by her civil rights bill to regulate social intercourse amongst her people in the States. Will Congress undertake to prescribe fast days, enforce temperance and take charge of the police laws of the States and the towns? These are questions which posterity must answer. Will they have no other remedy against this despotism but to substitute for it the one-man power. They at least will be in no doubt as to the causes, and history will be equally clear as to what parties forced it upon us.

"There is no longer any room for hope. We must fight. I repeat it, Sir—we must fight. An appeal to arms and to the God of

battles is all that is left us." So said and thought Patrick Henry, in reply to the British exactions upon the colonies. So thought, too, the people of the Confederate States, and they did fight. They waged a war for which history has no parallel against such odds in resources and numbers. Borne down by odds, against which it was almost vain to contend, we were bound to submit, and they have taken from us that which, in my opinion, it will be found

"Not enriches them,
But leaves us poor indeed."

Had the South permitted her property, her constitutional rights and her liberties to be surreptitiously taken from her without resistance and made no moan, would she not have lost her honor with them? If the alternative were between such a loss and armed resistance, is it surprising that she preferred the latter?

Preamble and Resolution

Offered in a large mass meeting of the people of Botetourt county, December 10th, 1860, by the Hon. John J. Allen, President of the Supreme Court of Virginia, and adopted with but two dissenting voices.

The people of Botetourt county, in general meeting assembled, believe it to be the duty of all the citizens of the Commonwealth, in the present alarming condition of our country, to give some expression of their opinion upon the threatening aspect of public affairs. They deem it unnecessary and out of place to avow sentiments of loyalty to the constitution and devotion to the union of these States. A brief reference to the part the State has acted in the past will furnish the best evidence of the feelings of her sons in regard to the union of the States and the constitution, which is the sole bond which binds them together.

In the controversies with the mother country, growing out of the efforts of the latter to tax the colonies without their consent, it was Virginia who, by the resolutions against the stamp act, gave the example of the first authoritative resistance by a legislative body to the British Government, and so imparted the first impulse to the Revolution.

Virginia declared her independence before any of the colonies, and gave the first written constitution to mankind.

By her instructions her representatives in the General Congress

introduced a resolution to declare the colonies independent States, and the declaration itself was written by one of her sons.

She furnished to the Confederate States the father of his country, under whose guidance independence was achieved, and the rights and liberties of each State, it was hoped, perpetually established.

She stood undismayed through the long night of the Revolution, breasting the storm of war and pouring out the blood of her sons like water on almost every battle-field, from the ramparts of Quebec to the sands of Georgia.

By her own unaided efforts the northwestern territory was conquered, whereby the Mississippi, instead of the Ohio river, was recognized as the boundary of the United States by the treaty of peace.

To secure harmony, and as an evidence of her estimate of the value of the union of the States, she ceded to all for their common benefit this magnificent region—an empire in itself.

When the articles of confederation were shown to be inadequate to secure peace and tranquility at home and respect abroad, Virginia first moved to bring about a more perfect union.

At her instance the first assemblage of commissioners took place at Annapolis, which ultimately led to the meeting of the convention which formed the present constitution.

This instrument itself was in a great measure the production of one of her sons, who has been justly styled the father of the constitution.

The government created by it was put into operation with her Washington, the father of his country, at its head; her Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, in his cabinet; her Madison, the great advocate of the constitution, in the legislative hall.

Under the leading of Virginia statesmen the Revolution of 1798 was brought about, Louisiana was acquired, and the second war of independence was waged.

Throughout the whole progress of the republic she has never infringed on the rights of any State, or asked or received an exclusive benefit.

On the contrary, she has been the first to vindicate the equality of all the States, the smallest as well as the greatest.

But claiming no exclusive benefit for her efforts and sacrifices in the common cause, she had a right to look for feelings of fraternity and kindness for her citizens from the citizens of other States, and

equality of rights for her citizens with all others; that those for whom she had done so much would abstain from actual aggressions upon her soil, or if they could not be prevented, would show themselves ready and prompt in punishing the aggressors; and that the common government, to the promotion of which she contributed so largely for the purpose of "establishing justice and insuring domestic tranquility," would not, whilst the forms of the constitution were observed, be so perverted in spirit as to inflict wrong and injustice and produce universal insecurity.

These reasonable expectations have been grievously disappointed.

Owing to a spirit of pharasaical fanaticism prevailing in the North in reference to the institution of slavery, incited by foreign emissaries and fostered by corrupt political demagogues in search of power and place, a feeling has been aroused between the people of the two sections, of what was once a common country, which of itself would almost preclude the administration of a united government in harmony.

For the kindly feelings of a kindred people we find substituted distrust, suspicion and mutual aversion.

For a common pride in the name of American, we find one section even in foreign lands pursuing the other with revilings and reproach.

For the religion of a Divine Redeemer of all, we find a religion of hate against a part; and in all the private relations of life, instead of fraternal regard, a "consuming hate," which has but seldom characterized warring nations.

This feeling has prompted a hostile incursion upon our own soil, and an apotheosis of the murderers, who were justly condemned and executed.

It has shown itself in the legislative halls by the passage of laws to obstruct a law of Congress passed in pursuance of a plain provision of the constitution.

It has been manifested by the industrious circulation of incendiary publications, sanctioned by leading men, occupying the highest stations in the gift of the people, to produce discord and division in our midst, and incite to midnight murder and every imaginable atrocity against an unoffending community.

It has displayed itself in a persistent denial of the equal rights of the citizens of each State to settle with their property in the common territory acquired by the blood and treasure of all.

It is shown in their openly avowed determination to circumscribe the institution of slavery within the territory of the States now re-

cognizing it, the inevitable effect of which would be to fill the present slaveholding States with an ever increasing negro population, resulting in the banishment of our own non-slaveholding population in the first instance and the eventual surrender of our country to a barbarous race, or, what seems to be desired, an amalgamation with the African.

And it has at last culminated in the election, by a sectional majority of the free States alone, to the first office in the republic, of the author of the sentiment that there is an "irrepressible conflict" between free and slave labor and that there must be universal freedom or universal slavery; a sentiment which inculcates, as a necessity of our situation, warfare between the two sections of our country without cessation or intermission until the weaker is reduced to subjection.

In view of this state of things, we are not inclined to rebuke or censure the people of any of our sister States in the South, suffering from injury, goaded by insults, and threatened with such outrages and wrongs, for their bold determination to relieve themselves from such injustice and oppression, by resorting to their ultimate and sovereign right to dissolve the compact which they had formed and to provide new guards for their future security.

Nor have we any doubt of the right of any State, there being no common umpire between coequal sovereign States, to judge for itself on its own responsibility, as to the mode and measure of redress.

The States, each for itself, exercised this sovereign power when they dissolved their connection with the British Empire.

They exercised the same power when nine of the States seceded from the confederation and adopted the present constitution, though two States at first rejected it.

The articles of confederation stipulated that those articles should be inviolably observed by every State, and that the Union should be perpetual, and that no alteration should be made unless agreed to by Congress and confirmed by every State.

Notwithstanding this solemn compact, a portion of the States did, without the consent of the others, form a new compact; and there is nothing to show, or by which it can be shown, that this right has been, or can be, diminished so long as the States continue sovereign.

The confederation was assented to by the Legislature for each State; the constitution by the people of each State for such State alone. One is as binding as the other, and no more so.

The constitution, it is true, established a government, and it ope-

rates directly on the individual; the confederation was a league operating primarily on the States. But each was adopted by the State for itself; in the one case by the Legislature acting for the State; in the other "by the people not as individuals composing one nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong."

The foundation, therefore, on which it was established was *federal*, and the State, in the exercise of the same sovereign authority by which she ratified for herself, may for herself abrogate and annul.

The operation of its powers, whilst the State remains in the Confederacy, is *national*; and consequently a State remaining in the Confederacy and enjoying its benefits cannot, by any mode of procedure, withdraw its citizens from the obligation to obey the constitution and the laws passed in pursuance thereof.

But when a State does secede, the constitution and laws of the United States cease to operate therein. No power is conferred on Congress to enforce them. Such authority was denied to the Congress in the convention which framed the constitution, because it would be an act of war of nation against nation—not the exercise of the legitimate power of a government to enforce its laws on those subject to its jurisdiction.

The assumption of such a power would be the assertion of a prerogative claimed by the British Government to legislate for the colonies in all cases whatever; it would constitute of itself a dangerous attack on the rights of the States, and should be promptly repelled.

These principles, resulting from the nature of our system of confederate States, cannot admit of question in Virginia.

Our people in convention, by their act of ratification, declared and made known that the powers granted under the constitution being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them whenever they shall be perverted to their injury and oppression.

From what people were these powers derived? Confessedly from the people of each State, acting for themselves. By whom were they to be resumed or taken back? By the people of the State who were then granting them away. Who were to determine whether the powers granted had been perverted to their injury or oppression? Not the whole people of the United States, for there could be no oppression of the whole with their own consent; and it could not have entered into the conception of the convention that the powers

granted could not be resumed until the oppressor himself united in such resumption.

They asserted the right to resume in order to guard the people of Virginia, for whom alone the convention could act, against the oppression of an irresponsible and sectional majority, the worst form of oppression with which an angry Providence has ever afflicted humanity.

Whilst, therefore, we regret that any State should, in a matter of common grievance, have determined to act for herself without consulting with her sister States equally aggrieved, we are nevertheless constrained to say that the occasion justifies and loudly calls for action of some kind.

The election of a President, by a sectional majority, as the representative of the principles referred to, clothed with the patronage and power incident to the office, including the authority to appoint all the postmasters and other officers charged with the execution of the laws of the United States, is itself a standing menace to the South—a direct assault upon her institutions—an incentive to robbery and insurrection, requiring from our own immediate local government, in its sovereign character, prompt action to obtain additional guarantees for equality and security in the Union, or to take measures for protection and security without it.

In view, therefore, of the present condition of our country, and the causes of it, we declare almost in the words of our fathers, contained in an address of the freeholders of Botetourt, in February, 1775, to the delegates from Virginia to the Continental Congress, “That we desire no change in our government whilst left to the free enjoyment of our equal privileges secured by the *constitution*; but that should a wicked and tyrannical *sectional majority*, under the sanction of the forms of the *constitution*, persist in acts of injustice and violence towards us, they only must be answerable for the consequences.”

“That liberty is so strongly impressed upon our hearts that we cannot think of parting with it but with our lives; that our duty to God, our country, ourselves and our posterity forbid it; we stand, therefore, prepared for every contingency.”

Resolved, therefore, That in view of the facts set out in the foregoing preamble, it is the opinion of this meeting that a convention of the people should be called forthwith; that the State, in its sovereign character, should consult with the other Southern States, and agree upon such guarantees as in their opinion will secure their equality,

tranquility and rights within the Union; and in the event of a failure to obtain such guarantees, to adopt in concert with the other Southern States, *or alone*, such measures as may seem most expedient to protect the rights and insure the safety of the people of Virginia.

And in the event of a change in our relations to the other States being rendered necessary, that the convention so elected should recommend to the people, for their adoption, such alterations in our State constitution as may adapt it to the altered condition of the State and country.

**Inaugural Address of President Jefferson Davis at Montgomery, Alabama,
February, 1861.**

Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America :

Called to the difficult and responsible station of Executive Chief of the Provisional Government which you have instituted, I approach the discharge of the duties assigned me with an humble distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who are to aid and guide me in the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in the patriotism and virtue of the people. Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a provisional government to take the place of the present one, and which, by its great moral and physical powers, will be better able to contend with the difficulties which arise from the conflicting interests of separate nations, I enter upon the duties of the office for which I have been chosen with the hope that the beginning of our career as a Confederacy may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to the enjoyment of that separate and independent existence which we have asserted, and which, with the blessing of Providence, we intend to maintain.

Our present position has been achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations. It illustrates the American idea that government rests upon the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish a government whenever it becomes destructive of the ends for which it was established. The declared purposes of the compact of Union from which we have withdrawn were to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, to provide for the common defence, to promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity; and when in the judgment of the sovereign States now

comprising this Confederacy it had been perverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and had ceased to answer the ends for which it was established, an appeal to the ballot-box declared that so far as they were concerned the government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted a right which the Declaration of Independence of 1776 defined to be inalienable. Of the time and occasion for its exercise, they, as sovereign, were the final judges each for itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He who knows the hearts of men will judge the sincerity with which we have labored to preserve the government of our fathers, in its spirit and in those rights inherent in it, which were solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the States, and which have been affirmed and re-affirmed in the Bills of Rights of the several States. When they entered into the Union of 1789, it was with the undeniable recognition of the power of the people to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of that government, whenever, in their opinion, its functions were perverted and its ends defeated. By virtue of this authority, the time and occasion requiring them to exercise it having arrived, the sovereign States here represented have seceded from that Union, and it is a gross abuse of language to denominate the act rebellion or revolution. They have formed a new alliance, but in each State its government has remained as before. The rights of person and property have not been disturbed. The agency through which they have communicated with foreign powers has been changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations.

Sustained by a consciousness that our transition from the former Union to the present Confederacy has not proceeded from any disregard on our part of our just obligations, or any failure to perform every constitutional duty—moved by no intention or design to invade the rights of others—anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations—if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. We are doubly justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on the part of others. There can be no cause to doubt that the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States will be found equal to any measures of defence which may be required for their security. Devoted to agricultural pursuits, their chief interest is the export of a commodity required in every manufacturing country. Our policy is peace, and

the freest trade our necessities will permit. It is alike our interest, and that of all those to whom we would sell and from whom we would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable restrictions upon interchange of commodities. There can be but little rivalry between us and any manufacturing or navigating community, such as the Northwestern States of the American Union.

It must follow, therefore, that mutual interest would invite good will and kindness between them and us. If, however, passion or lust of dominion should cloud the judgment and inflame the ambition of these States, we must prepare to meet the emergency, and maintain, by the final arbitrament of the sword, the position we have assumed among the nations of the earth. We have now entered upon our career of independence, and it must be inflexibly pursued.

Through many years of controversy with our late associates, the Northern States, we have vainly endeavored to secure tranquility and obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to separation, and henceforth our energies must be devoted to the conducting of our own affairs, and perpetuating the Confederacy we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled. But if this be denied us, and the integrity and jurisdiction of our territory be assailed, it will but remain for us with a firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke the blessings of Providence upon a just cause.

As a consequence of our new constitution, and with a view to meet our anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide a speedy and efficient organization of the several branches of the executive departments having special charge of our foreign intercourse, financial and military affairs, and postal service. For purposes of defence, the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon their militia; but it is deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a well instructed, disciplined army, more numerous than would be usually required for a peace establishment.

I also suggest that for the protection of our harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy adapted to those objects be built up. These necessities have doubtless engaged the attention of Congress.

With a constitution differing only in form from that of our forefathers, in so far as it is explanatory of their well known intents,

freed from sectional conflicts which have so much interfered with the pursuits of the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that the States from which we have parted may seek to unite their fortunes with ours under the government we have instituted. For this your constitution has made adequate provision, but beyond this, if I mistake not the judgment and will of the people, our reunion with the States from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable. To increase power, develop the resources, and promote the happiness of this Confederacy, it is necessary that there should be so much homogeneity as that the welfare of every portion be the aim of the whole. When this homogeneity does not exist, antagonisms are engendered which must and should result in separation.

Actuated solely by a desire to protect and preserve our own rights and promote our own welfare, the secession of the Confederate States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check; the cultivation of our fields has progressed as heretofore; and even should we be involved in war, there would be no considerable diminution in the production of the great staple which constitutes our exports, and in which the commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of producer and consumer can only be interrupted by external force, which would obstruct shipments to foreign markets—a course of conduct which would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad. Should reason guide the action of the government from which we have separated, a policy so injurious to the civilized world, the Northern States included, could not be dictated even by the strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but, if otherwise, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors. In the meantime there will remain to us, besides the ordinary remedies before suggested, the well known resources for retaliation upon the commerce of our enemy.

Experience in public stations of subordinate grade to this which your kindness has conferred on me, has taught me that care and toil and disappointments are the price of official elevation. You will have many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate, but you will not find in me either a want of zeal or fidelity to a cause that has my highest hopes and most enduring affection. Your generosity has bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction—one

which I neither sought nor desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and patriotism, I, rely to direct and support me in the performance of the duties required at my hands. We have changed the constituent parts, not the system of our government. The constitution formed by our fathers is the constitution of "the Confederate States." In *their* exposition of it, and in the judicial constructions it has received, it has a light that reveals its true meaning. Thus instructed as to the just interpretations of that instrument, and ever remembering that all public offices are but trusts, held for the benefit of the people, and that delegated powers are to be strictly construed, I will hope that by due diligence in the discharge of my duties, though I may disappoint your expectations, yet to retain, when retiring, something of the good will and confidence which welcome my entrance into office. It is joyous in perilous times to look around upon a people united in heart, who are animated and actuated by one and the same purpose and high resolve, with whom the sacrifices to be made are not weighed in the balance against honor, right, liberty and equality. Obstacles may retard, but cannot prevent their progressive movements. Sanctified by justice and sustained by a virtuous people, let me reverently invoke the God of our fathers to guide and protect us in our efforts to perpetuate the principles which by HIS blessing they were able to vindicate, establish and transmit to their posterity, and with the continuance of HIS favor, ever to be gratefully acknowledged, let us look hopefully forward to success, to peace, and to prosperity.

Address of Congress to the People of the Confederate States.

JOINT RESOLUTION IN RELATION TO THE WAR.

Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States, That the present is deemed a fitting occasion to remind the people of the Confederate States that they are engaged in a struggle for the preservation both of liberty and civilization; and that no sacrifice of life or fortune can be too costly which may be requisite to secure to themselves and their posterity the enjoyment of these inappreciable blessings; and also to assure them that, in the judgment of the Congress, the resources of the country, if developed with energy, husbanded with care, and applied with fidelity, are more than sufficient to support the most protracted war which it can be necessary to wage for our

independence, and to exhort them, by every consideration which can influence freemen and patriots, to a magnanimous surrender of all personal and party feuds, to an indignant rebuke of every exhibition of factious temper, in whatever quarter, or upon whatever pretext it may be made; to a generous support of all branches of the Government, in the legitimate exercise of their constitutional powers, and to that harmonious, unselfish and patriotic co-operation which can alone impart to our cause the irresistible strength which springs from united councils, fraternal feelings, and fervent devotion to the public weal.

In closing the labors of the first Permanent Congress, your representatives deem it a fit occasion to give some account of their stewardship; to review briefly what, under such embarrassments and adverse circumstances, has been accomplished; to invite attention to the prospect before us, and the duties incumbent on every citizen in this crisis; and to address such words of counsel and encouragement as the times demand.

Compelled, by a long series of oppressive and tyrannical acts, culminating at last in the selection of a President and Vice-President, by a party confessedly sectional and hostile to the South and her institutions, these States withdrew from the former Union and formed a new Confederate alliance as an independent Government, based on the proper relations of labor and capital. This step was taken reluctantly, by constraint, and after the exhaustion of every measure that was likely to secure us from interference with our property, equality in the Union, or exemption from submission to an alien Government. The Southern States claimed only the unrestricted enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Finding, by painful and protracted experience, that this was persistently denied, we determined to separate from those enemies who had manifested the inclination and ability to impoverish and destroy us. We fell back upon the right for which the colonies maintained the war of the Revolution, and which our heroic forefathers asserted to be clear and inalienable. The unanimity and zeal with which the separation was undertaken and perfected, finds no parallel in history. The people rose *en masse* to assert their liberties and protect their menaced rights. There never was before such universality of conviction among any people on any question involving so serious and so thorough a change of political and international relations. This grew out of the clearness of the right so to act, and the certainty of the perils of further association with the North. The

change was so wonderful, so rapid, so contrary to universal history, that many fail to see that all has been done in the logical sequence of principles, which are the highest testimony to the wisdom of our fathers, and the best illustration of the correctness of those principles. This Government is a child of law instead of sedition, of right instead of violence, of deliberation instead of insurrection. Its early life was attended by no anarchy, no rebellion, no suspension of authority, no social disorders, no lawless disturbances. Sovereignty was not for one moment in abeyance. The utmost conservatism marked every proceeding and public act. The object was "to do what was necessary and no more; and to do that with the utmost temperance and prudence." St. Just, in his report to the Convention of France, in 1793, said: "A people has but one dangerous enemy, and that is Government." We adopted no such absurdity. In nearly every instance the first steps were taken legally, in accordance with the will and prescribed direction of the constituted authorities of the seceding States. We were not remitted to brute force or natural law, or the instincts of reason. The charters of freedom were scrupulously preserved. As in the English revolution of 1688, and ours of 1776, there was no material alteration in the laws, beyond what was necessary to redress the abuses that provoked the struggle. No attempt was made to build on *speculative* principles. The effort was confined within the narrowest limits of historical and constitutional right. The controversy turned on the records and muniments of the past. We merely resisted innovation and tyranny, and contended for our birthrights and the covenanted principles of *our race*. We have had our governors, general assemblies and courts; the same electors, the same corporations, "the same rules for property, the same subordinations, the same order in the law and in the magistracy." When the sovereign States met in council, they in truth and substance, and in a constitutional light, did not make but prevented a revolution.

Commencing our new national life under such circumstances, we had a right to expect that we would be permitted, without molestation, to cultivate the arts of peace, and vindicate, on our chosen arena and with the selected type of social characteristics, our claims to civilization. It was thought, too, by many, that war would not be resorted to by an enlightened country, except on the direst necessity. That a people, professing to be animated by Christian sentiment, and who had regarded our peculiar institution as a blot and blur upon the fair escutcheon of their common Christianity, should

make war upon the South for doing what they had a perfect right to do, and for relieving them of the incubus which they professed rested upon them by association, was deemed almost beyond belief by many of our wisest minds. It was hoped, too, that the obvious interests of the two sections would restrain the wild frenzy of excitement, and turn into peaceful channels the thoughts of those who had but recently been invested with power in the United States.

These reasonable anticipations were doomed to disappointment. The red glare of battle, kindled at Sumter, dissipated all hopes of peace, and the two governments were arrayed in hostility against each other. *We charge the responsibility of this war upon the United States.* They are accountable for the blood and havoc and ruin it has caused. For such a war we were not prepared. The difference in military resources between our enemies and ourselves; the immense advantages possessed in the organized machinery of an established government; a powerful navy, the nucleus of an army, credit abroad, and illimitable facilities in mechanical and manufacturing power, placed them on "the vantage ground." In our infancy, we were without a seaman or soldier, without revenue, without gold and silver, without a recognized place in the family of nations, without external commerce, without foreign credit, with the prejudices of the world against us. While we were without manufacturing facilities to supply our wants, our ports were blockaded; we had to grapple with a giant adversary, defend two thousand miles of sea-coast, and an inland frontier of equal extent. If we had succeeded in preventing any successes on the part of our enemy, it would have been a miracle. What we have accomplished, with a population so inferior in numbers and means so vastly disproportionate, has excited the astonishment and admiration of the world.

The war in which we are engaged was wickedly, and against all our protests and the most earnest efforts to the contrary, forced upon us. South Carolina sent a commission to Washington to adjust all questions of dispute between her and the United States. One of the first acts of the Provisional Government was to accredit agents to visit Washington and use all honorable means to obtain a satisfactory settlement of all questions of dispute with that government. Both efforts failed. Commissioners were deceived and rejected, and clandestine but vigorous preparations were made for war. In proportion to our perseverance and anxiety have been the obstinacy and arrogance in spurning offers of peace. It seems we can be indebted for nothing to the virtues of our enemy. We are obliged to

his vices, which have enured to our strength. We owe as much to his insolence and blindness as to our precaution.

The wager of battle having been tendered, it was accepted. The alacrity with which our people flew to arms is worthy of all praise. Their deeds of heroic daring, patient endurance, ready submission to discipline, and numerous victories, are in keeping with the fervent patriotism that prompted their early volunteering. Quite recently, scores of regiments have re-enlisted for the war, testifying their determination to fight until their liberties were achieved. Coupled with, and contributing greatly to, this enthusiastic ardor, was the lofty courage, the indomitable resolve, the self-denying spirit of our noble women, who, by their labors of love, their patience of hope, their unflinching constancy, their uncomplaining submission to privations of the war, have shed an immortal lustre upon their sex and country.

Our army is no hireling soldiery. It comes not from paupers, criminals or emigrants. It was originally raised by the free, unconstrained, unpurchasable assent of the men. All vocations and classes contributed to the swelling numbers. Abandoning luxuries and comforts to which they had been accustomed, they submitted cheerfully to the scanty fare and exactive service of the camps. Their services above price, the only remuneration they have sought is the protection of their altars, firesides and liberty. In the Norwegian wars, the actors were, every one of them, named and patronymically described as the King's friend and companion. The same wonderful individuality has been seen in this war. Our soldiers are not a consolidated mass, an unthinking machine, but an army of intelligent units. To designate all who have distinguished themselves by special valor, would be to enumerate nearly all in the army. The generous rivalry between the troops from different States has prevented any special pre-eminence, and hereafter, for centuries to come, the gallant bearing and unconquerable devotion of Confederate soldiers will inspire the hearts and encourage the hopes, and strengthen the faith of all who labor to obtain their freedom.

For three years this cruel war has been waged against us, and its continuance has been seized upon as a pretext by some discontented persons to excite hostility to the government. Recent and public as have been the occurrences, it is strange that a misapprehension exists as to the conduct of the two governments in reference to peace. Allusion has been made to the unsuccessful efforts, when separation took place, to procure an amicable adjustment of all matters in dis-

pute. These attempts at negotiation do not comprise all that has been done. In every form in which expression could be given to the sentiment, in public meetings, through the press, by legislative resolves, the desire of this people for peace, for the uninterrupted enjoyment of their rights and prosperity, has been made known. The President, more authoritatively, in several of his messages, while protesting the utter absence of all desire to interfere with the United States, or acquire any of their territory, has avowed that the "advent of peace will be hailed with joy. Our desire for it has never been concealed. Our efforts to avoid the war, forced on us as it was by the lust of conquest and the insane passions of our foes, are known to mankind."

The course of the Federal Government has proved that it did not desire peace, and would not consent to it on any terms that we could possibly concede. In proof of this we refer to the repeated rejection of all terms of conciliation and compromise, to their recent contemptuous refusal to receive the Vice President, who was sent to negotiate for softening the asperities of war, and their scornful rejection of the offer of a neutral power to mediate between the contending parties. If cumulative evidence be needed, it can be found in the following resolution, recently adopted by the House of Representatives in Washington:

"*Resolved*, That as our country and the very existence of the best government ever instituted by man are imperilled by the most causeless and wicked rebellion that the world has seen, and believing as we do that the only hope of saving this country and preserving this government is by the power of the sword, we are for the most vigorous prosecution of the war until the constitution and the laws shall be enforced and obeyed in all parts of the United States; and to that end we oppose any armistice, or intervention, or mediation, or proposition for peace, from any quarter, so long as there shall be found a rebel in arms against the government; and we ignore all party names, lines and issues, and recognize but two parties in this war—patriots and traitors."

The motive of such strange conduct is obvious. The Republican party was founded to destroy slavery and the equality of the States, and Lincoln was selected as the instrument to accomplish this object. The Union was a barrier to the consummation of this policy, because the constitution, which was its bond, recognized and protected slavery and the sovereignty of the States. The Union must therefore be sacrificed, and to insure its destruction, war was determined on.

The mass of the northern people were not privy to, and sympathized in no such design. They loved the Union and wished to preserve it. To rally the people to the support of the war, its object was proclaimed to be "a restoration of the Union," as if that which implied voluntary assent, of which agreement was an indispensable element and condition, could be preserved by coercion. It is absurd to pretend that a government, really desirous of restoring the Union, would adopt such measures as the confiscation of private property, the emancipation of slaves, systematic efforts to invite them to insurrection, forcible abduction from their homes, and compulsory enlistment in the army, the division of a sovereign State without its consent, and the proclamation that one-tenth of the population of a State, and that tenth under military rule, should control the will of the remaining nine-tenths. The only relation possible between the two sections, under such a policy, is that of conqueror and conquered, superior and dependent. Rest assured, fellow-citizens, that although restoration may still be used as a war-cry by the Northern Government, it is only to delude and betray. Fanaticism has summoned to its aid cupidity and vengeance; and nothing short of your utter subjugation, the destruction of your State governments, the overthrow of your social and political fabric, your personal and public degradation and ruin, will satisfy the demands of the North. Can there be a man so vile, so debased, so unworthy of liberty as to accept peace on such humiliating terms?

It would hardly be fair to assert that all the northern people participate in these designs. On the contrary, there exists a powerful political party which openly condemns them. The administration has, however, been able thus far, by its enormous patronage and its lavish expenditures to seduce, or by its legions of "Hessian" mercenaries to overawe the masses, to control the elections and to establish an arbitrary despotism. It cannot be possible that this state of things can continue. The people of the United States, accustomed to freedom, cannot consent to be ruined and enslaved in order to ruin and enslave us. Moral, like physical, epidemics, have their allotted periods, and must, sooner or later, be exhausted and disappear. When reason returns, our enemies will probably reflect that a people like ours, who have exhibited such capabilities and extemporized such resources, can never be subdued; that a vast expanse of territory, with such a population, cannot be governed as an obedient colony. Victory would not be conquest. The inextinguishable quarrel would be transmitted "from bleeding sire to son,"

and the struggle would be renewed between generations yet unborn. To impoverish us would only be to dry up some of the springs of northern prosperity—to destroy southern wealth is to reduce northern profits, while the restoration of peace would necessarily re-establish some commercial intercourse. It may not be amiss, in this connection, to say that at one time it was the wish and expectation of many at the South to form a treaty of amity and friendship with the northern States, by which both peoples might derive the benefits of commercial intercourse, and move on side by side in the arts of peace and civilization. History has confirmed the lesson taught by Divine authority, that each nation, as well as each individual, should seek their happiness in the prosperity of others, and not in the injury or ruin of a neighbor. The general welfare of all is the highest dictate of moral duty and economic policy, while a heritage of triumphant wrong is the greatest curse that can befall a nation.

Until some evidence is given of a change of policy on the part of the government, and some assurance is received that efforts at negotiation will not be spurned, the Congress are of opinion that any direct overtures for peace would compromise our self-respect, be fruitless of good, and interpreted by the enemy as an indication of weakness. We can only repeat the desire of the people for peace, and our readiness to accept terms consistent with the honor and dignity and independence of the States, and compatible with the safety of our domestic institutions.

Not content with rejecting all proposals for a peaceful settlement of the controversy, a cruel war of invasion was commenced, which, in its progress, has been marked by a brutality and disregard of the rules of civilized warfare that stand out in unexampled barbarity in the history of modern wars. Accompanied by every act of cruelty and rapine, the conduct of the enemy has been destitute of that forbearance and magnanimity which civilization and Christianity have introduced to mitigate the asperities of war. The atrocities are too incredible for narration. Instead of a regular war, our resistance of the unholy efforts to crush out our national existence is treated as a rebellion, and the settled international rules between belligerents are ignored. Instead of conducting the war as betwixt two military and political organizations, it is a war against the whole population. Houses are pillaged and burned; churches are defaced; towns are ransacked; clothing of women and infants is stripped from their persons; jewelry and mementoes of the dead are stolen; mills and implements of agriculture are destroyed; private salt

works are broken up; the introduction of medicines is forbidden; means of subsistence are wantonly wasted to produce beggary; prisoners are returned with contagious diseases; the last morsel of food has been taken from families, who were not allowed to carry on a trade or branch of industry; a rigid and offensive *espionage* has been introduced to ferret out "disloyalty;" persons have been forced to choose between starvation of helpless children and taking the oath of allegiance to a hated government; the cartel for exchange of prisoners has been suspended and our unfortunate soldiers subjected to the grossest indignities; the wounded at Gettysburg were deprived of their nurses and inhumanly left to perish on the field; helpless women have been exposed to the most cruel outrages and to that dishonor which is infinitely worse than death; citizens have been murdered by the Butlers and McNeils and Milroys, who are favorite generals of our enemies; refined and delicate ladies have been seized, bound with cords, imprisoned, guarded by negroes, and held as hostages for the return of recaptured slaves; unoffending non-combatants have been banished or dragged from their quiet homes, to be immured in filthy jails; preaching the gospel has been refused, except on condition of taking the oath of allegiance; parents have been forbidden to name their children in honor of "rebel" chiefs; property has been confiscated; military governors have been appointed for States, satraps for provinces, and Haynaus for cities.

These cruelties and atrocities of the enemy have been exceeded by their malicious and blood-thirsty purposes and machinations in reference to the slaves. . Early in this war, President Lincoln averred his constitutional inability and personal unwillingness to interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, and the relation between master and servant. Prudential considerations may have been veiled under conscientious scruples, for Seward, in a confidential instruction to Mr. Adams, the minister to Great Britain, on 10th March, 1862, said: "If the Government of the United States should *precipitately* decree the immediate abolition of slavery, it would re-invigorate the declining insurrection in every part of the South." Subsequent reverses and the refractory rebelliousness of the seceded States caused a change of policy, and Mr. Lincoln issued his celebrated proclamation, a mere *brutum fulmen*, liberating the slaves in the "insurrectionary districts." On the 24th of June, 1776, one of the reasons assigned by Pennsylvania for her separation from the mother country was, that in hersister colonies the "King had excited the negroes to revolt, and to imbrue their hands in the blood of

their masters, in a manner unpracticed by civilized nations." This, probably, had reference to the proclamation of Dunmore, the last royal Governor of Virginia, in 1775, declaring freedom to all servants or negroes, if they would join "for the reducing the colony to a proper sense of its duty." The invitation to the slaves to rise against their masters, the suggested insurrection, caused, says Bancroft, "a thrill of indignation to run through Virginia, effacing all differences of party, and rousing one strong, impassioned purpose to drive away the insolent power by which it had been put forth." A cotemporary annalist, advertng to the same proclamation, said, "it was received with the greatest horror in all the colonies."

"The policy adopted by Dunmore," says Lawrence in his notes on Wheaton, "of arming the slaves against their masters, was not pursued during the war of the revolution; and when negroes were taken by the English, they were not considered otherwise than as property and plunder." Emancipation of slaves as a war measure has been severely condemned and denounced by the most eminent publicists in Europe and the United States. The United States, "in their diplomatic relations, have ever maintained," says the northern authority just quoted, "that slaves were private property, and for them, as such, they have repeatedly received compensation from England." Napoleon I. was never induced to issue a proclamation for the emancipation of the serfs in his war with Russia. He said: "I could have armed against her a part of her population, by proclaiming the liberty of the serfs. A great number of villages asked it of me, but I refused to avail myself of a measure which would have devoted to death thousands of families." In the discussions growing out of the treaty of peace of 1814, and the proffered mediation of Russia, the principle was maintained by the United States that "the emancipation of enemy's slaves is not among the acts of legitimate warfare." In the instructions from John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State, to Mr. Middleton, at St. Petersburg, October 18, 1820, it is said: "The British have broadly asserted the right of emancipating slaves (private property) as a legitimate right of war. No such right is acknowledged as a law of war by writers who admit any limitation. The right of putting to death all prisoners in cold blood, and without special cause, might as well be pretended to be a law of war, or the right to use poisoned weapons, or to assassinate."

Disregarding the teachings of the approved writers on international law, and the practice and claims of his own government in its purer days, President Lincoln has sought to convert the South

into a St. Domingo, by appealing to the cupidity, lusts, ambition and ferocity of the slave. Abraham Lincoln is but the lineal descendant of Dunmore, and the impotent malice of each was foiled by the fidelity of those who, by the meanness of the conspirators, would only, if successful, have been seduced into idleness, filth, vice, beggary and death.

But we tire of these indignities and enormities. They are too sickening for recital. History will hereafter *pillory* those who committed and encouraged such crimes in immortal infamy.

General Robert E. Lee, in a recent battle order, stated to his invincible legions, that "the cruel foe seeks to reduce our fathers and mothers, our wives and children, to abject slavery." He does not paint too strongly the purposes of the enemy or the consequences of subjugation. What has been done in certain districts, is but the prologue of the bloody drama that will be enacted. It is well that every man and woman should have some just conception of the horrors of conquest. The fate of Ireland at the period of its conquest, and of Poland, distinctly foreshadows what would await us. The guillotine, in its ceaseless work of blood, would be revived for the execution of the "rebel leaders." The heroes of our contest would be required to lay down their proud ensigns, on which are recorded the battle-fields of their glory, to stack their arms, lower their heads in humiliation and dishonor, and pass under the yoke of abolition misrule and tyranny. A hateful inquisition, made atrocious by spies and informers; star-chamber courts, enforcing their decisions by confiscations, imprisonments, banishments and death; a band of detectives, ferreting out secrets, lurking in every family, existing in every conveyance; the suppression of free speech; the deprivation of arms and franchises; and the ever present sense of inferiority would make our condition abject and miserable beyond what freeman can imagine. Subjugation involves everything that the torturing malice and devilish ingenuity of our foes can suggest—the destruction of our nationality, the equalization of whites and blacks, the obliteration of State lines, degradation to colonial vassalage, and the reduction of many of our citizens to dreary, hopeless, remediless bondage. A hostile police would keep "order" in every town and city. Judges, like Busted, would hold our courts, protected by Yankee soldiers. Churches would be filled by Yankee or tory preachers. Every office would be bestowed on aliens. Absenteeism would curse us with all its vices. Superadded to these, sinking us into a lower abyss of degradation, we would be made

the slaves of our slaves, hewers of wood and drawers of water for those upon whom God has stamped indelibly the marks of physical and intellectual inferiority. The past, or foreign countries, need not be sought unto to furnish illustrations of the heritage of shame that subjugation would entail. Baltimore, St. Louis, Nashville, Knoxville, New Orleans, Vicksburg, Huntsville, Norfolk, Newbern, Louisville and Fredericksburg, are the first fruits of the ignominy and poverty of Yankee domination.

The sad story of the wrongs and indignities endured by those States which have been in the complete or partial possession of the enemy, will give the best evidence of the consequences of subjugation. Missouri, a magnificent empire of agricultural and mineral wealth, is to-day a smoking ruin and the theatre of the most revolting cruelties and barbarities. The minions of tyranny consume her substance, plunder her citizens, and destroy her peace. The sacred rights of freemen are struck down, and the blood of her children, her maidens, and her old men, is made to flow, out of mere wantonness and recklessness. No whispers of freedom go unpunished, and the very instincts of self-preservation are outlawed. The worship of God and the rites of sepulture have been shamefully interrupted, and, in many instances, the cultivation of the soil is prohibited to her own citizens. These facts are attested by many witnesses, and it is but a just tribute to that noble and chivalrous people, that, amid barbarities almost unparalleled, they still maintain a proud and defiant spirit towards their enemies.

In Maryland, the judiciary, made subservient to executive absolutism, furnishes no security for individual rights or personal freedom; members of the legislature are arrested and imprisoned without process of law or assignment of cause, and the whole land groaneth under the oppressions of a merciless tyranny.

In Kentucky, the ballot-box has been overthrown, free speech is suppressed, the most vexatious annoyances harass and embitter, and all the arts and appliances of an unscrupulous despotism are freely used to prevent the uprising of the noble patriots of "the dark and bloody ground." Notes of gladness, assurances of a brighter and better day, reach us, and the exiles may take courage and hope for the future.

In Virginia, the model of all that illustrates human heroism and self-denying patriotism, although the tempest of desolation has swept over her fair domains, no sign of repentance for her separation from the North can be found. Her old homesteads dismantled,

her ancestral relics destroyed, her people impoverished, her territory made the battle-ground for the rude shocks of contending hosts, and then divided, with hireling parasites, mockingly claiming jurisdiction and authority, the Old Dominion still stands with proud crest and defiant mien, ready to tramp beneath her heel every usurper and tyrant, and to illustrate afresh her *sic semper tyrannis*, the "proudest motto that ever blazed on a nation's shield or a warrior's arms."

To prevent such effects, our people are now prosecuting this struggle. It is no mere war of calculation, no contest for a particular kind of property, no barter of precious blood for filthy lucre. Everything involved in manhood, civilization, religion, law, property, country, home, is at stake. We fight not for plunder, spoils, pillage, territorial conquest. The Government tempts by no prizes of "beauty or booty," to be drawn in the lottery of this war. We seek to preserve civil freedom, honor, equality, firesides, and blood is well shed when "shed for our family, for our friends, for our kind, for our country, for our God." Burke said: "A State, resolved to hazard its existence rather than abandon its object, must have an infinite advantage over that which is resolved to yield, rather than carry its resistance beyond a certain point." It is better to be conquered by any other nation than by the United States. It is better to be a dependency of any other power than of that. By the condition of its existence and essential constitution, as now governed, it must be in perpetual hostility to us. As the Spanish invader burned his ships to make retreat impossible, so we cannot afford to take steps backward. Retreat is more dangerous than advance. Behind us are inferiority and degradation—before us is everything enticing to a patriot.

Our bitter and implacable foes are preparing vigorously for the coming campaign. Corresponding efforts should be made on our part. Without murmuring, our people should respond to the laws which the exigency demands. Every one capable of bearing arms, should be connected with some effective military organization. The utmost energies of the whole population should be taxed to produce food and clothing, and a spirit of cheerfulness and trust in an all-wise and overruling Providence should be cultivated.

The history of the past three years has much to animate us to renewed effort, and a firmer and more assured hope. A whole people have given their hearts and bodies to repel the invader, and costly sacrifices have been made on the altar of our country. No

similar instance is to be found of such spontaneous uprising and volunteering. Inspired by a holy patriotism, again and again, have our brave soldiers, with the aid of Heaven, baffled the efforts of our foes. It is in no arrogant spirit, that we refer to successes that have cost us so much blood, and brought sorrow to so many hearts. We may find in all this an earnest of what, with determined and resolute exertion, we can do to avert subjugation and slavery—and we cannot fail to discern in our deliverance from so many and so great perils, the interposition of that Being who will not forsake us in the trials that are to come. Let us, then, looking upon the bodies of our loved and honored dead, catch inspiration from their example, and gather renewed confidence and a firmer resolve to tread, with unfaltering trust, the path that leads to honor and peace, although it lead through tears and suffering and blood.

We have no alternative but to do our duty. We combat for property, homes, the honor of our wives, the future of our children, the preservation of our fair land from pollution, and to avert a doom which we can read, both in the threats of our enemies and the acts of oppression, we have alluded to in this address.

The situation is grave, but furnishes no just excuse for despondency. Instead of harsh criticisms on the Government and our generals; instead of bewailing the failure to accomplish impossibilities, we should rather be grateful, humbly and profoundly, to a benignant Providence, for the results that have rewarded our labors. Remembering the disproportion in population, in military and naval resources, and the deficiency of skilled labor in the South, our accomplishments have surpassed those recorded of any people in the annals of the world. There is no just reason for hopelessness or fear. Since the outbreak of the war the South has lost the nominal possession of the Mississippi river and fragments of her territory; but Federal occupancy is not conquest. The fires of patriotism still burn unquenchably in the breasts of those who are subject to foreign domination. We yet have in our uninterrupted control a territory, which, according to past progress, will require the enemy ten years to overrun.

The enemy is not free from difficulties. With an enormous debt, the financial convulsion, long postponed, is surely coming. The short crops in the United States and abundant harvests in Europe will hasten what was otherwise inevitable. Many sagacious persons at the North discover in the usurpations of their Government the certain overthrow of their liberties. A large number revolt from

the unjust war waged upon the South, and would gladly bring it to an end. Others look with alarm upon the complete subversion of constitutional freedom by Abraham Lincoln, and feel, in their own persons, the bitterness of the slavery which three years of war have failed to inflict on the South. Brave and earnest men at the North have spoken out against the usurpations and cruelties daily practiced. The success of these men over the radical and despotic faction which now rules the North may open the way to peaceful negotiation and a cessation of this bloody and unnecessary war.

In conclusion, we exhort our fellow-citizens to be of good cheer and spare no labor, nor sacrifices, that may be necessary to enable us to win the campaign upon which we have just entered. We have passed through great trials of affliction, but suffering and humiliation are the schoolmasters that lead nations to self-reliance and independence. These disciplinary providences but mature and develope and solidify our people. We beg that the supplies and resources of the country, which are ample, may be sold to the Government to support and equip its armies. Let all spirit of faction and past party differences be forgotten in the presence of our cruel foe. We should not despond. We should be self-denying. We should labor to extend to the utmost the productive resources of the country. We should economize. The families of soldiers should be cared for and liberally supplied. We entreat from all a generous and hearty co-operation with the Government in all branches of its administration, and with the agents, civil or military, in the performance of their duties. Moral aid has the "power of the incommunicable," and, by united efforts, by an all-comprehending and self-sacrificing patriotism, we can, with the blessing of God, avert the perils which environ us, and achieve for ourselves and children peace and freedom. Hitherto the Lord has interposed graciously to bring us victory, and in His hand there is present power to prevent this great multitude which come against us from casting us out of the possession which He has given us to inherit.

T. J. SEMMES,
J. L. ORR,
A. E. MAXWELL,

Committee on the part of the Senate.

J. W. CLAPP,
J. L. M. CURRY,
JULIAN HARTRIDGE,
JOHN GOODE, JR.,
W. N. H. SMITH,

Committee of the House of Representatives.

Signed by Thomas S. Bocock, Speaker of House of Representatives; Walter Preston, John McQueen, Charles W. Russell, W. Lander, A. H. Conrow, C. J. Munnerlyn, Thomas S. Ashe, O. R. Singleton, J. L. Pugh, A. H. Arrington, Waller R. Staples, A. R. Boteler, Thomas J. Foster, W. R. Smith, Ro. J. Breckinridge, John M. Martin, Porter Ingram, A. H. Garland, E. S. Dargan, D. Funsten, Thomas D. McDowell, J. R. McLean, R. R. Bridgers, G. W. Jones, B. S. Gaither, George W. Ewing, W. D. Holder, Dan. W. Lewis, Henry E. Read, A. T. Davidson, M. H. Macwillie, James Lyons, Caspar W. Bell, R. B. Hilton, Charles J. Villere, J. W. Moore, Lucius J. Dupre, John D. C. Atkins, Israel Welsh, William G. Swan, F. B. Sexton, T. L. Burnett, George G. Vest, Wm. Porcher Miles, E. Barksdale, Charles F. Collier, P. W. Gray, W. W. Clarke, William W. Boyce, John R. Chambliss, John J. McRae, John Perkins, Jr., Robert Johnson, James Farrow, W. D. Simpson, Lucius J. Gartrell, M. D. Graham, John B. Baldwin, E. M. Bruce, Thomas B. Hanly, W. P. Chilton, O. R. Kenan, C. M. Conrad, H. W. Bruce, David Clopton, W. B. Machen, D. C. DeJarnette, H. C. Chambers, Thomas Menees, S. A. Miller, James M. Baker, Robert W. Barnwell, A. G. Brown, Henry C. Burnett, Allen T. Caperton, John B. Clark, Clement C. Clay, William T. Dortch, Landon C. Haynes, Gustavus A. Henry, Benjamin H. Hill, R. M. T. Hunter, Robert Jemison, Jr.; Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia; Robert W. Johnson, of Arkansas; Waldo P. Johnson, of Missouri; Augustus E. Maxwell, Charles B. Mitchel, W. S. Oldham, James L. Orr, James Phelan, Edwin G. Reade, T. J. Semmes, William E. Simms, Edward Sparrow, and Louis T. Wigfall.

Promised Material.

There has been promised us, from time to time, a large mass of material on almost every part of the history of the war. A number of gentlemen *intend* to send us valuable MSS. and documents. But we beg that they will do so at their earliest convenience, as every day's delay lessens the probability of our ever receiving them. These things are so easily forgotten, and MSS. and documents are so easily lost. A distinguished soldier wrote the secretary that he had accumulated a very valuable mass of material which he had *intended* sending us, but an unexpected fire had destroyed the whole of it.

Editorial Department.

Our First Paper.

As intimated in the last annual report of the Executive Committee, we have decided that it will be best for the Southern Historical Society to do in the future its own publishing, and we send out our first number with the firm conviction that those who are interested in vindicating the truth of Confederate History will sustain the enterprise and make it a complete success.

It seemed appropriate that our first number should contain some discussion of the causes which led to the war, the motives which prompted the Southern States to attempt the establishment of a Confederacy of their own, and the spirit in which they entered upon and prosecuted the great contest for constitutional freedom. Accordingly, we present the able paper of the distinguished statesman (Hon. R. M. T. Hunter), who graced the United States Senate in its palmier days—the famous “Botetourt resolutions” of the distinguished jurist (Judge Allen), which produced a profound impression at the time they were first published, and deserve to be put in more permanent form—the Inaugural Address of President Davis, the classic English of which is only equaled by its sentiments of lofty patriotism—and the address of the Confederate Congress, which is understood to have emanated from the able, facile pen of Hon. J. L. M. Curry, of Alabama, was signed by all of the members of Congress, and deserves to have a place in every vindication of the South.

The Southern Historical Society.

It may be well to give in this number a sketch of the origin, history, and objects of our Society, for the information of those unacquainted with them, and the following is therefore submitted :

On the 1st of May, 1869, a number of gentlemen in the city of New Orleans formed themselves into an Association under the style of the “Southern Historical Society,” with a parent society to hold its seat in that city, and with the design of having affiliated

societies in the States of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Missouri, and Kentucky and the District of Columbia; but New Orleans was not found a favorable location for the parent society, and therefore, under the call of the said society, a Convention was held at the Montgomery White Sulphur Springs, in Virginia, on the 14th of August, 1873, by which the society was re-organized, with a change of the seat of the parent society to the city of Richmond, Virginia.

The following resolutions were adopted by the said convention:

Resolved, 1. That the headquarters of the Southern Historical Society be transferred to Richmond, Virginia.

2. That this convention, in order to carry out the purposes proposed by the Executive Committee of the Southern Historical Society, at New Orleans, proceed to re-organize the society, with the object and purposes set forth in the annexed paper, as modified, and to elect officers.

3. That this organization be retained on its present basis, and that the officers shall be a President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer, and Executive Committee, resident in the State of Virginia, and a Vice-President in each of the Southern States.

4. That each Vice-President shall be ex-officio president of the auxiliary State society, and is requested to organize the same and the affiliated local societies.

5. That the Secretary shall receive a salary to be fixed by the Executive Committee.

6. That the society adopt some financial scheme to raise funds to carry out the purposes of the organization and the publication of its historical material.

7. That the fee of annual membership be three dollars, and of life membership fifty dollars.

8. That the publication of the material collected be made either by means of a magazine, or by occasional volumes of transactions, as may be found most expedient.

9. That the society as soon as re-organized proceed to enroll members and to extend its membership.

10. That in all questions touching the organization of the society, when a division is called for, the vote shall be taken by States, and each State shall be entitled to two votes.

11. That the thanks of the convention be tendered to the editor and publishers of the *Southern Magazine*, for their publication of valuable contributions to the history of the Confederate War.

12. That this convention offer to General Early its thanks for his able and valuable address, and request a copy for publication with the proceedings of the convention, so that a wide circulation may be given to it.

The following is the paper referred to in the second resolution, being the general outline for the original organization of the society, as modified by the convention:

The Southern Historical Society is organized with the following general outline:

A parent society, to hold its seat and its archives in the city of Richmond, Virginia, with affiliated societies to be organized in all the States favorable to the object proposed; these in their turn branching into local organizations in the different townships—forming thus a wide fellowship of closely co-ordinated societies, with a common centre in the parent association in the said city.

The object proposed to be accomplished is the collection, classification, preservation, and final publication, in some form to be hereafter determined, of all the documents and facts bearing upon the eventful history of the past few years, illustrating the nature of the struggle from which the country has just emerged, defining and vindicating the principles which lay beneath it, and marking the stages through which it was conducted to its issue. It is not understood that this association shall be purely sectional, nor that its labors shall be of a partisan character.

Everything which relates to this critical period of our national history, pending the conflict, antecedent or subsequent to it, from the point of view of either, or of both the contestants; everything, in short, which shall vindicate the truth of history is to be industriously collated and filed.

It is doubtless true, that an accepted history can never be written in the midst of the stormy events of which that history is composed, nor by the agents through whose efficiency they were wrought. The strong passions which are evoked in every human conflict disturb the vision and warp the judgment, in the scales of whose criticism the necessary facts are to be weighed—even the relative importance of these facts cannot be measured by those who are in too close proximity. Scope must be afforded for the development of the remote issues before they can be brought under the range of a philosophical apprehension; and the secret thread be discovered, running through all history, upon which its single facts crystalize in the unity of some great Providential plan.

The generations of the disinterested must succeed the generations of the prejudiced before history, properly termed such, can be written. This, precisely, is the work we now attempt, to construct the archives in which shall be collected these memoirs to serve for future history.

It is believed that invaluable documents are scattered over the whole land, in loose sheets, perhaps lying in the portfolios of private gentlemen, and only preserved as souvenirs of their own parts in the historic drama.

Existing in forms so perishable, regarded, it may be, only as so much waste paper, by those into whose hands they must fall, no delay should be suffered in their collection and preservation.

There is doubtless, too much that is yet unwritten floating only in the memories of the living, which if not speedily rescued will be swallowed in the oblivion of the grave, but which, if reduced to

record and collated, would afford the key to many a cypher, in a little while to become unintelligible for want of interpretation.

All this various material, gathered from every section, will need to be industriously classified and arranged, and finally deposited in the central archives of the society, under the care of appropriate guardians.

To this task of collection, we invite the immediate attention and co-operation of our copatriots throughout the South, to facilitate which, we propose the organization of State and district associations, that our whole people may be brought in harmony of action in this important matter.

The rapid changes through which the institutions of the country are now passing, and the still more stupendous revolutions in the opinions of men, remind us that we stand to-day upon the outer verge of a great historic cycle, within which a completed past will shortly be enclosed. Another cycle may touch its circumference; but the events it shall embrace will be gathered around another historic centre, and the future historian will pronounce that in stepping from the one to the other he has entered upon another and separate volume of the nation's record.

Let us, who are soon to be in that past to which we properly belong, see there are no gaps in the record.

Thus shall we discharge a duty to the fathers, whose principles we inherit, to the children, who will then know whether to honor or to dishonor the sires that begot them; and above all, to the dead heroes sleeping on the vast battle plains, from the Susquehannah to the Rio Grande, whose epitaph history yet waits to engrave upon their tombs.

The funds raised by initiation fees, assessments, donations and lectures, after defraying the current expenses, will be appropriated to the safe keeping of the archives, and publication of the transactions.

For the accomplishment of these ends contributions are respectfully solicited from all parties interested in the establishment and prosperity of the Southern Historical Society.

Contributions to the archives and library of the society are respectfully solicited under the following specific divisions:

1. The histories and historical collections of the individual States from the earliest periods to the present time, including travels, journals and maps.

2. Complete files of the newspapers, periodicals, literary, scientific and medical journals of the Southern States, from the earliest times to the present day, including especially the period of the recent American civil war.

3. Geological, topographical, agricultural, manufacturing and commercial reports, illustrating the statistics, climate, soil, resources, products and commerce of the Southern States.

4. Works, speeches, sermons and discourses relating to the recent

conflict and political changes. Congressional and State reports during the recent war.

5. Official reports and descriptions, by officers and privates and newspaper correspondents and eye-witnesses of campaigns, military operations, battles and sieges.

6. Military maps.

7. Reports upon the munitions, arms and equipment, organization, numbers and losses of the various branches of the Southern armies—infantry, artillery, cavalry, ordnance and commissary and quartermaster departments.

8. Reports of the Adjutant General of the late C. S. A., and of the Adjutant Generals of the armies, departments, districts and States, showing the resources of the individual States, the available fighting population, the number, organization and losses of the forces called into actual service.

9. Naval operations of the Confederate States.

10. Operations of the Nitre and Mining Bureau.

11. Commercial operations.

12. Foreign relations, diplomatic correspondence, etc.

13. Currency.

14. Medical statistics and medical reports.

15. Names of all officers, soldiers and sailors in the military and naval service of the Confederate States who were killed in battle, or died of disease or wounds.

16. Names of all wounded officers, soldiers and sailors. The nature of the wounds should be attached to each name, also the loss of one or more limbs should be carefully noted.

17. Published reports and manuscripts relating to civil prisoners held during the war.

18. All matters, published or unpublished, relating to the treatment, diseases, mortality, and exchange of prisoners of war.

19. The conduct of the hostile armies in the Southern States. Private and public losses during the war. Treatment of citizens by hostile forces.

20. Southern poetry, ballads, songs, etc.

The following are the officers of the Southern Historical Society, under the re-organization :

Parent Society, Richmond, Va.—Gen. JUBAL A. EARLY, President; Hon. ROBERT M. T. HUNTER, Vice-President; Rev. J. WM. JONES, Secretary and Treasurer.

Executive Committee.—Gen. Dabney H. Maury, Chairman; Col. Charles S. Venable, Col. Wm. Preston Johnson, Col. Robert E. Withers, Col. Joseph Mayo, Col. Geo. W. Munford, Lt. Col. Archer Anderson, Maj. Robert Stiles, George L. Christian, Esq.

Vice-Presidents of States.—Gen. Isaac R. Trimble, Maryland; Gov. Zebulon B. Vance, North Carolina; Gen. M. C. Butler, South Carolina; Gen. A. H. Colquit, Georgia; Admiral R. Semmes, Alabama; Col. W. Call, Florida; Gen. Wm. T. Martin, Mississippi; Gen. J. B.

Hood, Louisiana; Col. T. M. Jack, Texas; Hon. A. H. Garland, Arkansas; Gov. Isham G. Harris, Tennessee; Gen. J. S. Marmaduke, Missouri; Gen. S. B. Buckner, Kentucky; W. W. Corcoran, Esq., District of Columbia.

The secretary elected by the society (Col. Geo. W. Munford) faithfully carried out his instructions until other public duties constrained him to resign, and the present incumbent was elected.

The legislature of Virginia passed a bill giving the society such quarters in the State capitol as the Governor and Superintendent of Public Buildings might assign them, and we have thus secured an excellent office where our archives are as safe as those of the State. The work of collecting material has steadily progressed, and the degree of success which has attended the effort may be inferred from the following very general summary of *material on hand* made in the last annual report of the Executive Committee:

"In the way of official reports we have a very nearly complete set of all the reports printed by the Confederate departments, embracing messages of the President and Heads of Departments, reports of battles, statutes at large of Congress, acts and resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives; general orders of the Adjutant-General's department, and a large collection of reports of the several State governments. We have in MSS. a full set of reports of Longstreet's corps; all of Ewell's reports from the opening of the campaign of '63 to the close of the war; all of the papers of General J. E. B. Stuart; a full set of the papers of General S. D. Lee's corps, and a large number of most valuable reports of other officers of the different armies of the Confederacy. We have a complete set of the reports of the Committee on the Conduct of the War to the United States Congress, which embraces testimony of the leading Federal generals on nearly every one of their campaigns and battles; and we have also a number of other Federal official reports, and are arranging to get the whole of them. We are indebted to General A. A. Humphries, Chief of Engineers of the United States army, for a set of beautiful maps illustrating the movements of the armies, and for the courteous promise of adding other maps to those sent. We have in MS. a full sketch of the history of Longstreet's corps, by General E. P. Alexander, and a number of MS. narratives of other commands, campaigns, and movements, written by those whose position and reliability render them very valuable. Dr. J. R. Stevenson has given us a MS. fully vindicating the Confederate authorities from the charge of cruelty to Federal prisoners. We have a very large collection of pamphlets, published during the war and since, which throw light on our history. We have full bound files of the New York *Herald* and *Tribune* for the years of the war, and also files of several Richmond papers for the same period. General Early has presented us with a

bound volume of articles written by himself on various matters pertaining to the war, and the secretaries have earnestly sought to gather and preserve everything which appears in the press and seems of any value.

"We have on our shelves many of the books that have been written about the war, and are arranging to secure all that can be of any possible value to the future historian. In fine, we have already in our archives invaluable material for the history of every part of the war. We have the promise of valuable additions, and we hope soon to have a complete arsenal from which the defender of our cause may draw any desired weapon."

The Executive Committee feel that they may congratulate the Society and our friends everywhere on what we have already accomplished, and may confidently appeal to all lovers of truth for help in extending the good work in which we are engaged.

How our Friends can Help us.

1. Become members of the Society by sending the Secretary \$50 for a *Life* member's certificate, or \$3 for an *Annual* membership.
2. If you are already an annual member, see that your renewal fees are regularly paid.
3. Talk to your friends about the Society, and endeavor to induce them to become members.
4. Send us, and try to induce others to send us, material for our archives—such as is indicated above.
5. Many may find it convenient to make contributions of money to enable the Society to carry on its work. If you cannot contribute as much as Mr. Corcoran's liberal donation of \$500 per annum, you may aid us by donations of smaller sums.

An Explanation.

The Secretary has recently sent out to all members who are in arrears to the Society a request for payment, and has received from several gentlemen replies to the effect that they only subscribed for *one year*. The terms of membership in the Society are such that we take it for granted that a member desires to continue his membership unless he notifies the Secretary to the contrary *before the expiration of his subscription*. By remembering this our annual

members can save both the Secretary and themselves trouble. But where the notification has not been sent, we hope that members will find it convenient and agreeable to remit promptly the amount of the annual fee.

Our Connection with the Southern Magazine.

Since the 1st of July, 1875, the Southern Historical Society has had no connection whatever with the *Southern Magazine* published by the Messrs. Turnbull, Baltimore. All communications for the Society should, therefore, be addressed to the Secretary at Richmond, Virginia.

General E. P. Alexander's History of Longstreet's Corps.

In response to numerous inquiries, we will state that we propose to resume and to complete the publication of General Alexander's narrative, which was so abruptly broken off in the last July number of the *Southern Magazine*.

Subscribe or Renew.

We send this number to every member of the Society whose name appears on our books, and to a large number of persons who have never been members. But we desire them to understand distinctly our terms: We propose to send our papers only to *members who pay their fees, and to subscribers who pay annually in advance*. Let our annual members, therefore, promptly remit their renewal fee, and our friends who propose to become members of the Society, or subscribers to our papers, do so at once.

Book Notices.

Books sent the society from time to time will be briefly noticed in our MONTHLY.

We have recently received the following:

From Dr. H. T. Barnard, clerk in the War Department, sixteen volumes of *Reports of the Secretary of War*, from 1865 to 1875. While

not as valuable as the reports of the Secretary during the years of the war (a full set of which we are anxious to secure), they are still very important additions to our collection, as they mark the military history of "Reconstruction."

Report of Major General J. G. Barnard, Colonel of Engineers United States Army, on the Defences of Washington.

This book is gotten up in beautiful style; illustrated with maps, plans of fortifications, &c., and gives a very interesting description of the origin, progress, and detailed history of the defences of Washington.

There are, of course, some things in it which any intelligent Confederate will detect as mistakes, but it is evidently the work of an able soldier, and is a very valuable contribution to the history of those great campaigns which threatened the capture of Washington. General Barnard falls into the common error of all Federal writers in greatly overestimating the numbers of the several Confederate armies to which he has occasion to allude; but we have come to regard that as almost a necessity with both civilians and soldiers on that side.

This book completely refutes the popular idea of the defenceless condition of Washington at the time of General Early's advance on it in 1864, and shows that he acted with proper prudence in not making a more serious attack upon very formidable works which were defended by a force much larger than his own little army.

From Col. Wm. Allan, formerly chief of ordinance, Second Corps, Army Northern Virginia, we have received "CHANCELLORSVILLE," by Major Jed. Hotchkiss and Colonel Wm. Allan. This is a very able and valuable contribution to the history of the Virginia battle fields. The narrative is clear, accurate and vigorous, and the maps are in every respect admirable. The book is gotten up in the best style of *D. Van Nostrand*, New York, and should have a place in the library of every military student.

The Battle of Gettysburg. By Samuel P. Bates. Philadelphia: Davis & Co., 1875.

We are indebted to the publishers for a copy of this book, which has received the highest encomiums of Northern Military critics, and may be accepted as a standard work on the *Federal side*. Colonel John P. Nicholson, of Philadelphia, pronounces it "the fullest, fairest, and most accurate" account of the great battle yet published, and others are equally decided in its praise. A book thus recommended

must be worth reading in order to see a standard Northern history, if for no other reason. We have read it with interest, and may at some future time publish a full review of it. We can only say now that the author seems to have bestowed on it a great deal of labor, and has produced a book of historic value which will be widely read. It was not remarkable, perhaps, that Federal commanders during the war should have so egregiously overestimated our numbers; but it is entirely inexcusable that a historian at this day (with easy access to the official reports of the Confederate generals) should commit the same blunders. Mr. Bates puts Hill's corps at Fredericksburg at 30,000 men, Stuart's cavalry at Brandy Station at 12,000, the force which environed Milroy at Winchester at 60,000, and General Lee's entire force at Gettysburg at 107,000 men. Now the truth is that these figures are most inexcusable exaggerations. *General Lee's entire force at Gettysburg was not quite 57,000 men.* Ah! if our grand old chieftan had commanded the numbers which Northern generals and Northern writers attribute to him, then the story of Gettysburg and of the war would have been far different.

Sherman's Historical Raid. By H. V. Boynton. Cincinnati: Wilstach, Baldwin & Co.

The author has kindly sent us a copy of this able and scathing review of Sherman's Memoirs, and we have read it with very great interest.

He shows most conclusively from the official records that Sherman has done great injustice to Grant, Buell, Rosecrans, Thomas, McPherson, Schofield, and almost every other officer to whom he alludes in his book, and he carries the war into Africa by severely criticising Sherman's generalship, upon some of his most important fields, and showing that he was actually saved from terrible disaster again and again by the very men whom he now disparages.

We cannot, of course, accept *all* that General Boynton has written; but we rejoice to see this well merited rebuke to "the General of the Army" who not only makes himself "the hero of his own story," but oversteps all bounds of delicacy and propriety (not to say common decency), and well illustrates in his Memoirs the Proverb, "Oh! that mine enemy would write a book!"

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

Vol. I.

Richmond, Va., February, 1876.

No. 2.

A Vindication of Virginia and the South.

By Commodore M. F. MAURY.

[NOTE.—The following paper is not the production of a partisan or a politician, but of a great scientist, whose fame is world-wide, and whose utterances will have weight among the Nations and in ages to come.

This able vindication will derive additional interest and value from the statement that it was not written amid the storms of the war, but in his quiet mountain home, in May, 1871, not long before the world was deprived of his priceless services. It was, in fact, the last thing he ever prepared for the press (the MS. bears the marks of his final revision), and should go on the record as the dying testimony of one whose character was above reproach, and whose conspicuous services to the cause of science and humanity entitle him to a hearing.]

One hundred years ago we were thirteen British Colonies, remonstrating and disputing with the mother country in discontent. After some years spent in fruitless complaints against the policy of the British Government towards us, the Colonies resolved to sever their connection with Great Britain, that they might be first independent, and then proceed to govern themselves in their own way. At the same time they took counsel together and made common cause. They declared certain truths to be self evident, and proclaimed the right of every people to alter or amend their forms of government as to them may seem fit. They pronounced this right an *inalienable* right, and declared "that when a long train of abuses and usurpations evinces a design on the part of the Government to reduce a people to absolute despotism, it is their right, *it is their duty*, to throw off such government." In support of these declarations, the people of that day, in the persons of their representatives, pledging themselves, their fortunes and their sacred honor, went to war, and in the support of their cause appealed to Divine Providence for protection. Under these doctrines we and our fathers grew up, and we were taught to regard them with a reverence almost holy and to believe in them with quite a religious belief.

In the war that ensued, the Colonies triumphed; and in the treaty of peace, Great Britain acknowledged each one of her devolved Colonies to be a *nation*, endowed with all the attributes of sovereignty, independent of her, of each other, and of all other temporal powers whatsoever. These new-born nations were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia—thirteen in all.

At that time all the country west of the Alleghany mountains was a wilderness. All that part of it which lies north of the Ohio river and east of the Mississippi, called the Northwest Territory, and out of which the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and a part of Minnesota have since been carved, belonged to Virginia. She exercised dominion over it, and in her resided the rights of undisputed sovereignty. These thirteen powers, which were then as independent of each other as France is of Spain, or Brazil is of Peru, or as any other nation can be of another, concluded to unite and form a compact, called the Constitution, the main objects of which were to establish justice, secure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, and promote the general welfare. To this end they established a vicarious government, and named it the United States. This instrument had for its corner-stone the aforementioned *inalienable* rights. With the assertion of these precious rights—which are so dear to the hearts of all true Virginians—fresh upon their lips, each one of these thirteen States, signatories to this compact, delegated to this new Government so much of her own sovereign powers as were deemed necessary for the accomplishment of its objects, reserving to herself all the powers, prerogatives and attributes not specifically granted or specially enumerated. Nevertheless, Virginia, through abundant caution, when she fixed her seal to this Constitution, did so with the express declaration, in behalf of her people, that the powers granted under it might be resumed by them whenever the same should be perverted to their injury or oppression; that “no right, of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by the Congress, by the Senate or House of Representatives, acting in any capacity, by the President, or any department, or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes.” With this agreement, with a solemn appeal to the “Searcher of all hearts” for the purity of their intentions, our delegates, in the name and

in behalf of the people of Virginia, proceeded to accept and to ratify the Constitution for the Government of the United States.* Thus the Government at Washington was created.

But it did not go into operation until the other States—parties to the contract—had accepted by their act of signature and tacit agreement the conditions which Virginia required to be understood as the terms on which she accepted the Constitution and agreed to become one of the UNITED States. Thus these conditions became, to all intents and purposes, a part of that instrument itself; for it is a rule of law and a principle of right laid down, well understood and universally acknowledged, that if, in a compact between several parties, any one of them be permitted to enter into it on a condition, that condition enures alike to the benefit of all.

Notwithstanding the purity of motive and singleness of purpose which moved Virginia to become one of the United States, sectional interests were developed, and the seeds of faction, strife and discord appeared in the very convention which adopted the Constitution. At that time African negroes were bought and sold, and held in slavery in all the States. They had been brought here by the Crown and forced upon Virginia when she was in the colonial state, in spite of her oft-repeated petitions and remonstrances against it; and now since she, with others, were independent and masters of themselves, they desired to put an end forthwith to this traffic. To this the North objected, on the ground that her people were extensively engaged in kidnapping in Africa and transporting slaves thence for sale to Southern planters. They had, it was added, such interests at stake in this business that twenty years would be required to wind it up. At that time the political balance between the sections was equal; and the South, to pacify the North, agreed that the new Government should have no power, until after twenty years should have elapsed, to restrict their traffic; and thus the North gained a lease and a right to fetch slaves from Africa into the South till 1808. That year, one of Virginia's own sons being President of the United States, an act was passed forbidding a continuance of the traffic, and declaring the further prosecution of it piracy.

Virginia was the leader in the war of the Revolution, and *her* sons were the master-spirits of it, both in the field and in the cabinet. For an entire generation after the establishment of the Government under the Constitution, four of her sons—with an interregnum

* Proceeding of the Virginia Convention, 1788, p. 28. Code of Virginia, 1860.

of only four years—were called, one after the other, to preside, each for a period of eight years, over the affairs of the young Republic and to shape its policy. In the meantime Virginia gave to the new Government the whole of her northwest territory, to be held by it in trust for the benefit of all the States alike. Under the wise rule of her illustrious sons in the Presidential chair, the Republic grew and its citizens flourished and prospered as no people had ever done.

During this time, the African slave-trade having ceased, the price of negroes rose in the South; then the Northern people discovered that it would be better to sell their slaves to the South than to hold them, whereupon acts of so-called emancipation were passed in the North. They were prospective, and were to come in force after the lapse, generally, of twenty years,* which allowed the slaveholders among them ample time to fetch their negroes down and sell them to our people. This many of them did, and the North got rid of her slaves, not so much by emancipation or any sympathy for the blacks as by sale, and in consequence of her greed.

About this time also Missouri—into which the earlier settlers *had carried* their slaves—applied for admission into the Union as a State. The North opposed it, on the ground that slavery existed there. The South appealed to the Constitution, called for the charter which created the Federal Government, and asked for the clause which gave Congress the power to interfere with the domestic institutions of any State, or with any of her affairs, further than to see that her organic law insured a republican form of Government to her people. Nay, she appealed to the force of treaty obligations; and reminded the North that in the treaty with France for the acquisition of Louisiana, of which Missouri was a part, the public faith was pledged to protect the French settlers there, and their descendants, in their rights of property, which includes slaves. The public mind became excited, sectional feelings ran high, and the Union was in danger of being broken up through Northern aggression and Congressional usurpations at that early day. To quiet the storm, a son of Virginia came forward as peace-maker, and carried through Congress a bill that is known as "The Missouri Compromise." So the danger was averted. This bill, however, was a concession, simple and pure, to the North on the part of the South, with no equivalent whatever, except the gratification of a patriotic desire to live in harmony with her sister States and preserve the

* Slavery did not cease in New York till 1827.

Union. This compromise was to the effect that the Southern people should thereafter waive their right to go with their slaves into any part of the common territory north of the parallel of $36^{\circ} 30'$. Thus was surrendered up to the North for settlement, at her own time and in her own way, more than two-thirds of the entire public domain, with equal rights with the South in the remainder.

That posterity may fairly appreciate the extent of this exaction by the North, with the sacrifice made by the South to satisfy it, maintain the public faith and preserve the Union, it is necessary to refer to a map of the country, and to remember that at that time neither Texas, New Mexico, California nor Arizona belonged to the United States; that the country west of the Mississippi which fell under that compromise is that which was acquired from France in the purchase of Louisiana, and which includes *West* Minnesota, the whole of Iowa, Arkansas, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Nebraska, and Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, Idaho, Washington and Oregon, embracing an area of 1,360,000 square miles. Of this the South had the privilege of settling Arkansas alone, or less than four per cent. of the whole. The sacrifice thus made by the South, for the sake of the Union, will be more fully appreciated when we reflect that under the Constitution Southern gentlemen had as much right, and the same right to go into the Territories with their slaves, that the men of the North had to carry with them there their apprentices and servants. Though this arrangement was so prejudicial to the South, though the Supreme Court decided it to be unconstitutional, null and void, the Southern people were still willing to stand by it; but the North would not. Backed by majorities in Congress, she only became more and more aggressive. Furthermore, the magnificent country given by Virginia to the Union came to be managed in the political interests of the North. It was used for the encouragement of European emigration, and its settlement on her side of that parallel, while the idea was sought to be impressed abroad by false representations that South of $36^{\circ} 30'$ in this country out-door labor is death to the white man, and that throughout the South generally labor was considered degrading. Such was the rush of settlers from abroad to the polar side of $36^{\circ} 30'$ and for the cheap and rich lands of the northwest territory, that the population of the North was rapidly and vastly increased—so vastly that when the war of 1861 commenced, the immigrants and the descendants of immigrants which the two sections had received from the Old World since this

grant was made, amounted to not less than 7,000,000 souls more for the North than for the South. This increase destroyed the balance of power between the sections in Congress, placed the South hopelessly in the minority, and gave the reins of the Government over into the hands of the Northern factions. Thus the two hundred and seventy millions of acres of the finest land on the continent which Virginia gave to the Government to hold in trust as a *common fund*, was so managed as greatly to benefit one section and do the other harm. Nor was this all. Large grants of land, amounting to many millions of acres, were made from this domain to certain Northern States, for their railways and other works of internal improvement, for their schools and corporations; but not an acre to Virginia.

In consequence of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, the Orders in Council, the Embargo and the war which followed in 1812, the people of the whole country suffered greatly for the want of manufactured articles, many of which had become necessities of life. Moreover, it was at that time against the laws of England for any artisan or piece of machinery used in her workshops to be sent to this country. Under these circumstances it was thought wise to encourage manufacturing in New England, until American labor could be educated for it, and the requisite skill acquired, and Southern statesmen took the lead in the passage of a tariff to encourage and protect our manufacturing industries. But in course of time these restrictive laws in England were repealed, and it then became easier to import than to educate labor and skill. Nevertheless the protection continued, and was so effectual that the manufacturers of New England began to compete in foreign markets with the manufacturers of Old England. Whereupon the South said, "Enough: the North has free trade with us; the Atlantic ocean rolls between this country and Europe; the expense of freight and transportation across it, with moderate duties for *revenue* alone, ought to be protection enough for these Northern industries. Therefore let us do away with tariffs for *protection*. They have not, by reason of geographical law, turned a wheel in the South; moreover, they have proved a greivous burden to our people." Northern statesmen did not see the case in that light; but fairness, right and the Constitution were on the side of the South. She pointed to the unfair distribution of the public lands, the unequal dispensation among the States of the Government favor and patronage, and to the fact that the New England manufacturers had gained a

firm footing and were flourishing. Moreover, peace, progress and development had, since the end of the French wars, dictated free trade as the true policy of all nations. Our Senators proceeded to demonstrate by example the hardships of submitting any longer to tariffs for protection. The example was to this effect:—The Northern farmer clips his hundred bales of wool, and the Southern planter picks his hundred bales of cotton. So far they are equal, for the Government affords to each equal protection in person and property. That's fair, and there is no complaint. But the Government would not stop here. It went further—protected this industry of one section and taxed that of the other; for though it suited the farmer's interest and convenience to send his wool to a New England mill to have it made into cloth, it also suited in a like degree the Southern planter to send his cotton to Old England to have it made into calico. And now came the injustice and the grievance. They both prefer the Charleston market, and they both, the illustration assumed, arrived by sea the same day and proceeded together, each with his invoice of one hundred bales, to the custom-house. There the Northern man is told that he may land his one hundred bales duty free; but the Southern man is required to leave forty of his in the custom-house for the privilege of landing the remaining sixty.* It was in vain for the Southerner to protest or to urge, "You make us pay bounties to Northern fishermen under the plea that it is a nursery for seamen. Is not the fetching and carrying of Southern cotton across the sea in Southern ships as much a nursery for seaman as the catching of codfish in Yankee smacks? But instead of allowing us a bounty for this, you exact taxes and require protection for our Northern fellow-citizens at the expense of Southern industry and enterprise." The complaints against the tariff were, at the end of ten or twelve years, followed by another compromise in the shape of a modified tariff, by which the South again gained nothing and the North everything. The effect was simply to *lessen*, not to abolish, the tribute money exacted for the benefit of Northern industries.

Fifteen years before the war it was stated officially from the Treasury Department in Washington, that under the tariff then in force the self-sustaining industry of the country was taxed in this indirect way in the sum of \$80,000,000 annually, none of which went into the coffers of the Government, but all into the pocket of the protected manufacturer. The South, moreover, complained of

* The tariff at that time was forty per cent.

the unequal distribution of the public expenditures; of unfairness in protecting, buoying, lighting and surveying the coasts, and laid her complaints on grounds like these: for every mile of sea-front in the North there are four in the South, yet there were four well-equipped dockyards in the North to one in the South; large sums of money had been expended for Northern, small for Southern defences; navigation of the Southern coast was far more difficult and dangerous than that of the Northern, yet the latter was better lighted; and the Southern coast was not surveyed by the Government until it had first furnished Northern ship-owners with good charts for navigating their waters and entering their harbors.

Thus dealt by, there was cumulative dissatisfaction in the Southern mind towards the Federal Government, and Southern men began to ask each other, "Should we not be better off out of the Union than we are in it?"—nay, the public discontent rose to such a pitch in consequence of the tariff, that nullification was threatened, and the existence of the Union was again seriously imperilled, and dissolution might have ensued had not Virginia stepped in with her wise counsels. She poured oil upon the festering sores in the Southern mind, and did what she could in the interests of peace; but the wound could not be entirely healed; Northern archers had hit too deep.

The Washington Government was fast drifting towards centralization, and the result of all this Federal partiality, of this unequal protection and encouragement, was that New England and the North flourished and prospered as no people have ever done in modern times. Scenes enacted in the Old World, twenty-eight hundred years ago, seemed now on the eve of repetition in the new. About the year 915 B. C., the twelve tribes conceived the idea of making themselves a *great nation* by centralization. They established a government which, in three generations, by reason of similar burdens upon the people, ended in permanent separation. Solomon taxed heavily to build the temple and dazzle the nation with the splendor of his capital; his expenditures were profuse, and he made his name and kingdom fill the world with their renown. He died one hundred years after Saul was anointed, and then Jerusalem and the temple being finished, the ten tribes—supposing the necessity of further taxation had ceased—petitioned Rehoboam for a reduction of taxes, a repeal of the tariff. Their petition was scorned, and the world knows the result. The ten tribe seceded in a body, and there was war; so thus there remained

to the house of David only the tribes of Benjamin and Judah. They, like the North, had received the benefit of this taxation. The chief part of the enormous expenditures was made within their borders, and they, like New England, flourished and prospered at the expense of their brethren.

By the Constitution, a citizen of the South had a right to pursue his fugitive slave into any of the States, apprehend and bring him back; but so unfriendly had the North become towards the South, and so regardless of her duties under the Constitution, that Southern citizens, in pursuing and attempting to apprehend runaway negroes in the North, were thrown into jail, maltreated and insulted despite of their rights. Northern people loaded the mails for the South with inflammatory publications inciting the negroes to revolt, and encouraging them to rise up, in servile insurrection, and murder their owners. Like tampering with the negroes was one among the causes which led Virginia into her original proposition to the other colonists, that they should all, for the common good and common safety, separate themselves from Great Britain and strike for independent existence. In a resolution, unanimously adopted in convention for a declaration of such independence, it is urged that the King's representative in Virginia was "tempting our slaves by every artifice to resort to him, and training and employing them against their masters."* To counteract this attempt by the New England people to do the like, the Legislatures of Virginia and other Southern States felt themselves constrained to curtail the privileges of the slave, to increase the patrols, and for the public safety to enact severe laws against the black man. This grated upon the generous feelings of our people the more, because they were thus compelled in self-defence to spread hateful laws upon the statute-book of their State, and subject her fair fame to invidious criticisms by posterity, and this in consequence of the repeated attempt of the Northern people to tamper with the negroes and interfere with our domestic affairs. It was a shaft which sank deep and rankled long; it brought to mind colonial times, and put into Southern heads the idea of another separation. But this was not all. Societies were formed in the North to encourage our negroes to escape and to harbor the runaways; emissaries came down to inveigle them away; and while they were engaged at this, the Northern States aided and abetted by passing acts prohibiting their

* Resolutions of Virginia for a Declaration of Independence, unanimously adopted 15th May, 1776.—Page 1, *Code of Virginia*, 1860.

officers to assist the Southern citizen in the capture of runaways, and *hindering him from doing it himself*. At length things came to such a pass that a Southern gentleman, notwithstanding his right, dared not when he went to the North, either on business or pleasure, to carry with him, as he formerly did, a body servant. More harsh still—delicate mothers and emaciated invalids with their nurses, though driven from their Southern homes, as they often are, by pestilence or plague, dared not seek refuge in the more bracing climates of the North; they were liable to be mobbed and to see their servants taken away by force, and when that was done, they found that Northern laws afforded no protection. In short, our people had no longer equal rights in a common country.

Finally, the aggressive and fanatical spirit of the North ran to such a pitch against us, that just before the Southern people began to feel that patience and forbearance were both exhausted, a band of raiders, fitted out and equipped in the North, came down upon Virginia with sword and spear in hand. They commenced in the dead of night to murder our citizens, to arm the slaves, encouraging them to rise up, burn and rob, kill and slay throughout the South. The ringleader was caught, tried and hung. Northern people regarded him as a martyr in a righteous cause. His body was carried to the North; they paid homage to his remains, sang pæans to his memory, and amidst jeers and taunts for Virginia, which to this day are reverberated through the halls of Congress, enrolled his name as one who had deserved well of his country.

These acts were highly calculated to keep the Southern mind in a feverish state and in an unfriendly mood; and there were other influences at work to excite sectional feelings and begat just indignation among the Southern people. The North was commercial, the South agricultural. Through their fast-sailing packets and steamers, Northern people were in constant communication with foreign nations; the South, rarely, except through the North. Northern men and Northern society took advantage of this circumstance to our prejudice. They defamed the South and abused the European mind with libels and slanders and evil reports against us of a heinous character. They represented Southern people as a lawless and violent set, where men and women were without shame. They asserted, with all the effrontery of impudent falsehood, that the chief occupation of the gentlemen of Virginia was the breeding of slaves like cattle for the more Southern markets. To this day the whole south is suffering under this defamation of character;

for it is well known that emigrants from Europe now refuse to come and settle in Virginia and the South on account of their belief in the stories against us with which their minds have been poisoned.

This long list of grievances does not end here. The population of the North had, by reason of the vast numbers of foreigners that had been induced to settle there, become so great that the balance of power in Congress was completely destroyed. The Northern people became more tyrancical in their disposition, Congress more aggressive in their policy. In every branch of the Government the South was in a hopeless minority, and completely at the mercy of an unscrupulous majority for their rights in the Union. Emboldened by their popular majorities on the hustings, the master-spirits of the North now proclaimed the approach of an "irrepressible conflict" with the South, and their representative men in Congress preached the doctrine of a "higher law," confessing that the policy about to be pursued in relation to Southern affairs was dictated by a rule of conduct unknown to the Constitution, not contained in the Bible, but *sanctioned*, as they said, by *some higher law* than the Bible itself. Thus finding ourselves at the mercy of faction and fanaticism, the Presidential election for 1860 drew nigh. The time for putting candidates in the field was at hand. The North brought out their candidate, and by their platform pledged him to acts of unfriendly legislation against us. The South warned the North and protested, the political leaders in some of the Southern States publicly declaring that if Mr. Lincoln, their nominee, were elected, the States would not remain in the Union. He was truly a sectional candidate. He received no vote in the South, but was, under the provisions of the Constitution, duly elected nevertheless; for now the poll of the North was large enough to elect whom she pleased.

When the result of this election was announced, South Carolina and the Gulf States each proceeded to call a convention of her people; and they, in the exercise of their *inalienable right* to alter and abolish the form of government and to institute a new one, resolved to withdraw from the Union *peaceably*, if they could. They felt themselves clear as to their right, and thrice-armed; for they remembered that they were sovereign people, and called to mind those precious rights that had been solemnly proclaimed, and in which and for which we and our fathers before us had the most abiding faith, reverence and belief. Prominent among these was,

as we have seen, the right of each one of these States to consult her own welfare and withdraw or remain in the Union in obedience to its dictates and the judgment of her own people. So they sent commissioners to Washington to propose a settlement, the Confederate States offering to assume their quota of the debt of the United States, and asking for their share of the common property. This was refused.

In the meantime Virginia assembled her people in grand council too; but she refused to come near the Confederate States in their councils. *She* had laid the corner-stone of the Union, *her* sons were its chief architects; and though she felt that she and her sister States had been wronged without cause, and had reason, good and sufficient, for withdrawing from a political association which no longer afforded domestic tranquility, or promoted the general welfare, or answered its purposes, yet her love for the Union and the Constitution was strong, and the idea of pulling down, without having first exhausted all her persuasives, and tried all means to save what had cost her so much, was intolerable. She thought the time for separation had not come, and waited first to try her own "mode and measure of redress"; she considered that it should not be such as the Confederate States had adopted. Moreover, by standing firm she hoped to heal the breach, as she had done on several occasions before. She asked all the States to meet her in a peace congress. They did so, and the North being largely in the majority, threw out Southern propositions and rejected all the efforts of Virginia at conciliation. North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas all remained in the Union, awaiting the action of our State, who urged the Washington Government not to attempt to coerce the seceded States, or force them with sword and bayonet back into the Union—a thing, she held, which the charter that created the Government gave it no authority to do.

Regardless of these wise counsels and of all her rightful powers, the North mustered an army to come against the South; whereupon, seeing the time had come, and claiming the right which she had especially reserved not only for herself, but for all the States, to withdraw from the Union, the grand old Commonwealth did not hesitate to use it. She prepared to meet the emergency. Her people had already been assembled in convention, and they, in the persons of their representatives, passed the ORDINANCE OF SECESSION, which separated her from the North and South, and left her alone, again a free, sovereign and independent State. This

done, she sounded the notes of warlike preparation. She called upon her sons who were in the service of the Washington Government to confess their allegiance to her, resign their places, and rally around her standard. The true men among them came. In a few days she had an army of 60,000 men in the field; but her policy was still peace, armed peace, not war. Assuming the attitude of defence, she said to the powers of the North, "Let no hostile foot cross my borders." Nevertheless they came with fire and sword; battle was joined; victory crowned her banners on many a well-fought field; but she and her sister States, cut off from the outside world by the navy which they had helped to establish for the common defence, battled together against fearful odds at home for four long years, but were at last overpowered by mere numbers, and then came disaster. Her sons who fell died in defence of their country, their homes, their rights, and all that makes native land dear to the hearts of men.

RECORDS OF LONGSTREET'S CORPS, A. N. V.

By General E. P. ALEXANDER, Chief of Artillery.

The "Seven Days Battles."

[Continued from the Southern Magazine of June, 1875.]

On the morning of Monday, the 30th, the enemy in front of Magruder had disappeared, having crossed the swamp in the night—a part by the main road from Bottom's bridge, and a part by Brackett's ford. The column of General Jackson (Ewell's, Jackson's, D. H. Hill's and Whiting's divisions) commenced crossing the Chickahominy at a very early hour, and entered the Williamsburg road at Savage station just in front of General Magruder's command, who was thereupon ordered to move across to the Darbytown road and follow Longstreet.*

This day was the crisis of McClellan's retreat, the Confederate forces now being within striking distance of him in the rear and upon his flank, while miles of his trains still blocked the roads. For their protection his troops were disposed as follows: Franklin's corps, with Richardson's division of Sumner's corps, and Nagle's

* At Savage station a large hospital, with twenty-five hundred sick and wounded, fell into General Magruder's hands. Large quantities of stores had been destroyed here, and among them all medical supplies, even those necessary for the enemy's own sick. (See General Lee's report).

brigade of Keyes' corps held the crossings of White Oak swamp, both against the approach of Jackson on the Bottom Bridge road, and of Huger on the Charles City road; the latter being opposed by Slocum's division of Franklin's corps, which was posted north of the Charles City road, covering also Brackett's crossing of White Oak swamp. The junction of the Long Bridge, the Charles City and the Quaker roads at Riddle's shop was covered by Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps, with McCall's division of Porter's corps—the former upon the right, and connecting with Slocum's left at the Charles City road; the latter crossing the Long Bridge road a half mile in front of Riddle's shop. Nearly at right angles to the direction of McCall's line, and somewhat overlapped by it, but five hundred yards distant, was Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps covering the Quaker road, which ran parallel to it several hundred yards in its rear. Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps supported McCall, who, as well as Kearney, was formed, each with two brigades holding a front line, and the third (each division was composed of three brigades) in reserve. The country in front of these three divisions was open for several hundred yards, and afforded a fine field for their artillery, which was reinforced from the artillery reserve, and unlimbered in heavy force in front of a wood, in which the infantry lines were covered. Keyes' corps, and Sykes' and Morrel's divisions of Porter's corps, held Malvern Hill and its approaches, over which the whole of the Federal trains made their way towards the James, the rear wagons passing at four P. M. The principal effort of General Lee was directed against the position at Riddle's shop, against which Jackson's, Huger's and Longstreet's columns were all expected to co-operate. The battle which resulted is generally known in the South as that of

FRAZIER'S FARM,

and at the North as Glendale; and, as only Longstreet's column was engaged in it, before proceeding to its details, it is necessary to glance at the operations during the day of the other Confederate divisions.

About 10 A. M. the head of the column under General Jackson reached the crossing of White Oak swamp and found the bridge destroyed, and a Federal battery (Hazzard's) posted to prevent a crossing. After considerable delay, twenty-three guns were quietly gotten into position, and at quarter before two suddenly opened upon the Yankee battery at a range of about a thousand yards.

Only four shots were fired in reply before Captain Hazzard was killed, and the battery so crippled that it was compelled to leave the field, abandoning one of its guns, which had been disabled. Seeing the field clear, General Jackson in person, with a regiment of cavalry under Colonel Munford, and a detachment of infantry skirmishers, crossed the swamp at the ford by the side of the bridge and advanced to get the abandoned gun. Before this could be accomplished, however, a second battery opened fire on this ford from behind a dense wood, which screened it from the view of the Confederate artillery, and the cavalry was forced to return through the swamp, a little ways below the bridge. An effort was now made to rebuild the broken bridge, but the enemy were able to fire upon it with accuracy, and the working party was driven off. Meanwhile, the Confederate batteries endeavored to silence this second battery by a random fire through the woods towards its position, but, as might have been expected, without success. The enemy replied with a similar fire from about eighteen guns, and a noisy conflict was maintained all the afternoon with very little loss on either side. The infantry and skirmishers remained across the swamp, but no further effort was made to force a passage, and the troops bivouacked that night where they were halted in the morning.*

The column under General Huger, on the Charles City road, marched at daylight from Brightwell's, Wright's brigade being detached and sent across White Oak swamp on the left to see that none of the enemy were left behind. Crossing near Hobson's, General Wright advanced his brigade down the north side until (about two o'clock) he met the column under General Jackson. He then returned, at General Jackson's request, and endeavored to force a passage at Brackett's crossing, but found it too well protected, and was compelled to ascend the swamp to a point opposite Fisher's, where he crossed by a cow path and rejoined Huger's division.

* Shortly after the commencement of this artillery duel, General Hampton, who commanded a brigade of infantry, in the leading division of Jackson's column, discovered, while reconnoitering, a crossing of the swamp, practicable for infantry, a short distance below the road; and, crossing in person, he made his way up a small tributary ravine which curved to the right and headed near the road some distance beyond the bridge, and found himself on the flank and rear of the infantry which supported the Federal batteries. He returned and explained the situation to General Jackson, and asked permission to take his brigade across and attack, but was refused and ordered first to build a bridge where he had crossed. This, though not necessary, was soon accomplished (it was only prepared for infantry, as it could not be approached by artillery), and its completion was reported to General Jackson, but he made no reply whatever to the report, and took no action upon it. My authority for this statement is General Hampton.

Meanwhile, the other brigades moved very slowly, skirmishing slightly, and cutting away trees which the enemy continually felled in their road. A scarcity of tools made this work so slow that it was late in the afternoon when Mahone's brigade, in the lead, reached Brackett's field and found the enemy (Slocum's divisions) posted behind a considerable swamp, which here falls into White Oak swamp. Mahone advanced a section of Moorman's battery, which drew a very severe fire on itself and the supporting infantry, and developed such a strong position that General Huger determined to turn it by a movement to his right. Night, however, had now come on, and the division bivouacked that night near Mrs. Fisher's.

The division of General Magruder was marched in the morning from Savage station across to Timberlake's store on the Darbytown road (three miles above Fussell's mill), a distance of about ten miles by the road traversed. Here, about two P. M., General Magruder received a note from General Lee (written under the impression, it seems, that his division was in supporting distance of Longstreet), ordering him to halt and wait further orders.

Meanwhile, General Holmes, with six thousand infantry and six batteries, had been brought from the defences on the James river, and at ten A. M. had taken position at New Market. Hearing here of the enemy's trains passing over Malvern Hill, General Holmes moved his command down the River road about four P. M., and ordered his chief of artillery, Colonel Deshler, to establish batteries to fire upon the enemy's columns. After some difficulty, Colonel Deshler got five pieces into position, and opened upon Malvern Hill. He was immediately replied to by thirty guns from the hill, and at the same time also the gunboats anchored in the river at Turkey Bend opened a severe fire, directed in their aim by signals from Malvern. After maintaining the unequal conflict for an hour, Colonel Deshler retired seriously punished, but bringing off his guns; and General Holmes, seeing the hopelessness of further efforts, withdrew his whole command. During this withdrawal, a stampede was caused by the heavy fire of the gunboats, among some artillery which had not been engaged and a cavalry battalion, which resulted in the abandonment of two guns and caissons in a road through the woods, where they were found and carried off by the skirmishers of Warren's brigade, which held that flank of the Federal line.*

* It was never known in the Confederate army that the enemy had followed after Holmes' retreat at all, and it was therefore always supposed that some other Confederate battery had

Shortly after the advance of General Holmes, General Magruder was ordered to move to his support, but he only arrived at New Market about dusk, after General Holmes had withdrawn, and therefore took no part in the affair.

It happened, therefore, from the above-mentioned circumstances, that the whole of the fighting at Frazier's farm or Riddle's shop fell upon Longstreet's command, of which A. P. Hill's division now numbered about eleven thousand, and his own division numbered about seven thousand. The greater part of the four divisions of Kearney, McCall, Sedgwick and Hooker were engaged on the Yankee side, averaging ten thousand each.

Early on the morning of the 30th, Longstreet and A. P. Hill resumed their advance upon the Darbytown road, the division of the former leading. Turning to the left on entering the Long Bridge road, the enemy's pickets were soon encountered, and on being driven in they disclosed the position of McCall and Kearney, as has been already described. Line of battle was at once formed by Longstreet's division, under command of General R. H. Anderson, in two lines, the first being composed of Pryor's, Wilcox's, Anderson's (commanded by Jenkins) and Kemper's brigades, in the order named from left to right; the second of Featherston's and Pickett's brigades in rear of the two wings of the first line. The centre of Jenkins' brigade rested on the Long Bridge road, on the right of which was a very dense and tangled wood, and on the left a succession of old fields and pine thickets. A. P. Hill's division was formed in close column near the road, three-fourths of a mile in rear.

The formation was complete and everything in readiness for an attack by two P. M., but General Lee, who was on the field with President Davis, directed that it should be delayed until Huger or Jackson should be heard from. About three P. M. there came from the left the sound of the artillery affair between Huger's advance at Brightwell's and Slocum's artillery, the character of which has already been stated. Supposing it to be General Huger's announcement of his being in position, Longstreet at once replied by ordering his artillery opened. In compliance with this order,

found and either appropriated these guns or sent them to Richmond along with those captured at Frazier's farm. They did, however, fall into the enemy's hands, and formed the foundation of a not very ingenious sentence in McClellan's address to his army, viz: "You have saved all your material, all your trains and all your guns except a few lost in battle, taking in return guns and colors from the enemy." The "few lost in battle" were fifty-two and these two were the only guns "taken in return."

Dearing's battery opened a cannonade which drew a furious and somewhat mischievous fire from the enemy's batteries, which nearly enfiladed the Long Bridge road. An hour passed in this artillery duelling produced no material result, as the intervening thickets hid the contending batteries from each other's view, and the firing was mostly at random. About four P. M., nothing definite being known of Huger and Jackson, but the lateness of the hour admitting no longer delay, General Longstreet assumed the offensive. As no one can go through the details of the action which followed without surprise at the fatal want of concert of action which characterized the many gallant and bloody assaults of the Confederates, it is perhaps best to say beforehand that it was but the pestilent mishaps of almost every offensive battle field which the army of Northern Virginia ever fought, and that its causes were perhaps not peculiar to any one. The wooded character of the country is the reason assigned by Generals Lee and Longstreet in their reports, and an insufficient staff organization was doubtless another source of much difficulty.

The order to move forward and attack was first received by Kemper's brigade, which held the right flank in the dense wood before mentioned, with its right regiment (the Seventeenth Virginia) thrown back to protect the flank. In hearing of the order to charge, through some misapprehension, the brigade started before General Kemper was able to wheel the Seventeenth into line with the others, and as it was impossible to control promptly so extensive a line in such tangled undergrowth, the remaining regiments were allowed to move on, and this one was directed to follow as soon as it could change its front. After advancing several hundred yards in good order, in spite of swampy ground and a sharp shelling of the woods by the enemy, the Yankee pickets were discovered retiring, on seeing which the line immediately cheered loudly and took the double quick in pursuit. This space soon brought them to the open field, across which were seen the Federal infantry and batteries. A terrible fire was now poured upon them, but without halting to reform the line, disintegrated and much reduced by the double quick through the woods, a charge was made upon a battery (Kern's) about three hundred yards distant (near Mitlock's house) supported by Seymour's brigade, the left brigade of McCall's division. The impetuosity of the charge broke the enemy's line and for a time the battery was in Kemper's possession, but the handful of men who gained it were unable to

maintain it long before the heavy attacks in front and flank which fell upon them, as soon as their small force was appreciated, and they were soon compelled to retreat. The Seventeenth Virginia following in rear of the rest of the brigade had also become much scattered in its rapid movements in the forest, but considerable portions of it came out in time to assist in covering the retreat of their comrades, whom the enemy pursued back into the woods. Here the regiments became so scattered that they were only collected together again after some hours, and they bore no further part in the action. The total loss in the brigade in this charge was four hundred and twenty-four, of whom one hundred and seventy-five were captured.*

Meanwhile, about the time that Kemper had penetrated the enemy's lines, Pickett's brigade, under Colonel Strange, and Branch's brigade of A. P. Hill's division were hurried forward to his support. The difficulties of the forest, however, prevented their arrival in time to take advantage of his success, and after passing the fragments of this brigade in retreat, Branch and Strange (the latter on the right) became engaged within the wood with the pursuing enemy, and drove him back into the field. On the edge of this field Branch halted, where a projection of the wood placed him within range of the battery which Kemper had assaulted (Kern's), and opening fire upon it he succeeded in silencing it and driving off its cannoneers. Strange, emerging on the field about this time, made a gallant charge on the position, and, after a sharp affair with its supports, took the battery and held it permanently, turning its guns upon the enemy, and completely routing Seymour's brigade.

While these operations were taking place upon the right, the conflict had also been taken up upon the centre by Andrews' battery of Hill's division, and by R. H. Anderson's brigade under Colonel Jenkins. Moving forward at the same time with Pickett's brigade, Jenkins made his way through the woods, bearing more to the left

* A large part of those captured fell into the hands of a brigade (probably of Hooker's division) which was in the very wood from which Kemper started, its line of battery being perpendicular to the original line of Kemper's brigade, and not twenty rods distant from his flank during the whole afternoon. A courier, bearing a message from the skirmish line to the line of battle, about fifty yards off, before the charge was made, lost his direction and fell into their hands; and after the charge, Lieutenant-Colonel Marye, and a number of men and officers of the Seventeenth in returning, as they thought to their original position, walked directly upon this brigade and were captured. Strange to say beyond making these captures, it took no part in the action, and its position was never known or suspected by the Confederates.

and keeping his left flank upon the Long Bridge road, until he arrived near the edge of the wood, within three hundred yards of the enemy's batteries. Here a hot exchange of fire began with a battery and the Federal infantry drawn up in the wood and in a gully in rear of the guns, and a temporary halt was made while Chapman's battery (of three guns) was brought up; but it was hardly unlimbered before it was crippled and driven off. Nothing daunted by the overwhelming force in his front, Colonel Jenkins then ordered a charge, which was at once executed, with the utmost gallantry and success, capturing the battery (Cooper's), killing its horses, and turning its guns upon the enemy, and driving the infantry from their position and pursuing beyond it. This success, however, was obtained at a heavy sacrifice, and the force left in ranks was so reduced that the advance of the enemy's second line drove it back and retook the battery, the survivors falling back into the wood from which they had advanced, where a portion of them were rallied by Lieutenant-Colonel Steadman, of the Sixth South Carolina, and afterward joined in the charge of Wilcox's brigade.

Jenkins' brigade took into this charge 1,106 men, of whom 562 were killed or wounded and 27 captured.*

On the repulse of Jenkins, Wilcox and Pryor, who were about being stretched out to the left to connect with Huger (who was still expected), were now ordered to attack directly in front. The brigades were formed in line, Pryor upon the left, and commenced their advance—Wilcox's centre resting on the Long Bridge road. Dense pine thickets entirely obstructed the view on the left of the road, and so interfered with the advance, that they could only be passed by breaking "by companies to the front." Gaining at length the edge of an open field, the enemy's line was discovered by Pryor's brigade, also in the edge of a wood, their right being brought by it obliquely forward. Both parties immediately opened all of their muskets upon each other, and an indecisive but bloody conflict ensued. Featherston's brigade was advanced to Pryor's support, and took ground on his left, and shortly afterwards, General Featherston being wounded, and his brigade and Pryor's badly cut up, Gregg's brigade of A. P. Hill's division was also

* The losses in Jenkins' own regiment, the Palmetto Sharpshooters, were perhaps never exceeded in the war in so short an affair—amounting to 44 killed and 210 wounded out of 375 engaged. Captain Kilpatrick's company had but one man left untouched, and two other companies but three each. Colonel Jenkins himself bore the marks of ten bullets on his person, horse and accoutrements.

sent to the left to protect against a flank movement which the enemy seemed to threaten. Only one of Gregg's regiments (the Fourteenth South Carolina) was sharply engaged, however, the rest of the brigade being disposed on the flank. This conflict was maintained in unabated fury until after dark, neither party making a charge.*

Meanwhile Wilcox's brigade continued to move forward against the battery (Cooper's) which had been charged by Jenkins, with the exception of his left regiment (the Eighth Alabama), which became involved in the fight on the left and halted with Pryor's brigade. The remaining regiments, on clearing the woods, received a terrible fire from the guns and infantry on each side of the Long Bridge road, but without halting a moment they dashed upon the batteries at the double-quick in magnificent style, no longer in ranks, but holding well together and cheering, but not stopping to fire. On the right of the road (where Jenkins had charged before) the enemy did not wait for close quarters, and Cooper's battery was again taken. On the left of the road, the Eleventh Alabama had to traverse an open space of six hundred yards before reaching the battery in its front (Randall's), but advancing rapidly through a terrible discharge of canister and musketry, it pressed up to the very muzzles of the guns, where it exchanged one volley with the Fourth and Seventh Pennsylvania, of Meade's brigade (McCall's division), and then charged upon them with the bayonet. A desperate hand-to-hand fight occurred, in which the Alabamians were victorious, and drove their opponents into the woods a short distance in rear of the guns. No reinforcements, however, coming to their support, and being subjected to a severe cross-fire from the front and left, the ground affording no shelter, the battery could not long be held. The gallant regiment, therefore, at length retired, unpursued and slowly, from its bloody prize, and crossing the road, joined in the woods on the right the two regiments which had captured Cooper's battery, and which had also at last been compelled to retire, for lack of support, from heavy attacks by fresh troops. In this assault Wilcox's brigade carried in about 1,200 men (including the Eighth Alabama, which did not charge

* At one time, just after dark, both parties ceased fire under the impression that they were firing upon friends, and a Yankee officer of the Twentieth Indiana rode up to the Fourteenth South Carolina and asked the name of the regiment. He was captured, and all doubt being removed, firing was recommenced and continued until after all other parts of the field were silent. The Fourteenth South Carolina lost 76 men in this action out of about 200 engaged.

the batteries), and lost 455 killed and wounded, and 16 prisoners. The Eleventh Alabama (commanded by Captain Field, who received two wounds) lost forty-nine privates killed, and of its ten company commanders, five were killed outright, one was mortally, two were severely and one was slightly wounded. It entered the field 357 strong, and had 181 killed and wounded.

Having united the remnants of these regiments in the wood in front of Cooper's battery, which had been taken by the Ninth and Tenth Alabama, General Wilcox still exchanged musketry with the enemy, who remained in the woods behind the battery, and did not offer to re-occupy it.*

Meanwhile the remainder of A. P. Hill's division having been moved forward, Field's brigade (with the exception of the Fortieth Virginia, which was sent to protect the right flank of Pickett's brigade, and was heavily engaged there) was ordered to renew the attack upon Randall's and Cooper's batteries. Archer's brigade was sent to the support of Pickett, and J. R. Anderson and Pender were held in reserve for a short time. Field formed in single line on each side of the Long Bridge road, the Fifty-fifth and Sixtieth Virginia on the right, and the Forty-seventh and Second Virginia battalion on the left. The whole line then rushed to the charge with a cheer, and in spite of a heavy fire which met them, they continued to advance with impetuosity and repossessed both Randall's and Cooper's batteries, and drove off their infantry supports; the two regiments on the right of the road pursuing them nearly a half mile.†

*The details of the charge of the 11th Alabama are obtained from General Wilcox's report and an account by General McCall (who was present in Randall's battery at the time), published in *Report of Committee on Conduct of War*, Vol. 1, page 588. In another report, *Pennsylvania Reserves in the Peninsula*, page 5, General McCall says of this affair: "Bayonets were crossed and locked in the struggle; bayonet wounds were freely given and received. I saw skulls crushed by the heavy blow of the butt of the musket, and, in short, the desperate thrusts and parries of a life-and-death encounter, proving indeed that *Greek had met Greek when the Alabama boys fell upon the sons of Pennsylvania.*"

General Wilcox gives two instances of the desperate character of the fighting, as follows: "The sword and bayonet were freely used. Captain W. C. Parker had two successive encounters with Federal officers, both of whom he felled with his sword, and beset by others of the enemy he was severely wounded—receiving two bayonet wounds in the breast and one in his side, and a musket wound breaking his thigh. Lieutenant Michie had a hand-to-hand collision with an officer, and, having just dealt a severe blow to his adversary, he fell cut over the head with a sabre-bayonet from behind, and had afterwards three bayonet wounds in the face and two in the breast; all severe wounds, which he survived, however, for three days. Many of the men received and gave in return bayonet wounds." *Reports of Army Northern Virginia*, vol. 1, page 343.

† In this charge the bayonet was again freely used by the Sixtieth Virginia, Colonel Starke, who met the enemy in the wood, in rear of Cooper's battery. Colonel Starke, in his official report, says, "very many of the enemy fell before that formidable weapon. * * * I can-

This pursuit, however, exposed their flank and rear, and might probably have resulted in their capture by some troops, apparently from Hooker's line, who advanced with a battery from the direction of Willis Church and had nearly attained the Long Bridge road when Pender's brigade, which had been sent after Field on his charge, opportunely arrived. A Yankee column, moving by a flank at the double quick, approached within seventy-five yards of Pender, apparently not seeing the gray uniforms in the dusk, and was scattered by a single volley. After a sharp skirmish, the battery was also driven off, and Field's rear was secured. A little later, J. R. Anderson's brigade, the last reserve, was also advanced on Pender's left to Field's support, and being told that Field was in its front, allowed itself to be deceived by a Federal brigade, which approached it calling out, "don't shoot, we are friends," and finally delivered a volley which caused it much loss. Anderson, however, did not retreat, but ordering his men to lie down, he maintained a fire upon the enemy until after dark. Appreciating his danger, and favored by the arrival of Pender and Anderson, Field at length withdrew his line to unite with Pender, and cover the captured batteries, which he also took measures to remove. Even upon this line volleys of musketry were still exchanged so heavily that for a time much apprehension was felt for the result, and General A. P. Hill was endeavoring to rally a reserve of stragglers and to encourage the front line by raising loud cheers, when about nine P. M., the musketry very suddenly ceased on each side and the battle was ended.

Its results in killed and wounded can only be approximated. Longstreet and A. P. Hill lost probably 2,000 each, and the enemy probably also lost 4,000 men and eighteen guns, comprised in the three batteries which had been captured. A few prisoners only were captured on either side, but among the Federal prisoners was Major-General McCall, who, accompanied by three couriers and members of his staff, rode into the Forty-seventh Virginia after night fall. On discovering their position, General McCall and a courier surrendered. His adjutant, Major Bibble, was shot in attempting to escape, and the fourth person succeeded in galloping off.

not close this report without mentioning the conduct of Private R. A. Christian, of Company I. Private Christian, in the bayonet charge, was assailed by no less than four of the enemy at the same instant. He succeeded in killing three of them with his own hands, though wounded in several places by bayonet thrusts; and his brother, Eli Christian, going to his aid, dispatched the fourth."

Shortly after the cessation of the firing, General Magruder's division, very much jaded by its day's march, arrived on the field, having been recalled from New Market, where it had been directed, as before explained, to the support of General Holmes' attack. General Magruder was directed to relieve the divisions of Hill and Longstreet, to feel the enemy during the night, and to prepare to attack at daylight. The enemy was found to be still in position late in the night, but when a skirmish line was advanced in the morning it found but a small rear guard in its front, and soon met the skirmishers of General Jackson's column advancing from White Oak swamp. General Jackson's column being the freshest was now directed to pursue the enemy, on the road since known as the Quaker road, while General Magruder was ordered to advance toward Malvern Hill on a parallel road to the right.*

Sending a regiment of cavalry in front as an advanced guard, General Jackson pushed the head of the infantry column close behind them, through the woods, and advanced rapidly upon Malvern Hill, fearing lest the enemy should escape. No sooner, however, did the cavalry show itself where the Quaker road debouches from the woods, on the open slopes of Crew's farm, than the position of the enemy was made apparent by a furious cannonade from heavy batteries posted to command all approaches and to enfilade the road. So perfectly was this done, that a single shrapnel killed two and wounded nineteen men of the First Texas Regiment. Receiving this heavy enfilade fire, the cavalry came back in confusion, while the infantry was thrown in the woods on the right and left of the road. A reconnoissance soon developed the great strength of the enemy's position and force. Preparations were at once made by General Lee to attack. Jackson's line was formed with Whiting's division on the left and D. H. Hill's on the right. Stafford's Louisiana brigade of Ewell's division held the centre between Whiting and Hill. The rest of Jackson's command was formed in a second line in rear of the first. On the right of D. H. Hill came in Armistead's and Wright's brigades of Huger's division, and on their

* The road generally called the Quaker road, since the battle of Malvern Hill, is more properly the Willis Church road. A small cross-road from the Long Bridge to the River road, entering the latter a half mile above where the Willis Church road comes in, after crossing Malvern Hill, was always known as the Quaker road before this period. A confusion of names arose, however, at this time, which has resulted in the general application of the latter name to the road by Willis Church. No accurate maps of this section of country and its roads existed at the time, and to that fact it is probably due that no force was directed to the right and sent to east of Turkey creek to cut the River road below the Turkey Creek bridge.

right D. R. Jones' sub-division of Magruder's command, consisting of Tombs' and G. T. Anderson's brigades. The remainder of Huger's command (Mahone's and Ransom's brigades), and of Magruder's command (Barksdale's, Cobb's, Kershaw's and Semmes' brigades, the last two constituting McLaws' division), were disposed and used in support of Armistead, Wright and D. R. Jones. General Holmes, with his division, moved from New Market a short distance down the River road, and formed line of battle, but took no part in the action, deeming the enemy's position too strong for attack in that direction. Longstreet and A. P. Hill remained in reserve on the Long Bridge road. Owing to ignorance of the roads and topography and the dense forests which impeded communication, the whole line was not formed until late in the afternoon.

The Federal army was all concentrated upon the field, its divisions being in the following order from its left to right, viz: Sykes, Morell, Couch, Kearney, Hooker, Sedgwick, Richardson, Smith, Slocum and Peck. McCall was in reserve, in rear of Sykes and Morell. The artillery reserve was also present, and was so disposed with the division batteries that General McClellan states that "the fire of sixty guns could be concentrated on any point on the front or left" of his left wing, which was the flank attacked. The position was of great natural strength, and the Federal gunboats in the James were also able to throw their enormous projectiles over the whole ground occupied by the Confederates.

Considerable artillery firing had taken place during the day, and it was designed to precede the attack of the infantry with a heavy cannonade, but owing to the narrow debouchments of the roads on the plain, and the few good positions for guns, and more especially to the faulty organization of the artillery, no concentration of batteries was effected. Several batteries were put in action at different points and at different times, but being advanced singly against the entire array of superior metal displayed by the enemy, they were each soon disabled and driven off.*

About 6 P. M. the attacks by the infantry were begun, and as their details are much confused, and, moreover, do not fall strictly within the limits of this narrative, they are passed over, and General Lee's brief but excellent and comprehensive report of this field is substituted:

* Among the batteries thus advanced, the following are complimented in the official reports for their gallant behavior, viz: Pegram's, Carpenter's, Grime's, Poague's, Balthis', Reilly's and Moorman's.

"The obstacles presented by the woods and swamp made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient force of artillery to oppose successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy, while the field itself afforded us few positions favorable for its use, and none for its proper concentration. Orders were issued for a general advance, at a given signal, but the causes referred to prevented a proper concert of action among the troops. D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line, but a simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the overwhelming numbers and numerous batteries of the enemy. Jackson sent to his support his own division, and that part of Ewell's which was in reserve, but owing to the increasing darkness and intricacy of the forest and swamp, they did not arrive in time to render the desired assistance. Hill was, therefore, compelled to abandon part of the ground he had gained, after suffering severe loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy. On the right, the attack was gallantly made by Huger's and Magruder's commands. Two brigades of the former commenced the action" (Wright's and Armstead's), "and the other two were subsequently sent to the support of Magruder and Hill (D. H.) Several determined efforts were made to storm the hill at Crew's house. The brigades advanced bravely across the open field, raked by the fire of a hundred cannon and the musketry of large bodies of infantry. Some were broken and gave way, others approached close to the guns, driving back the infantry, compelling the advanced batteries to retire to escape capture, and mingling their dead with those of the enemy. For want of concert among the attacking columns their assaults were too weak to break the Federal line, and after struggling gallantly, sustaining and inflicting great loss, they were compelled successively to retire. Night was approaching when the attack began, and it soon became difficult to distinguish friend from foe. The firing continued until after 9 P. M., but no decided result was gained. Part of the troops were withdrawn to their original positions, others remained on the open field, and some rested within a hundred yards of the batteries which had been so bravely, but vainly, assailed. The general conduct of the troops was excellent—in some cases heroic. The lateness of the hour at which the attack necessarily began gave the enemy the full advantage of his superior position, and augmented the natural difficulties of our own."

The commendation bestowed by General Lee was indeed merited by no few of the gallant commands which faced the *feu d'enfer* of that terrible field. The dead of the Tenth Louisiana of Semmes' brigade were found next morning beyond the line occupied by the Yankee guns and among the outbuildings of Crew's settlement, which had been the very stronghold of their line. It happened to this brigade, as well as to some others of those who were in front after dark, that they were fired into from behind by those moving up in support. At the cessation of the fire, several fragments of different commands were lying down and holding their ground within a short distance of the enemy's line, and as soon as the fighting ceased an informal truce was established by common consent, and numerous parties from both armies, with lanterns and litters, wandered over the field seeking for the unfortunate wounded, whose groans and calls on all sides could not fail to move with pity the heart of friend or foe.

Morning broke with a heavy rain, and showed the enemy's position entirely deserted, his army having withdrawn safely during the night across Turkey Creek bridge, leaving on the field his killed, with three disabled guns and the usual number of scattered small arms.

His retreat was now secure, and he reached Harrison's bar, or Westover, a strong position on the James, previously selected, without further molestation, and immediately fortified it so vigorously, that when, on the 4th of July, the Confederates again came up, no chance of success was left to an assault. General Lee remained in its front for a few days, reconnoitering and offering battle, but it proved in vain, and on the 8th the army was withdrawn to the vicinity of Richmond.

The Confederate loss in the battle of Malvern Hill is reported at 5,062, of which 2,900 fell in Magruder's and Huger's divisions, and 2,162 in Jackson's command. The Federal loss did not exceed one-third of that number.*

The total Confederate loss in the Seven Days Battles may be estimated at slightly above 17,000.†

General McClellan reports his losses at 1,582 killed, 7,709 wounded, and 5,958 missing; total, 15,249.

The Confederates captured fifty-two pieces of artillery, and

* Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*, page 162.

† Jackson reports his total losses in his four divisions as 5,446; in Longstreet's division the loss amounted to 4,429; in A. P. Hill's, to 3,870. Partial returns of Magruder, Huger and Holmes indicate the amount of their losses to be about 3,500. Aggregate, 17,245.

collected from the battle-fields over thirty-five thousand stand of small arms, of which probably twenty-five thousand had been abandoned by the enemy. Including the sick and wounded, about ten thousand prisoners fell into the hands of the Confederates. The total casualties of Longstreet's brigades are given in the following table. The reserve artillery was not engaged:

BRIGADIER GEN'L.	Designation of brigade.	Present for duty before battles.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		Aggregate.
			Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
J. L. Kemper.....	1st.	1,500	8	36	14	191	19	146	41	373	414
R. H. Anderson....	2d.	1,250	10	125	47	587	13	57	725	782
Geo. E. Pickett....	3d.	1,481	10	62	52	511	19	62	592	654
C. M. Wilcox.....	4th.	1,850	13	216	52	754	1	19	66	988	1,055
R. A. Pryor.....	5th.	1,400	15	154	35	645	11	50	810	860
W. S. Featherston..	6th.	1,350	7	107	31	510	3	6	41	623	664
Grand total.....	8,881	63	700	231	3,193	23	214	317	4,112	4,429

Camp Fires of the Boys in Gray.

By Private CARLTON MCCARTHY, of the Richmond Howitzers.

[NOTE.—The substance of this paper was delivered in response to a toast at the banquet and reunion of the Richmond Howitzers, November 9th, 1875, and there has been a very general desire for its publication. It is a vivid picture of camp life, which will be readily recognized by the old soldier, and contains matter well worthy of a place in these PAPERS.]

The soldier may forget the long, weary march, with its dust, heat, and thirst, and he may forget the horrors and blood of the battle-field, or he may recall them sadly, as one thinks of the loved dead; but the cheerful, happy scenes of the camp fire he will never forget! How willingly he closes his eyes to the present to dream of those happy, careless days and nights. Around the fire crystallize the memories of the soldier's life. It was his home—his place of rest, where he met with good companionship. *Who kindled the fire?* Nobody had matches, there was no fire in sight, and yet, scarcely

was the camp determined when the bright blaze of the camp-fire was seen. *He* was a shadowy fellow who kindled the fire. Nobody knows who he was, but no matter how wet the leaves, how sobby the twigs—no matter if there was no fire in a mile of the camp, that fellow could start one. Some men might get down on hands and knees, and blow it and fan it, rear and charge, and fume and fret, and yet “she wouldn’t burn.” But this fellow would come, kick it all around, scatter it, rake it together again, shake it up a little, and oh! *how it burned!* The little flames would bite the twigs, and snap at the branches, embrace the logs, and leap and dance, and laugh at the touch of the master’s hand and soon lay at his feet a bed of glowing coals.

As soon as the fire is kindled all hands want water. Who can find it? Where is it? Never mind! we have a man who knows where to go. He says, “where’s our bucket?” and then we hear the rattle of the old tin cup as it drops to the bottom of it, and away he goes, nobody knows where. But *he* knows, and he doesn’t stop to think, but without the slightest hesitation or doubt, strikes out in the darkness.

From the camp-fire as a centre, draw 500 radii, and start an ordinary man on any of them, and let him walk a mile on each, and he will miss the water. But that fellow in the mess with the water instinct never failed. He would go as straight for the spring, or well, or creek, or river, as though he had lived in that immediate neighborhood all his life and never got water anywhere else. What a valuable man he was. A modest fellow, who never knew his own greatness. But others remember and honor him. May he never want for any good thing! Having a roaring fire and a bucket of good water, we settle down. A man cannot be comfortable “*anywhere;*” so each man and his “chum” picks out a tree, and that particular tree becomes the homestead of the two. They hang their canteens on it, lay their haversacks and spread their blankets at the foot of it, and sit down, and lean their weary backs against it, and feel that they are at home. How gloomy the woods are beyond the glow of our fire? How cosy and comfortable we are who stand around it and inhale the aroma of the coffee boiler and the skillet? The man squatting by the fire is a person of importance. He doesn’t talk—not he; his whole mind is concentrated on that skillet. He is our cook—volunteer, natural and talented cook. Not in a vulgar sense. He doesn’t mix, but simply bakes, the biscuit. Every faculty, all the energy of the man, is employed in that great work. Don’t suggest

anything to him if you value his friendship! Don't attempt to put on or take off from the top of that skillet one single coal, and don't be in a hurry for the biscuit. You need not say you "like yours half done," &c. Simply wait. When he thinks they are ready, and not before, you get them. *He* may raise the lid cautiously now and then and look in, but don't *you* look in. Don't say you think they are done; because it's useless.

Ah! his face relaxes—he raises the lid, turns it upside down to throw off the coals, and says: *All right boys!* And now with the air of a wealthy philanthropist he distributes the solid and weighty product of his skill to, as it were, the humble dependents around him.

The "General" of the mess having satisfied the cravings of the inner-man, now proceeds to enlighten the ordinary members of it as to when, how and why, and where the campaign will open, and what will be the result.

He arranges for every possible and impossible contingency, and brings the war to a favorable and early termination. The greatest mistake General Lee ever made, was that he failed to consult this man. Who can tell what "might have been" if he had.

Now, to the consternation of all hands, our old friend, "the Bore," familiarly known as "the old Auger," opens his mouth to tell us of a little incident illustrative of his personal prowess, and, by way of preface, commences at Eden and goes laboriously through the Patriarchal age, on through the Mosaic dispensation to the Christian era, takes in Grecian and Roman history, by the way, then Spain and Germany and England and colonial times, and the early history of our grand Republic; the causes of and necessity for our war, and a complete history up to date. And then slowly unfolds the little matter. We always loved to hear this man, and prided ourselves on being the only mess in the army having such treasure *all our own*.

The "Auger" having been detailed for guard-duty walks off, and his voice grows fainter and fainter in the distance, and we call forth our Poet. One eye is bandaged with a dirty cotton rag. He is bareheaded and his hair resembles a dismantled straw-stack. His elbows and knees are out, and his pants, from the knee down, have a brown-toasted tinge imparted by the genial heat of many a fire. His toes protrude themselves prominently from his shoes. You would say, "What a dirty, ignorant fellow." But listen to his rich, well-modulated voice. How perfect his memory. What graceful

gestures. How his single eye glows. See the color on his cheek.
See the strained and still attention of the little group around him.
Hear him!

“I am dying, Egypt, dying—
 Ebbs the crimson life-tide fast,
And the dark Plutonian shadows
 Gather on the evening blast.
Let thine arms, Oh! Queen, support me,
 Hush thy sobs and bow thine ear;
Listen to the great heart secrets—
 Thou, and thou alone, must hear.

“Though my proud and veteran legions
 Bear their Eagles high no more,
And my wrecked and shattered galleys
 Strew dark Actium’s fatal shore—
Though no glittering guards surround me,
 Prompt to do their master’s will,
I must perish like a Roman;
 Die—the great triumvir still.

“Let not Cæsar’s servile minions
 Mock the lion thus laid low;
’Twas no foeman’s hand that slew him,
 ’Twas his own that struck the blow.
Here, then, pillow on thy bosom
 Ere his star fade quite away,
Him, who drunk with thy caresses,
 Madly flung a world away.

“Should the base plebeian rabble
 Dare assail my fame at Rome,
Where the noble spouse Octavia
 Weeps within her widowed home—
Seek her! say the Gods have told me,
 Altars, Augurs—circling wings,
That her blood, with mine commingled,
 Yet shall mount the throne of kings.

“As for thee, dark-eyed Egyptian,
 Glorious Sorceress of the Nile,
Light the path to Stygian horrors
 With the glories of thy smiles.
Give to Cæsar Crowns and Arches,
 Let his brow the Laurel twine—
I could scorn the Senate’s triumph,
 Triumphing in love like thine.

"I am dying, Egypt, dying!
Hard! the insulting foeman's cry,
They are coming! quick! my falchion!!
Let me front them ere I die.
Ah! no more amid the battle,
Shall my heart exulting swell—
Iris and Osiris guard thee—
Cleopatra! Rome! Farewell!"

"Good!" "Bully!" "Go ahead, Jack!" "Give us some more, old fellow!" And he generally did, much to everybody's satisfaction. We all loved Jack, *the Poet* of our mess. He sleeps, his battles o'er, in Hollywood.

The *Singing man* generally put in towards the last and sung us to bed. He was generally a diminutive man, with a sweet voice and a sweetheart at home. His songs had in them rosy lips, blue eyes, golden hair, pearly teeth, and all that sort of thing. Of course he would sing some good rollicking songs in order to give all a chance. And so, with hearty chorus, "Three times around went she," "Virginia, Virginia, the Land of the Free," "No Surrender," "Lula, Lula, Lula is Gone," "John Brown's Body," with many variations, "Dixie," "The Bonnie Blue Flag," "Farewell to the Star Spangled Banner," "Hail Columbia," with immense variations, and "Maryland, My Maryland," till about the third year of the war, when we began to think Maryland had "breathed and burned" long enough and ought to "come." What part of her did come was *first class*. How the woods did ring with song. There were patriotic songs, romantic and love songs, sarcastic, comic and war songs, pirates' glees, plantation melodies, lullabies, good old hymn tunes, anthems, Sunday-school songs, and everything but vulgar and obscene songs—these were scarcely ever heard, and were nowhere in the army well received or encouraged.

The recruit—our latest acquisition—was *so* interesting. His nice, clean clothes, new hat, new shoes, trimming on his shirt front, letters and cross guns on his hat, new knife for all the fellows to borrow, nice comb for general use, nice little glass to shave by, good smoking tobacco, money in his pocket to lend out; oh! what a great convenience he was. How *many* things he had that a fellow could borrow, and how willing he was to go on guard, and get wet, and give away his rations, and bring water, and cut wood, and ride horses to water; and he was so clean and sweet, and his cheeks so rosy, all the fellows wanted to bunk with him under

his nice new blanket, and impart to him some of their numerous and energetic "tormenters."

And then it was so *interesting* to hear him talk. He knew so *much* about war, arms, tents, knapsacks, ammunition, marching, fighting, camping, cooking, shooting, and everything a soldier is and does. It is remarkable how much a recruit and how little an old soldier knows about such things. After a while the recruit forgets all, and is as ignorant as any veteran. How good the fellows were to a really gentlemanly boy; how they loved him!

The Scribe was a wonderful fellow and very useful. He could write a two-hours pass, sign the captain's name better than the captain himself, and endorse it "respectfully forwarded approved," sign the colonel's name after "respectfully forwarded approved," and then on up to the commanding officer. And do it so well! Nobody wanted anything better. The boys had great veneration for the scribe, and used him constantly.

The Mischievous man was very useful. He made fun. He knew how to volunteer to shave a fellow with a big beard and moustache. He wouldn't lend his razor, but he'd shave him. Very well—he shaves one cheek, one-half the chin, one side of the upper lip, puts his razor in his pocket, walks off, and leaves his customer the most one-sided chap in the army. He knew how to do something like this *every day*. What a treasure to a mess!

The Forager was a good fellow. He always divided with the mess. If there was buttermilk anywhere inside of ten miles he found it. Apples he could smell from afar off. If anybody was killing pork in the county he got the spareribs. If a man had a cider cart on the road he saw him first and bought him out. *No hound* had a keener scent, no eagle a sharper eye. How indefatigable he was. Distance, rivers, mountains, pickets, patrols, roll-calls—nothing could stop or hinder him. He never bragged about his exploits—simply brought in the spoils, laid them down and said, "pitch in." Not a word of the weary miles he had traveled, how he begged or how much he paid—simply "pitch in."

The Commissary man—he happened to be in our mess, never had any sugar over, any salt, any soda, any coffee—oh, no! But beg him, plead with him, bear with him when he says, "Go way, boy! Am I the commissary-general? Have I got all the sugar in the Confederacy? Don't you know rations are short now?" Then see him relax. "Come here, my son, untie that bag there, and look in that old jacket and you will find another bag—a little bag—and

look in there and you will find some sugar." "Now go round and tell everybody in camp, won't you. Tell 'em all to come and get some sugar. *Oh! I know you won't. Oh yes! of course.*"

Time would fail me to tell of the "lazy man," the "brave man," the "worthless man," the "bully," and the "ingenious man," the "helpless man," the "sensitive man," and the "gentleman," but they are as familiar to the members of the mess as the "honest man," who would not eat stolen pig, but would "take a little of the gravy."

Every soldier remembers, indeed was personally acquainted with, the *universal* man. How he denied vehemently his own identity, and talked about "poison oak," and heat and itch, and all those things, and strove in the presence of those who knew-how-it-was-themselves to prove his absolute freedom from anything like "universality." Poor fellow, sulphur internally and externally would not do. Alas! his only hope was to acknowledge his unhappy state, and stand, in the presence of his peers, confessed—a lousy man.

The "Boys in Blue" generally preferred to camp in the open fields. The Confed's took to the woods, and so the Confederate camp was not as orderly or as systematically arranged, but the most picturesque of the two. The blazing fire lit up the forms and faces and trees around it with a ruddy glow, but only deepened the gloom of the surrounding woods, so that the soldier pitied the poor fellows away off on guard in the darkness, and hugged himself and felt how good it was to be with the fellows around the fire. How companionable was the blaze and the glow of the coals! They seemed to warm the heart as well as the foot. The imagination seemed to feed on the glowing coals and surrounding gloom, and when the soldier gazed on the fire, peace, liberty, home, strolls in the woods and streets with friends, the church, the school, playmates and sweethearts all passed before him, and even the dead came to mind. Sadly, yet pleasantly, he thought of the loved and lost, and the future loomed up, and the possibility of death and prison and the grief at home would stir his heart, and the tears would fall trickling to the ground. Then was the time to fondle the little gifts from home. Simple things—the little pincushion, the needlecase with thread and buttons, the embroidered tobacco bag, and the knitted gloves. Then the time to gaze on photographs, and to read and re-read the letter telling of the struggles at home and the coming box of good things—butter and bread, and toasted and ground

coffee, and sugar cakes and pies, and other comfortable things saved by self-denial for the soldier, brother and son. Then the time to call on God to spare, protect and bless the dear, defenceless, helpless ones at home. Then the time for high resolves; to read to himself his duty; to "re-enlist for the war." Then his heart grew to his comrades, his general and his country; and as the trees, swept by the wintry winds, moaned around him, the soldier slept and dreamed, and dreamed of home, sweet home.

Those whose knowledge of war and its effects on the character of the soldier was gleaned from the history of the wars of Europe and of ancient times, greatly dreaded the demoralization which they supposed would result from the Confederate war for independence, and their solicitude was directed mainly towards the young men of Virginia and the South who were to compose the armies of the Confederate States. It was feared by many that the bivouac, the camp fires and the march would accustom the ears of their bright and innocent boys to obscenity, oaths and blasphemy, and forever destroy that purity of mind and soul which was their priceless possession when they bid farewell to home and mother. Some feared the destruction of the battle-field. The wiser feared hardship and disease; and others, more than all, the destruction of morals and everything good and pure in character. That the fears of the last named were realized in some cases cannot be denied; but that the general result was demoralization can be denied, and the contrary demonstrated.

Let us consider the effect of camp life upon a pure and noble boy; and to make the picture complete, let us go to his home and witness the parting.

The boy is clothed as a soldier. His pockets and his haversack are stored with little conveniences made by the loving hands of mother, sister and sweetheart, and the sad yet proud hour has arrived. Sisters, smiling through their tears, filled with commingled pride and sorrow, kiss and embrace their great hero.

The mother, with calm heroism suppressing her tender maternal grief, impresses upon his lips a fervent, never-to-be-forgotten kiss, presses him to her heart, and resigns him to God, his country and his honor.

The father, last to part, presses his hand, gazes with ineffable love into his bright eyes, and fearing to trust his feelings for a more lengthy farewell, says, "Good bye, my boy; God bless you, be a man!"

Let those scoff who will; but let them know that such a parting is itself a new and wonderful power, a soul-enlarging, purifying and elevating power, worth the danger, toil and suffering of the soldier. The sister's tears, the father's words, the mother's kiss, planted in the memory of that boy will surely bring forth fruit beautiful as a mother's love.

As he journeys to the camp, how dear do all at home become! Oh! what holy tears he sheds! His heart, how tender! Then, as he nears the line, and sees for the first time the realities of war, the passing sick and weary, and the wounded and bloody dead, his soldier spirit is born; he smiles, his chest expands, his eyes brighten, his heart swells with pride; he hurries on, and soon stands in the magic circle around the glowing fire, the admired and loved pet of a dozen true hearts. Is he happy? Aye! Never before has he felt such glorious, swelling, panting joy. He's a soldier now! He is put on guard. No longer the object of care and solicitude, he stands in the solitude of the night, himself a guardian of those who sleep. Courage is his now. He feels he is trusted as a man, and is ready at once nobly to perish in the defence of his comrades.

He marches. Dare he murmur or complain? No; the eyes of all are upon him, and endurance grows silently, till pain and weariness are familiar, and cheerfully borne.

At home he would be pitied and petted; but now he must endure, or have the contempt of the strong spirits around him.

He is hungry. So are others; and he must not only bear the privation, but he must divide his pitiful meal when he gets it with his comrades; and so generosity strikes down selfishness. In a thousand ways he is tried, and that by sharp critics. His smallest faults are necessarily apparent, for, in the varying conditions of the soldier, every quality is put to the test. If he shows the least cowardice he is undone. His courage must never fail. He must be manly and independent, or he will be told he's a baby, ridiculed, teased and despised. When war assumes her serious dress, he sees the helplessness of women and children, he hears their piteous appeals, and chivalry burns him till he does his utmost of sacrifice and effort to protect and comfort and cheer them.

It is a mistake to suppose that the older men in the army encouraged vulgarity and obscenity in the young recruit; for even those who themselves indulged in these would frown on the first show of them in a boy, and without hesitation put him down mercilessly. No parent could watch a boy as closely as his mess-mates

did and could, because they saw him at all hours of the day and night, dependent on himself alone: and were merciless critics, who demanded more of their protege than they were willing to submit to themselves.

The young soldier's piety had to perish ignominiously, or else assume a boldness and strength which nothing else could so well impart as the temptations, sneers and dangers of the army. Religion had to be bold, practical and courageous, or die.

In the army the young man learned to value men for what they were, and not on account of education, wealth or station; and so his attachments when formed were sincere and durable, and he learned what constitutes a man, and a desirable and reliable friend. The stern demands upon the boy, and the unrelenting criticisms of the mess, soon bring to mind the gentle forbearance, and kind remonstrance, and loving counsels of parents and homefolks, and while he thinks, he weeps, and loves, and reverences, and yearns after the things against which he once strove and under which he chafed and complained.

Home, father, mother, sister—oh! how far away; oh! how dear. Himself how contemptible! ever to have felt cold and indifferent to such love. Then, how vividly he recalls the warm pressure of his mother's lips on the forehead of her boy. How he loves his mother! See him as he fills his pipe from the silk embroidered bag. There is his name embroidered carefully, beautifully by his sister's hand. Does he forget her? Does he not now love her more sincerely and truly and tenderly than ever? Could he love her quite as much had he never parted, never longed to see her and could not; never been uncertain if she was safe, never felt she might be homeless, helpless, insulted, a refugee from home? Can he ever now look on a little girl and not treat her kindly, gently and lovingly—remembering his sister? A boy having ordinary natural goodness, and the home supports described, and the constant watching of men, ready to criticise, could but improve. The least exhibition of selfishness, cowardice, vulgarity, dishonesty, or meanness of any kind, brought down the dislike of every man upon him, and persistence in *any one* disreputable practice, or habitual laziness and worthlessness, resulted in complete ostracism, loneliness and misery; while on the other hand he might, by good behavior and genuine generosity and courage, secure unbounded love and sincere respect from all. Visits home, after prolonged

absence and danger, open to the young soldier new treasures—new, because, though possessed always, never before felt and realized.

The affection once seen only in every day attention, as he reaches home, breaks out in unrestrained vehemence. The warm embrace of the hitherto dignified father, the ecstatic pleasure beaming in the mother's eye, the proud welcome of the sister, and the wild enthusiasm even of the old black mammy, crowd on him the knowledge of their love and make him braver, and stronger, and nobler. He's a hero from that hour! Death for these—how easy!! The dangers of the battle-field, and the demands upon his energy, strength and courage, not only strengthen, but almost create new faculties of mind and heart. The death, sudden and terrible, of those dear to him, and the imperative necessity of standing to his duty while the wounded cry and groan, and while his heart yearns after them to help them, and the terrible thirst, and hunger, and heat, and weariness—all these teach a boy self-denial, attachment to duty, and the value of peace and safety; and instead of hardening him, as some suppose they do, make him to pity and love even the enemy of his country who bleeds and dies for *his* country.

The acquirement of subordination certainly is a useful one, and that the soldier perforce has. And that not in an abject, cringing way, but as realizing the necessity of it, and seeing the result of it in the good order and consequent effectiveness and success of the army as a whole, but more particularly of his own company and detachment.

And if the soldier rises to office, the responsibility of command, attention to detail and minutiae, the critical eyes of his subordinates, and the demands of his superiors, all withdraw him from the enticements of vice, and mould him into a solid, substantial character, both capable and willing to meet and overcome difficulties.

The effect of outdoor life on the physical constitution is undoubtedly good, and as the physical improves, the mental is improved; and as the mind is enlightened, the spirit is enabled to grasp the purifying truths of the gospel, and thus the whole man is benefited.

Who can calculate the benefit derived from the contemplation of the beautiful in nature, as the soldier sees? Mountains and valleys, dreary wastes and verdant fields, rivers, sequestered homes, stirred by the sounds of war; quiet, sleepy villages, as they lay in the morning light, doomed to the flames at evening: this enlarges the

mind, and stores it with a panorama whose pictures he may pass before his mental vision with quiet pleasure year after year for a lifetime.

War is horrible, but still it is in a sense a privilege to have lived in time of war. The emotions are never so stirred as then. Imagination takes her highest flights, poetry blazes, song stirs the soul, and every noble attribute is brought into full play.

It does seem that the production of one Lee and one Jackson is worth much blood and treasure, and the building of a noble character all the toil and sacrifice of war. The camp fires of the Army of Northern Virginia were not places of revelry and debauchery. They often exhibited gentle scenes of love and humanity, and the purest sentiments and gentlest feelings of man were there admired and loved, while vice and debauch, in any, from highest to lowest, were condemned and punished more severely than they are among those who stay at home and shirk the dangers and toils of the soldier's life. Indeed, the demoralizing effects of the late war were far more visible "at home" among the skulks, and bomb-proofs, and suddenly diseased, than in the army.

And the demoralized men of to-day are not those who served in the army.

The defaulters, the renegades, the bummers and cheats, are the boys who enjoyed fat places and salaries and easy comfort—while the solid, respected and reliable men of the community are those who did their duty as soldiers, and having learned to suffer in war have preferred to labor and suffer and earn rather than steal—in peace.

And, strange to say, it is not those who suffered most and lost most, who fought and bled—who saw friend after friend fall, who wept the dead and buried their hopes—it is not these who now are bitter and dissatisfied, and quarrelsome and fretful, and growling and complaining—no, they are the peaceful, submissive, law-abiding and order-loving of the country, ready to join hands with all good men in every good work, and prove themselves as brave and good in peace as they were stubborn and unconquerable in war.

Many a weak, puny boy was returned to his parents a robust, healthy, *manly man*. Many a timid, helpless boy went home a brave, independent man. Many a wild, reckless boy, went home sobered, serious and trustworthy, and many whose career at home was wicked and blasphemous, went home changed in heart, with

principles fixed, to comfort and sustain the old ages of those who gave them to their country, expecting not to receive them again. Men learned that life was passable and enjoyable without a roof or even a tent, to shelter from the storm—that cheerfulness was compatible with cold and hunger, and that a man without money, food or shelter, need not feel utterly hopeless, but might, by employing his wits, find something to eat where he never found it before; and feel that, like a terrapin, he might make himself at home wherever he might be. Men did actually become as independent of the imaginary “necessities” as the very wild beasts. And can a man learn all this and not know better than another how to economize what he has and how to appreciate the numberless superfluities of life? Is he not made, by the knowledge he has of how little he really needs, more independent and less liable to dishonest exertions to procure a competency?

If there were any true men in the South, any brave, any noble, they were in the army. If there are good and true men in the South now, they would go into the army for similar cause. And to prove that the army demoralized, you must prove that the men who came out of it are the worst in the country to-day. Who will try it?

Strange as it may seem, religion flourished in the army. So great was the work of the chaplains, that whole volumes have been written to describe the religious history of the four years of war. Officers who were ungodly men found themselves restrained alike by the grandeur of the piety of the great chiefs and the earnestness of the humble privates around them. Thousands embraced the Gospel, and died triumphing over death! Instead of the degradation so dreaded, was the strange ennobling and purifying which made men despise all the things for which they ordinarily strive, and glory in the sternest hardships, the most bitter self-denials and cruel suffering and death. Love for home, kindred and friends intensified, was denied the gratification of its yearnings, and made the motive for more complete surrender to the stern demands of duty. Discipline, the cold master of our enemies, never caught up with the gallant devotion of our Christian soldiers, and the science of war quailed before the majesty of an army singing hymns.

Hypocrisy went home to dwell with the able-bodied skulkers, being too closely watched in the army and too thoroughly known to thrive. And so the camp fire often lighted the pages of the best Book, while the soldier read the orders of the Captain of his salva-

tion. And often did the songs of Zion ring loud and clear on the cold night air, while the muskets rattled and the guns boomed in the distance, each intensifying the significance of the other, testing the sincerity of the Christian while trying the courage of the soldier. Stripped of all sensual allurements, and offering only self-denial, patience and endurance, the Gospel took hold of the deepest and purest motives of the soldiers, won them thoroughly, and made the army as famous for its forbearance, temperance, respect for women and children, sobriety, honesty and morality, as it was for endurance and invincible courage.

Never was there an army where feeble old age received such sympathy, consideration and protection; and women, deprived of their natural protectors, fled from the advancing hosts of the enemy and found safe retreat and chivalrous protection and shelter in the lines of the Army of Northern Virginia; while children played in the camps, delighted to nestle in the arms of the roughly clad but tender-hearted soldiers. Such was the behavior of the troops on the campaign in Pennsylvania, that the the citizens of Gettysburg have in my presence expressed wonder and surprise at their perfect immunity from insult, violence, or even intrusion, when their city was occupied by and in complete possession of the Boys in Gray.

Letter from General J. E. Johnston.

REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,
Secretary Southern Historical Society:

Dear Sir—In the account of "The Seven Days' Fighting" published by your Society in the June No. of the Southern Magazine, there are some errors as to the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia in the beginning of June, 1862. As they contradict previous statements of mine, I beg leave to point them out. In the statement of the strength of Holmes' division, at least 4,000 brought by him to the army from Petersburg, June 1st, are omitted; only those brought at the end of the month are referred to—they may have been 6,500.

In that of Longstreet's, the strength was near 14,000 June 1st. The six brigades that *then* joined it had been reduced to 9,000 when they marched, late in August, to Northern Virginia. The cavalry

could not have exceeded 3,000, nor the reserve artillery 1,000, June 1st.

G. W. Smith's division of five brigades amounted to near 13,000 June 1st; only two of these brigades, guessed by the author to number 5,300, are mentioned, under Whiting, as belonging to Jackson's command. Jackson's and Ewell's divisions are set down at 9,000. General Ewell, with whom I had repeated conversations on the subject, told me that he had in his 8,000 men. General Jackson had a brigade more, and at the first of the year amounted to 10,200.

General Lawton had about 3,500 men at Cold Harbor, but (*he still says*) brought 6,000 into the army, many being left behind in Jackson's march—as rapid as usual—and they unaccustomed to marching, having served only in garrison.

General Ripley's troops are also omitted. He reported to the Adjutant-General of the army, the afternoon of May 31st, his arrival in Richmond with 5,000 men to join it.

The author gives our loss at "Seven Pines," on the Williamsburg road, at above 4,800. General Longstreet, in his official report dated June 11th, when, if ever, the number of killed and wounded must have been known, gives it roughly at 3,000. General D. H. Hill, whose division did all the fighting on that road from three o'clock (when it began) to six, and four-fifths of it from six to seven, when it ended, set his down at 2,500—leaving 500 for that of R. H. Anderson, who came into the first line at six, on the 31st, and Pickett's, and part (two regiments) of Pryor's, June 31st, which is consistent. According to the writer, two brigades and a half in two hours lost about as heavily as four in four hours of harder fighting.

Very truly yours,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

A Correction.

SELMA, ALA., March 11th, 1875.

DR. J. WM. JONES,

Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va. :

Dear Sir—I wish to correct my narrative of the services of the Ironclad "Virginia," in which the Teaser, Beaufort and Raleigh are called "*tugs*." In the fight they did good service as "gunboats," and should have been so designated. The Beaufort had a con-

verted, single-banded rifle gun, 32-pound calibre, and a 24-pound carronade. The Teaser and Raleigh were, I think, similarly armed.

Please annex this to my narrative, and you will oblige,

Your obedient servant,

CATESBY AP. R. JONES.

Capture of the Indianola.

REV. JOHN WILLIAM JONES,

Secretary of the Southern Historical Society:

Sir—The last September number of the Southern Magazine contained an article in relation to the capture of the Federal ironclad *Indianola*. The article, in the absence of other information, draws its narrative principally from letters published in the Northern press during the war. It would manifestly be unjust to the officers and men who effected the capture to allow the facts stated in the article to remain the only record in the archives of the Historical Society. I deem it proper, therefore, to vindicate the truth of history by transmitting to you the order of General Taylor organizing the expedition, the official report of the engagement with and capture of the *Indianola*, which report, I believe, has never yet been published.

For the better understanding of the report, it is well to briefly describe the Confederate rams that effected the capture.

The *Webb* was an ordinary tow-boat, engaged before the war in towing and piloting vessels in and out the Mississippi, and in no way materially changed or strengthened, though braced by cross pieces of timber. A row of cotton bales extended in front of her machinery, leaving its sides and rear entirely bare. The armament consisted of a rifled and banded 32-pounder, mounted on the bow, without any semblance of protection, and of two brass six-pound guns, and she was manned by about 70 artillerists and sharpshooters. There was no cover or protection for the men.

The "Queen of the West" was an ordinary steamboat of the Western rivers, built for peaceful purposes ten years before the war, and converted by the Federals into a ram.

A wooden frame was built around her machinery to enclose it, and outside of this frame two tiers of cotton bales extended from

the main deck to the cabin deck—but this arrangement was so defective, that it was unable to protect the machinery from the fire of a smooth-bore 32-pound gun, which, at the distance of over 1,200 yards, disabled her machinery, and thereby effected her capture by the Confederates when she ascended Red river and came under the fire of Fort DeRussey.

The armament of the *Queen* in her engagement with the *Indianola* consisted of only what was captured with her, and was composed of a 30-pounder Parrot gun mounted on her bow, and utterly unprotected, and a 20-pounder Parrot gun and three 12-pounder howitzers on her cabin deck.

Around these latter guns was a wall composed of 3-inch plank, which, while merely affording a screen, became a source of increased hazard and peril when exposed to artillery fire. She was manned with about eighty artillerymen and sharpshooters.

In the beginning of 1863 the Federal forces held the whole of the Mississippi river, except that portion lying between Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

It was essential for the Confederates to retain, as long as possible, this small link, as it served as the only connection between the Trans-Mississippi and the East.

If this narrow section of the river was lost, Texas, West Louisiana and Arkansas would be practically severed from the Confederacy, and Vicksburg and Port Hudson shut off from the supplies of provisions then much needed, while the constant stream of cattle which were being driven in thousands from Texas, and crossed over the river near Red river to supply the Western armies, would be interrupted and destroyed.

Major-General Richard Taylor, then commanding the Western District of Louisiana, fully appreciated the vital importance of maintaining his connection with the east of the river, and when in the beginning of February, 1863, he learned that the *Queen* of the West had run past our batteries at Vicksburg, he ordered one or two steamboats then on Red river to be prepared to pursue her, but it chanced that the *Queen* ascended Red river, and engaged his batteries at Fort DeRussey, and was captured. The *Queen* was immediately brought to Alexandria, and while she was being repaired, information reached General Taylor that the *Indianola* had run past the Vicksburg batteries, and the control of the river was again wrested from us.

General Taylor, whose marvelous energy is well known to all

who ever served under him, pushed the repairs on the *Queen* with all the means at his command. Great wood fires were lighted on the shore, and the work continued day and night; and when, on the 19th February, the *Queen* left Alexandria, work was still going on, and mechanics were carried down to complete her while steaming towards the enemy.

The capture of the *Indianola* restored to the Confederates for several weeks the command of the Mississippi river between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and General Taylor was able to forward immense supplies to Port Hudson and Vicksburg, which enabled the defence of these strongholds to be protracted.

But in the spring Admiral Farragut came up from the Gulf, and gave his hand to Admiral Porter, and the great river passed from the power of the Confederates.

Yours, respectfully,

J. L. BRENT.

Ashland, La. (New River P. O.), March 31, 1875.

(Copy.)

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WESTERN LOUISIANA, }
Alexandria, February 19, 1863.

(Extract.)

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 49.

* * * * *

III. Major J. L. Brent will take supreme command of the two gunboats, the *Queen of the West*, Captain James McCloskey commanding, and the *Webb*, Captain Pierce.

He will apply to Major W. M. Levy, commanding post at Fort DeRussey, for such aid and assistance as he may require for fitting out the expedition in the shortest possible space of time, which will be rendered by Major Levy to the extent of his means.

So soon as the boats shall be ready for service, Major Brent will proceed down Red river, taking with him the steamer *Grand Duke*, if deemed advisable, and into the Mississippi in search of the enemy's gunboat.

In the event of her capture or destruction, Major Brent will act in accordance with the verbal instructions of the Major-General commanding, or in such other manner as circumstances may direct.

By command of Major-General Taylor.

E. SURGET, A. A. General.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. TAYLOR'S GUNBOAT EXPEDITION,
C. S. Webb, thirty miles below Vicksburg,
Off Prize Ironclad *Indianola*,
February 25th, 1863. }

Maj. E. SURGET, A. A. Gen.:

Major—My last dispatch to you, exclusive of the telegram sent you last night, was from Natchez. The Federal ironclad *Indianola* had forty-eight hours start of us at Acklin's Landing; at Natchez she was less than twenty-five hours in advance. We left Natchez on the evening of the 23d instant; and I found that we could easily overhaul her on the evening of the 24th, but I determined not to do so, in order that I might bring the enemy to an engagement only at night, considering for many reasons that this time was most advantageous to us.

We reached Grand Gulf before sunset, and there learned that the enemy was only about four hours in advance of us. As we were running more than two miles to his one, the time required to overtake him could be easily calculated, and I determined to overtake and bring him to action early in the night.

We came up with the *Indianola* about 9.40 last night, just above New Carthage, near the foot of Palmyra island, and I immediately signalled the *Webb* to prepare for action.

Our order of approach was as follows: The *Queen of the West* about 500 yards in advance of the *Webb*, and the *Batey*, Lieutenant-Colonel Brand commanding (who I wrote you joined us with a force and steamer fitted out at Port Hudson) over two miles in the rear, and lashed to my tender the *Grand Era*.

The moon was partially obscured by a veil of clouds, and gave and permitted just sufficient light for us to see where to strike with our rams, and just sufficient obscurity to render uncertain the aim of the formidable artillery of the enemy.

We first discovered him when about 1,000 yards distant, hugging the western bank of the Mississippi, with his head quartering across and down the river.

Not an indication of life appeared as we dashed on towards him, his lights obscured, and his machinery apparently without motion.

We had also covered our lights, and only the fires of the *Era* could be seen, two miles back, where she was towing the *Batey*.

The distance between him and the *Queen* had diminished to about 500 yards, when, for the first time, we could clearly distinguish the long black line of the two coal barges which protected his sides from forward of his bow to nearly abreast his wheels.

The impatient desire of our men to open fire could be scarcely restrained, but I would not allow it, as the vast importance of traversing the distance to be passed over without drawing the fire of his powerful guns was too apparent. At last, when within about 100 yards, I authorized Captain McCloskey to open fire, which he accordingly did with his two Parrot guns and one Cross

12-pounder; but at the second round the 20-pounder Parrot was disabled by blowing out its vent-piece.

Our intention was to dash our bow near the enemy's wheel-house, just in rear of the coal barge, but when about fifty yards distant he backed and interposed the barge between us and him. Our bow went crushing clear through the barge, heavily loaded with coal, and was not arrested until it struck with a violent shock, and scattered some of his timbers amidship, deeply indenting the iron plating of his hull.

So tremendous had been the momentum of our attack, made under full pressure of steam, that for some minutes we could not disengage ourselves, but remained with our bows against the sides of the *Indianola*, held fast by the pressure of the coal and barge through which we had crushed. In this position our sharpshooters kept up fire, sweeping the deck of the enemy, who feebly answered.

After a brief interval one of the coal barges sank, and the other drifted down the current; and the *Queen* finding herself free, immediately rounded up stream, to add to her next charge the additional power obtainable from the descending current of the river. Just then the *Webb* came dashing by us, and plunged into the *Indianola* with great force just in rear, or on the turn of her bow.

Some of the iron plating was loosened, but this blow of the *Webb* produced no serious external injury, though prisoners since report that it disabled the left-hand engine.

As the *Webb* approached on this her first charge, the two 11-inch Dahlgreen guns in the forward casemate of the enemy opened on her at seventy-five yards distant, but fortunately she was untouched.

The vigor of the *Webb's* onset forced the enemy around, and carrying her forward laid her across and in actual contact with these monitor guns, if run out in battery. Dashing safely around from this perilous position, the *Webb* swung across the bow and on to the starboard side of the enemy, getting between him and his remaining coal barge, breaking its fastenings and setting it adrift.

The result of our first onset was to strip the *Indianola* of the two coal barges which protected her sides, and to injure her to some extent in her wheel, which was apparent from the subsequent want of rapidity and precision in her movements.

As soon as the *Webb* swept away clear of the enemy the *Queen* swung around and again dashed upon him, who this time with partial success endeavored to break the force of the onset, by presenting his bow to our bow. But his movements were too torpid, and not entirely successful, which tends to confirm the belief that his machinery was injured by the first blow.

The *Queen* struck a little forward of midships, but, as he was turning, the force of the blow glanced along his side and passed his wheel-house.

Just as the *Queen* swung clear of his stern, he opened upon us with two 9-inch guns in his after iron casemate at so near a range

that the flames of the guns almost touched us—their heat being felt.

One shot struck the *Queen* on her starboard shoulder and knocked away ten or twelve bales of cotton, causing us to list over, and then a shell entered under our front port hole, on the port side, struck the chase of a brass 12-pounder gun and exploded, killing two men, wounding four, and disabling two pieces.

This time the *Queen* swung around rapidly up stream, and in a very brief interval dashed on the enemy for the third time, striking a little to the rear of his starboard wheel-house, crashing through and shattering his frame work, and loosening some of his iron plates. By this time the *Webb* had run up stream, making a wide circuit, had turned, and, for her second onset, came charging on with a full head of steam just as the *Queen* had rounded out after her third blow, and striking the enemy very nearly in the same place where the *Queen* had just before hit him.

Through and through his timbers, crushing and dashing aside his iron plates, the sharp bow of the *Webb* penetrated as if it were going to pass entirely through the ship. As the *Webb* backed clear the *Indianola*, with all the speed she could raise, declined further fight and ran down the river towards the western bank, with the intention, as afterwards appeared, of getting a line out on shore, in order that the officers and crew might land and abandon their steamer. In fact a line was got out on shore, but not fastened, and three of the crew effected their escape, but were captured to-day by the cavalry of Major Harrison.

After the *Queen* had struck the enemy for the third time, she was for sometime almost unmanageable—she had listed so much over on the port side that one of her wheels was raised nearly out of the water. She was making water, and presented every appearance of sinking.

Captain McCloskey righted her a little by throwing over cotton from his upper decks.

He was able to bring her around very slowly; but still this gallant commander succeeded in weaning her with difficulty, and headed her for her fourth charge.

Whilst the *Webb* had her bow knocked off to within fourteen inches of the water line, her splendid machinery was unhurt, and she quickly and gallantly bore up for her third charge. When bearing down and approaching the enemy, Captain Pierce reports that he was hailed from the enemy's deck, announcing his surrender, and begged to be towed ashore, as he was sinking. Captain Pierce further represents that he then placed a line on board and commenced towing the *Indianola*, when the line parted.

As the *Queen of the West* was running off from her last charge, making a circuit to obtain room and space to add increased momentum to her onset, we encountered the steamer *Batey*, Lieutenant-Colonel Brand commanding, who had cast off from the tender *Grand Era*, and was hovering around to enter the fight when an opportunity offered.

The *Batey* is a frail steamboat, with but little power, and incapable of being used as a ram. She was crowded with two hundred and fifty gallant volunteers from the forces at Port Hudson, who had embarked in the *Batey* with the resolution to fight the enemy by boarding him. We called out to them that the opportunity for boarding had arrived, as it was apparent the enemy was disabled and much demoralized.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brand with his command gallantly bore away, approached the enemy after the line from the *Webb* had parted, and gave, as I am informed by him, the command, "prepare to board," when he was greeted by a voice from the *Indianola*, announcing her surrender, and that she was in a sinking condition.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brand then boarded her upper deck, and received the sword of the Federal commander, Lieutenant Brown.

This result must have been very gratifying to Colonel Brand, as it was obtained without the loss or injury of a single man of his command.

Upon my reaching the deck of the *Indianola*, Lieutenant-Colonel Brand most handsomely acknowledged that the capture was entirely due to the *Queen of the West* and to the *Webb*, and he has so officially reported.

I have no doubt, if it had been necessary, that Colonel Brand and his gallant command would have again demonstrated that nothing can resist the desperation of troops who regard not their own lives, but victory.

Upon taking possession, I immediately appointed Lieutenant Thomas H. Handy prize-master.

We found our prize a most formidable gunboat, mounting two 11-inch guns forward, and two 9-inch guns aft, all protected by thick iron casemates, utterly impenetrable to our artillery, even at the very shortest range. The motive power consisted of side wheels and two propellers. She was filled with a valuable cargo, embracing supplies, stores, etc. The officers and crew, amounting to over one hundred, fell into our hands as prisoners. Nothing shows more clearly how well she was protected than the fact that our artillery, though frequently fired at the range of twenty and thirty yards, utterly failed to injure her. Lieutenant Handy, of the *Webb*, fired an 80-pound shell from his rifled and banded 32-pound gun so close to the forward casemate of the enemy that it actually enveloped his port-holes in flames, and yet no injury was sustained by the casemate.

Our sharpshooters deliberately and coolly fired at every onset.

Notwithstanding all these circumstances, the enemy lost but one man killed and none wounded. The *Webb* had one man wounded, and the *Queen* two killed and four wounded.

The fire of the enemy was terrific, and delivered at short range mostly. His huge shot and shell were directed a little wide of the mark, except the two shots that struck the *Queen*, and one shot that passed through the bulwarks of the *Webb*. This was re-

markable, as he frequently fired at such close range that the flames of his enormous guns almost enveloped our bows.

The escape from destruction of the feeble crafts, that were five times precipitated upon the iron sides of this powerful war-steamer, mounting an armament of 9 and 11-inch guns, was Providential.

On taking possession, we found our prize rapidly making water, which we could not arrest. Seeing that she would sink, I did not wish that this should take place on the western side of the river, where the Federal forces could easily have retaken her, and therefore made fast to her with two of my steamers, and towed her over the river to the eastern side, where she sunk in the water up to her gun-deck, just as we reached the shallow water, thus losing us the enormous value of her capture, as well as the valuable stores that were in her hold.

I am much indebted for the success of the expedition to the skill and gallantry of my officers and men. Captain James McCloskey, commanding the *Queen*, combined with the courage of the soldier, the skill and aptitude that characterizes the sailor of our western waters. Lieutenant Thomas H. Handy, of the Crescent artillery, commanded the troops on the *Webb*. He exhibited skill and courage in handling his command, and in person assisted in manning the 32-pound rifled gun. Lieutenant Rice, of the Twenty-first Tennessee, was on the *Webb* with a detachment from his regiment, and bore himself well and gallantly. Lieutenant Prather, also on the *Webb*, served his two-field pieces entirely unprotected with praiseworthy courage, and was well seconded by Mr. Charles Schuler, acting as chief of one of the guns.

Captain Charles Pierce, a civilian, commanded and controlled the movements of the *Webb*. It was he who selected the weak spots of the enemy, and with a steady hand and eye dashed the *Webb* against the *Indianola*.

Not only did the officers act well, but I have nothing but commendations for the private soldiers.

Captain Caines' and Lieutenant Rice's company, of the Twenty-first Tennessee, and the detachment of Lieutenant Doolan, adjutant of Major Burnett's battalion of Texans, and detachment from the Third Maryland artillery, were in the expedition, and acted with courage and discipline when under fire.

Captain J. W. Mangum, Assistant-Adjutant General of Brigadier-General Moore, accompanied the expedition as a volunteer and acted as my adjutant. He comported himself gallantly under fire; and throughout the expedition rendered me valuable services.

I herewith submit the report of Captain McCloskey, commanding the *Queen*. He mentions favorably Captain Caines and Lieutenant Miller of the Twenty-first Tennessee, Lieutenant Doolan, adjutant of Major Burnett's battalion, Sergeant E. H. Langley, of the Third Maryland artillery, acting as lieutenant in charge of the two Parrot guns; and the volunteers, Captain J. H. White, slightly

wounded, acting with efficiency as ordnance officer; Captain Tank and Lieutenants Fisk and Stanmeyer, both wounded, and Lieutenant R. R. Hyams, who as quartermaster and commissary exhibited much energy. As I was on board the *Queen* during the action, the conduct of the officers and men was under my own eye, and I cheerfully endorse the commendation of Captain McCloskey. He also speaks highly of the intrepid promptness and skill of his pilots and engineers, and of the conduct of Assistant Surgeon Blanchard, who manifested much care and coolness, coming on the gun-deck in the midst of the action and personally supervising the removal of the wounded.

Sergeant Magruder, of the signal corps, also deserves mention for having rendered very important services in the discharge of the responsible duties devolved upon him.

Captain Pierce, of the *Webb*, verbally reports to me that his pilots and engineers behaved themselves with coolness and bravery, and discharged their duties with promptness and energy.

I have no doubt that this is correct, from the skillful and efficient manner in which his boat was handled.

This report is dated from the *Webb*, as I have dispatched the *Queen*, Captain McCloskey, to Warrenton, and if possible to Vicksburg.

I am, Major, yours respectfully,

J. L. BRENT,
Major Commanding.

Speech of General Fitz. Lee, at A. N. V. Banquet, October 28th, 1875.

After speaking in general terms to the sentiment of the toast to the cavalry, General Lee delivered the following beautiful tribute to his old commander, General J. E. B. Stuart:

Brother Confederates—I hope I may receive your pardon if I occupy a brief portion of your time in talking to you of the Chief of Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, for my thoughts just now go out, in the language of General Johnston, to the “Indefatigable Stuart.”

To-day, comrades, I visited his grave. He sleeps his last sleep upon a little hillside in Hollywood, in so quiet, secluded a spot that I felt indeed that no sound “could awake him to glory again.” A simple wooden slab marks the spot, upon which is inscribed—“*General Stuart, wounded May 11th, 1864; died May 12th, 1864.*” And there rests poor J. E. B. Stuart,

It was in 1852 I first knew him, the date of my entry as a cadet in the United States Military Academy—twenty-three years ago. Having entered West Point two years before, he was a second-

class-man at the time—a classmate of Custis Lee's, Pegram's and Pender's. "Beauty Stuart" he was then universally called, for however manly and soldierly in appearance he afterwards grew, in those days his comrades bestowed that appellation upon him to express their idea of his personal comeliness in inverse ratio to the term employed.

In that year, I recollect, he was orderly sergeant of his company, and in his first-class year its cadet captain.

I recall his distinguishing characteristics, which were a strict attention to his military duties, an erect, soldierly bearing, an immediate and almost thankful acceptance of a challenge from any cadet to fight, who might in any way feel himself aggrieved, and a clear, metallic, ringing voice.

I can well remember, when a cadet there and in the next company to his in the line at parade, always listening with eagerness to hear him bring his company to "order arms, parade rest"—there was so much music in his voice; and even as I speak here I fancy I can almost hear it once more, sounding like the silver trumpet of the Archangel.

Little, gentlemen, did I imagine then that I would hear that same voice so often above the roar of battle and trampling of steeds upon so many hard fought fields—still delightfully musical, calm and clear as of old—only perhaps a little more powerful.

After his graduation, I never saw him again until the commencement of the late war. He was assigned to the First United States Cavalry, whose Colonel was Sumner and whose Lieutenant-Colonel was Joseph E. Johnston. Two years later, when I graduated, I was put in the Second Cavalry, serving in Texas. My Colonel was Albert Sidney Johnson; the Lieutenant-Colonel was R. E. Lee; the Majors were Hardee and George H. Thomas, and the two senior Captains Van Dorn and Kirby Smith.

Stuart served with much distinction as a United States officer; had plenty of roving, riding, and fighting Indians.

When John Brown's troops were marching on and took possession of the engine-house at Harper's Ferry, Stuart was in or near Washington on leave of absence, but he immediately volunteered for the occasion, and accompanied the then Colonel R. E. Lee as his aid to that place. He it was who, at great personal *risk*, carried the summons to surrender to Brown, and afterwards united in the charge the marines under Green made there when battering down the door, and largely contributed to end forever the career of

the "messenger and prophet," as some at the North delighted to call him.

J. E. B. Stuart's duties began in the late war in the Valley of Virginia, as a Lieutenant-Colonel of cavalry under General Johnston, when he was confronting Patterson, and after that his person, his prowess, his daring, his dash, his gay humor, his great services, are as familiar as "household words" to all of us. Many within the sound of my voice recall him then. His strong figure, his big brown beard, his piercing, laughing blue eye, the drooping hat and black feather, the "fighting jacket," as he termed it, the tall cavalry boots, the high health and exuberant vitality, forming one of the most jubilant and striking figures in the war, which cannot easily be forgotten.

It was after the first battle of Manassas that my personal intercourse with him began. I in turn, as he was promoted, commanded his old regiment, his old brigade, and his old division—being one step behind him—and feel that, perhaps, I have a right to speak of him. Can I or any one else do justice to his many exploits as commander of the cavalry of the historic "Army of Northern Virginia?"

Is it necessary to tell you that his ride around McClellan's army, on the Richmond lines, was not undertaken to gain eclat by the popular applause it might bring him, but it was made to locate the flanks of the Federal army—to blaze the way for the great Stonewall Jackson, whose memory has been so vividly recalled to us, and whom General Lee was planning to bring down upon the right and rear of McClellan, and wanted to know where it was located. I commanded a regiment upon that expedition, and know that after Stuart found himself in rear of the Federal right, his own grand genius taught him to make the circuit—the entire circuit of the Federal army—as the easiest way to avoid the dispositions that were being made to cut him off, should he return the way he marched.

Must I tell you of his trip to Catlett's, in Pope's rear, or of his second ride around the same McClellan, and of his ride from Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to Leesburg, Virginia, a distance of ninety miles, in thirty-six hours—a march that has no equal in point of rapidity in the records of the war? Of his behavior upon the right of Jackson at Fredericksburg? Of Chancellorsville, where an eye-witness asserts that he could not get rid of the idea that "Harry of Navarre" was present, except that Stuart's plume was

black; for everywhere, like "Navarre," he was in front, and the men "followed the feather"? And where, riding at the head of and in command of Jackson's veterans, his ringing voice could be heard high, high above the thunder of artillery and the ceaseless roar of musketry, singing, "Old Joe Hooker, won't you come out the wilderness"? Of the 9th of June, at Beverly's Ford; of Brandy Station; of Gettysburg; of his action during the memorable early days of May, 1864; of his last official dispatch, dated May 11, 1864, 6.30 A. M., where he was fighting against the immense odds of Sheridan, preventing them from occupying this city, and where he said, "My men and horses are tired, hungry and jaded, but all right?" Of "Yellow Tavern," fought six miles from here, where his mortal wound was received, given when he was so close to the line of the enemy that he was firing his pistol at them? His voice—I can even now hear—after the fatal shot was fired, as he called out to me as I rode up to him, "Go ahead, Fitz, old fellow, I know you will do what is right," and constitutes my most precious legacy.

Shall I tell you when he was on the Rappahannock, and they telegraphed him his child was dying—his darling little Flora—that he replied that "I shall have to leave my child in the hands of God; my duty to my country requires me here."

Comrades, here in the city of Richmond, and for whose defence he fell, his pure spirit winged its way to heaven. Faith, which overcomes all things, was in his heart. Right here he, who on the battle-field was more fiery than even "Rupert of the bloody sword," quietly lay awaiting the summons of the angel of death. The bright blue eye, that always beamed with laughter, now looked into the very face of death without a quiver of the lid. About noon of the day of his death, President Davis visited his bedside, and in reply to his question as to how he felt, the dying hero answered, "Easy, but willing to die if God and my country think I have fulfilled my destiny and done my duty," showing that beneath the gay manners of the cavalier there was a deep, divine and religious sentiment that shone forth, illuminating the hero's character and giving dignity to the last moments of his life.

"Sing," said he to the Rev. Dr. Peterkin, the very worthy pastor of St. James church in this city, "Rock of ages cleft for me, let me hide myself in Thee," and the fast sinking soldier joined in with all the strength his failing power permitted. He then prayed with the friends around, and with the words "I am going fast now, I

am resigned, God's will be done," the great, grand cavalry leader furl'd his battle-flag forever.

Gentlemen, my object in all this is to bring you to the simple grave upon the hillside in beautiful Hollywood that I saw to-day, and to ask you if the Pantheon of Virginia's heart can be complete until it contains the image of this, one of her most gracious cavaliers?

The city of Richmond, saved by the fight at "Yellow Tavern" from capture, pledged itself to erect a monument to this hero, and I hope the day is not far distant when she will be able to redeem so sacred an obligation.

Soldiers! from the depths of my heart I rejoice to have witnessed the splendid tribute that has reached us from across the ocean to the memory of the immortal Jackson. I feel a natural pride in the knowledge that the day is close at hand when the capital of the State can boast of an equestrian statue to the great Confederate Commander-in-Chief; and after that, may I not express the fond hope that the memory of his trusted and chosen commander of cavalry will also be transmitted to posterity in a statute that will not only be an ornament to the city, but around which we all can unite in paying a true tribute to the virtues of the hero to whose name and fame it will forever stand in lofty and lasting attestation?

Seacoast Defences of South Carolina and Georgia.

By General A. L. LONG, Chief of Artillery.

The seacoast defences occupied the attention of the Confederate Government as soon as it became apparent that the war was inevitable. The line of coast extending from the entrance of the Chesapeake bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande presented innumerable bays, inlets and harbors, into which vessels could run either for predatory excursions or with the intention of actual invasion. The Federals having the command of the sea, it was certain that they would take advantage of this open condition of the coast to employ their naval force as soon as it could be collected, not only to enforce the blockade which had been declared, but also for making inroads along our unprotected coast.

That the system of defence adopted may be understood, I will describe a little in detail the topography of the coast. On the coast of North Carolina are Albemarle and Pamlico sounds, pene-

trating far into the interior; then the Cape Fear river, connecting with the ocean by two channels, the southwest channel being defended by a small inclosed fort and a water battery. On the coast of South Carolina are Georgetown and Charleston harbors. A succession of islands extend along the coast of South Carolina and Georgia, separated from the main land by a channel, which is navigable for vessels of moderate draft from Charleston to Fernandina, Florida. There are fewer assailable points on the Gulf than on the Atlantic. Pensacola, Mobile, and the mouth of the Mississippi were defended by works that had hitherto been regarded as sufficiently strong to repulse any naval attack that might be made upon them. Immediately after the bombardment and capture of Fort Sumter, the work of seacoast defence was begun and carried forward as rapidly as the limited means of the Confederacy would permit. Roanoke Island and other points on Albemarle and Pamlico sounds were fortified. Batteries were established on the southeast entrance of Cape Fear river, and the works on the southwest entrance of that river were strengthened. Defences were constructed at Georgetown, and at all assailable points on the northeast coast of South Carolina. The works of Charleston harbor were greatly strengthened by earthworks and floating batteries. The defences from Charleston down the coast of South Carolina and Georgia were confined chiefly to the islands and salient points bearing upon the channels leading inland. Defensive works were erected at all important points along the coast. Many of the defences, being injudiciously located and hastily erected, offered but little resistance to the enemy when attacked. These defects were not surprising, when we take into consideration the inexperience of the engineers, and the long line of seacoast to be defended. As soon as a sufficient naval force had been collected, an expedition under the command of General Butler was sent to the coast of North Carolina, and captured several important points. A second expedition, under Admiral Dupont and General Sherman, was sent to make a descent on the coast of South Carolina. On the 27th of November, Dupont attacked the batteries that were designed to defend Port Royal harbor, and almost without resistance carried them and gained possession of Port Royal. This is the best harbor in South Carolina, and is the strategic key to all the south Atlantic coast. Later, Burnside captured Roanoke Island, and established himself in eastern North Carolina without resistance. The rapid fall of Roanoke Island and Port Royal harbor struck consternation into

the hearts of the inhabitants along the entire coast. The capture of Port Royal gave the Federals the entire possession of Beaufort island, which afforded a secure place of rest for the army, while the harbor gave a safe anchorage for the fleet. Beaufort island almost fills a deep indenture in the main shore, being separated the greater part of its extent by a narrow channel, which is navigable its entire circuit. Its northern extremity extends to within a few miles of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. The main road from Port Royal to Pocotaligo crosses the channel at this point. The evacuation of Hilton Head, on the southwestern extremity of Beaufort island, followed the capture of Port Royal. This exposed Savannah, only about twenty-five miles distant, to an attack from that direction. At the same time, the Federals having command of Helena bay, Charleston was liable to be assailed from north Edisto or Stono inlet, and the railroad could have been reached without opposition by the road from Port Royal to Pocotaligo.

Such was the state of affairs when General Lee reached Charleston, about the first of December, 1861, to assume the command of the departments of North Carolina, Georgia and Florida. His vigorous mind at once comprehended the situation, and with his accustomed energy he met the difficulties that presented themselves. Directing fortifications to be constructed on the Stono and the Edisto and the Combahee, he fixed his headquarters at Coosawhatchie, the point most threatened, and directed defences to be erected opposite Hilton Head, and on the Broad and Saltcatchie, to cover Savannah. These were the points requiring immediate attention. He superintended in person the works overlooking the approach to the railroad from Port Royal, and soon infused into his troops a part of his own energy. The works he had planned rose with magical rapidity. A few days after his arrival at Coosawhatchie, Dupont and Sherman sent their first reconnoissance in that direction, which was met and repulsed by shot from the newly erected batteries, and now, whether the Federals advanced towards the railroad or turned in the direction of Charleston or Savannah, they were arrested by the Confederate batteries. The people, seeing the Federals repulsed at every point, regained their confidence, and with it their energy.

Having received orders to report to General Lee, I joined him in December, a few days after he had assumed command of the Department, and was assigned the duty of Chief of Artillery and Ordnance.

The most important points being now secured against immediate attack, the General proceeded to organize a system of seacoast defence different from that which had previously been adopted. He withdrew the troops and material from those works which had been established on the islands and salient points which he could not defend, to a strong interior line, where the effect of the Federal naval force would be neutralized. After a careful reconnoissance of the coast, he designated such points as he considered it necessary to fortify. The most important positions on this extensive line were Georgetown, Charleston, Pocotaligo, Coosawhatchie and Savannah. Coosawhatchie being central, could communicate with either Charleston or Savannah in two or three hours by railroad; so in case of an attack, they could support each other. The positions between Coosawhatchie and Savannah, and those between Charleston and Coosawhatchie, could be reinforced from the positions contiguous to them. There was thus a defensive relation throughout the entire line.

At this time there was a great want of guns suitable for seacoast defence. Those in use had been on the coast for more than thirty years, and were of too light a calibre to cope with the powerful ordnance that had been introduced into the Federal navy. It was, therefore, desirable to arm the batteries now constructed with heavy guns. The Ordnance Department being prepared to cast guns of the heaviest calibre, requisitions were made for eight and ten-inch columbiads for the batteries bearing on the channels that would be entered by gunboats. The heavy smooth bore guns were preferred to the rifle cannons for fixed batteries, as experiments had shown that the crushing effect of the solid round shot was more destructive than the small breach and deeper penetration of the rifle bolts. The difference of range was not important, as beyond a certain distance the aim could not be accurate. By the last of December many batteries had been completed, and other works were being rapidly constructed. When the new year of 1862 opened, there was a greater feeling of security among the people of South Carolina and Georgia than had been felt for several months.

The information received from every quarter led to the belief that the Federal Government was making preparations for a powerful attack upon either Charleston or Savannah. In anticipation of this attack, every effort was made to strengthen these places. General Ripley, who commanded at Charleston, and General Lawton, the commander at Savannah, ably seconded General Lee

in the execution of his plans, while Generals Evans, Drayton and Mercer assisted him at other points. The Ordnance Department, under the direction of its energetic chief, Colonel Gorgas, filled with wonderful promptitude the various demands made upon it. This greatly facilitated the completion of the defences.

The Federal troops on Beaufort island were inactive during the months of December, January and February, and the fleet was in the offing, blockading Charleston and Savannah. About the first of March the Federal gunboats entered the Savannah river by way of the channel leading from Hilton Head. The small Confederate fleet was too weak to engage them, so they retained undisputed possession of the river. They then established batteries to intercept the communication between Fort Pulaski and the city of Savannah. This fort commands the entrance to the Savannah river, twelve miles below the city.

A few days after getting possession of the river the Federals landed a force, under General Gilmore, on the opposite side of the fort. General Gilmore, having completed his batteries, opened fire about the first of April. Having no hope of succor, Fort Pulaski, after striking a blow for honor, surrendered with about five hundred men.

General Lee received an order about the middle of March assigning him to duty in Richmond, in obedience to which he soon after repaired to that place. The works that he had so skilfully planned were now near completion. In three months he had established a line of defence from Wingaw bay, on the northeast coast of South Carolina, to the mouth of Saint Mary's river in Georgia—a distance of more than two hundred miles. This line not only served for a present defence, but offered an impenetrable barrier to the combined Federal forces operating on the coast, until they were carried by General Sherman in his unopposed march through Georgia and South Carolina, near the close of the war.

That the importance of these works may be properly understood, it will be necessary to know what they accomplished. In the first place, they protected the most important agricultural section of the Confederacy from the incursions of the enemy, and covered the most important line of communication between the Mississippi and the Potomac. Besides these material advantages, it produced great moral effect in giving the inhabitants of the Southern States a feeling of security and confidence.

We perceive in this campaign of General Lee in Georgia and South Carolina results achieved by a single genius equal to those which could have been accomplished by an incalculable force.

Editorial Paragraphs.

Our Papers.

The enterprise of doing our own publishing, which was begun in January with some misgivings as to the result, has excited a most gratifying interest, and received such *substantial* aid that it may now be announced that it is *an assured success*.

The press all through the South has teemed with kindly notices of the PAPERS, and of the Society; the secretary has received a large number of private letters from leading Confederates warmly endorsing our plan, and subscriptions and renewal fees have flowed in so steadily as to insure the pecuniary success of the enterprise.

If our friends everywhere will exert themselves a little to send us new subscribers, or advertisements for our advertising pages, we will be able not only to meet the expenses of publication, but also to have the necessary means of carrying out other important plans for the prosecution of our work.

We add sixteen pages to the size of our PAPERS this issue, and expect still further to increase the number of the pages as our subscription list may justify.

As to the *character* of the PAPERS, it may be well to say that they will be strictly Historical. We shall publish nothing that does not bear directly on the War between the States, and proper understanding of the measures, men and deeds of those stirring times. A large part of our space will be devoted to official reports, and our pages will contain a number of important ones which have never been published. But at the same time each number will contain something of *popular* as well as historic interest.

In a word, we propose to issue a Monthly which will at the same time interest the general reader and be of value to the future historian.

Kindness of the Press.

It would occupy more space than we could command to mention even the names of the newspapers which have contained kindly notices of our first number, and we therefore simply take off our editorial hat, and thank them all.

Canvassers Wanted.

We are very anxious to secure in every section reliable, energetic men (or women) to canvass for members of the Society, and subscribers to our PAPERS. We can pay to such a liberal commission, and would be obliged if our friends would seek out suitable agents, and recommend them to us.

Our Terms.

The number of letters of inquiry daily received makes it necessary for us to state distinctly again our terms of subscription. The payment of \$50 entitles one to become a **LIFE MEMBER**, and to receive for life (without further fees) all of the publications of the Society.

The payment of \$3 entitles one to become an **ANNUAL MEMBER** of the Society, and to receive for twelve months our **MONTHLY PAPERS**, and any other publications which the Society may issue during the year.

Those who are not entitled to become *Members of the Society*, or who do not prefer to do so, can become subscribers to our **MONTHLY PAPERS** by paying \$3 per annum.

Payments must be made invariably in advance.

Advertisements.

We hope that our friends will aid us in securing advertisements, such as are suitable to our columns. Our issues go into every section of the country, and among the very best classes of our people, and we believe that we present an admirable medium of advertising.

The Society's Responsibility for what we Publish.

There are, of course, differences of opinion among prominent actors in the Confederate struggle as to many of the events, and we are liable to make publications which will arouse these differences. It should be understood that the Executive Committee are not to be considered as endorsing, and the Society is not to be held responsible for everything which we publish.

Indeed, we may sometimes publish what we differ from, on the principle that if errors endorsed by responsible names creep into our archives, they had better be published now, while men competent to correct them are living, than to turn up in future years when probably no one will be able to refute them.

Our Next (March) Number.

The recent attempt of Mr. Blaine to "fire the Northern heart," by reviving the stories of "Rebel barbarity" to prisoners of war, and the eagerness with which the Radical press of the North caught up the old charge, and are still echoing it through the land, have made us feel that the time has come when this question of the *treatment of prisoners* during the late war should be fully ventilated, and our Confederate Government and people put right on the record concerning it. We shall, therefore, devote the next number of our **PAPERS** to this subject. We expect to be able to establish some such points as the following:

1. The Confederate authorities *always* ordered the kind treatment of prisoners of war, and if there were individual cases of cruel treatment it was in violation of positive orders.

2. The orders were to give prisoners the same rations that our own soldiers received, and if rations were scarce and of inferior quality, it was through no fault of the Confederacy.

3. The prison hospitals were put on the same footing precisely as the hospitals for our own men, and if there was unusual suffering caused by want of medicine and hospital stores, it arose from the fact that the Federal authorities declared these "contraband of war," and refused to accept the Confederate offer to allow Federal surgeons to come to the prisons with supplies of medicines and stores.

4. The prisons were established with reference to healthfulness of locality, and the great mortality among the prisoners arose from epidemics and chronic diseases, which our surgeons had not the means of preventing or arresting.

A strong proof of this will be given in an official statement which shows that nearly as large a proportion of the Confederate guard at Andersonville died as of the prisoners themselves.

5. The above reasons cannot be assigned for the cruel treatment which Confederates received in Northern prisons. The order-books on that side are filled with vindictive orders. Though in a land flowing with plenty, our poor fellows in prison were famished with hunger, and would have considered *half* the rations served Federal soldiers bountiful indeed. Their prison hospitals were very far from being on the same footing with the hospitals for their own soldiers, and our men died by thousands from causes which the Federal authorities *could* have prevented.

6. But the real cause of the suffering on both sides was the stoppage of the exchange of prisoners, and for this the *Federal authorities alone* were responsible. The Confederates kept the cartel in good faith. It was broken on the other side.

The Confederates were anxious to exchange man for man. It was the settled policy on the other side *not* to exchange prisoners. The Confederates offered to exchange sick and wounded. This was refused. In August, 1864, we offered to send home all the Federal sick and wounded *without equivalent*. The offer was not accepted until the following December, and it was during that period that the greatest mortality occurred. The Federal authorities stood by and coldly suffered their soldiers in our prisons to die, in order that they might "fire the Northern heart" with stories of "Rebel barbarities."

7. But the charge of cruelty made against the Confederate leaders is triumphantly refuted by such facts as these: The official reports of Secretary Stanton and Surgeon-General Barnes show that a much larger per cent. of Confederates perished in Northern prisons than of Federals in Southern prisons. And though the most persistent efforts were made to *get up a case* against President Davis, General Lee and others (even to the extent of offering poor Wirz a reprieve if he would implicate them), they were not able to secure testimony upon which even Holt and his military court dared to go into the trial.

We have a large mass of documents on this subject, and the Secretary has been busy compiling them. But it is earnestly requested that any of our friends who have facts and figures bearing on the question in any of its branches, which they are willing to give (or *lend*) to the Society, will *at once* forward them to the Secretary, Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Richmond, Va.

Let us unite in making the discussion full, thorough, and a complete vindication of our long slandered people. Will not our Southern papers call special attention to this matter?

Book Notices.

J. H. Coates & Co., 822 Chestnut street, Philadelphia, the publishers, have kindly sent us the first volume of the translation (embracing two volumes of the French edition) of HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA, by the *Comte de Paris*.

The favorable notices of this book by the Northern press, and an extract we had seen from the preface, which seemed just and fair, made us anxious to see the book.

As the work of a foreigner of distinction, it is worth the attention of our people, and will find a place in the libraries of our military men. But it can never be accepted by us as at all *fair* to the Confederate side, and some portions of the volume before us smack of the bitter partisan rather than of the disinterested foreigner who is trying to mete out even-handed justice to "both the blue and the gray." The author evidently sees through only the *bluest* of spectacles.

Reserving the privilege of pointing out in a future number some of its most glaring mistakes, we will only add now that the book is gotten up by the publishers in excellent style and will doubtless have a large sale.

D. Van Nostrand, New York, has put us under many obligations by presenting the library of the Society with the following sixteen volumes of his publications, gotten up in the admirable style for which this famous publisher of military books is noted:

1. *The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents*. By General Barnard.
2. *Report of the Engineer and Artillery operations of the Army of the Potomac*, from its organization to the close of the Peninsular campaign. By General J. G. Barnard and W. F. Barry.
3. *General McClellan's Report* of operations of the army of the Potomac while under his command.
4. *The C. S. A. and the battle of Bull Run*. By General Barnard.
5. *Records of Living Officers of the United States Navy*. By Lieutenant Lewis R. Hammersley.
6. *Rifled Ordnance*. By Lynall Thomas, F. R. S. L.
7. *Report of the United States Commissioners on Munitions of War*, exhibited at the Paris Exposition of 1867.
8. *Manual for Quartermasters and Commissaries*. By Captain R. F. Hunter, U. S. A.
9. *Osborn's Hand-Book of the United States Navy, from April, 1861, to May, 1864*.
10. *Manual of Military Surgeons*. By Dr. John Ordronaux.
11. *The War in the United States*. By Ferdinand Leeomte, Lieutenant-Colonel Swiss Confederation.
12. *Our Naval School and Naval Officers*. Meade.
13. *How to Become a Successful Engineer*. By Bernard Stuart.
14. *The Hand-Book of Artillery*. By Major Joseph Roberts, United States Artillery.

15. *Company Drill and Bayonet Fencing*. By Colonel J. Monroe, United States Army.

16. *General Todleben's History of the Defence of Sebastopol*.

We regret that our space will not allow us at present to review each one of these books, which make a most valuable addition to a military library. General Barnard's books are very valuable for a study of the campaigns of which they treat—albeit there are many things in them on which we would take issue with him.

General McClellan's report is invaluable to the student of his campaigns, and (though full of most exaggerated estimates of the force opposed to him) shows him to have displayed great skill in the organization and discipline, and very decided ability in the handling of his army, while his famous letter on the conduct of the war marks him as a humane gentleman, and will go down in history in striking contrast with the orders of Butler, Pope, Sheridan, Sherman, and others of that class.

The books about the navy are of interest, and the *manuals* are very valuable for those who may desire to prepare for the profession of a soldier.

HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY. *By Honorable Nahum Capen, L. L. D.* American Publishing Co., Hartford, Connecticut. We are indebted to the courtesy of the distinguished author for a copy of the first volume of this book, which is warmly commended by leading men in every section of the country.

It is a book of vast research, and shows great ability. Although the publishers take special pains to prove that Mr. Capen was not a sympathizer with "the Rebels," the book has a very decided leaning to our side, and should have a wide circulation.

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL MONTHLY. *By S. D. Poole, Editor and Proprietor, Raleigh, N. C.* Terms: Postage paid, \$4 a year in advance. We have received the first (January) number of this new candidate for public favor, and gladly place it on our exchange list, and bid it a hearty "God speed."

The printers admonish us that we have not more space now than to say that the elegant style of the make up of this number, together with our knowledge of Colonel Pool's ability, gives assurance that he will make a first-class magazine.

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

Vol. I.

Richmond, Va., March, 1876.

No. 3.

THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS DURING THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES.

[Compiled by Secretary of Southern Historical Society.]

There is, perhaps, no subject connected with the late war which more imperatively demands discussion at our hands than the *Prison Question*. That the Confederate Government should have been charged in the heat of the passions of the war with a systematic cruelty to prisoners was to be expected. The pulpits, the press, and the Government reports, which were so busy denouncing "Rebel barbarities" that they had no censure for the McNeils, the Turchins, the Butlers, the Milroys, the Hunters, the Sher-mans, and the Sheridans, who, under the flag of "Liberty," perpetrated crimes which disgrace the age, were not to be expected to be over scrupulous in originating and retailing slanders against the Government and people of the South. But it was hoped that after the passions of the war had cooled, and the real facts had become accessible, that these sweeping charges would be at least modified, and these bitter denunciations cease.

We have been doomed to a sad disappointment. The leader of the Radical party (Mr. Blaine) has recently in his place in the United States Congress revived all of the charges which twelve years ago "fired the Northern heart," and has marred the music of the "Centennial chimes," with such language as this:

"Mr. Davis was the author, knowingly, deliberately, guiltily and wilfully, of the gigantic murder and crime at Andersonville. And I here, before God, measuring my words, knowing their full extent and import, declare that neither the deeds of the Duke of Alva in the Low countries, nor the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, nor the thumb-screws and engines of torture of the Spanish Inquisition, begin to compare in atrocity with the hideous crimes of Andersonville."

He then quotes and endorses the following extract from the report

of the *ex parte* committee of Congress who examined this question at a time when passion was at its flood tide:

"The subsequent history of Andersonville has startled and shocked the world with a tale of horror, of woe and death before unheard and unknown to civilization. No pen can describe, no painter sketch, no imagination comprehend its fearful and unutterable iniquity. It would seem as if the concentrated madness of earth and hell had found its final lodgment in the breasts of those who inaugurated the rebellion and controlled the policy of the Confederate Government, and that the prison at Andersonville had been selected for the most terrible human sacrifice which the world had ever seen. Into its narrow walls were crowded thirty-five thousand enlisted men, many of them the bravest and best, the most devoted and heroic of those grand armies which carried the flag of their country to final victory. For long and weary months here they suffered, maddened, were murdered, and died. Here they lingered, unsheltered from the burning rays of a tropical sun by day, and drenching and deadly dews by night, in every stage of mental and physical disease, hungered, emaciated, starving, maddened; festering with unhealed wounds; gnawed by the ravages of scurvy and gangrene; with swollen limb and distorted visage; covered with vermin which they had no power to extirpate; exposed to the flooding rains which drove them drowning from the miserable holes in which, like swine, they burrowed; parched with thirst and mad with hunger; racked with pain or prostrated with the weakness of dissolution; with naked limbs and matted hair; filthy with smoke and mud; soiled with the very excrement from which their weakness would not permit them to escape; eaten by the gnawing worms which their own wounds had engendered; with no bed but the earth; no covering save the cloud or the sky; these men, these heroes, born in the image of God, thus crouching and writhing in their terrible torture and calculating barbarity, stand forth in history as a monument of the surpassing horrors of Andersonville as it shall be seen and read in all future time, realizing in the studied torments of their prison-house the ideal of Dante's Inferno and Milton's Hell."

So industriously have these statements been circulated—so generally have they entered into the literature of the North—so widely have they been believed, that the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Hon. B. H. Hill), who ventured upon a calm reply, in which he ably refuted the assertions of Mr. Blaine, has been denounced by the Radical press as a "co-conspirator with Jeff. Davis to murder Union prisoners," and has been told by even some of our own papers that his speech was "very unfortunate."

As we have in the archives of our Society the means of triumphantly vindicating the Confederate Government from the charge

of cruelty to prisoners, as we have been appealed to by leading men North and South and in Europe to give the facts in reference to this matter, and as the present seems an opportune time, we have decided to enter upon the task.

We have only to premise that our work is mainly one of *compilation*, and that our chief difficulty is which documents to select from the vast number which we have in our collection.

THE QUESTION STATED.

Let it be distinctly understood that we do not for a moment affirm that there was not a vast amount of suffering and fearful mortality among the Federal prisoners at the South. But we are prepared to prove before any fair tribunal, from documents now in our archives, the following points:

1. The Confederate authorities *always* ordered the kind treatment of prisoners of war, and if there were individual cases of cruel treatment it was in violation of positive orders.

2. The orders were to give prisoners the same rations that our own soldiers received, and if rations were scarce and of inferior quality it was through no fault of the Confederacy.

3. The prison-hospitals were put on the same footing precisely as the hospitals for our own men, and if there was unusual suffering caused by want of medicine and hospital stores it arose from the fact that the Federal authorities declared these "contraband of war," and refused to accept the Confederate offer to allow Federal surgeons to come to the prisons with supplies of medicines and stores.

4. The prisons were established with reference to healthfulness of locality, and the great mortality among the prisoners arose from epidemics and chronic diseases which our surgeons had not the means of preventing or arresting.

A strong proof of this is the fact that nearly *as large a proportion of the Confederate guard at Andersonville died as of the prisoners themselves.*

5. The above reasons cannot be assigned for the cruel treatment which Confederates received in Northern prisons. Though in a land flowing with plenty, our poor fellows in prison were famished with hunger, and would have considered *half* the rations served Federal soldiers bountiful indeed. Their prison-hospitals were very far from being on the same footing with the hospitals for their own soldiers, and our men died by thousands from causes which the Federal authorities *could* have prevented.

6. But the real cause of the suffering on both sides was the stoppage of the exchange of prisoners, and for this the *Federal authorities alone* were responsible. The Confederates kept the cartel in good faith. It was broken on the other side.

The Confederates were anxious to exchange man for man. It was the settled policy on the other side *not* to exchange prisoners. The Confederates offered to exchange sick and wounded. This was refused. In August, 1864, we offered to send home all the Federal sick and wounded *without equivalent*. The offer was not accepted until the following December, and it was during that period that the greatest mortality occurred. The Federal authorities determined as their war policy not to exchange prisoners, they invented every possible pretext to avoid it, and they at the same time sought to quiet the friends of their prisoners and to "fire the Northern heart" by most shamelessly charging that the Confederate Government refused to exchange, and by industriously circulating the most malignant stories of "Rebel barbarities" to helpless veterans of the Union.

7. But the charge of cruelty made against the Confederate leaders is triumphantly refuted by such facts as these: The official reports of Secretary Stanton and Surgeon General Barnes show that a much larger per cent. of Confederates perished in Northern prisons than of Federals in Southern prisons. And though the most persistent efforts were made to *get up a case* against President Davis, General Lee, and others (even to the extent of offering poor Wirz a reprieve if he would implicate them), they were not able to secure testimony upon which even Holt and his military court dared to go into the trial.

It may be well, before discussing the question in its full details, to introduce the

TESTIMONY OF LEADING CONFEDERATES

who are implicated in this charge of cruel treatment to prisoners

And first we give a recent letter of ex-President Davis in reply to Mr. Blaine's charges:

NEW ORLEANS, January 27, 1876.

HON. JAMES LYONS :

My Dear Friend—Your very kind letter of the 14th instant was forwarded from Memphis, and has been received at this place.

I have been so long the object of malignant slander and the subject of unscrupulous falsehood by partisans of the class of Mr. Blaine, that, though I cannot say it has become to me matter

of indifference; it has ceased to excite my surprise even in this instance, when it reaches the extremity of accusing me of cruelty to prisoners. What matters it to one whose object is personal and party advantage that the records, both Federal and Confederate, disprove the charge; that the country is full of witnesses who bear oral testimony against it, and that the effort to revive the bitter animosities of the war obstructs the progress toward the reconciliation of the sections? It is enough for him if his self-seeking purpose be promoted.

It would, however, seem probable that such expectations must be disappointed, for only those who are wilfully blind can fail to see in the circumstances of the case the fallacy of Mr. Blaine's statements. The published fact of an attempt to suborn Wirz, when under sentence of death, by promising him a pardon if he would criminate me in regard to the Andersonville prisoners, is conclusive as to the wish of the Government to make such charge against me, and the failure to do so shows that nothing could be found to sustain it. May we not say the evidence of my innocence was such that Holt and Conover, with their trained band of suborned witnesses, dared not make against me this charge—the same which Wirz, for his life, would not make, but which Blaine, for the Presidential nomination, has made?

Now let us review the leading facts of this case. The report of the Confederate commissioner for exchange of prisoners shows how persistent and liberal were our efforts to secure the relief of captives. Failing in those attempts, I instructed General R. E. Lee to go under flag of truce and seek an interview with General Grant, to represent to him the suffering and death of Federal prisoners held by us, to explain the causes which were beyond our control, and to urge in the name of humanity the observance of the cartel for the exchange of prisoners. To this, as to all previous appeals, a deaf ear was turned. The interview was not granted. I will not attempt, from memory, to write the details of the correspondence. Lee no longer lives to defend the cause and country he loved so well and served so efficiently; but General Grant cannot fail to remember so extraordinary a proposition, and his objections to executing the cartel are well known to the public. But whoever else may choose to forget my efforts in this regard, the prisoners at Andersonville and the delegates I permitted them to send to President Lincoln to plead for the resumption of exchange of prisoners cannot fail to remember how willing I was to restore them to their homes and to the comforts of which they were in need, provided the imprisoned soldiers of the Confederacy should be in like manner released and returned to us.

This foul accusation, though directed specially against me, was no doubt intended as, and naturally must be, the arraignment of the South, by whose authority and in whose behalf my deeds were done. It may be presumed that the feelings and the habits of the Southern soldiers were understood by me, and in that connection

any fair mind would perceive in my congratulatory orders to the army after a victory, in which the troops were most commended for their tenderness and generosity to the wounded and other captives, as well the instincts of the person who issued the order as the knightly temper of the soldiers to whom it was addressed. It is admitted that the prisoners in our hands were not as well provided for as we would, but it is claimed that we did as well for them as we could. Can the other side say as much?

To the bold allegations of ill treatment of prisoners by our side, and humane treatment and adequate supplies by our opponents, it is only necessary to offer two facts—first, it appears from the reports of the United States War Department that though we had sixty thousand more Federal prisoners than they had of Confederates, six thousand more of Confederates died in Northern prisons than died of Federals in Southern prisons; second, the want and suffering of men in Northern prisons caused me to ask for permission to send out cotton and buy supplies for them. The request was granted, but only on condition that the cotton should be sent to New York and the supplies be bought there. General Beale, now of St. Louis, was authorized to purchase and distribute the needful supplies.

Our sympathy rose with the occasion and responded to its demands—not waiting for ten years, then to vaunt itself when it could serve no good purpose to the sufferers.

Under the mellowing influence of time and occasional demonstrations at the North of a desire for the restoration of peace and good will, the Southern people have forgotten much—have forgiven much of the wrongs they bore. If it be less so among their invaders, it is but another example of the rule that the wrong-doer is less able to forgive than he who has suffered causeless wrong. It is not, however, generally among those who braved the hazards of battle that unrelenting vindictiveness is to be found. The brave are generous and gentle. It is the skulkers of the fight—the Blaines—who display their flags on an untented field. They made no sacrifice to prevent the separation of the States. Why should they be expected to promote the confidence and good will essential to their union?

When closely confined at Fortress Monroe I was solicited to add my name to those of many esteemed gentlemen who had signed a petition for my pardon, and an assurance was given that on my doing so the President would order my liberation. Confident of the justice of our cause and the rectitude of my own conduct, I declined to sign the petition, and remained subject to the inexcusable privations and tortures which Dr. Craven has but faintly described. When, after two years of close confinement, I was admitted to bail, as often as required I appeared for trial under the indictment found against me, but in which Mr. Blaine's fictions do not appear. The indictment was finally quashed on no application of mine, nor have I ever evaded or avoided a trial upon any charge

the General Government might choose to bring against me, and have no view of the future which makes it desirable to me to be included in an amnesty bill.

Viewed in the abstract or as a general question, I would be glad to see the repeal of all laws inflicting the penalty of political disabilities on classes of the people that it might, as prescribed by the constitution, be left to the courts to hear and decide causes, and to affix penalties according to pre-existing legislation. The discrimination made against our people is unjust and impolitic if the fact be equality and the purpose be fraternity among the citizens of the United States. Conviction and sentence without a hearing, without jurisdiction, and affixing penalties by *ex post facto* legislation, are part of the proceeding which had its appropriate end in the assumption by Congress of the Executive function of granting pardons. To remove political disabilities which there was not legal power to impose was not an act of so much grace as to form a plausible pretext for the reckless diatribe of Mr. Blaine.

The papers preserved by Dr. Stevenson happily furnish full proof of the causes of disease and death at Andersonville. They are now, I believe, in Richmond, and it is to be hoped their publication will not be much longer delayed. I have no taste for recrimination, though the sad recitals made by our soldiers returned from Northern prisons can never be forgotten. And you will remember the excitement those produced, and the censorious publications which were uttered against me because I would not visit on the helpless prisoners in our hands such barbarities as, according to reports, had been inflicted upon our men.

Imprisonment is a hard lot at the best, and prisoners are prone to exaggerate their sufferings, and such was probably the case on both sides. But we did not seek by reports of committees, with photographic illustrations, to inflame the passions of our people. How was it with our enemy? Let one example suffice. You may remember a published report of a committee of the United States Congress which was sent to Annapolis to visit some exchanged prisoners, and which had appended to it the photographs of some emaciated subjects, which were offered as samples of prisoners returned from the South.

When a copy of that report was received, I sent it to Colonel Ould, commissioner for the exchange of prisoners, and learned, as I anticipated, that the photographs, as far as they could be identified, had been taken from men who were in our hospital when they were liberated for exchange, and whom the hospital surgeon regarded as convalescent, but too weak to be removed with safety to themselves. The anxiety of the prisoners to be sent to their homes had prevailed over the objections of the surgeon. But this is not all, for I have recently learned from a priest who was then at Annapolis that the most wretched looking of these photographs was taken from a man who had never been a prisoner, but who had been left on the "sick list" at Annapolis when the command

to which he was attached had passed that place on its southward march.

Whatever may be said in extenuation of such imposture because of the exigencies of war, there can be no such excuse now for the attempts of Mr. Blaine, by gross misrepresentation and slanderous accusation, to revive the worst passions of the war; and it is to be hoped that, much as the event is to be regretted, it will have the good effect of evoking truthful statements in regard to this little understood subject from men who would have preferred to leave their sorrowful story untold if the subject could have been allowed peacefully to sink into oblivion.

Mutual respect is needful for the common interest, is essential to a friendly union, and when slander is promulgated from high places the public welfare demands that truth should strip falsehood of its power for evil.

I am, respectfully and truly, your friend,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

We next introduce

THE TESTIMONY OF GENERAL R. E. LEE,

who was Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate armies, who has been widely charged with being *particeps criminis* in this matter, but whom *the world* will ever believe to have been as incapable of connivance at a cruel act as he was of the slightest departure from the strictest accuracy of statement.

The following is an extract from his sworn testimony before the Congressional Reconstruction Committee:

"*Question.* By Mr. Howard: 'I wish to inquire whether you had any knowledge of the cruelties practiced toward the Union prisoners at Libby Prison and on Belle Isle?' *Answer.* 'I never knew that any cruelty was practiced, and I have no reason to believe that it was practiced. I can believe, and have reason to believe, that privations may have been experienced by the prisoners, because I know that provision and shelter could not be provided for them.'

"*Q.* 'Were you not aware that the prisoners were dying from cold and starvation?' *A.* 'I was not.'

"*Q.* 'Did these scenes come to your knowledge at all?' *A.* 'Never. No report was ever made to me about them. There was no call for any to be made to me. I did hear—it was mere hearsay—that statements had been made to the War Department, and that everything had been done to relieve them that could be done, even finally so far as to offer to send them to some other points—Charleston was one point named—if they would be received by the United States authorities and taken to their homes; but whether this is true or not I do not know.'

"*Q.* 'And of course you know nothing of the scenes of cruelty about which complaints have been made at those places' (Andersonville and Salisbury)? *A.* 'Nothing in the world, as I said before. I

suppose they suffered for want of ability on the part of the Confederate States to supply their wants. At the very beginning of the war I knew that there was suffering of prisoners on both sides, but as far as I could I did everything in my power to relieve them, and to establish the cartel which was agreed upon.'

"Q. 'It has been frequently asserted that the Confederate soldiers feel more kindly toward the Government of the United States than any other people of the South. What are your observations on that point?' A. 'From the Confederate soldiers I have heard no expression of any other opinion. They looked upon the war as a necessary evil, and went through it. I have seen them relieve the wants of Federal soldiers on the field. The orders always were that the whole field should be treated alike. Parties were sent out to take the Federal wounded as well as the Confederate, and the surgeons were told to treat the one as they did the other. These orders given by me were respected on every field.'

"Q. 'Do you think that the good feeling on their part toward the rest of the people has continued since the close of the war?' A. 'I know nothing to the contrary. I made several efforts to exchange the prisoners after the cartel was suspended. I do not know to this day which side took the initiative. I know there were constant complaints on both sides. I merely know it from public rumors. I offered to General Grant, around Richmond, that we should ourselves exchange all the prisoners in our hands. There was a communication from the Christian Commission, I think, which reached me at Petersburg, and made application to me for a passport to visit all the prisoners South. My letter to them I suppose they have. I told them I had not that authority, that it could only be obtained from the War Department at Richmond, but that neither they nor I could relieve the sufferings of the prisoners; that the only thing to be done for them was to exchange them; and, to show that I would do whatever was in my power, I offered them to send to City Point all the prisoners in Virginia and North Carolina over which my command extended, provided they returned an equal number of mine, man for man. I reported this to the War Department, and received for answer that they would place at my command all the prisoners at the South if the proposition was accepted. I heard nothing more on the subject.'"

The following private letter to a friend and relative was never intended for the public eye, but may be accepted as his full conviction on this subject:

"LEXINGTON, VA., April 17, 1867.

"DR. CHARLES CARTER,

"No. 1632 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa.:"

"My Dear Dr. Carter—I have received your letter of the 9th inst., inclosing one to you from Mr. J. Francis Fisher, in relation to certain information which he had received from Bishop Wilmer. My respect for Mr. Fisher's wishes would induce me to reply fully to-

all his questions, but I have not time to do so satisfactorily; and, for reasons which I am sure you both will appreciate, I have a great repugnance to being brought before the public in any manner. Sufficient information has been officially published, I think, to show that whatever sufferings the Federal prisoners at the South underwent, were incident to their position as prisoners, and produced by the destitute condition of the country, arising from the operations of war. The laws of the Confederate Congress and the orders of the War Department directed that the rations furnished prisoners of war should be the same in quantity and quality as those furnished enlisted men in the army of the Confederacy, and that the hospitals for prisoners should be placed on the same footing as other Confederate States hospitals in all respects. It was the desire of the Confederate authorities to effect a continuous and speedy exchange of prisoners of war; for it was their true policy to do so, as their retention was not only a calamity to them, but a heavy expenditure of their scanty means of subsistence, and a privation of the services of a veteran army. Mr. Fisher or Bishop Wilmer has confounded my offers for the exchange of prisoners with those made by Mr. Ould, the Commissioner of the Confederate States. It was he that offered, when all hopes of effecting the exchange had ceased, to deliver all the Federal sick and wounded, to the amount of fifteen thousand, without an equivalent, provided transportation was furnished. Previously to this, I think, I offered to General Grant to send into his lines all the prisoners within my department, which then embraced Virginia and North Carolina, provided he would return me man for man; and when I informed the Confederate authorities of my proposition, I was told that, if it was accepted, they would place all the prisoners at the South at my disposal. I offered subsequently, I think to the committee of the United States Sanitary Commission, who visited Petersburg for the purpose of ameliorating the condition of their prisoners, to do the same. But my proposition was not accepted: Dr. Joseph Jones has recently published a pamphlet termed 'Researches upon Spurious Vaccination,' etc., issued from the University Medical Press, Nashville, Tenn., in which he treats of certain diseases of the Federal prisoners at Andersonville and their causes, which I think would be interesting to you as a medical man, and would furnish Mr. Fisher with some of the information he desires. And now I wish you to understand that what I have written is for your personal information and not for publication, and to send as an expression of thanks to Mr. Fisher for his kind efforts to relieve the sufferings of the Southern people.

"I am very much obliged to you for the prayers you offered for us in the days of trouble. Those days are still prolonged, and we earnestly look for aid to our merciful God. Should I have any use for the file of papers you kindly offer me I will let you know.

"All my family unite with me in kind regards to your wife and children. And I am, very truly, your cousin,

(Signed)

R. E. LEE."

VICE-PRESIDENT ALEX. H. STEVENS,

in his "War Between the States," declares that the efforts which have been made to "fix the odium of cruelty and barbarity" upon Mr. Davis and the Confederate authorities "constitute one of the boldest and baldest attempted outrages upon the truth of history which has ever been essayed." After briefly, but most conclusively, discussing the general question, Mr. Stevens continues as follows in reference to the Federal prisoners sent South:

Large numbers of them were taken to Southwestern Georgia in 1864, because it was a section most remote and secure from the invading Federal armies, and because, too, it was a country of all others then within the Confederate limits, not thus threatened with an invasion, most abundant with food, and all resources at command for the health and comfort of prisoners. They were put in one stockade for the want of men to guard more than one. The section of country, moreover, was not regarded as more unhealthy, or more subject to malarious influences, than any in the central part of the State. The official order for the erection of the stockade enjoined that it should be in "a healthy locality, plenty of pure water, a running stream, and, if possible, shade trees, and in the immediate neighborhood of grist and saw mills." The very selection of the locality, so far from being, as you suppose, made with cruel designs against the prisoners, was governed by the most humane considerations.

Your question might, with much more point, be retorted by asking, why were Southern prisoners taken in the dead of winter with their thin clothing to Camp Douglas, Rock Island and Johnson's Island—icy regions of the North—where it is a notorious fact that many of them actually froze to death?

As far as mortuary returns afford evidence of the general treatment of prisoners on both sides, the figures show nothing to the disadvantage of the Confederates, notwithstanding their limited supplies of all kinds, and notwithstanding all that has been said of the horrible sacrifice of life at Andersonville.

It now appears that a larger number of Confederates died in Northern than of Federals in Southern prisons or stockades. The report of Mr. Stanton, as Secretary of War, on the 19th of July, 1866, exhibits the fact that, of the Federal prisoners in Confederate hands during the war, only 22,576 died; while of the Confederate prisoners in Federal hands 26,436 died. This report does not set forth the exact number of prisoners held by each side respectively. These facts were given more in detail in a subsequent report by Surgeon General Barnes, of the United States Army. His report I have not seen, but according to a statement editorially, in the *National Intelligencer*—very high authority—it appears from the Surgeon General's report, that the whole number of Federal prisoners captured by the Confederates and held in Southern prisons, from first to

last during the war, was, in round numbers, 270,000; while the whole number of Confederates captured and held in prisons by the Federals was, in like round numbers, only 220,000. From these two reports it appears that, with 50,000 more prisoners in Southern stockades, or other modes of confinement, the deaths were nearly 4,000 less! According to these figures, the *per centum* of Federal deaths in Southern prisons was *under nine!* while the *per centum* of Confederate deaths in Northern prisons was *over twelve!* These mortality statistics are of no small weight in determining on which side was the most neglect, cruelty and inhumanity!

But the question in this matter is, *upon whom does this tremendous responsibility* rest of all this sacrifice of human life, with all its indescribable miseries and sufferings? The facts, beyond question or doubt, show that it rests *entirely* upon the authorities at Washington! It is now well understood to have been a part of *their settled policy* in conducting the war not to exchange prisoners. The grounds upon which this extraordinary course was adopted were that it was humanity to the men in the field, on their side, to let their captured comrades perish in prison, rather than to let an equal number of Confederate soldiers be released on exchange to meet them in battle! Upon the Federal authorities, and upon them only, with this policy as their excuse, rests the whole of this responsibility. To avert the indignation which the open avowal of this policy by them at the time would have excited throughout the North, and throughout the civilized world, the false cry of cruelty towards prisoners was raised against the Confederates. This was but a pretext to cover their own violation of the usages of war in this respect among civilized nations.

Other monstrous violations of like usages were not attempted to be palliated by them, or even covered by a pretext. These were, as you must admit, open, avowed and notorious! I refer only to the general sacking of private houses—the pillaging of money, plate, jewels and other light articles of value, with the destruction of books, works of art, paintings, pictures, private manuscripts and family relics; but I allude, besides these things, especially to the hostile acts directly against property of all kinds, as well as outrages upon non-combatants—to the laying waste of whole sections of country; the attempted annihilation of all the necessities of life; to the wanton killing, in many instances, of farm stock and domestic animals; the burning of mills, factories and barns, with their contents of grain and forage, not sparing orchards or growing crops, or the implements of husbandry; the mutilation of county and municipal records of great value; the extraordinary efforts made to stir up servile insurrections, involving the wide spread slaughter of women and children; the impious profanation of temples of worship, and even the brutish desecration of the sanctuaries of the dead!

All these enormities of a savage character against the very existence of civilized society, and so revolting to the natural senti-

ments of mankind, when not thoroughly infuriated by the worst of passions, and in open violation of modern usages in war—were perpetrated by the Federal armies in many places throughout the conflict, as legitimate means in putting down the rebellion, so-called!—*War Between the States*, vol. 2, pp. 507–510.

We next present the

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT OULD, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER OF EXCHANGE.

The following paper was published by Judge Ould in the *National Intelligencer* in August, 1868. It is a calm, able, truthful exposition of the question, which has not been and cannot be answered:

RICHMOND, VA., August 17, 1868.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER:

Gentlemen—I have recently seen so many misrepresentations of the action of the late Confederate authorities in relation to prisoners, that I feel it due to the truth of history, and peculiarly incumbent on me as their agent of exchange, to bring to the attention of the country the facts set forth in this paper:

I.

The cartel of exchange bears date July 22d, 1862. Its chief purpose was to secure the delivery of all prisoners of war.

To that end, the fourth article provided that all prisoners of war should be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture. From the date of the cartel until the summer of 1863 the Confederate authorities had the excess of prisoners. During the interval deliveries were made as fast as the Federal Government furnished transportation. Indeed, upon more than one occasion I urged the Federal authorities to send increased means of transportation. It has never been alleged that the Confederate authorities failed or neglected to make prompt deliveries of prisoners who were not held under charges, when they had the excess. On the other hand, during the same time the cartel was openly and notoriously violated by the Federal authorities. Officers and men were kept in confinement, sometimes in irons or doomed to cells, without charge or trial. Many officers were kept in confinement even after the notices published by the Federal authorities had declared them exchanged.

In the summer of 1863 the Federal authorities insisted upon limiting exchanges to such as were held in confinement on either side. This I resisted as being in violation of the cartel. Such a construction not only kept in confinement the excess on either side, but ignored all paroles which were held by the Confederate Government. These were very many, being the paroles of officers and men who had been released on capture. The Federal Government

at that time held few or no paroles. They had all, or nearly all, been surrendered, the Confederate authorities giving prisoners as equivalent for them. Thus it will be seen that as long as the Confederate Government had the excess of prisoners matters went on smoothly enough, but as soon as the posture of affairs in that respect was changed the cartel could no longer be observed. So, as long as the Federal Government held the paroles of Confederate officers and men, they were respected, and made the basis of exchange; but when equivalents were obtained for them, and no more were in hand, the paroles which were held by the Confederate authorities could not be recognized. In consequence of the position thus assumed by the Federal Government, the requirement of the cartel that all prisoners should be delivered within ten days was practically nullified. The deliveries which were afterwards made were the results of special agreements.

The Confederate authorities adhered to their position until the 10th of August, 1864, when, moved by the sufferings of the men in the prisons of each belligerent, they determined to abate their just demand. Accordingly, on the last named day, I addressed the following communication to Brigadier-General John E. Mulford (then Major), Assistant Agent of Exchange:

RICHMOND, August 10, 1864.

MAJOR JOHN E. MULFORD,

Assistant Agent of Exchange:

Sir—You have several times proposed to me to exchange the prisoners respectively held by the two belligerents—officer for officer and man for man. The same offer has also been made by other officials having charge of matters connected with the exchange of prisoners.

This proposal has heretofore been declined by the Confederate authorities, they insisting upon the terms of the cartel, which required the delivery of the excess on either side on parole. In view, however, of the very large number of prisoners now held by each party, and the suffering consequent upon their continued confinement, I now consent to the above proposal, and agree to deliver to you the prisoners held in captivity by the Confederate authorities, provided you agree to deliver an equal number of Confederate officers and men. As equal numbers are delivered from time to time, they will be declared exchanged. This proposal is made with the understanding that the officers and men on both sides who have been longest in captivity will be first delivered, where it is practicable.

I shall be happy to hear from you as speedily as possible whether this arrangement can be carried out.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT OULD,
Agent of Exchange.

The delivery of this letter was accompanied with a statement of the mortality which was hurrying so many Federal prisoners at Andersonville to the grave.

On the 22d day of August, 1864, not having heard anything in response, I addressed a communication to Major-General E. A. Hitchcock, United States Commissioner of Exchange, covering a copy of the foregoing letter to General Mulford, and requesting an acceptance of my propositions.

No answer was received to either of these letters. General Mulford, on the 31st day of August, 1864, informed me in writing that he had no communication on the subject from the United States authorities, and that he was not at that time authorized to make any answer.

This offer, which would have instantly restored to freedom thousands of suffering captives—which would have released every Federal soldier in confinement in Confederate prisons—was not even noticed. Was that because the Federal officials did not deem it worthy of a reply, or because they feared to make one? As the Federal authorities at that time had a large excess of prisoners, the effect of the proposal which I had made, if carried out, would have been to release all Union prisoners, while a large number of the Confederates would have remained in prison, awaiting the chances of the capture of their equivalents.

II.

In January, 1864, and, indeed, some time earlier, it became very manifest that in consequence of the complication in relation to exchanges, the large bulk of prisoners on both sides would remain in captivity for many long and weary months, if not for the duration of the war. Prompted by an earnest desire to alleviate the hardships of confinement on both sides, I addressed the following communication to General E. A. Hitchcock, United States Commissioner of Exchange, and on or about the day of its date delivered the same to the Federal authority :

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,
RICHMOND, VA., January 24, 1868.

MAJOR-GENERAL E. A. HITCHCOCK,

Agent of Exchange :

Sir—In view of the present difficulties attending the exchange and release of prisoners, I propose that all such on each side shall be attended by a proper number of their own surgeons, who, under rules to be established, shall be permitted to take charge of their health and comfort.

I also propose that these surgeons shall act as commissaries, with power to receive and distribute such contributions of money, food, clothing and medicines as may be forwarded for the relief of prisoners. I further propose that these surgeons be selected by

their own Governments, and that they shall have full liberty at any and all times, through the agents of exchange, to make reports not only of their own acts, but of any matters relating to the welfare of prisoners.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT OULD,
Agent of Exchange.

To this communication no reply of any kind was ever made. I need not state how much suffering would have been prevented if this offer had been met in the spirit in which it was dictated. In addition, the world would have had truthful accounts of the treatment of prisoners on both sides by officers of character, and thus much of that misrepresentation which has flooded the country would never have been poured forth. The jury-box in the case of Wirz would have had different witnesses, with a different story. It will be borne in mind that nearly all of the suffering endured by Federal prisoners happened after January, 1864. The acceptance of the proposition made by me, on behalf of the Confederate Government, would not only have furnished to the sick medicines and physicians, but to the well an abundance of food and clothing from the ample stores of the United States.

The good faith of the Confederate Government in making this offer cannot be successfully questioned; for food and clothing (without the surgeons) were sent in 1865, and were allowed to be distributed by Federal officers to Federal prisoners.

Why could not the more humane proposal of January, 1864, have been accepted?

III.

When it was ascertained that exchanges could not be made, either on the basis of the cartel, or officer for officer and man for man, I was instructed by the Confederate authorities to offer to the United States Government their sick and wounded *without requiring any equivalents*. Accordingly, in the summer of 1864, I did offer to deliver from ten to fifteen thousand of the sick and wounded at the mouth of the Savannah river, without requiring any equivalents, assuring at the same time the agent of the United States, General Mulford, that if the number for which he might send transportation could not readily be made up from sick and wounded, I would supply the difference with well men. Although this offer was made in the summer of 1864, transportation was not sent to the Savannah river until about the middle or last of November, and then I delivered as many prisoners as could be transported—some thirteen thousand in number—amongst whom were more than five thousand well men.

More than once I urged the mortality at Andersonville as a reason for haste on the part of the United States authorities. I know, personally, that it was the purpose of the Confederate Government to send off from all its prisons all the sick and wounded, and to con-

tinue to do the same, from time to time, without requiring any equivalents for them. It was because the sick and wounded at points distant from Georgia could not be brought to Savannah within a reasonable time that the five thousand well men were substituted.

Although the terms of my offer did not require the Federal authorities to deliver any for the ten or fifteen thousand which I promised, yet some three thousand sick and wounded were delivered by them at the mouth of the Savannah river. I call upon every Federal and Confederate officer and man who saw the cargo of living death, and who is familiar with the character of the deliveries made by the Confederate authorities, to bear witness that none such was ever made by the latter, even when the very sick and desperately wounded alone were requested. For, on two occasions at least, such were specially asked for, and particular request was made for those who were so desperately sick that it would be doubtful whether they would survive a removal a few miles down James river. Accordingly, the hospitals were searched for the worst cases, and after they were delivered they were taken to Annapolis, and there photographed as specimen prisoners. The photographs at Annapolis were terrible indeed; but the misery they portrayed was surpassed at Savannah.

The original rolls showed that some thirty-five hundred had started from Northern prisons, and that death had reduced the number during the transit to about three thousand. The mortality amongst those who were delivered alive during the following three months was equally frightful.

But why was there this delay between the summer and November in sending transportation for sick and wounded, for whom no equivalents were asked? Were Union prisoners made to suffer in order to aid the photographs "in firing the popular heart of the North?"

IV.

In the summer of 1864, in consequence of certain information communicated to me by the Surgeon-General of the Confederate States as to the deficiency of medicines, I offered to make purchases of medicines from the United States authorities, to be used exclusively for the relief of Federal prisoners. I offered to pay gold, cotton or tobacco for them, and even two or three prices if required. At the same time I gave assurances that the medicines would be used exclusively in the treatment of Federal prisoners; and moreover agreed, on behalf of the Confederate States, if it was insisted on, that such medicines might be brought into the Confederate lines by the United States surgeons, and dispensed by them. To this offer I never received any reply. Incredible as this appears, it is strictly true.

V.

General John E. Mulford is personally cognizant of the truth of most, if not all, the facts which I have narrated. He was connected with the cartel from its date until the close of the war. During a portion of the time he was Assistant Agent of Exchange on the part of the United States. I always found him to be an honorable and truthful gentleman. While he discharged his duties with great fidelity to his own Government, he was kind—and I might almost say, tender—to Confederate prisoners. With that portion of the correspondence with which his name is connected he is, of course, familiar. He is equally so with the delivery made at Savannah and its attending circumstances, and with the offer I made as to the purchase of medicines for the Federal sick and wounded. I appeal to him for the truth of what I have written. There are other Federal corroborations to portions of my statements. They are found in the report of Major-General B. F. Butler to the "Committee on the Conduct of the War." About the last of March, 1864, I had several conferences with General Butler at Fortress Monroe in relation to the difficulties attending the exchange of prisoners, and we reached what we both thought a tolerably satisfactory basis.

The day that I left there General Grant arrived. General Butler says he communicated to him the state of the negotiations, and "most emphatic verbal directions were received from the Lieutenant-General not to take any step by which another able bodied man should be exchanged until further orders from him;" and that on April 30, 1864, he received a telegram from General Grant "to receive all the sick and wounded the Confederate authorities may send you, but send no more in exchange." Unless my recollection fails me, General Butler also, in an address to his constituents, substantially declared that he was directed in his management of the question of exchange with the Confederate authorities, to put the matter offensively, *for the purpose of preventing an exchange.*

The facts which I have stated are also well known to the officers connected with the Confederate Bureau of Exchange.

At one time I thought an excellent opportunity was offered of bringing some of them to the attention of the country. I was named by poor Wirz as a witness in his behalf. The summons was issued by Chipman, the Judge Advocate of the military court. I obeyed the summons, and was in attendance upon the court for some ten days. The investigation had taken a wide range as to the conduct of the Confederate and Federal Governments in the matter of the treatment of prisoners, and I thought the time had come when I could put before the world these humane offers of the Confederate authorities, and the manner in which they had been treated. I so expressed myself more than once—perhaps too publicly. But it was a vain thought.

Early in the morning of the day on which I expected to give my testimony, I received a note from Chipman, the Judge Advocate,

requiring me to surrender my subpoena. I refused, as it was my protection in Washington. Without it the doors of the Old Capitol Prison might have opened and closed upon me. I engaged, however, to appear before the court, and I did so the same morning. I still refused to surrender my subpoena, and thereupon the Judge Advocate endorsed on it these words: "The within subpoena is hereby revoked; the person named is discharged from further attendance." I have got the curious document before me now, signed with the name of "N. P. Chipman, Colonel," &c. I intend to keep it, if I can, as the evidence of the first case, *in any court of any sort*, where a witness who was summoned *for the defence* was dismissed *by the prosecution*. I hastened to depart, confident that Richmond was a safer place for me than the metropolis.

Some time ago a committee was appointed by the House of Representatives to investigate the treatment of Union prisoners in Southern prisons. After the appointment of the committee—the Hon. Mr. Shanks, of Indiana, being its chairman—I wrote to the Hon. Charles A. Eldridge and the Hon. Mr. Mungen (the latter a member of the committee) some of the facts herein detailed. Both of these gentlemen made an effort to extend the authority of the committee so that it might inquire into the treatment of prisoners North as well as South, and especially that it might inquire into the truth of the matters which I had alleged. All these attempts were frustrated by the Radical majority, although several of the party voted to extend the inquiry. As several thousand dollars of the money of the people have been spent by this committee, will not they demand that the investigation shall be thorough and impartial? The House of Representatives have declined the inquiry; let the people take it up.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT OULD.

We may add to the above statement that (through the courtesy of Judge Ould) we now have on our table the letter-book of our Commissioner of Exchange, containing copies of all of his official letters to the Federal authorities, and they prove, beyond the shadow of a doubt, every point which he makes.

If it be replied to the above testimony that President Davis, General Lee, Vice-President Stevens and Judge Ould were "all criminals in this matter," and that their testimony is thereby invalidated, we will not pause to defend these high-toned gentlemen, whom the verdict of history will pronounce as stainless as any public men who ever lived, but we will proceed to introduce testimony of a different character. While the Northern press was ringing with the charge of "Rebel barbarity to prisoners," the Confederate Congress raised a joint committee of the Senate and House

of Representatives to consider the whole subject of the treatment of prisoners. The Chairman was Judge J. W. C. Watson, of Holly Springs, Mississippi, an elder of the Presbyterian Church and a pure minded, Christian gentleman, and the committee was composed of gentlemen of highest character, who were absolutely incapable of either countenancing or whitewashing cruelty to prisoners, or of subscribing their names to statements not proven to be true. After a full investigation, and the taking of a large volume of testimony, the committee submitted a report. The testimony was being printed when Richmond was evacuated, and was unfortunately consumed in the great conflagration. A few copies of the report were saved, and we have secured one for our archives, which we now give in full:

Report of the Joint Committee of the Confederate Congress appointed to Investigate the Condition and Treatment of Prisoners of War.

[Presented March 3d, 1865.]

The duties assigned to the committee under the several resolutions of Congress designating them, are "to investigate and report upon the condition and treatment of the prisoners of war respectively held by the Confederate and United States Governments; upon the causes of their detention, and the refusal to exchange; and also upon the violations by the enemy of the rules of civilized warfare in the conduct of the war." These subjects are broad in extent and importance; and in order fully to investigate and present them, the committee propose to continue their labors in obtaining evidence, and deducing from it a truthful report of facts illustrative of the spirit in which the war has been conducted.

NORTHERN PUBLICATIONS.

But we deem it proper at this time to make a preliminary report, founded upon evidence recently taken, relating to the treatment of prisoners of war by both belligerents. This report is rendered specially important, by reason of persistent efforts lately made by the Government of the United States, and by associations and individuals connected or co-operating with it, to asperse the honor of the Confederate authorities, and to charge them with deliberate and wilful cruelty to prisoners of war. Two publications have been issued at the North within the past year, and have been circulated not only in the United States, but in some parts of the South, and in Europe. One of these is the report of the joint select committee of the Northern Congress on the conduct of the war, known as "Report No. 67." The other purports to be a "Narrative of the privations and sufferings of United States officers and soldiers while prisoners of war," and is issued as a report of a com-

mission of inquiry appointed by "The United States Sanitary Commission."

This body is alleged to consist of Valentine Mott, M. D., Edward Delafield, M. D., Gouverneur Morris Wilkins, Esq., Ellerslie Wallace, M. D., Hon. J. J. Clarke Hare, and Rev. Treadwell Walden. Although these persons are not of sufficient public importance and weight to give authority to their publications, yet your committee have deemed it proper to notice it in connection with the "Report No. 67," before mentioned; because the Sanitary Commission has been understood to have acted, to a great extent, under the control and by the authority of the United States Government, and because their report claims to be founded on evidence taken in solemn form.

THEIR SPIRIT AND INTENT.

A candid reader of these publications will not fail to discover that, whether the statements they make be true or not, their spirit is not adapted to promote a better feeling between the hostile powers. They are not intended for the humane purpose of ameliorating the condition of the unhappy prisoners held in captivity. They are designed to inflame the evil passions of the North; to keep up the war spirit among their own people; to represent the South as acting under the dominion of a spirit of cruelty, inhumanity and interested malice, and thus to vilify her people in the eyes of all on whom these publications can work. They are justly characterized by the Hon. James M. Mason as belonging to that class of literature called the "sensational," a style of writing prevalent for many years at the North, and which, beginning with the writers of newspaper narratives and cheap fiction, has gradually extended itself, until it is now the favored mode adopted by medical professors, judges of courts and reverend clergymen, and is even chosen as the proper style for a report by a committee of their Congress.

PHOTOGRAPHS.

Nothing can better illustrate the truth of this view than the "Report No. 67," and its appendages. It is accompanied by eight *pictures* or *photographs*, alleged to represent United States prisoners of war returned from Richmond in a sad state of emaciation and suffering. Concerning these cases your committee will have other remarks, to be presently submitted. They are only alluded to now to show that this report does really belong to the "sensational" class of literature, and that, *prima facie*, it is open to the same criticism to which the yellow covered novels, the "narratives of noted highwaymen," and the "awful beacons" of the Northern book stalls should be subjected.

The intent and spirit of this report may be gathered from the following extract: "The evidence proves, beyond all manner of doubt, a determination on the part of the Rebel authorities, deliberately and persistently practiced for a long time past, to subject

those of our soldiers who have been so unfortunate as to fall into their hands to a system of treatment which has resulted in reducing many of those who have survived and been permitted to return to us to a condition, both physically and mentally, which no language we can use can adequately describe." (Report, p. 1.) And they give also a letter from Edwin M. Stanton, the Northern Secretary of War, from which the following is an extract: "The enormity of the crime committed by the Rebels towards our prisoners for the last several months is not known or realized by our people, and cannot but fill with horror the civilized world when the facts are fully revealed. There appears to have been a deliberate system of savage and barbarous treatment and starvation, the result of which will be that few (if any) of the prisoners that have been in their hands during the past winter will ever again be in a condition to render any service, or even to enjoy life." (Report, p. 4.) And the Sanitary Commission, in their pamphlet, after picturing many scenes of privation and suffering, and bringing many charges of cruelty against the Confederate authorities, declare as follows: "The conclusion is unavoidable, therefore, that these privations and sufferings have been designedly inflicted by the military and other authorities of the Rebel Government, and could not have been due to causes which such authorities could not control." (X. 95.)

TRUTH TO BE SOUGHT.

After examining these publications your committee approached the subject with an earnest desire to ascertain *the truth*. If their investigation should result in ascertaining that these charges (or any of them) were true, the committee desired, as far as might be in their power, and as far as they could influence the Congress, to remove the evils complained of and to conform to the most humane spirit of civilization; and if these charges were unfounded and false, they deemed it a sacred duty without delay to present to the Confederate Congress and people, and to the public eye of the enlightened world, a vindication of their country, and to relieve her authorities from the injurious slanders brought against her by her enemies. With these views we have taken a considerable amount of testimony bearing on the subject. We have sought to obtain witnesses whose position or duties made them familiar with the facts testified to, and whose characters entitled them to full credit. We have not hesitated to examine Northern prisoners of war upon points and experience specially within their knowledge. We now present the testimony taken by us, and submit a report of facts and inferences fairly deducible from the evidence, from the admissions of our enemies, and from public records of undoubted authority.

FACTS AS TO SICK AND WOUNDED PRISONERS.

First in order, your committee will notice the charge contained both in "Report No. 67" and in the "sanitary" publication, founded on the appearance and condition of the sick prisoners sent from

Richmond to Annapolis and Baltimore about the last of April, 1864. These are the men some of whom form the subjects of the photographs with which the United States Congressional Committee have adorned their report. The disingenuous attempt is made in both these publications to produce the impression that these sick and emaciated men were fair representatives of the general state of the prisoners held by the South, and that all their prisoners were being rapidly reduced to the same state by starvation and cruelty, and by neglect, ill treatment and denial of proper food, stimulants and medicines in the Confederate hospitals. Your committee take pleasure in saying that not only is this charge proved to be wholly false, but the evidence ascertains facts as to the Confederate hospitals, in which Northern prisoners of war are treated, highly creditable to the authorities which established them, and to the surgeons and their aids who have so humanely conducted them. The facts are simply these:

The Federal authorities, in violation of the cartel, having for a long time refused exchange of prisoners, finally consented to a partial exchange of the sick and wounded on both sides. Accordingly a number of such prisoners were sent from the hospitals in Richmond. General directions had been given that none should be sent except those who might be expected to endure the removal and passage with safety to their lives; but in some cases the surgeons were induced to depart from this rule by the entreaties of some officers and men in the last stages of emaciation, suffering not only with excessive debility, but with "nostalgia," or home sickness, whose cases were regarded as desperate, and who could not live if they remained, and might possibly improve if carried home. Thus it happened that some very sick and emaciated men were carried to Annapolis, but their illness was *not* the result of ill treatment or neglect. Such cases might be found in any large hospital, North or South. They might even be found in private families, where the sufferer might be surrounded by every comfort that love could bestow. Yet these are the cases which, with hideous violation of decency, the Northern committee have paraded in pictures and photographs. They have taken their own sick and enfeebled soldiers; have stripped them naked; have exposed them before a daguerreian apparatus; have pictured every shrunken limb and muscle; and all for the purpose, not of relieving their sufferings, but of bringing a false and slanderous charge against the South.

CONFEDERATE SICK AND WOUNDED—THEIR CONDITION WHEN
RETURNED.

The evidence is overwhelming that the illness of these prisoners was not the result of ill treatment or neglect. The testimony of Surgeons Semple and Spence; of Assistant Surgeons Tinsley, Marriott and Miller, and of the Federal prisoners E. P. Dalrymple, George Henry Brown and Freeman B. Teague, ascertains this to the satisfaction of every candid mind. But in refuting this charge,

your committee are compelled by the evidence to bring a counter charge against the Northern authorities, which they fear will not be so easily refuted. In exchange, a number of Confederate sick and wounded prisoners have been at various times delivered at Richmond and at Savannah. The mortality among these on the passage and their condition when delivered were so deplorable as to justify the charge that they had been treated with inhuman neglect by the Northern authorities.

Assistant Surgeon Tinsley testifies: "I have seen many of our prisoners returned from the North who were nothing but skin and bones.. They were as emaciated as a man could be to retain life, and the photographs (appended to 'Report No. 67') would not be exaggerated representations of our returned prisoners to whom I thus allude. I saw 250 of our sick brought in on litters from the steamer at Rocketts. Thirteen dead bodies were brought off the steamer the same night. At least thirty died in one night after they were received."

Surgeon Spence testifies: "I was at Savannah, and saw rather over three thousand prisoners received. The list showed that a large number had died on the passage from Baltimore to Savannah. The number sent from the Federal prisons was 3,500, and out of that number they delivered only 3,028, to the best of my recollection. Captain Hatch can give you the exact number. Thus, about 472 died on the passage. I was told that 67 dead bodies had been taken from one train of cars between Elmira and Baltimore. After being received at Savannah, they had the best attention possible, yet many died in a few days."—"In carrying out the exchange of disabled, sick and wounded men, we delivered at Savannah and Charleston about 11,000 Federal prisoners, and their physical condition compared most favorably with those we received in exchange, although of course the worst cases among the Confederates had been removed by death during the passage."

Richard H. Dibrell, a merchant of Richmond, and a member of the "Ambulance Committee," whose labors in mitigating the sufferings of the wounded have been acknowledged both by Confederate and Northern men, thus testifies concerning our sick and wounded soldiers at Savannah, returned from Northern prisons and hospitals: "I have never seen a set of men in worse condition. They were so enfeebled and emaciated that we lifted them like little children. Many of them were like living skeletons. Indeed, there was one poor boy, about 17 years old, who presented the most distressing and deplorable appearance I ever saw. He was nothing but skin and bone, and besides this, he was literally eaten up with vermin. He died in the hospital in a few days after being removed thither, notwithstanding the kindest treatment and the use of the most judicious nourishment. Our men were in so reduced a condition, that on more than one trip up on the short passage of ten miles from the transports to the city, as many as five died. The clothing of the privates was in a wretched state of tatters and filth."—"The mor-

tality on the passage from Maryland was very great, as well as that on the passage from the prisons to the port from which they started. I cannot state the exact number, but I think I heard that 3,500 were started, and we only received about 3,027."—"I have looked at the photographs appended to 'Report No. 67' of the committee of the Federal Congress, and do not hesitate to declare that several of our men were worse cases of emaciation and sickness than any represented in these photographs."

The testimony of Mr. Dibrell is confirmed by that of Andrew Johnston, also a merchant of Richmond, and a member of the "Ambulance Committee."

Thus it appears that the sick and wounded Federal prisoners at Annapolis, whose condition has been made a subject of outcry and of wide-spread complaint by the Northern Congress, were not in a worse state than were the Confederate prisoners returned from Northern hospitals and prisons, of which the humanity and superior management are made subjects of special boasting by the United States Sanitary Commission!

CONFEDERATE HOSPITALS FOR PRISONERS.

In connection with this subject, your committee take pleasure in reporting the facts ascertained by their investigations concerning the Confederate hospitals for sick and wounded Federal prisoners. They have made personal examination, and have taken evidence specially in relation to "Hospital No. 21," in Richmond, because this has been made the subject of distinct charge in the publication last mentioned. It has been shown not only by the evidence of the surgeons and their assistants, but by that of Federal prisoners, that the treatment of the Northern prisoners in these hospitals has been everything that humanity could dictate; that their wards have been well ventilated and clean; their food the best that could be procured for them—and in fact that no distinction has been made between their treatment and that of our own sick and wounded men. Moreover, it is proved that it has been the constant practice to supply to the patients, *out of the hospital funds*, such articles as milk, butter, eggs, tea and other delicacies, when they were required by the condition of the patient. This is proved by the testimony of E. P. Dalrymple of New York, George Henry Brown of Pennsylvania, and Freeman B. Teague of New Hampshire, whose depositions accompany this report.

CONTRAST.

This humane and considerate usage was *not* adopted in the United States hospital on Johnson's Island, where Confederate sick and wounded officers were treated. Colonel J. H. Holman thus testifies: "The Federal authorities did not furnish to the sick prisoners the nutriment and other articles which were prescribed by their own surgeons. All they would do was to permit the prisoners to buy the nutriment or stimulants needed; and if they had no money,

they could not get them. I know this, for I was in the hospital sick myself, and I had to buy myself such articles as eggs, milk, flour, chickens and butter, after their doctors had prescribed them. And I know this was generally the case, for we had to get up a fund among ourselves for this purpose, to aid those who were not well supplied with money." This statement is confirmed by the testimony of Acting Assistant Surgeon John J. Miller, who was at Johnson's Island for more than eight months. When it is remembered that such articles as eggs, milk and butter were very scarce and high priced in Richmond, and plentiful and cheap at the North, the contrast thus presented may well put to shame the "Sanitary Commission," and dissipate the self-complacency with which they have boasted of the superior humanity in the Northern prisons and hospitals.

CHARGE OF ROBBING PRISONERS.

Your committee now proceed to notice other charges in these publications. It is said that their prisoners were habitually stripped of blankets and other property, on being captured. What pillage may have been committed on the battle-field, after the excitement of combat, your committee cannot know. But they feel well assured that such pillage was never encouraged by the Confederate generals, and bore no comparison to the wholesale robbery and destitution to which the Federal armies have abandoned themselves, in possessing parts of our territory. It is certain that after the prisoners were brought to the Libby, and other prisons in Richmond, no such pillage was permitted. Only articles which came properly under the head of munitions of war were taken from them.

SHOOTING PRISONERS.

The next charge noticed is, that the guards around the Libby Prison were in the habit of recklessly and inhumanly shooting at the prisoners upon the most frivolous pretexts, and that the Confederate officers, so far from forbidding this, rather encouraged it, and made it a subject of sportive remark. This charge is wholly false and baseless. The "Rules and Regulations" appended to the deposition of Major Thomas P. Turner, expressly provide, "Nor shall any prisoner be fired upon by a sentinel or other person, except in case of revolt or attempted escape." Five or six cases have occurred in which prisoners have been fired on and killed or hurt; but every case has been made the subject of careful investigation and report, as will appear by the evidence. As a proper comment on this charge, your committee report that the practice of firing on our prisoners by the guards in the Northern prisons appears to have been indulged in to a most brutal and atrocious extent. See the depositions of C. C. Herrington, William F. Gordon, Jr., J. B. McCreary, Dr. Thomas P. Holloway, and John P. Fennell. At Fort Delaware a cruel regulation as to the use of the "sinks" was made the pretext for firing on and murdering several

of our men and officers, among them Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, who was lame, and was shot down by the sentinel while helpless and feeble and while seeking to explain his condition. Yet this sentinel was not only not punished, but was promoted for his act. At Camp Douglas as many as eighteen of our men are reported to have been shot in a single month. These facts may well produce a conviction, in the candid observer, that it is the North and not the South that is open to the charge of deliberately and wilfully destroying the lives of the prisoners held by her.

MEANS FOR SECURING CLEANLINESS.

The next charge is, that the Libby and Belle Isle prisoners were habitually kept in a filthy condition, and that the officers and men confined there were prevented from keeping themselves sufficiently clean to avoid vermin and similar discomforts. The evidence clearly contradicts this charge. It is proved by the depositions of Major Turner, Lieutenant Bossieux, Rev. Dr. McCabe, and others, that the prisons were kept constantly and systematically policed and cleansed; that in the Libby there was an ample supply of water conducted to each floor by the city pipes, and that the prisoners were not only not restricted in its use, but urged to keep themselves clean. At Belle Isle, for a brief season (about three weeks), in consequence of a sudden increase in the number of prisoners, the police was interrupted, but it was soon restored, and ample means for washing both themselves and their clothes were at all times furnished to the prisoners. It is doubtless true that, notwithstanding these facilities, many of the prisoners were lousy and filthy; but it was the result of their own habits, and not of neglect in the discipline or arrangements of the prison. Many of the prisoners were captured and brought in while in this condition. The Federal General Neal Dow well expressed their character and habits. When he came to distribute clothing among them, he was met by profane abuse; and he said to the Confederate officer in charge, "You have here the *scrapings and rakings of Europe*." That such men should be filthy in their habits might be expected.

CHARGE OF WITHHOLDING AND PILLAGING BOXES.

We next notice the charge that the boxes of provisions and clothing sent to the prisoners from the North were not delivered to them, and were habitually robbed and plundered by permission of the Confederate authorities. The evidence satisfies your committee that this charge is, in all substantial points, untrue. For a period of about one month there was a stoppage in the delivery of boxes, caused by a report that the Federal authorities were forbidding the delivery of similar supplies to our prisoners. But the boxes were put in a warehouse, and were afterwards delivered. For some time no search was made of boxes from the "Sanitary Committee," intended for the prisoners' hospitals. But a letter was intercepted

advising that money should be sent in these boxes, "as they were never searched;" which money was to be used in bribing the guards, and thus releasing the prisoners. After this it was deemed necessary to search every box, which necessarily produced some delay. Your committee are satisfied that if these boxes or their contents were robbed, the prison officials are not responsible therefor. Beyond doubt, robberies were often committed by prisoners themselves, to whom the contents were delivered for distribution to their owners. Notwithstanding all this alleged pillage, the supplies seem to have been sufficient to keep the quarters of the prisoners so well furnished that they frequently presented, in the language of a witness, "the appearance of a large grocery store."

THE FEDERAL COLONEL SANDERSON'S TESTIMONY.

In connection with this point, your committee refer to the testimony of a Federal officer—Colonel James M. Sanderson—whose letter is annexed to the deposition of Major Turner. He testifies to the full delivery of the clothing and supplies from the North, and to the humanity and kindness of the Confederate officers, specially mentioning Lieutenant Bossieux, commanding on Belle Isle. His letter was addressed to the President of the United States Sanitary Commission, and was beyond doubt received by them, having been forwarded by the regular flag of truce. Yet the scrupulous and honest gentlemen composing that commission have not found it convenient for their purposes to insert this letter in their publication. Had they been really searching for the *truth*, this letter would have aided them in finding it.

MINE UNDER THE LIBBY PRISON.

Your committee proceed next to notice the allegation that the Confederate authorities had prepared a mine under the Libby prison, and placed in it a quantity of gunpowder for the purpose of blowing up the buildings, with their inmates, in case of an attempt to rescue them. After ascertaining all the facts bearing on this subject, your committee believe that what was done, under the circumstances, will meet a verdict of approval from all whose prejudices do not blind them to the truth. The state of things was unprecedented in history, and must be judged of according to the motives at work and the result accomplished. A large body of Northern raiders, under one Colonel Dahlgren, was approaching Richmond. It was ascertained, by the reports of prisoners captured from them, and other evidence, that their design was to enter the city, to set fire to the buildings, public and private—for which purpose turpentine balls in great number had been prepared—to murder the President of the Confederate States and other prominent men—to release the prisoners of war, then numbering five or six thousand—to put arms into their hands, and to turn over the city to indiscriminate pillage, rape and slaughter. At the same time a plot

was discovered among the prisoners to co-operate in this scheme, and a large number of knives and slung-shot (made by putting stones into woolen stockings) were detected in places of concealment about their quarters. To defeat a plan so diabolical, assuredly the sternest means were justified. If it would have been right to put to death any one prisoner attempting to escape under such circumstances, it seems logically certain that it would have been equally right to put to death any number making such attempt. But in truth the means adopted were those of humanity and *prevention*, rather than of execution. The Confederate authorities felt able to meet and repulse Dahlgren and his raiders, if they could prevent the escape of the prisoners.

The real object was to save their lives as well as those of our citizens. The guard force at the prisons was small, and all the local troops in and around Richmond were needed to meet the threatened attack. Had the prisoners escaped, the women and children of the city, as well as their homes, would have been at the mercy of five thousand outlaws. Humanity required that the most summary measures should be used to *deter* them from any attempt at escape.

A mine was prepared under the Libby Prison; a sufficient quantity of gunpowder was put into it, and pains were taken to *inform the prisoners* that any attempt at escape made by them would be effectually defeated. The plan succeeded perfectly. The prisoners were awed and kept quiet. Dahlgren and his party were defeated and scattered. The danger passed away, and in a few weeks the gunpowder was removed. Such are the facts. Your committee do not hesitate to make them known, feeling assured that the conscience of the enlightened world and the great law of self-preservation justify all that was done by our country and her officers.

CHARGE OF INTENTIONAL STARVATION AND CRUELTY.

We now proceed to notice, under one head, the last and gravest charge made in these publications. They assert that the Northern prisoners in the hands of the Confederate authorities have been starved, frozen, inhumanly punished, often confined in foul and loathsome quarters, deprived of fresh air and exercise, and neglected and maltreated in sickness—and that all this was done upon a deliberate, wilful and long conceived plan of the Confederate Government and officers, for the purpose of destroying the lives of these prisoners, or of rendering them forever incapable of military service. This charge accuses the Southern Government of a crime so horrible and unnatural, that it could never have been made except by those ready to blacken with slander men whom they have long injured and hated. Your committee feel bound to reply to it calmly but emphatically. They pronounce it false in fact and in design; false in the basis on which it assumes to rest, and false in its estimate of the motives which have controlled the Southern authorities.

HUMANE POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT.

At an early period in the present contest the Confederate Government recognized their obligation to treat prisoners of war with humanity and consideration. Before any laws were passed on the subject, the Executive Department provided such prisoners as fell into their hands with proper quarters and barracks to shelter them, and with rations the same in quantity and quality as those furnished to the Confederate soldiers who guarded these prisoners. They also showed an earnest wish to mitigate the sad condition of prisoners of war, by a system of fair and prompt exchange—and the Confederate Congress co-operated in these humane views. By their act, approved on the 21st day of May, 1861, they provided that "all prisoners of war taken, whether on land or at sea, during the pending hostilities with the United States, shall be transferred by the captors from time to time, and as often as convenient, to the Department of War; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War, with the approval of the President, to issue such instructions to the Quartermaster-General and his subordinates as shall provide for the safe custody and sustenance of prisoners of war; *and the rations furnished prisoners of war shall be the same in quantity and quality as those furnished to enlisted men in the army of the Confederacy.*" Such were the declared purpose and policy of the Confederate Government towards prisoners of war—and amid all the privations and losses to which their enemies have subjected them, they have sought to carry them into effect.

RATIONS AND GENERAL TREATMENT.

Our investigations for this preliminary report have been confined chiefly to the rations and treatment of the prisoners of war at the Libby and other prisons in Richmond and on Belle Isle. This we have done, because the publications to which we have alluded refer chiefly to them, and because the "Report No. 67" of the Northern Congress plainly intimates the belief that the treatment in and around Richmond was worse than it was farther South. That report says: "It will be observed from the testimony, that all the witnesses who testify upon that point state that the treatment they received while confined at Columbia, South Carolina, Dalton, Georgia, and other places, *was far more humane* than that they received at Richmond, where the authorities of the so-called Confederacy were congregated." Report, p. 3.

The evidence proves that the rations furnished to prisoners of war, in Richmond and on Belle Isle, have been *never* less than those furnished to the Confederate soldiers who guarded them, and have at some seasons been larger in quantity and better in quality than those furnished to Confederate troops in the field. This has been, because until February, 1864, the Quartermaster's Department furnished the prisoners, and often had provisions or funds when the

Commissary Department was not so well provided. Once, and only once, for a few weeks the prisoners were without meat; but a larger quantity of bread and vegetable food was in consequence supplied to them. How often the gallant men composing the Confederate army have been without meat, for even longer intervals, your committee do not deem it necessary to say. Not less than sixteen ounces of bread and four ounces of bacon, or six ounces of beef, together with beans and soup, have been furnished per day to the prisoners. During most of the time the quantity of meat furnished to them has been greater than these amounts; and even in times of the greatest scarcity they have received as much as the Southern soldiers who guarded them. The scarcity of meats and of bread stuffs in the South, in certain places, has been the result of the savage policy of our enemies in burning barns filled with wheat or corn, destroying agricultural implements, and driving off or wantonly butchering hogs and cattle. Yet amid all these privations we have given to their prisoners the rations above mentioned. It is well known that this quantity of food is sufficient to keep in health a man who does not labor hard. All the learned disquisitions of Dr. Ellerslie Wallace on the subject of starvation might have been spared, for they are all founded on a false basis. It will be observed that few (if any) of the witnesses examined by the "Sanitary Commission" speak with any accuracy of the quantity (in weight) of the food actually furnished to them. Their statements are merely conjectural and comparative, and cannot weigh against the positive testimony of those who superintended the delivery of large quantities of food, cooked and distributed according to a fixed ratio, for the number of men to be fed.

FALSEHOODS PUBLISHED AS TO PRISONERS FREEZING ON BELLE ISLE.

The statements of the "Sanitary Commission," as to prisoners freezing to death on Belle Isle, are absurdly false. According to that statement, it was common, during a cold spell in winter, to see several prisoners frozen to death every morning in the places in which they had slept. This picture, if correct, might well excite our horror; but unhappily for its sensational power, it is but a clumsy daub, founded on the fancy of the painter. The facts are, that tents were furnished sufficient to shelter all the prisoners; that the Confederate commandant and soldiers on the Island were lodged in similar tents; that a fire was furnished in each of them; that the prisoners fared as well as their guards; and that only one of them was ever frozen to death, and he was frozen *by the cruelty of his own fellow-prisoners*, who thrust him out of the tent in a freezing night because he was infested with vermin. The proof as to the healthiness of the prisoners on Belle Isle, and the small amount of mortality, is remarkable, and presents a fit comment on the lugubrious pictures drawn by the "Sanitary Commission," either from their own fancies or from the fictions put forth by their false witnesses. Lieutenant Bossieux proves that from the establishment

of the prison camp on Belle Isle in June, 1862, to the 10th of February, 1865, more than twenty thousand prisoners had been at various times there received, and yet that the whole number of deaths during this time was only one hundred and sixty-four. And this is confirmed by the Federal Colonel Sanderson, who states that the average number of deaths per month on Belle Isle was "from two to five, more frequently the lesser number." The sick were promptly removed from the Island to the hospitals in the city.

CHARACTER OF THE NORTHERN WITNESSES.

Doubtless the "Sanitary Commission" have been to some extent led astray by their own witnesses, whose character has been portrayed by General Neal Dow, and also by the editor of the *New York Times*, who, in his issue of January 6th, 1865, describes the material for recruiting the Federal armies as "wretched vagabonds, of depraved morals, decrepit in body, without courage, self-respect or conscience. They are dirty, disorderly, thievish and incapable."

CRUELTY TO CONFEDERATE PRISONERS AT THE NORTH.

In reviewing the charges of cruelty, harshness and starvation to prisoners, made by the North, your committee have taken testimony as to the treatment of our own officers and soldiers in the hands of the enemy. It gives us no pleasure to be compelled to speak of suffering inflicted upon our gallant men; but the self-laudatory style in which the "Sanitary Commission" have spoken of their prisons, makes it proper that the truth should be presented. Your committee gladly acknowledge that in many cases our prisoners experienced kind and considerate treatment; but we are equally assured that in nearly all the prison stations of the North—at Point Lookout, Fort McHenry, Fort Delaware, Johnson's Island, Elmira, Camp Chase, Camp Douglas, Alton, Camp Morton, the Ohio Penitentiary, and the prisons of St. Louis, Missouri—our men have suffered from insufficient food, and have been subjected to ignominious, cruel and barbarous practices, of which there is no parallel in anything that has occurred in the South. The witnesses who were at Point Lookout, Fort Delaware, Camp Morton and Camp Douglas testify that they have often seen our men picking up the scraps and refuse thrown out from the kitchens, with which to appease their hunger. Dr. Herrington proves that at Fort Delaware unwholesome bread and water produced diarrhoea in numberless cases among our prisoners, and that "their sufferings were greatly aggravated by the regulation of the camp which forbade more than twenty men at a time at night to go to the sinks. I have seen as many as five hundred men in a row waiting their time. The consequence was that they were obliged to use the places where they were. This produced great want of cleanliness, and aggravated the disease." Our men were compelled to labor in unloading Federal vessels and in putting up buildings for Federal officers, and if they refused, were driven to the work with clubs."

The treatment of Brigadier-General J. H. Morgan and his officers was brutal and ignominious in the extreme. It will be found stated in the depositions of Captain M. D. Logan, Lieutenant W. P. Crow, Lieutenant-Colonel James B. McCreary and Captain B. A. Tracy, that they were put in the Ohio Penitentiary and compelled to submit to the treatment of felons. Their beards were shaved and their hair was cut close to the head. They were confined in convicts' cells and forbidden to speak to each other. For attempts to escape, and for other offences of a very light character, they were subjected to the horrible punishment of the dungeon. In mid-winter, with the atmosphere many degrees below zero, without blanket or overcoat, they were confined in a cell without fire or light, with a foetid and poisonous air to breathe, and here they were kept until life was nearly extinct. Their condition on coming out was so deplorable as to draw tears from their comrades. The blood was oozing from their hands and faces. The treatment in the St. Louis prison was equally barbarous. Captain William H. Sebring testifies: "Two of us—A. C. Grimes and myself—were carried out into the open air in the prison yard, on the 25th of December, 1863, and handcuffed to a post. Here we were kept all night in sleet, snow and cold. We were relieved in the day time, but again brought to the post and handcuffed to it in the evening, and thus we were kept all night until the 2d of January, 1864. I was badly frost-bitten and my health was much impaired. This cruel infliction was done by order of Captain Byrnes, Commandant of Prisons in St. Louis. He was barbarous and insulting to the last degree."

OUR PRISONERS PUT INTO CAMPS INFECTED WITH SMALL-POX.

But even a greater inhumanity than any we have mentioned was perpetrated upon our prisoners at Camp Douglas and Camp Chase. It is proved by the testimony of Thomas P. Holloway, John P. Fennell, H. H. Barlow, H. C. Barton, C. D. Bracken and J. S. Barlow, that our prisoners in large numbers were put into "condemned camps," where small-pox was prevailing, and speedily contracted this loathsome disease, and that as many as 40 new cases often appeared daily among them. Even the Federal officers who guarded them to the camp protested against this unnatural atrocity; yet it was done. The men who contracted the disease were removed to a hospital about a mile off, but the plague was already introduced, and continued to prevail. For a period of more than twelve months the disease was constantly in the camp; yet our prisoners during all this time were continually brought to it, and subjected to certain infection. Neither do we find evidences of amendment on the part of our enemies, notwithstanding the boasts of the "Sanitary Commission." At Nashville, prisoners recently captured from General Hood's army, even when sick and wounded, have been cruelly deprived of all nourishment suited to their condition; and other prisoners from the same army have been carried into the infected Camps Douglas and Chase.

Many of the soldiers of General Hood's army were frost-bitten by being kept day and night in an exposed condition before they were put into Camp Douglas. Their sufferings are truthfully depicted in the evidence. At Alton and Camp Morton the same inhuman practice of putting our prisoners into camps infected by small-pox prevailed. It was equivalent to murdering many of them by the torture of a contagious disease. The insufficient rations at Camp Morton forced our men to appease their hunger by pounding up and boiling bones, picking up scraps of meat and cabbage from the hospital slop tubs, and even eating rats and dogs. The depositions of William Ayres and J. Chambers Brent prove these privations.

BARBAROUS PUNISHMENTS.

The punishments often inflicted on our men for slight offences have been shameful and barbarous. They have been compelled to ride a plank only four inches wide, called "Morgan's horse;" to sit down with their naked bodies in the snow for ten or fifteen minutes, and have been subjected to the ignominy of stripes from the belts of their guards. The pretext has been used that many of their acts of cruelty have been by way of retaliation. But no evidence has been found to prove such acts on the part of the Confederate authorities. It is remarkable that in the case of Colonel Streight and his officers, they were subjected only to the ordinary confinement of prisoners of war. No special punishment was used except for specific offences; and then the greatest infliction was to confine Colonel Streight for a few weeks in a basement room of the Libby Prison, with a window, a plank floor, a stove, a fire, and plenty of fuel.

We do not deem it necessary to dwell further on these subjects. Enough has been proved to show that great privations and sufferings have been borne by the prisoners on both sides.

WHY HAVE NOT PRISONERS OF WAR BEEN EXCHANGED?

But the question forces itself upon us why have these sufferings been so long continued? Why have not the prisoners of war been exchanged, and thus some of the darkest pages of history spared to the world? In the answer to this question must be found the test of responsibility for all the sufferings, sickness and heart-broken sorrow that have visited more than eighty thousand prisoners within the past two years. On this question, your committee can only say that the Confederate authorities have always desired a prompt and fair exchange of prisoners. Even before the establishment of a cartel they urged such exchange, but could never effect it by agreement, until the large preponderance of prisoners in our hands made it the interest of the Federal authorities to consent to the cartel of July 22d, 1863. The ninth article of that agreement expressly provided that in case any misunderstanding should arise, *it should not interrupt the release of prisoners on parole*, but should be

made the subject of friendly explanation. Soon after this cartel was established, the policy of the enemy in seducing negro slaves from their masters, arming them and putting white officers over them to lead them against us, gave rise to a few cases in which questions of crime under the internal laws of the Southern States appeared. Whether men who encouraged insurrection and murder could be held entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war under the cartel, was a grave question. But these cases were few in number, and ought never to have interrupted the general exchange. We were always ready and anxious to carry out the cartel in its true meaning, and it is certain that the ninth article required that the prisoners on both sides should be released, and that the few cases as to which misunderstanding occurred should be left for final decision. Doubtless if the preponderance of prisoners had continued with us, exchanges would have continued. But the fortunes of war threw the larger number into the hands of our enemies. Then they refused further exchanges—and for twenty-two months this policy has continued. Our Commissioner of Exchange has made constant efforts to renew them. In August, 1864, he consented to a proposition, which had been repeatedly made, to exchange officer for officer and man for man, leaving the surplus in captivity. Though this was a departure from the cartel, our anxiety for the exchange induced us to consent. Yet, the Federal authorities repudiated their previous offer, and refused even this partial compliance with the cartel. Secretary Stanton, who has unjustly charged the Confederate authorities with inhumanity, is open to the charge of having done all in his power to prevent a fair exchange, and thus to prolong the sufferings of which he speaks; and very recently, in a letter over his signature, Benjamin F. Butler has declared that in April, 1864, the Federal Lieutenant-General Grant forbade him "to deliver to the Rebels a single able-bodied man;" and moreover, General Butler acknowledges that in answer to Colonel Ould's letter consenting to the exchange, officer for officer and man for man, he wrote a reply, "not diplomatically but obtrusively and demonstratively, *not for the purpose of furthering exchange of prisoners, but for the purpose of preventing and stopping the exchange, and furnishing a ground on which we could fairly stand.*"

These facts abundantly show that the responsibility of refusing to exchange prisoners of war rests with the Government of the United States, and the people who have sustained that Government; and every sigh of captivity, every groan of suffering, every heart broken by hope deferred among these eighty thousand prisoners, will accuse them in the judgment of the just.

With regard to the prison stations at Andersonville, Salisbury and places south of Richmond, your committee have not made extended examination, for reasons which have already been stated. We are satisfied that privation, suffering and mortality, to an extent much to be regretted, did prevail among the prisoners there, but they were not the result of neglect, still less of design on the part

of the Confederate Government. Haste in preparation; crowded quarters, prepared only for a smaller number; want of transportation and scarcity of food, have all resulted from the pressure of the war, and the barbarous manner in which it has been conducted by our enemies. Upon these subjects your committee propose to take further evidence, and to report more fully hereafter.

But even now enough is known to vindicate the South, and to furnish an overwhelming answer to all complaints on the part of the United States Government or people, that their prisoners were stinted in food or supplies. Their own savage warfare has wrought all the evil. They have blockaded our ports; have excluded from us food, clothing and medicines; have even declared medicines contraband of war, and have repeatedly destroyed the contents of drug stores and the supplies of private physicians in the country; have ravaged our country, burned our houses, and destroyed growing crops and farming implements. One of their officers (General Sheridan) has boasted, in his official report, that in the Shenandoah Valley alone he burned two thousand barns filled with wheat and corn; that he burned all the mills in the whole tract of country; destroyed all the factories of cloth; and killed or drove off every animal, even to the poultry, that could contribute to human sustenance. These desolations have been repeated again and again in different parts of the South. Thousands of our families have been driven from their homes as helpless and destitute refugees. Our enemies have destroyed the railroads and other means of transportation by which food could be supplied from abundant districts to those without it. While thus desolating our country, in violation of the usages of civilized warfare, they have refused to exchange prisoners; have forced us to keep fifty thousand of their men in captivity, and yet have attempted to attribute to us the sufferings and privations caused by their own acts. We cannot doubt that, in the view of civilization, we shall stand acquitted, while they must be condemned.

In concluding this preliminary report, we will notice the strange perversity of interpretation which has induced the "Sanitary Commission" to affix as a motto to their pamphlet the words of the compassionate Redeemer of mankind:

"For I was anhungered and ye gave me no meat; I was thirsty and ye gave me no drink; I was a stranger and ye took me not in; naked and ye clothed me not; sick and in prison and ye visited me not."

We have yet to learn on what principle the Federal mercenaries, sent with arms in their hands to destroy the lives of our people, to waste our land, burn our houses and barns, and drive us from our homes, can be regarded by us as the followers of the meek and lowly Redeemer, so as to claim the benefit of his words. Yet even these mercenaries, when taken captive by us, have been treated with proper humanity. The cruelties inflicted on our prisoners at the North may well justify us in applying to the "Sanitary Com-

mission" the stern words of the Divine Teacher—"Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye."

We believe that there are many thousands of just, honorable and humane people in the United States, upon whom this subject, thus presented, will not be lost; that they will do all they can to mitigate the horrors of war; to complete the exchange of prisoners, now happily in progress, and to prevent the recurrence of such sufferings as have been narrated. And we repeat the words of the Confederate Congress, in their manifesto of the 14th of June, 1864:

"We commit our cause to the enlightened judgment of the world, to the sober reflections of our adversaries themselves, and to the solemn and righteous arbitrament of heaven."

Rev. William Brown, D. D., of the *Central Presbyterian*, writes as follows in his paper:

"So far as the intentions and orders of the Confederate Government were concerned, no blame can rest upon it. The places selected were healthy, and the food and medicines ordered were the same as those assigned to our own soldiers and hospitals. The fate of prisoners, especially if the number be large, is generally and unavoidably a hard one. When the intentions of the Government may be right, the neglect or tyranny of subordinates may render the condition of the captives miserable. We can testify from personal observation, and from an intimate acquaintance with the most unimpeachable testimony, that the treatment of our soldiers in prison was often horrible and brutal in the extreme. A vast mass of evidence had been obtained by a committee appointed by the Confederate Senate. At the head of this committee was that pure minded, eminent Christian gentleman, Judge J. W. C. Watson, of Holly Springs, Mississippi. The volume of testimony gathered from a large number of returned prisoners, men of undoubted veracity, we were invited, by the kindness of Judge Watson, to inspect. It was in the hands of the printer in Richmond when the memorable fire occurred, at the time of its evacuation in April, 1865, and was unfortunately consumed in the great conflagration. But Camp Douglas, Roek Island, Johnson's Island, Elmira, Fort Delaware, and other Federal prisons, could they find a tongue, would tell a tale of horror that should forever silence all clamor about '*Libby Prison*' and '*Belle Isle*' and '*Andersonville*.' At Fort Delaware the misrule and suffering were probable less than at any other; yet whoever wishes to get a glimpse at the Federal prisons in their best estate, and under the control of 'the best Government the world ever saw,' let him consult '*Bonds of the United States Government*,' a volume published last year by the Rev. I. W. K. Handy, D. D., a member of the Synod of Virginia, now residing near Staunton; or let him inquire of the Rev. T. D. Witherspoon, D. D., another member of the same Synod, and now

residing in Petersburg. They can both say, as victims, 'We speak concerning that which we know, and testify of that we have seen.'

"It may be—we neither affirm here nor deny—that Wirz deserved his unhappy fate for his treatment of prisoners at Andersonville; he was a subordinate officer, and may have abused his power. But whoever shall look into that whole dreadful history of the treatment of prisoners during the war, even in the light of such imperfect evidence as it has been possible to obtain, will have to conclude that the operation of hanging ought to have been extended a great deal further, and not to have stopped till it reached certain very *high quarters*. The refusal of the military court to allow Judge Ould to *appear as a witness* for Wirz is to be noted as a most significant fact. Read his remarkable statement. He went on to Washington city, summoned by the court to give testimony in behalf of this man charged with a high crime, which put his life in peril. He was fully prepared to bring before that court certain incontestable facts which it was afraid to allow the public to hear. If they should only get before the world in such a conspicuous light, then would somebody—the coming men—have to say, 'Farewell, a long farewell, to all my future greatness!' And so we have the extraordinary fact, here asserted by Judge Ould (and when did criminal jurisprudence, even in the worst acts of Jeffries, surpass its infamy?), that a witness, of the highest character, summoned by the defence was debarred from giving testimony, and was *dismissed by the prosecutor!*

"The reports of the Federal authorities show that a larger number of Confederates died in Northern than of Federal prisoners in Southern prisons or stockades. The whole number of Federal prisoners held in Confederate prisons was, from first to last, in round numbers, 270,000; while the whole number of Confederates held by the Federals was, in round numbers, 220,000. But, with 50,000 more prisoners held by the Confederates, the deaths were actually about 4,000 less. The number of Federal prisoners that died was 22,576; of Confederate prisoners, 26,436.

"Now let the voice of truth tell where was the greater neglect, cruelty, inhumanity. And more than this: upon which side rests the tremendous responsibility of the suffering and distress from the long imprisonment of so many thousands of soldiers? Do not the facts show, beyond a question, that it rests *solely* upon the authorities at Washington? The source of the documents referred to is of the most responsible character. The standing of Judge Ould and Alexander H. Stevens before the world is such as to leave no excuse for disregarding them. Besides this, they make a straightforward issue; they quote or point to their authorities for what they say, and calmly challenge contradiction. The documents were, after the surrender of General Lee, delivered over to the Federal Government, and are now on file in the city of Washington. If the letters quoted or referred to by Judge Ould are not official or genuine, their falsity can easily be shown from the origi-

nal papers. If any of his or Mr. Stephens' statements are untrue, the means of refutation are at hand; let them be produced."

But we will now introduce the

TESTIMONY OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES, MR. CHARLES A. DANA.

In an editorial in his paper, the *New York Sun*, Mr. Dana, after speaking of the bitterness of feeling towards Mr. Davis at the North, thus comments on his recent letter to Mr. Lyons:

This letter shows clearly, we think, that the Confederate authorities, and especially Mr. Davis, ought not to be held responsible for the terrible privations, sufferings and injuries which our men had to endure while they were kept in the Confederate military prisons. The fact is unquestionable that while the Confederates desired to exchange prisoners, to send our men home and to get back their own, General Grant steadily and strenuously resisted such an exchange. While, in his opinion, the prisoners in our hands were well fed, and were in better condition than when they were captured, our prisoners in the South were ill fed, and would be restored to us too much exhausted by famine and disease to form a fair set-off against the comparative vigorous men who would be given in exchange. "It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons," said Grant in an official communication, "not to exchange them; but it is humane to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. If we commence a system of exchanges which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they count for no more than dead men." "I did not," he said on another occasion, "deem it justifiable or just to reinforce the enemy; and an immediate resumption of exchanges would have had that effect without any corresponding benefit."

This evidence must be taken as conclusive. It proves that it was not the Confederate authorities who insisted on keeping our prisoners in distress, want and disease, but the commander of our own armies. We do not say that his reason for this course was not valid; but it was not Jefferson Davis, or any subordinate or associate of his, who should now be condemned for it. We were responsible ourselves for the continued detention of our captives in misery, starvation and sickness in the South,

Moreover, there is no evidence whatever that it was practicable for the Confederate authorities to feed our prisoners any better than they were fed, or to give them better care and attention than they received. The food was insufficient; the care and attention were insufficient, no doubt; and yet the condition of our prisoners was not worse than that of the Confederate soldiers in the field, except in so far as the condition of those in prison must of necessity be worse than that of men who are free and active outside.

Again, in reference to those cases of extreme suffering and disease, the photographs of whose victims were so extensively circulated among us toward the end of the war, Mr. Davis makes, it seems to us, a good answer. Those very unfortunate men were not taken from prisons, but from Confederate hospitals, where they had received the same medical treatment as was given to sick and wounded Confederate soldiers. The fact mentioned by Mr. Davis that while they had 60,000 more prisoners of ours than we had of theirs, the number of Confederates who died in our prisons exceeded by 6,000 the whole number of Union soldiers who died in Southern prisons, though not entirely conclusive, since our men were generally better fed and in better health than theirs, still furnishes a strong support to the position that, upon the whole, our men were not used with greater severity or subjected to greater privations than were inevitable in the nature of the case. Of this charge, therefore, of cruelty to prisoners, so often brought against Mr. Davis, and reiterated by Mr. Blaine in his speech, we think he must be held altogether acquitted.

There are other things in his letter not essential to this question, expressions of political opinion and intimations of views upon larger subjects, which it is not necessary that we should discuss. We are bound, however, to say that in elevation of spirit, in a sincere desire for the total restoration of fraternal feeling and unity between the once warring parts of the Republic, Mr. Davis' letter is infinitely superior and infinitely more creditable to him, both as a statesman and a man, than anything that has recently fallen from such antagonists and enemies of his as Mr. Blaine.

Having produced the testimony of reliable witnesses who were in position to know the truth in reference to this whole question, we proceed to give a somewhat more detailed statement of the facts in reference to it.

THE CONFEDERATE LAW.

We have before us the "statutes at large" of the Confederate Congress, the general orders which emanated from the War Department, and the orders of the Confederate Surgeon-General in reference to the management of hospitals. We have carefully examined these volumes and papers, and are unable to discover a syllable looking to or in the least degree countenancing the maltreatment of prisoners of war.

As early as the 21st of May, 1861, the Confederate Congress passed a law which provided that "all prisoners of war taken, whether on land or sea, during the pending hostilities with the United States, shall be transferred by the captors from time to time, and as often as convenient, to the Department of War; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War, with the approval of the President,

to issue such instructions to the Quartermaster-General and his subordinates as shall provide for the safe custody and sustenance of prisoners of war; and the rations furnished prisoners of war shall be the same in quantity and quality as those furnished to enlisted men in the army of the Confederacy."

This law of the Confederate Congress was embodied in the orders issued from the War Department, and from the headquarters in the field, and we defy the production of a single order from any Confederate Department which militates against this humane provision.

PRIVATEERS.

The first question concerning prisoners which arose between the two governments, was when the privateer *Savannah* was captured on the 3d of June, 1861, off Charleston. In accordance with Mr. Lincoln's proclamation declaring privateering "piracy," the crew of the *Savannah* were placed in irons, and sent to New York. So soon as the facts were known in Richmond, Mr. Davis sent Mr. Lincoln, by a special messenger (Colonel Taylor), a communication, in which, under date of July 6th, 1861, he said:

"Having learned that the schooner *Savannah*, a private armed vessel in the service, and sailing under a commission issued by authority of the Confederate States of America, had been captured by one of the vessels forming the blockading squadron off Charleston harbor, I directed a proposition to be made to the officer commanding the squadron, for an exchange of the officers and crew of the *Savannah* for prisoners of war held by this Government, 'according to number and rank.' To this proposition, made on the 19th ultimo, Captain Mercer, the officer in command of the blockading squadron, made answer, on the same day, that 'the prisoners (referred to) are not on board of any of the vessels under my command.'

"It now appears, by statements made, without contradiction, in newspapers published in New York, that the prisoners above mentioned were conveyed to that city, and have been treated not as prisoners of war, but as criminals; that they have been put in irons, confined in jail, brought before the courts of justice on charges of piracy and treason; and it is even rumored that they have been actually convicted of the offences charged, for no other reason than that they bore arms in defence of the rights of this Government and under the authority of its commission.

"I could not, without grave discourtesy, have made the newspaper statements above referred to the subject of this communication, if the threat of treating as pirates the citizens of this Confederacy, armed for its service on the high seas, had not been contained in

your proclamation of the 19th of April last; that proclamation, however, seems to afford a sufficient justification for considering these published statements as not devoid of probability.

"It is the desire of this Government so to conduct the war now existing as to mitigate its horrors, as far as may be possible; and, with this intent, its treatment of the prisoners captured by its forces has been marked by the greatest humanity and leniency consistent with public obligation. Some have been permitted to return home on parole, others to remain at large, under similar conditions, within this Confederacy, and all have been furnished with rations for their subsistence, such as are allowed to our own troops. It is only since the news has been received of the treatment of the prisoners taken on the *Savannah*, that I have been compelled to withdraw these indulgencies, and to hold the prisoners taken by us in strict confinement.

"A just regard to humanity and to the honor of this Government now requires me to state explicitly, that, painful as will be the necessity, this Government will deal out to the prisoners held by it the same treatment and the same fate as shall be experienced by those captured on the *Savannah*; and if driven to the terrible necessity of retaliation, by your execution of any of the officers or crew of the *Savannah*, that retaliation will be extended so far as shall be requisite to secure the abandonment of a practice unknown to the warfare of civilized man, and so barbarous as to disgrace the nation which shall be guilty of inaugurating it.

"With this view, and because it may not have reached you, I now renew the proposition made to the commander of the blockading squadron, to exchange for the prisoners taken on the *Savannah* an equal number of those now held by us, according to rank."

Colonel Taylor was permitted to go to Washington, but was refused an audience with the President, and was obliged to content himself with a verbal reply from General Scott that the communication had been delivered to Mr. Lincoln, and that he would reply in writing as soon as possible.

No answer ever came, however, and the Confederate authorities were compelled to select by lot from among the Federal prisoners in their hands a number to whom they proposed to mete out the same fate which might await the crew of the *Savannah*. But fortunately Mr. Lincoln was induced, from some cause, to recede from his position—albeit he never deigned an answer of any sort to Mr. Davis' letter—and the horrors of retaliation were thus averted. Although not necessary to this discussion, it may be well (in view of the flippancy with which Northern writers even now speak of "pirate Semmes"), to say that the Federal Government does not seem to have been influenced in this matter by any considerations

of humanity, but rather by what occurred in the British House of Lords, on the 16th of May, soon after Mr. Lincoln's proclamation, declaring the Confederate privateers *pirates*, reached that country.

On this subject the Earl of Derby said:

"He apprehended that if *one thing was clearer than another, it was that privateering was not piracy*, and that no law could make that piracy, as regarded the subjects of one nation, which was not piracy by the law of nations. Consequently the United States *must not be allowed to entertain this doctrine*, and to call upon Her Majesty's Government *not to interfere*. He knew it was said that the United States treated the Confederate States of the South as mere rebels, and that as rebels these expeditions were liable to all the penalties of high treason. That was not the doctrine of this country, because we have declared that they are entitled to all the rights of belligerents. *The Northern States could not claim the rights of belligerents for themselves, and, on the other hand, deal with other parties not as belligerents, but as rebels.*"

Lord Brougham said that "it was clear that privateering was not piracy by the law of nations."

Lord Kingsdown took the same view. "What was to be the operation of the Presidential proclamation upon this subject was a matter for the consideration of the United States." But he expressed the opinion that the enforcement of the doctrine of that proclamation "would be an act of barbarity which would produce an outcry throughout the civilized world."

Up to this time there had been no formal *cartel* for the exchange of prisoners, and the policy of the Washington Government seemed to be that they would not treat with "Rebels" in any way which would acknowledge them as "belligerents." But many prisoners on both sides were released on parole, and a proposition made in the Confederate Congress to return the Federal prisoners taken at First Manassas, without any formality whatever, would doubtless have prevailed but for the difficulty in reference to the crew of the *Savannah*.

The pressure upon the Federal Government by friends of the prisoners became so great that they were finally induced to enter into a *cartel* for the exchange of prisoners on the very basis that the Confederates had offered in the beginning. The Confederate General Howell Cobb and the Federal General Wool entered into this arrangement on the 14th of February, 1862—the only unadjusted point being that General Wool was unwilling that each party should agree to pay the expenses of transporting their prisoners to the frontier, and this he promised to refer to his Government.

At a second interview, the 1st March, General Wool informed General Cobb that his Government would not consent to pay these expenses, and thereupon General Cobb promptly receded from his demand, and agreed to the terms proposed by the other side. But General Wool, who had said at the beginning of the negotiation, "I am alone *clothed with full power* for the purpose of arranging for the exchange of prisoners," was now under the necessity of stating that "his Government had changed his instructions." And thus the negotiations were abruptly broken off, and the matter left where it was before. The vacillating conduct of the Federal Government was of easy explanation and in perfect accord with their double dealing throughout the war. After these negotiations had begun, the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson had given the United States a considerable preponderance in the number of prisoners held by them, and they at once reverted to their original purpose of not treating with "Rebels" on equal terms.

But Jackson's Valley campaign, the Seven Days Battles around Richmond, and other Confederate successes again reversed the "balance of power," and brought the Federal Government to terms to which the Confederate authorities were *always* willing. Accordingly negotiations were again entered into by General D. H. Hill, on the part of the Confederacy, and General John A. Dix, on the part of the United States, and the result was the adoption of the following

Cartel.

HAXALL'S LANDING, ON JAMES RIVER,
July 22, 1862.

The undersigned, having been commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent to make arrangements for a general exchange of prisoners of war, have agreed to the following articles:

Article I. It is hereby agreed and stipulated that all prisoners of war held by either party, including those taken on private armed vessels, known as privateers, shall be exchanged upon the conditions and terms following:

Prisoners to be exchanged man for man and officer for officer; privateers to be placed upon the footing of officers and men of the navy.

Men and officers of lower grades may be exchanged for officers of a higher grade, and men and officers of different services may be exchanged according to the following scale of equivalents:

A general-commander-in-chief or an admiral shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for sixty privates or common seamen.

A flag-officer or major-general shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for forty privates or common seamen.

A commodore, carrying a broad pennant, or a brigadier-general shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or twenty privates or common seamen.

A captain in the navy or a colonel shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for fifteen privates or common seamen.

A lieutenant-colonel or commander in the navy shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for ten privates or common seamen.

A lieutenant-commander or a major shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or eight privates or common seamen.

A lieutenant or a master in the navy or a captain in the army or marines shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or six privates or common seamen.

Masters' mates in the navy or lieutenants or ensigns in the army shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or four privates or common seamen.

Midshipmen, warrant officers in the navy, masters of merchant vessels and commanders of privateers shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or three privates or common seamen. Second captains, lieutenants, or mates of merchant vessels or privateers, and all petty officers in the navy, and all non-commissioned officers in the army or marines, shall be severally exchanged for persons of equal rank, or for two privates or common seamen; and private soldiers or common seamen shall be exchanged for each other, man for man.

Article II. Local, State, civil and militia rank held by persons not in actual military service will not be recognized, the basis of exchange being the grade actually held in the naval and military service of the respective parties.

Article III. If citizens, held by either party on charges of disloyalty for any alleged civil offence, are exchanged, it shall only be for citizens. Captured sutlers, teamsters, and all civilians in the actual service of either party to be exchanged for persons in similar position.

Article IV. All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture, and the prisoners now held and those hereafter taken to be transported to the points mutually agreed upon, at the expense of the capturing party. The surplus prisoners, not exchanged, shall not be permitted to take up arms again, nor to serve as military police, or constabulary force in any fort, garrison or field-work held by either of the respective parties, nor as guards of prisoners, deposit or stores, nor to discharge any duty usually performed by soldiers, until exchanged under the provisions of this cartel. The exchange is not to be considered complete until the officer or soldier exchanged for has been actually restored to the lines to which he belongs.

Article V. Each party, upon the discharge of prisoners of the other party, is authorized to discharge an equal number of their

own officers or men from parole, furnishing at the same time to the other party a list of their prisoners discharged, and of their own officers and men relieved from parole, thus enabling each party to relieve from parole such of their own officers and men as the party may choose. The lists thus mutually furnished will keep both parties advised of the true condition of the exchange of prisoners.

Article VI. The stipulations and provisions above mentioned to be of binding obligation during the continuance of the war, it matters not which party may have the surplus of prisoners, the great principles involved being—1st. An equitable exchange of prisoners, man for man, officer for officer, or officers of higher grade exchanged for officers of lower grade, or for privates, according to the scale of equivalents. 2d. That privates and officers and men of different services may be exchanged according to the same scale of equivalents. 3d. That all prisoners, of whatever arm of service, are to be exchanged or paroled in ten days from the time of their capture, if it be practicable to transfer them to their own lines in that time; if not, as soon thereafter as practicable. 4th. That no officer, soldier, or employee in service of either party is to be considered as exchanged and absolved from his parole until his equivalent has actually reached the lines of his friends. 5th. That the parole forbids the performance of field, garrison, police, or guard or constabulary duty.

JOHN A. DIX, *Major-General.*

D. H. HILL, *Major-General, C. S. A.*

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES.

Article VII. All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all prisoners hereafter taken, shall be sent with reasonable dispatch to A. M. Aiken's, below Dutch Gap, on the James river, in Virginia, or to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi river, in the State of Mississippi, and there exchanged or paroled until such exchange can be effected, notice being previously given by each party of the number of prisoners it will send, and the time when they will be delivered at those points respectively; and in case the vicissitudes of war shall change the military relations of the places designated in this article to the contending parties, so as to render the same inconvenient for the delivery and exchange of prisoners, other places, bearing as nearly as may be the present local relations of said places to the lines of said parties, shall be, by mutual agreement, substituted. But nothing in this article contained shall prevent the commanders of two opposing armies from exchanging prisoners or releasing them on parole at other points mutually agreed on by said commanders.

Article VIII. For the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing articles of agreement, each party will appoint two agents, to be called Agents for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, whose duty it shall be to communicate with each other, by correspondence and otherwise; to prepare the lists of prisoners, to attend to the delivery of

the prisoners at the places agreed on, and to carry out promptly, effectually and in good faith all the details and provisions of the said articles of agreement.

Article IX. And in case any misunderstanding shall arise in regard to any clause or stipulation in the foregoing articles, it is mutually agreed that such misunderstanding shall not interrupt the release of prisoners on parole, as herein provided, but shall be made the subject of friendly explanation, in order that the object of this agreement may neither be defeated nor postponed.

JOHN A. DIX, *Major-General.*

D. H. HILL, *Major-General, C. S. A.*

The rigid observance of the above cartel would have prevented all the horrors of prison life, North and South, and have averted the great mortality in Southern prisons and the greater mortality in Northern prisons. *The Confederate authorities carried out in good faith the provisions of the cartel until the other side had not only frequently violated nearly every article, but finally repudiated the cartel itself.*

Judge Ould's letter-book gives the most incontrovertible proof of this statement; but we reserve the detailed proofs for the present, and pass to consider further the

TREATMENT OF FEDERAL PRISONERS BY THE CONFEDERATE
AUTHORITIES.

We have given above the testimony of General Lee—that the orders were to treat the whole field alike, caring for wounded friend and foe without discrimination, and that “these orders were respected on every field.” Time and again, after some great victory, has the writer seen our brave soldiers, though well nigh worn out with the conflict, ministering to their wounded foes—sharing with them their scant rations, carrying them water, binding up their wounds, and bearing them gently back to our field hospitals, where we gave them every attention in our power. We were personal witnesses of that scene at Port Republic, when Fremont, who had been so badly whipped by Ewell at Cross Keys the day before, stood idly by until Jackson had routed Shields, and then amused himself by shelling the Confederate ambulances and litter-bearers who were caring for the Federal wounded. It is by no means affirmed that there were not individual instances of cruelty to prisoners on the part of Confederate soldiers (especially in the latter part of the war, when their passions were aroused by the heart-rending stories of Federal outrages to helpless women and children which came from every quarter), but we do most emphati-

cally assert that our soldiers as a class were worthy of the eulogy which President Davis pronounced upon them just after the Seven Days Battles around Richmond, in which he said, "You are fighting for all that is dearest to man, and though opposed to a foe who disregards many of the usages of war, *your humanity to the wounded and prisoners was a fit and crowning glory to your valor.*"

The following well authenticated incident of a gallant Confederate soldier was brought out during his funeral obsequies last fall:

"While Pickett's division was before Newbern, General Pickett received by flag of truce a letter from a gentleman in Boston, accompanied by a package of money containing \$2,000, in which the writer stated he had a brother, a Federal officer, in the Libby Prison; that his brother was a former comrade of Pickett in the Mexican war; and appealed to him, by the friendship of their old days, to forward the money to his brother. The appeal touched the generous heart of the soldier, and he dispatched an orderly with the money to the officer. The orderly, tempted by the unusual sight of so much greenbacks, basely deserted to the enemy and escaped with the booty. As soon as Pickett heard of the desertion he immediately went to Richmond, and by a mortgage on his Turkey Island property succeeded in borrowing \$2,000, which he carried to the prisoner, with an explanation of and apology for the delay. The officer, when he learned by what means the General had raised the money, declined to accept \$1,000 of it; but with that nice sense of honor which distinguished the true Southern gentleman, General Pickett compelled him to do so. The two soldiers then talked over the brave old days of the past, when together they fought under the same flag; and as the conversation ripened into friendly confidence the prisoner frankly told the General that his object was to escape if possible, and that he intended using some of the money he had paid him in the effort. The General checked him at once by telling him that he could not receive his confidence in such a matter; that the money was his own, and that he had a right to do with it as he pleased, but it would be improper for him to become a party to his plans. He then left. The prisoner did escape. The war ended disastrously to the South, and General Pickett's estate was sold to satisfy the mortgage which he had executed."

This incident of the treatment which the chivalric Pickett accorded to this prisoner is by no means an isolated example of the readiness of Confederate officers and soldiers to do all in their power to alleviate the condition of prisoners. Incidents illustrating this might be multiplied.

But we proceed to inquire into the treatment received by Federal prisoners after they reached our prisons. And as the report of

the committee of the Confederate Congress treats chiefly of the prisons in and around Richmond, we will speak chiefly of

ANDERSONVILLE,

of which Mr. Blaine says, "Libby pales into insignificance before Andersonville." We cannot better state the case than it has been done by a well known writer :

"The site of the prison at Andersonville—a point on the South-western Railway, in Georgia—had been selected under an official order having reference to the following points: 'A healthy locality, plenty of pure, good water, a running stream, and if possible shade trees, and in the immediate neighborhood of grist and saw mills.' The pressure was so great at Richmond and the supplies so scant that prisoners were sent forward while the stockade was only about half finished. When the first instalment of prisoners arrived, there was no guard at Andersonville, and the little squad which had charge of them in the cars had to remain; and at no time did the guard, efficient and on duty, exceed fifteen hundred, to man the stockade, to guard, and to do general duty and afford relief and enforce discipline over thirty-four thousand prisoners.

"In regard to the sufferings and mortality among the prisoners at Andersonville, none of it arose from the unhealthiness of the locality. The food, though the same as that used by the Confederate soldiers—the bread, too, being corn—was different from that to which they had been accustomed, did not agree with them, and scurvy and diarrhoea prevailed to a considerable extent; neither disease, however, was the result of starvation. That some prisoners did not get their allowance, although a full supply was sent in, is true. But there not being a guard sufficient to attend to distribution, Federal prisoners were appointed, each having a certain number allotted to his charge, among whom it was his duty to see that every man got his portion, and, as an inducement, this prisoner had special favors and advantages. Upon complaint of those under him, he was broke and another selected; so that it only required good faith on the part of these head men, thus appointed, to insure to each man his share. But prisoners would often sell their rations for whiskey and tobacco, and would sell the clothes from their backs for either of them.

"In regard to sanitary regulations, there were certain prescribed places and modes for the reception of all filth, and a sluice was made to carry it off; but the most abominable disregard was manifested of all sanitary regulations, and to such a degree that if a conspiracy had been entered into by a large number of the prisoners to cause the utmost filth and stench, it could not have accomplished a more disgusting result. Besides which there was a large number of atrocious villians, whose outrages in robbing, beating and murdering their fellow-prisoners must have been the cause,

directly or remotely, of very many deaths and of an inconceivable amount of suffering. We must recollect that among thirty-four thousand prisoners, who had encountered the hardships of the fields of many battles, and had had wounds, there were many of delicate physique—many of respectability—to whom such self-created filth and such atrocious ruffianism would of itself cause despondency, disease and death; and when, in addition to this, was the conviction that the Federal War Department, perfectly cognizant of all this, had deliberately consigned them indefinitely to this condition, a consuming despair was superadded to all their other sufferings.

"The merits of Andersonville may be summed up by saying that it was of unquestioned healthfulness; it was large enough and had water enough, and could have been made tolerable for the number originally intended for it. It appears that the increase of that number was apparently a matter of necessity for the time; that other sites were selected and prepared with all possible dispatch; that the provisions were similar in amount and quality to those used by Confederate soldiers; that deficient means rendered a supply of clothing, tents and medicines scanty; that the rules of discipline and sanitary regulations of the prison, *if complied with by the prisoners*, would have secured to each a supply of food, and have averted almost, if not altogether, the filth and the ruffianism, which two causes, outside of unavoidable sickness, caused the great mass of suffering and mortality."

We will add the following article, written by Mr. L. M. Park, of La Grange, Georgia, who is personally known to us as a gentleman of unimpeachable character, and whose testimony is of the highest importance, as he speaks of what he saw himself. His article was originally written for the *Southern Magazine*, and while it contains some expressions which are bitter against the slanderers of our people, we will give it entire except the concluding paragraphs:

The "Rebel Prison Pen" at Andersonville, Georgia.

It is the duty of every lover of justice, when he sees a gross and injurious calumny put into circulation which he is able to refute from direct knowledge, to challenge it at once, and more especially if it is aimed at his own people, and meant to be used to their injury. It is true that in those regions for which these calumnies are prepared they are too generally preferred to the truth, even when the truth is offered; but the duty of affirming the truth is no less obligatory on those who are able to affirm it. It is with this view that the following paper is written to correct certain statements which recently appeared in *Appleton's Journal*,* professing to relate

*See September monthly part "A Jaunt in the South." These corrections were offered to that journal, but declined on the ground of personal regard for the author of "A Jaunt in the South," who is a regular contributor.

facts gleaned during a trip to Andersonville, Georgia, concerning the Confederate military prison there and the treatment of Federal prisoners. Instead of reviewing the article in detail, I will merely take up, one by one, the principal false statements.

THE WATER THE PRISONERS DRANK.

It was my fortune to be stationed at Andersonville almost from the first establishment of the prison until the removal to Millen, Georgia, or Camp Lawton, and I unhesitatingly pronounce the statement that "the prisoners had to drink the water which conveyed the offal of three camps and two large bakeries or kitchens off before it reached them," utterly false. The guards drank of the same water that quenched the prisoners' thirst, cooked their food with the same water, the same large stream or creek flowing through the encampment of guards and stockade, or prison-pen, as Northern writers sneeringly call it. The camps of the guards all faced the stream, while their sinks were far off in the rear, and orders were most strict not to muddy the water, much less defile it in any way. As to the offal of the bakeries, these being presided over by prisoners on parole, and who did the cooking for the entire prison, I cannot believe they would pollute the water their brother prisoners had to drink. As rapidly as they could the prisoners dug wells; in all some two hundred were dug, and purer, sweeter, colder water I never drank. Being on the staff of Captain Wirz, I had free access to the prison at all times day or night, and whenever I wished to quench my thirst, I went inside the prison and drank from one of these wells.

THAT PROVIDENTIAL SPRING, SO-CALLED.

That "providential spring" is an impious myth. I have been in the prison thousands of times and never before heard it so called, except on reading the *Herald's* account of the anniversary of the Fulton street prayer meeting, when some pharisaically pious old brother recited a long rigmarole about this same "providential spring," and said it was planted there in direct answer to prayer. The gist of this spring-tale is that when the prisoners' sickness and suffering from thirst was at its greatest, all at once, in the twinkling of an eye, this spring gushed forth in direct answer to prayer. Was ever such blasphemy? If such was the case, why does the spring still exist after it has answered its purpose? Do those rocks of Horeb struck by Moses to slake the children of Israel's thirst still exist, and at this late day the water gush forth? It is all a cock-and-bull story, and unlike Sterne's, one of the poorest I ever heard.

TWO FEDERAL AND THREE REBEL PROVIDENTIAL SPRINGS.

If my recollection serves me right, there was yet another of these same "providential springs" inside the stockade, and that Providence who sends the rain alike upon the just and the unjust gave

unto the wicked and ungodly Rebels *three* of these "providential springs;" and I am sure he did not plant ours in answer to prayer, for we had just as soon drunk the branch water.

REASONS WHY THERE WERE NO BARRACKS.

The Confederate Government has always been harshly assailed for its want of humanity in not having barracks to house the prisoners from the sun and rains. A more senseless hue and cry was never heard. How was it possible to saw timber into planks without saw-mills? There were two water-power mills distant three and six miles respectfully, but such rude primitive affairs undeserving the name. The nearest steam saw-mill was twenty-three miles distant (near Smithville), the next at Reynolds, about fifty miles distant; but the great bulk of the lumber used, fully two-thirds, was brought from Gordon, a distance of eighty miles. Even if these mills had had the capacity to supply the necessary amount of lumber, it would still have been impossible to have provided barracks for the prisoners, as all the available engines of all the railroads in the Confederacy were taxed to their utmost capacity in transporting supplies for the army in the field and to the prisons. But few even of the officers of the guard had shanties, and these few were built of slabs and sheeting, which every one knows is the refuse of the mills. And even though there were no lack of lumber, when we remember that there was but one solitary manufactory of cut nails in the limits of the Confederacy, certainly no blame could be attached to the authorities for not furnishing more comfortable quarters for them. Nearly every building in the encampment was built of rough logs and covered with clap-boards split from the tree and held to their places by poles. The force of these statements is readily appreciated by every intelligent, unprejudiced mind. Besides, is it customary for any nation in time of war to treat their prisoners in a more humane manner than their own soldiers in the field? The inquiry becomes pertinent when we reflect that during the last two years of the war there was not a tent of any description to be found in any of the armies of the Confederacy, save such as were captured from the Federals.

HOW THE STOCKADE WAS BUILT.

The stockade was built by the negroes belonging to the neighboring farms, either hired or pressed into service by the Confederate authorities to cut down the immense pine trees growing on the ground intended for the stockade; and these same trees were then cut into proper lengths and hewn upon the spot, and then planted in a ditch dug four feet deep to receive them. In this manner was the stockade made. Before it was completed the prisoners were forwarded in great numbers; and it being impossible to keep them in the cars, we had to put them in the completed end of the stockade and double the guards, and our whole force kept ever ready

day and night for the slightest alarm; for at first we had only the shattered remnants of two regiments—the Twenty-sixth Alabama and the Fifty-fifth Georgia—numbering in all some three hundred and fifty men. This constituted the guard. In about ten days thereafter my regiment—the First Georgia Reserves, composed of young boys and old men (I was not sixteen), just organized—were sent to take the place of the Twenty-sixth Alabama and Twenty-sixth Georgia, so they could be sent to the front for duty. In a few days after our arrival the 2d, 3d and 4th Georgia Reserves, all composed of lads and hoary-headed men (for we were reduced to the strait of “robbing the cradle and the grave for men to make soldiers of”), joined us as rapidly as they could be organized. The author of “Jaunt in the South” says: “When the stockade was occupied in 1864, there was not a tree or blade of grass within it. Its reddish sand was entirely barren, and not the smallest particle of green showed itself. But now the surface is covered completely with underbrush; a rich growth of bushes, trees and plants has covered the entire area, and where before was a dreary desert there is now a wild and luxurious garden.” I have before said the ground was covered with a pine forest, and the trees were utilized to build the stockade. Any one who has traveled south of Macon, Georgia, knows the pine is abundant, and in fact almost the only tree. In these forests the ground is covered by wire grass or other grass peculiar to them.

WHY ANDERSONVILLE WAS SELECTED.

The main reasons for locating the prison at Andersonville, after its first being thought the most secure place in the Confederacy from Yankee cavalry raids, was the abundance of the water and the timber wherewith to construct the prison rapidly, and its being in the very heart of the grain-growing region of the South, which would make it less inconvenient to supply with provisions such a vast multitude.

MALICIOUS EXHIBITION IN OHIO STATE CAPITOL.

In the summer of 1867, I set out for New York, being resolved to live no longer in the South, where negroes were being placed over us by Yankee bayonets, and in their vernacular, “de bottom rail wuz agittin’ on de top er de fence.” I traveled very leisurely, and stopped in every city of any note on my route, and kept eyes and ears wide open to drink in everything. I visited the Ohio State Capitol at Columbus, and in the museum of curiosities were some small paper boxes carefully preserved in a glass case, containing what purported to have been the exact quality and quantity of rations issued per diem to each prisoner at Andersonville. In one box was about a pint of coarse unbolted meal, and in another about one tablespoonful of rice; and still another box with about two tablespoonsful of black peas; and in a tiny little box was about one-eighth of a teaspoon of salt. Underneath it is all explained, and

says, among other things, "When rice was given, the peas were withheld; but when they had no rice, this kind of peas was given instead." It is needless to tell how my blood boiled at such an atrociously malicious and false exhibition. No wonder the hatred of the North is kept alive, and the bloody chasm continually widened by such wicked and uncharitable displays as this in one of the largest and most enlightened States in the Union.

RATIONS TO GUARDS AND PRISONERS THE SAME.

I was for three months a clerk in the Commissary Department at Andersonville, and it was my business to weigh out rations for the guards and prisoners alike; and I solemnly assert that the prisoners got ounce for ounce and pound for pound of just the same quality and quantity of food as did the guards. The State authorities of Ohio ought to blush at thus traducing and slandering a fallen foe, and never in the first instance to have placed on exhibition for preservation as truth this fabrication of partisan hate. No Andersonville prisoner, unless he were lost to all sense of honor and shame, could make such a statement as that the rations were no more than the specimens shown.

WHY THE PRISONERS WERE FED ON CORN BREAD.

It has been charged as a crying shame upon the Confederacy by ignorant humanitarians that the South might at least have given the prisoners wheat bread occasionally; that they rarely ate corn bread in their own land, and that the bread we issued was made of meal so coarse and unsifted that it caused dysentery, thereby largely increasing the mortality. It is well known now that the South depends very largely, and with shame I confess it, on the West for her bread and bacon, and the cotton belt proper makes but little pretension of raising wheat, for the climate, it is said, is unsuited; so that the region round about Andersonville, being in the very heart of the cotton-growing section of Georgia, such a thing as feeding prisoners on flour was simply impossible, and the little flour that was obtained as tithes (one-tenth of all the crops raised was required by our Government) was devoted entirely to the use of the hospitals. Not only was this true of the territory immediately surrounding Andersonville, but of the whole South. Our own armies were unsupplied with flour, and perhaps not one family in fifty throughout the whole land enjoyed that luxury. The guards ate the same bread, or rather meal; the bread eaten by the prisoners being baked by regular bakers (prisoners detailed for that purpose), while the guards did their own cooking. The meal, however, was the same, and both were unsifted and in truth very coarse. I ate the unsifted meal always.

THE DEAD LINE.

Another cry of holy horror is raised every time the "Dead Line" is mentioned, as if this dead line was *prima facie* evidence that the

Southerners were as barbarous and cruel a race as ever blotted the face of earth. The civilized North, however, had the same barbarous dead line in their prisons, and in fact originated the device. It was a necessity with us, for we had never at one time more than 1,200 to 1,500 guards in the four regiments fit for duty, and we had the keeping at one time of very nearly 40,000 prisoners. By a concerted plan of onslaught they could at any time have scaled the walls, captured guards, and with the weapons of their keepers overrun the entire country, which, all south of Dalton, Georgia (100 miles north of Atlanta), was left wholly unprotected save by gray-haired old men and young boys; and the women, children, and negroes, who were the only hope for the making of crops for our armies, would have been helplessly at their mercy. This dead line was clearly defined, and consisted of stakes driven into the ground twenty feet from the stockade walls, and on these stakes was a three-inch strip of plank nailed all around the inside of the prison. They were all notified that a step beyond this line was not prudent, and they were not so unwise as to venture beyond that limit.

BURIAL OF DEAD PRISONERS.

Speaking of the number and burial of the dead, the writer of the aforesaid "Jaunt" says: "The authorities at the stockade who had charge of the interment of the Federal dead did their work rudely, * * * digging pits and burying them in." Then he goes on: "It is hard to comprehend the true value of the number, 14,000; its magnitude eludes you. Fourteen thousand men would form a great mob, or a great army, or a great town. Here you have 14,000 men lying silently in a few acres. Within these bounds men have suffered as greatly as have any since the world began." In reply to this, I would merely say the burial was the work of prisoners paroled especially for the purpose, both the hauling of the bodies to the ground, the digging of the graves, and even the records of the names were all done by paroled prisoners. Books and a tent were provided solely for the latter purpose. Owing to the weakness of the guard, paroled prisoners were employed for this duty, as we could spare no men for the purpose; and if the work was rudely or carelessly done, the blame rests with them. As compensation they were given double rations and almost entire freedom. As to the number of the dead, we admit that it is great, but statistics show that more Southern soldiers died in Northern prisons than Northern soldiers in Southern prisons. In vain have Northern writers tried to disprove this fact.

MORTALITY NO GREATER AMONG PRISONERS THAN GUARD.

Great as was the mortality among the prisoners, it was no greater in proportion to numbers than that of the guard, which is fully attested by the reports of the surgeon in charge. Besides, it is well known to every soul that can or does read that the Confederacy,

through their agent, Judge Ould, made frequent and tireless efforts to get the United States Government, through their agent, General Butler, to exchange. But no, the Federal authorities would not hear to it; but acting on the avowed and promulgated idea that the South, being blockaded, could not recruit her armies from foreign lands, while to the North the whole of Europe was opened, they cruelly determined not to exchange, so as to detain our soldiers from again fighting them, well knowing that even then we had made our last conscription (17 to 50 years), and when those we had were killed up or in prison we would of course be overpowered. This was their cold-blooded, brutal policy; and closely did they stick to it, even till we were almost literally wiped out, while the men they had fighting us were in most part hired substitutes, drafted men, and foreign hirelings.

PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF MORTALITY.

Farther, as to the mortality among the prisoners, let it be remembered that a majority of the deaths caused in our prisons was for want of proper medicines, which we did not have and could not get, except by blockade-running. Had the Federal Government any of the milk of human kindness in its composition, it would have acceded to our earnest request to take cotton in exchange for drugs to administer to their own dying soldiers. Their immense manufactories were lying idle for want of cotton, while we had it but could not use it. But as these self-same drugs and medicines would also be applied to the relief of our own sick soldiers, they determined it would be to their advantage to let all die alike, knowing the South could get no more men to supply the places of the sick, the dying, and those they had imprisoned, so refused all overtures. After using every effort and exhausting every argument to get an exchange, we proposed—as we had no medicines and could get none, except what we accidentally ran in through the blockade from Europe (they being declared contraband and always confiscated whenever captured by the blockading fleet)—we proposed to turn over to them all their sick, without requiring man for man, but giving them absolutely up, if the United States would only send vessels for transporting them. This was done at Camp Lawton (Millen, Georgia), after the prison was removed from Andersonville for greater security.

EXTRACTS FROM AN OFFICER'S DIARY.

From the private journal of a Confederate officer high in command, both at Andersonville and other Southern prisons, I glean the annexed facts, the first bearing directly upon the foregoing:—“At one time an order came to Camp Lawton to prepare 2,000 men for exchange. The order from Richmond was to select first the wounded, next the oldest prisoners and the sickly, filling up with healthy men according to date. This party went first to Savannah,

as arranged, but by some mistake the ships were at Charleston, and the poor wretches had to be taken there; and every one who knew the Southern railroads in those days; and the difficulty or rather impossibility to procure food for such a crowd along the road, will know what those poor fellows suffered. At Charleston they were refused, the commissioner declaring that 'he was not going to exchange able-bodied men for such miserable specimens of humanity.' (The term used was more brutal). Finding him obdurate, Colonel Ould requested him to take them without exchange. This he refused with a sneering laugh, and the crowd was ordered back. Never did the writer of this witness such woe-begone countenances, in which misery and hopelessness were more strongly painted, than shown by those poor fellows on their return. And the curses leveled against the rulers who thus treated the defenders of their country were fearful, although certainly well deserved. As the stockade-gate closed upon them the surgeon in charge said to the writer: 'Poor fellows! the world has closed upon more than half of them; this disappointment will be their death-knell.' His words proved true. Who murdered those men? Let history answer the question."

CLOTHING FOR PRISONERS.

Again I extract from the aforesaid journal: "The Northerners talk so much of the cruelty of the South to the Federal prisoners. At one time the unfortunate prisoners were almost without clothing, indeed some had hardly as much as common decency required. The South could not provide them, not being able to clothe their own men. An application was made to Seward. The reply was that 'the Federal Government did not supply clothing to prisoners of war.' Luckily for the poor fellows, a society in New York took the matter in hand, and several bales of clothing and cases of shoes were forwarded to Richmond, and divided, in proportion to numbers, among the prisons."

CRUELTY TO PRISONERS.

A great deal has been said of the cruelty to the prisoners inside the stockade. This so-called cruelty was inflicted by their own men. In every prison a police with a chief, all from the prisoners, was appointed to keep order, see to the enforcement of the regulations, and inquire into all offences, reporting through their chief to the Commandant. The punishments, such as were used in the Federal army, were ordered to be inflicted by these men, and some were of such a barbarous nature that they were prohibited with disgust by the Confederate officers, who substituted milder and more humane ones; and yet the former were in common practice in the Federal armies, as testified by all the prisoners.

BLOODHOUNDS.

Among the numerous lies invented by Northerners, and actually still believed by some parties to this day, was the story that the

Confederates used to hunt and worry prisoners with bloodhounds. Now it is well known that the breed of bloodhounds is nearly extinct in the South, and the large packs of those dogs alluded to by writers on this subject existed only in their imaginations, the prolific brains of penny-a-liners, whose vile and lying compositions even now abound in many so-called respectable New York papers. No public man is safe from their atrocious attacks. Among the various specimens of this dog alluded to by the above-named gentry, was the famous bloodhound of the Libby Prison. The writer has often seen this formidable animal, which certainly in his youth must have been as fine a specimen of the kind as could be met anywhere, but unfortunately for the thrilling portion of the accounts of his doings at the time of the war, the poor beast, worn out from old age and with hardly a tooth in his head, wandered about a harmless, inoffensive creature. He was the property of the Commandant of Libby, who kept him because he was a pet dog of his father's, and there the brute lived a pensioner in his old age. As to his worrying men, he could not, had he even tried, have worried a child. The other prisons had none, not even as pensioners. Among the records history gives us of using those dogs to hunt men, it is stated that during the Florida war a number of bloodhounds were imported by the Federal Government from Cuba to hunt the Indians out of the Everglades, and that numbers of the natives were worried to death by the ferocious beasts. The writer does not deny that when a prisoner got out of the stockade trying to escape, if no clue could be obtained of his whereabouts, a few mongrel or half-bred fox-hounds were used to *track* him, but the worrying was all done in the correspondent's own brain. However, it suited the times and made the article sell. The only complaint made is that this vile and malicious lie is still, if not believed, repeated by some who use it for party purposes, and thus help to keep up the bad feeling between North and South.

In reference to the causes of the mortality at Andersonville, we have the highest medical authority, testimony which the other side cannot impeach, for it was on his testimony (garbled and perverted, it is true) that they hung Captain Wirz. Dr. Joseph Jones, now a professor in the Medical College at New Orleans, and then one of the most distinguished surgeons in the Confederate service, was sent to Andersonville to inspect the prison and report on the causes of mortality at Andersonville. He has recently sent us a MS., from which we make the following extract:

Statement of Dr. Joseph Jones.

In the specification of the first charge against Henry Wirz, formerly commandant of the interior of the Confederate States military prison at Andersonville, during his *trial* before a *special Military*

Commission, convened in accordance with Special Orders No. 453, War Department, Adjutant-General's office, Washington, August 23d, 1865, the following is written:

"And the said Wirz, still pursuing his wicked purpose and still aiding in carrying out said conspiracy, did use and caused to be used, for the pretended purpose of vaccination, impure and poisonous matter, which said impure and poisonous matter was then and there, by the direction and order of said Wirz, maliciously, cruelly and wickedly deposited in the arms of many of the said prisoners, by reason of which large numbers of them—to wit: one hundred—lost the use of their arms; and many of them—to wit: about the number of two hundred—were so injured that soon thereafter they died; all of which he, the said Henry Wirz, well knew and maliciously intended, and, in aid of the then existing rebellion against the United States, with the view of weakening and impairing the armies of the United States; and in furtherance of the said conspiracy, and with full knowledge, consent and connivance of his co-conspirators aforesaid, he, the said Wirz, then and there did."

Among the co-conspirators specified in the charges were the surgeon of the post, Dr. White, and the surgeon in charge of the military prison hospital, R. R. Stevenson, Surgeon, C. S. A. As the vaccinations were made in accordance with the orders of the Surgeon-General, C. S. A., and of the medical officers acting under his command, the charge of deliberately poisoning the Federal prisoners with vaccine matter is a sweeping one; and whether intended so or not, affects every medical officer stationed at that post; and it appears to have been designed to go farther, and to affect the reputation of every one who held a commission in the Medical Department of the Confederate army.

The acts of those who once composed the Medical Department of the Confederate army, from the efficient and laborious Surgeon-General to the regimental and hospital officers, need no defence at my hands. Time, with its unerring lines of historic truth, will embalm their heroic labors in the cause of suffering humanity, and will acknowledge their untiring efforts to ameliorate the most gigantic mass of human suffering that ever fell to the lot of a beleagured and distressed people.

The grand object of the trial and condemnation of Henry Wirz was the conviction and execution of President Davis, General Robert E. Lee, and other prominent men of the Confederacy, in order that "*treason might be rendered forever odious and infamous.*"

In accordance with the direction of Dr. Samuel Preston Moore, formerly Surgeon-General, C. S. A., I instituted, during the months of August and September, 1864, a series of investigations on the diseases of the Federal prisoners confined in Camp Sumter, Andersonville, Georgia.

The report which I drew up for the use of the Medical Department of the Confederate army, contained a truthful representation of the sufferings of these prisoners, and at the same time gave an

equally truthful view of the difficulties under which the medical officers labored, and of the distressed and beleagured and desolated condition of the Southern States.

Shortly after the close of the civil war this report, which had never been delivered to the Confederate authorities, on account of the destruction of all railroad communication with Richmond, Virginia, was suddenly seized by the agents of the United States Government conducting the trial of Henry Wirz. I have since learned that the United States authorities gained knowledge of the fact that I had inspected Andersonville through information clandestinely furnished by a distinguished member of the medical profession of the North, who, after the close of the war, had shared the hospitality of my own home.

It was with extreme pain that I contemplated the diversion of my labors, in the cause of medical science, from their true and legitimate object; and I addressed an earnest appeal, which accompanied the report, to the Judge-Advocate, Colonel N. P. Chipman, in which I used the following language:

"In justice to myself, as well as to those most nearly connected with this investigation, I would respectfully call the attention of Colonel Chipman, Judge-Advocate, U. S. A., to the fact, that the matter which is surrendered in obedience to the demands of a power from which there is no appeal, was prepared solely for the consideration of the Surgeon-General, C. S. A., and was designed to promote the cause of humanity and to advance the interests of the medical profession. This being granted, I feel assured that the Judge-Advocate will appreciate the deep pain which the anticipation gives me that these labors may be diverted from their original mission and applied to the prosecution of criminal cases. The same principle which led me to endeavor to deal humanely and justly by these prisoners, and to make a truthful representation of their condition to the Medical Department of the Confederate States army, now actuates me in recording my belief that as far as my knowledge extends there was no deliberate or wilful design on the part of the Chief Executive, Jefferson Davis, and the highest authorities of the Confederate Government to injure the health and destroy the lives of these Federal prisoners. On the 21st of May, 1861, it was enacted by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 'that all prisoners of war taken, whether on land or sea, during the pending hostilities with the United States, should be transferred by the captors, from time to time, as often as convenient, to the Department of War; and it should be the duty of the Secretary of War, with the approval of the President, to issue such instructions to the Quartermaster-General and his subordinates as shall provide for the safe custody and sustenance of prisoners of war; and the rations furnished prisoners of war shall be the same in quantity and quality as those furnished enlisted men in the army of the Confederacy.' By act of February 17th, 1864, the Quartermaster-General was relieved of this duty, and the Commis-

sary-General of Subsistence was ordered to provide for the sustenance of prisoners of war. According to General Orders No. 159, Adjutant and Inspector-General's office, 'Hospitals for prisoners of war are placed on the same footing as other Confederate States hospitals in all respects, and will be managed accordingly.'

"The Federal prisoners were removed to southwestern Georgia in the early part of 1864, not only to secure a place of confinement more remote than Richmond and other large towns from the operations of the United States forces, but also '*to secure a more abundant and easy supply of food.*' As far as my experience extends, no person who had been reared on wheat bread, and who was held in captivity for any length of time, could retain his health and escape either scurvy or diarrhœa, if confined to the Confederate ration (issued to the soldier in the field and hospital) of unbolted corn meal and bacon. The large armies of the Confederacy suffered more than once from scurvy; and as the war progressed, secondary hemorrhage and hospital gangrene became fearfully prevalent from the deteriorated condition of the systems of the troops, dependent on the prolonged use of salt meat; and but for the extra supplies received from home, and from the various State benevolent institutions, scurvy and diarrhœa and dysentery would have been still farther prevalent.

"It was believed by the citizens of the Southern States that the Confederate authorities desired to effect a continuous and speedy exchange of prisoners of war in their hands, on the ground that the retention of these soldiers in captivity was a great calamity, not only entailing heavy expenditure of the scanty means of subsistence, already insufficient to support their suffering, half-starved, half-clad and unpaid armies, struggling in the field with overwhelming numbers, and embarrassing their imperfect and dilapidated lines of communication, but also as depriving them of the services of a veteran army, fully equal to one-third the number actively engaged in the field; and the history of subsequent events have shown that the retention in captivity of the Confederate prisoners was one of the efficient causes of the final and complete overthrow of the Confederate Government. * * * * It is my honest belief that if the exhausted condition of the Confederate Government—with its bankrupt currency—with its retreating and constantly diminishing armies—with the apparent impossibility of filling up the vacancies by death and desertion and sickness, and of gathering a guard of reserves of sufficient strength to allow of the proper enlargement of the military prison—and with a country torn and bleeding along all its borders—with its starving women and children and old men, fleeing from the desolating march of contending armies, crowding the dilapidated and overburdened railroad lines, and adding to the distress and consuming the poor charities of those in the interior, who were harassed by the loss of sons and brothers and husbands, and by the fearful visions of starvation and undefined misery—could be fully realized,

much of the suffering of the Federal prisoners would be attributed to causes connected with the distressed condition of the Southern States."

The Judge-Advocate, N. P. Chipman, Colonel, U. S. A., was not only deaf to this appeal, but in his final argument before the *Military Commission*, or so called "*Court*," whilst excluding all portions of my testimony which related to the distressed condition of the Southern States, and the efforts of the medical officers and Confederate authorities to relieve the sufferings of these prisoners of war, deliberately endeavored to arouse the hatred of the entire North against the author of the report and the medical officers of the Confederate army. This statement will be manifest from the following quotation, which I extract from the "*argument*" of the Judge-Advocate before the "*Court*:"

"He had called into his counsels an eminent medical gentleman, of high attainments in his profession, and of loyalty to the Rebel Government unquestioned. Amid all the details in this terrible tragedy there seems to me none more heartless, wanton and void of humanity than that revealed by the Surgeon-General, to which I am about to refer. I quote now from the report of this same Dr. Joseph Jones, which he says (Record, p. 4384) was made in the interest of the Confederate Government for the use of the Medical Department, in the view that no eye would see it but that of the Surgeon-General.

"After a brief introduction to his report, and to show under what authority it was made, he quotes a letter from the Surgeon-General, dated Surgeon-General's office, Richmond, Virginia, August 6th, 1864. The letter is addressed to Surgeon I. H. White, in chage of the Hospital for Federal prisoners, Andersonville, Georgia, and is as folllows:

"Sir—The field of pathological investigation afforded by the large collection of Federal prisoners in Georgia is of great extent and importance, and it is believed that results of value to the profession may be obtained by careful examination of the effects of disease upon a large body of men subjected to a decided change of climate and the circumstances peculiar to prison life. The surgeon in charge of the hospital for Federal prisoners, together with his assistants, will afford every facility to Surgeon Joseph Jones in the prosecution of the labors ordered by the Surgeon-General. The medical officers will assist in the performance of such *post mortems* as Dr. Jones may indicate, in order that this great field for pathological investigation may be explored for the benefit of the Medical Department of the Confederate States armies.

"S. P. MOORE, *Surgeon-General*."

"Pursuant to his orders, Dr. Jones, as he tells us, proceeded to Andersonville, and on September 17th received the following pass:

"ANDERSONVILLE, September 17th, 1864.

"Captain—You will permit Surgeon Joseph Jones, who has orders from the Surgeon-General, to visit the sick within the stockade that are under medical treatment. Surgeon Jones is ordered to make certain investigations which may prove useful to his profession.

"By order of General Winder.

"Very respectfully,

"W. S. WINDER, A. A. G.

"Captain H. WIRZ, Commanding Prison."

"When we remember that the Surgeon-General had been apprised of the wants of that prison, and that he had overlooked the real necessities of the prison, shifting the responsibility upon Dr. White, whom he must have known was totally incompetent, it is hard to conceive with what devilish mallice, or criminal devotion to his profession, or reckless disregard of the high duties imposed upon him—I scarcely know which—he could sit down and deliberately pen such a letter of instructions as that given to Dr. Jones. Was it not enough to have cruelly starved and murdered our soldiers? Was it not enough to have sought to wipe out their very memories by burying them in nameless graves? Was it not enough to have instituted a system of medical treatment, the very embodiment of charlatanism? Was it not enough, without adding to the many other diabolical motives, which must have governed the perpetrators of these acts, this scientific object, as deliberate and cold-blooded as one can conceive? The Surgeon-General could quiet his conscience when the matter was laid before him, through Colonel Chandler, by endorsing that it was impossible to send medical officers to take the place of the contract physicians on duty at Andersonville; yet could select at the same time a distinguished gentleman of the medical profession and send him to Andersonville, directing the whole force of surgeons there to render him every assistance, leaving their multiplied duties for that purpose. Why? Not to alleviate the sufferings of the prisoners; not to convey to them one ounce more of nutritious food; to make no suggestions for the improvement of their sanitary condition; for no purpose of this kind, but, as the letter of instruction itself shows, for no other purpose than 'that this great field of pathological investigation may be explored for the benefit of the Medical Department of the Confederate armies!' The Andersonville Prison, so far as the Surgeon-General was concerned, was a mere dissecting-room, a clinic institute, to be made tributary to the Medical Department of the Confederate armies."

The denunciations of the Judge-Advocate were leveled not merely against a defenceless prisoner of war, whose papers had been seized and himself dragged as a witness to this crucifixion of

his native land, but they were sweeping in their character, and were designed to arraign the humanity, honesty and intelligence of the Surgeon-General and the entire corps of medical officers of the Confederate army.

This charge had the desired effect, and was reiterated even by eminent medical men in the North. Thus the son of the Vice-President of the United States, Dr. Augustus C. Hamlin, *late Medical Inspector United States Army, Royal Antiquarian*, etc., etc., in his "*Martyria, or Anderson Prison*," says:

"Here came a medical officer of the highest rank in the Rebel army, and one of the most eminent *savans* of the South, to study the *physiology and philosophy* of STARVATION. The notes of that FEARFUL CLINIC are preserved, and may some future day startle the scientific world with their clearness, their candor, their positive evidence of the cause of deaths. Thus the *scalpel* silences the argument, the reasoning of *sophistry*."

A similar statement has been made by Dr. Austin Flint, Jr., in his recent work on the "*Physiology of Man*."

It was clearly demonstrated in my report that diarrhœa, dysentery, scurvy and hospital gangrene were the diseases which caused the mortality at Andersonville. And it was still farther shown that this mortality was referable, in no appreciable degree, to either the character of the soil, or waters, or the conditions of climate. The effects of salt meat and farinaceous food, without fresh vegetables, were manifest in the great prevalence of scurvy. The scorbutic condition thus induced modified the course of every disease, poisoned every wound, however slight, and lay at the foundation of those obstinate and exhausting diarrhœas and dysenteries which swept off thousands of these unfortunate men. By a long and painful investigation of the diseases of these prisoners, supported by numerous *post mortem* examinations, I demonstrated conclusively that scurvy induced nine-tenths of the deaths. Not only were the deaths registered as due to unknown causes, to apoplexy, to anascarca, and to debility, directly traceable to scurvy and its effects; and not only was the mortality in small-pox and pneumonia and typhoid fever, and in all acute diseases, more than doubled by the scorbutic complaint, but even these all but universal and deadly bowel affections arose from the same causes, and derived their fatal characters from the same conditions which produced the scurvy. It has been well established by the observations of Blanc, Pare, Lind, Woodall, Huxham, Hunter, Trotter and others that this scorbutic condition of the system, especially in crowded camps, ships, hospitals and beleagured cities is most favorable to the origin and spread of fatal ulcers and hospital gangrene.

By the official reports of the medical officers of both the English and French armies, during the Crimean war, it was conclusively shown that, notwithstanding the extraordinary exertions of these powerful nations, holding undisputed sway of both land and sea, scurvy and a scorbutic condition of the blood increased to a fearful

degree the mortality, not only of gunshot wounds, but of all diseases, and especially of pneumonia, diarrhoea and dysentery. I have recorded numerous incontrovertible facts to show that the scorbutic ulcers and hospital gangrene, and the accidents from vaccination arising at Andersonville, were by no means new in the history of medicine, and that the causes which induced these distressing affections have been active in all wars and sieges, and amongst all armies and navies.

In truth, these men at Andersonville were in the condition of a crew at sea—confined on a foul ship, upon salt meat, and unvarying food, and without fresh vegetables. Not only so, but these unfortunate prisoners were like men forcibly confined and crowded upon a ship tossed about on a stormy ocean—without a rudder, without a compass, without a guiding star, and without an apparent boundary or end to their voyage; and they reflected in their steadily increasing miseries the distressed condition and waning fortunes of a desolated and bleeding country, which was compelled, in justice to her own unfortunate sons, to hold their men in this most distressing captivity.

The Federal prisoners received the same rations, in kind, quality and amount, issued to Confederate soldiers in the field. These rations were, during the last eighteen months of the war, insufficient, and without that variety of fresh meat and vegetables, which would ward off scurvy, from soldiers as well as prisoners. As far as my experience extended, no body of troops could be confined exclusively to the Confederate rations of 1864 and 1865, without manifesting symptoms of the scurvy.

The Confederate rations grew worse and worse as the war progressed, and as portion after portion of the most fertile regions of the Confederate States were overrun and desolated by the Federal armies. In the straitened condition of the Confederate States the support of an army of one hundred thousand prisoners, forced on their hands by a relentless policy, was a great and distressing burden, which consumed their scant resources, burdened their rotten lines of railroad, and exhausted the overtaxed energies of the entire country, crowded with refugees from their desolated homes.

The Confederate authorities charged with the *exchange of prisoners* used every effort in their power, consistent with their views of national honor and rectitude, to effect an exchange of all prisoners in their hands, and to establish and maintain definite rules by which all prisoners of war might be continuously exchanged as soon as possible after capture.

Whatever the feelings of resentment on the part of the Confederates may have been against those who were invading and desolating their native land, which had been purchased by the blood of their ancestors from the English and Indians, the desire for the speedy exchange and return of the great army of veterans held captives in Northern prisons was earnest and universal, and this desire for speedy and continuous exchange on the part of the Government,

as well as on the part of the people, sprang not merely from motives of compassion for their unfortunate kindred and fellow-soldiers, but also from the dictates of that policy which would exchange on the part of a weak and struggling people, a large army of prisoners (consumers and non-combatants, requiring an army for their safe keeping) for an army of tried veterans.

Apart from the real facts of the case, it is impossible to conceive that any government in the distressed and struggling state of the Confederacy, could deliberately advocate any policy which would deprive it of a large army of veterans, and compel it to waste its scant supplies, already insufficient for the support of its struggling and retreating armies.

And the result has shown that the destruction of the Confederate Government was accomplished as much by the persistent retention in captivity of the Confederate soldiers, as by the emancipation and arming of the Southern slaves, and the employment of European recruits.

After the trial of Wirz, I published a small volume, entitled "*Researches upon Spurious Vaccination, or the Abnormal Phenomena, accompanying and following vaccination in the Confederate army during the recent civil war, 1861-1865,*" in which I examined the charge that the medical officers of the Confederate army had deliberately poisoned the Federal prisoners with poisonous vaccine matter.

Copies of this work were sent to several of the most prominent Generals and medical officers of the Confederate army, with the request that they would communicate such facts, as were in their possession, with reference to the sufferings of the Federal and Confederate prisoners. The universal testimony was to the effect that the sufferings of the Federal prisoners was due to causes over which the Confederate Government had little or no control, and that the sufferings and mortality amongst the Confederate prisoners confined in Northern prisons were equally great and deplorable.

From this correspondence, I select the following letter from General Robert E. Lee:

"LEXINGTON, VA., 15th April, 1867.

"DR. JOSEPH JONES :

"Dear Sir—I am much obliged to you for the copy of your '*Researches on Spurious Vaccination,*' which I will place in the library of the Lexington College. I have read with attention your examination of the charge made by the United States Military Commission, that the Confederate surgeons poisoned the Federal prisoners at Andersonville with vaccine matter. I believe every one who has investigated the afflictions of the Federal prisoners is of the opinion that they were incident to their condition as prisoners of war, and to the distressed state of the whole Southern country, and I fear they were fully shared by the Confederate prisoners in Federal prisons.

"Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE."

It appears, then, from the foregoing statements that the prison at Andersonville was established with a view to healthfulness of location, and that the great mortality which ensued resulted chiefly from the crowded condition of the stockade, the use of corn bread, to which the prisoners had not been accustomed, the want of variety in the rations furnished, and the want of medicines and hospital stores to enable our surgeons properly to treat the sick. As to the first point, the reply is at hand. The stockade at Andersonville was originally designed for a much smaller number of prisoners than were afterwards crowded into it. But prisoners accumulated—after the stoppage of exchange—in Richmond and at other points; the Dahlgren raid—which had for its avowed object the liberation of the prisoners, the assassination of President Davis and his Cabinet, and the sacking of Richmond—warned our authorities against allowing large numbers of prisoners to remain in Richmond, even if the difficulty of feeding them there was removed; and the only alternative was to rush them down to Andersonville, as enough men to guard them elsewhere could not be spared from the ranks of our armies, which were now everywhere fighting overwhelming odds. We have a statement from an entirely trustworthy source that the reason prisoners were not detailed to cut timber with which to enlarge the stockade and build shelters, is, that this privilege *was* granted to a large number of them when the prison was first established, they giving their parole of honor not to attempt to escape; and that they *violated their paroles, threw away their axes, and spread dismay throughout that whole region by creating the impression that all of the prisoners had broken loose.* This experiment could not, of course, be repeated, and the rest had to suffer for the bad faith of these, who not only prevented the detail of any numbers of other prisoners for this work, but made way with axes which could not be replaced. In reference to feeding the prisoners on corn bread, there has been the loudest complaints and the bitterest denunciations. They had not been accustomed to such hard fare as “hog and hominy,” and the poor fellows did suffer fearfully from it. *But the Confederate soldiers had the same rations.* Our soldiers had the advantage of buying supplies and of receiving occasional boxes from home, which the prisoners at Andersonville could have enjoyed to an even greater extent had the United States authorities been willing to accept the humane proposition of our Commissioner of Exchange—to allow each side to send supplies to their prisoners. But why did not the Confederacy furnish bet-

ter rations to both our own soldiers and our prisoners? and why were the prisoners at Andersonville not supplied with *wheat* bread instead of *corn* bread? Answers to these questions may be abundantly found by referring to the orders of Major-General John Pope, directing his men "to live on the country"; the orders of General Sherman, in fulfilling his avowed purpose to "make Georgia howl" as he "smashed things generally" in that "great march," which left smoking, blackened ruins and desolated fields to mark his progress; the orders of General Grant to his Lieutenant, to desolate the rich wheat-growing Valley of Virginia; or the reports of General Sheridan, boasting of the number of barns he had burned, the mills he had destroyed, and the large amount of wheat he had given to the flames, until there was really more truth than poetry in his boast that he had made the Shenandoah Valley "such a waste that even a crow flying over would be compelled to carry his own rations." We have these and other similar orders of Federal Generals in our archives (we propose to give hereafter a few choice extracts from them), and we respectfully submit that, for the South to be abused for not furnishing Federal prisoners with better rations, when our own soldiers and people had been brought painfully near the starvation point by the mode of warfare which the Federal Government adopted, is even more unreasonable than the course of the old Egyptian task-masters, who required their captives to "make brick without straw." And to the complaints that the sick did not have proper medical attention, we reply that the hospital at Andersonville was placed on *precisely the same footing as the hospitals for the treatment of our own soldiers*. We have the law of the Confederate Congress enjoining this, and the orders of the Surgeon-General enforcing it. Besides, we have in our archives a large budget of original orders, telegrams, letters, &c., which passed between the officers on duty at Andersonville and their superiors. We have carefully looked through this large mass of papers, and we have been unable to discover *a single sentence* indicating that the prisoners were to be treated otherwise than kindly, or that the hospital was to receive a smaller supply of medicines or of stores than the hospitals for Confederate soldiers. On the contrary, the whole of these papers go to show that the prison hospital at Andersonville was *on the same footing precisely* with every hospital for sick or wounded Confederates, and that the scarcity of medicines and hospital stores, of which there was such constant complaint, proceeded from causes which our authorities could not control.

But we can make the case still stronger. Whose fault was it that the Confederacy was utterly unable to supply medicines for the hospitals of either friend or foe? Most unquestionably the responsibility rests with the Federal authorities. They not only declared medicines "contraband of war"—even arresting ladies coming South for concealing a little quinine under their skirts—but they sanctioned the custom of their soldiers to sack every drug store in the Confederacy which they could reach, and to destroy even the little stock of medicines which the private physician might chance to have on hand.

When General Milroy banished from Winchester, Virginia, the family of Mr. Lloyd Logan, because the General (and his wife) fancied his elegantly furnished mansion for headquarters, he not only forbade their carrying with them a change of raiment, and refused to allow Mrs. Logan to take one of her spoons with which to administer medicine to a sick child, but he *most emphatically prohibited their carrying a small medicine chest, or even a few phials of medicine which the physician had prescribed for immediate use.* Possibly some ingenious casuist may defend this policy; but who will defend at the bar of history the refusal of the Federal authorities to accept Judge Ould's several propositions to allow surgeons from either side to visit and minister to their own men in prison—to allow each to furnish medicines, &c., to their prisoners in the hands of the other—and finally *to purchase in the North, for gold, cotton, or tobacco, medicines for the exclusive use of Federal prisoners in the South?* Well might General Lee have said to President Davis, in response to expressions of bitter disappointment when he reported the failure of his efforts to bring about an exchange of prisoners: "*We have done everything in our power to mitigate the suffering of prisoners, and there is no just cause for a sense of further responsibility on our part.*" Dr. R. Randolph Stevenson, who was for most of the time surgeon in charge at Andersonville, has in MS. a large volume on this whole subject, and treats fully the diseases at Andersonville, their causes, and their mortality. He has kindly tendered us the free use of his MS. in the preparation of this paper, but we do not feel that it would be right to anticipate the publication of his book (which it is hoped will not be long delayed) by full quotations from it. We give, however, several specimens of the character of the papers to which reference is made above:

[Copy.]

SURGEON-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
RICHMOND, VA., September 12, 1864.

Sir—You are instructed to assign the medical officers now on duty with the sick prisoners at Andersonville, Georgia, to the points that have been selected for the accommodation of the prisoners. All the sick whose lives will not be endangered by transportation will be removed. The medical officers selected will be required to accompany the sick. You will visit each station and see that such arrangements are made for the sick as their wants may require, and use all the means for their comfort that the Government can furnish.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

S. P. MOORE, *Surgeon-General C. S. A.*

To I. H. WHITE, *Surgeon C. S. M. Prison Hospital, Andersonville, Ga.*

[Copy.]

OFFICE OF SURGEON IN CHARGE C. S. M. HOSPITAL.
ANDERSONVILLE, GA., November 4, 1864.

Colonel—Under orders from Brigadier-General John H. Winder I respectfully request that W. H. H. Phelps, of your post, be detailed and ordered to report to me for assignment to duty as purchasing agent of vegetables and anti-scorbutics for the sick and wounded prisoners now under my charge at this place.

Yours truly,

R. R. STEVENSON, *Surgeon in Charge.*

To Colonel LEON VON ZINKEN, *Commanding Post Columbus, Ga.*

Endorsements.

Approved:

S. M. BEMISS, *Acting Medical Director.*

Approved:

LEON VON ZINKEN, *Colonel Commanding Post.*

[Copy.]

OFFICE CHIEF SURGEON C. S. M. PRISONS, GEORGIA AND ALABAMA.
CAMP LAWTON, GA., November 9, 1864.

Sir— * * * We have been quite busy for the last two days in selecting the sick to be exchanged. After getting them all ready at the depot, we were notified by telegraph not to send them, and had to take them back to the stockade. Many of these poor fellows, already broken down in health, will succumb through despair.

* * * * *

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

I. H. WHITE, *Chief Surgeon.*

To Surgeon R. R. STEVENSON, *in charge Post, Andersonville, Ga.*

A strong point illustrating the position that the sickness among the prisoners was from causes which the Confederate authorities could not control, is the fact that the Confederate guard, officers and surgeons were attacked by the same maladies, and that the deaths among them were *about as numerous, in proportion to their numbers, as among the prisoners themselves*. Dr. Jones states in his report, that the deaths among the Confederates at Andersonville from typhoid and malarial fevers were *more numerous* than among the prisoners, and Dr. Stevenson makes the following statement:

"The guards on duty here were similarly affected with gangrene and scurvy. Captain Wirz had gangrene in an old wound, which he had received in the Battle of Manassas, in 1861, and was absent from the post (Andersonville) some four weeks on surgeon's certificate. (*In his trial certain Federal witnesses swore to his killing certain prisoners in August, 1864, when he (Wirz) was actually at that time absent on sick leave in Augusta, Georgia.*) General Winder had gangrene of the face, and was forbidden by his surgeon (I. H. White) to go inside the stockade. Colonel G. C. Gibbs, commandant of the post, had gangrene of the face, and was furloughed under the certificate of Surgeons Wible and Gore, of Americus, Georgia. The writer of this can fully attest to effects of gangrene and scurvy contracted whilst on duty there; their marks will follow him to his grave. The Confederate graveyard at Andersonville will fully prove that the mortality among the guards was almost as great in proportion to the number of men as among the Federals."

Again:

"For a period of some three months (July, August and September, 1864) Captain Wirz and those few faithful medical officers of the post were engaged night and day in ministering to the wants of the sick and dying, and caring for the dead. So arduous were their duties that many of the medical officers were taken sick and had to abandon their post. In fact the pestilence assumed such fearful proportions that Medical-Director S. H. Stout could hardly induce such medical men as could be spared from the pressing wants of the service (Georgia was at this time one vast hospital) to go to Andersonville.

"It was this horrible condition of the captives that prompted Colonel Ould, the Confederate Commissioner of Exchange, to make his repeated efforts in the interest of humanity to get the Federal Government (as they had refused all further exchanges) to send medicines, supplies of clothing, &c. (offering to pay for them in gold or cotton), for the exclusive use of the Federal prisoners, to be dispensed, if desired, by Federal surgeons sent for that purpose."

Let us follow the preceding statements by the following

TESTIMONY OF THE PRISONERS THEMSELVES.

In reference to the recent discussion in Congress, an editor in Mr. Blaine's own State (Maine) says:

"In all the talk that is being made about Andersonville prison by agitators and politicians who hope to profit by stirring up dead animosities, it is noticeable that no evidence is produced from men who were prisoners at that place. In order to get the views and experiences of an actual prisoner, we called a few days ago upon Mr. John F. Frost, whose business place is a stone's throw from our office. Mr. Frost says:

"I was orderly of Captain Fogler's company, Nineteenth Maine; was made prisoner at Petersburg in June, 1864, and was at Andersonville eleven months, or until the war ended. There was suffering among the men who were sick, from the lack of medicines and delicacies, but all had their rations as fully and regularly as did the Confederate guard. There were times of scarcity, when supply trains were cut off by the Federal forces; and at such times I have known the guard to offer to buy the prisoners' rations, being very short themselves. On these occasions the guards would take a portion of their scanty supplies from the people of the country to feed the prisoners. The Rebels were anxious to effect an exchange and get the prisoners off their hands, but it was reported and believed among the prisoners that the Federal authorities refused. At one time I was with a detail of three thousand prisoners who were marched two hundred miles to the coast to be exchanged, but it was declined by the Federal authorities, as was reported, and we marched back with no enviable feelings. I believe that the larger share of the responsibility for the suffering in that prison belonged to our own Government. Wirz was harsh and cruel to the prisoners, and deserved hanging. But I believe the Confederate authorities did as well as they could for the prisoners in the matter of clothing, provisions and medicines."

"This, let it be remembered, is not the talk of a designing politician who stayed safely at home, but the testimony of a soldier of good record, from an actual experience of eleven months in Andersonville prison."

The following resolutions were adopted by the prisoners:

[Copy.]

"Resolutions that were adopted by the Federal prisoners who had been confined at Andersonville, and dated Savannah, September 23, 1864" (see United States Sanitary Commission Memoirs, by Professor A. Flint, New York):

* * * "*Resolved*, That while allowing the Confederate Government all due praise for the attention paid to the prisoners, numbers of our men are consigned to early graves," etc.

"Resolved, That ten thousand of our brave comrades have descended into untimely graves, caused by difference in climate, food, etc. And whereas these difficulties still remain, we would declare our firm belief that unless we are speedily exchanged we have no other alternative but to share the same lamentable fate of our comrades.

** * Must this thing still go on? Is there no hope? * * * **

*"Resolved, * * * We have suffered patiently, and are still willing to suffer, if by so doing we can benefit the country; but we most respectfully beg leave to say that we are not willing to suffer to further the ends of any party or clique to the detriment of our families and our country.*

(Signed)

"P. BRADLEY,

"Chairman of Committee in behalf of Prisoners."

We give the following full extract from the testimony of Prescott Tracy, of the Eighty-second Regiment New York Volunteers, before the United States Sanitary Commission, and published in their report:

"As far as we saw General Winder and Captain Wirz, the former was kind and considerate in his manners, the latter harsh, though not without kindly feelings.

"It is a melancholy and mortifying fact that some of our trials came from our own men. At Belle Isle and Andersonville there were among us a gang of desperate men, ready to prey on their fellows. Not only thefts and robberies, but even murders were committed. Affairs became so serious at Camp Sumter that an appeal was made to General Winder, who authorized an arrest and trial by a criminal court. Eighty-six were arrested, and six were hung, besides others who were severely punished. These proceedings effected a marked change for the better.

"Some few weeks before being released I was ordered to act as clerk in the hospital. This consists simply of a few scattered trees and fly tents, and is in charge of Dr. White, an excellent and considerate man, with very limited means, but doing all in his power for his patients. He has twenty-five assistants, besides those detailed to examine for admittance to the hospital. This examination was made in a small stockade attached to the main one, to the inside door of which the sick came or were brought by their comrades, the number to be removed being limited. Lately, in consideration of the rapidly increasing sickness, it was extended to one hundred and fifty daily. That this was too small an allowance is shown by the fact that the deaths within our stockade were from thirty to forty a day. I have seen one hundred and fifty bodies waiting passage to the 'dead house,' to be buried with those who died in hospital. The average of deaths through the earlier months was thirty a day. At the time I left, the average was over one hundred and thirty, and one day the record showed one hundred and forty-six.

"The proportion of deaths from starvation, not including those consequent on the diseases originating in the character and

limited quantity of food—such as diarrhœa, dysentery and scurvy—I cannot state; but, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, there were scores every month. We could at any time point out many for whom such a fate was inevitable, as they lay or feebly walked, mere skeletons, whose emaciation exceeded the examples given in *Leslie's Illustrated* for June 18, 1864. For example: in some cases the inner edges of the two bones of the arms, between the elbow and the wrist, with the intermediate blood vessels, were plainly visible when held toward the light. The ration, in quantity, was perhaps barely sufficient to sustain life, and the cases of starvation were generally those whose stomachs could not retain what had become entirely indigestible.

"For a man to find, on waking, that his comrade by his side was dead, was an occurrence too common to be noted. I have seen death in almost all the forms of the hospital and battle-field, but the daily scenes in Camp Sumter exceeded in the extremity of misery all my previous experience.

"The work of burial is performed by our own men, under guards and orders, twenty-five bodies being placed in a single pit, without head-boards, and the sad duty performed with indecent haste. Sometimes our men were rewarded for this work with a few sticks of firewood, and I have known them to quarrel over a dead body for the job.

"Dr. White is able to give the patients a diet but little better than the prison rations—a little flour porridge, arrow-root, whiskey, and wild or hog tomatoes. In the way of medicine, I saw nothing but camphor, whiskey, and a decoction of some kind of bark—white oak, I think. He often expressed his regret that he had not more medicines."

We beg leave to call especial attention to the passages in the above extract which we have italicised, and which are very significant in testimony which was gotten up to prove "Rebel barbarity."

Another Andersonville prisoner testifies as follows before the United States Congressional Committee:

"We never had any difficulty in getting vegetables; we used to buy almost anything that we wanted of the sergeant who called the roll mornings and nights. His name was Smith, I think; he was Captain Wirz's chief sergeant. We were divided into messes, eight in each mess; my mess used to buy from two to four bushels of sweet potatoes a week, at the rate of fifteen dollars Confederate money per bushel. [They got twenty dollars of Confederate money for one dollar of greenbacks in those days.] Turnips were bought at twenty dollars a bushel. We had to buy our own soap for washing our own persons and clothing; we bought meat and eggs and buiscuit. There seemed to be an abundance of those things; they were in the market constantly. That sergeant used to come down with a wagon-load of potatoes at a time, bringing twenty or twenty-five bushels at a load sometimes."

We will next introduce the following

STATEMENT OF GENERAL J. D. IMBODEN.

It touches on points which we have already discussed, and anticipates some others which we shall afterwards give more in detail. But it is a clear and very interesting narrative of an important eyewitness; and we will not mutilate the paper, but will give it entire in its original form:

RICHMOND, VA., January 12th, 1876.

GENERAL D. H. MAURY,

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Southern Historical Society:

General—At your request I cheerfully reduce to writing the facts stated by me in our conversation this morning, for preservation in the archives of your society, and as bearing upon a historical question—the treatment of prisoners during our late civil war, which it seems certain politicians of the vindictive type in the North, led by a Presidential aspirant, have deemed it essential to their party success to thrust upon the country again in the beginning of this our centennial year.

It is to be hoped that after a lapse of ten years since we of the South grounded our arms, passion has so far yielded to patriotism, reason, and sentiments of a common humanity in the minds and hearts of the great mass of intelligent people at the North, that all the facts relating to the great struggle between the States of the North and South may be calmly presented, if not for final decision by this generation, at least to aid impartial mankind in the future to judge correctly between the conquering and the vanquished parties to the contest; and to fix the responsibility where it attaches, to the one side or the other, or to both, for sufferings inflicted that were not necessarily incident to a state of war between contending Christian powers.

I now proceed to give you a simple historical narrative of facts within my personal knowledge, that I believe have never been published, although at the request of Judge Robert Ould, of this city, who was the Confederate Commissioner for the Exchange of Prisoners, I wrote them out in 1866, and furnished the MS. to a reporter of the New York *Herald*. But the statement never appeared in that journal, for the reason assigned by the reporter, that the conductors of the *Herald* deemed the time inopportune for such a publication. My MS. was retained by them, and I have never heard of it since.

It is perhaps proper to state how I came to be connected with the prison service of the Confederate States. An almost fatal attack of typhoid fever, in the summer and fall of 1864, so impaired my physical condition that I was incapable of performing efficiently the arduous duties of my position as a cavalry officer on active service in the mountains of Virginia, and therefore I applied to the

Confederate War Office for assignment to some light duty farther south till the milder weather of the ensuing spring would enable me to take my place at the head of the brave and hardy mountaineers of the Valley and western counties of Virginia I had the honor to command. General R. E. Lee kindly urged my application in person, and procured an order directing me to report to Brigadier-General J. H. Winder, then Commissary of Prisoners, whose headquarters were at Columbia, South Carolina. I left my camp in the Shenandoah Valley late in December, 1864, and reached Columbia, I think, on the 6th of January, 1865. General Winder immediately ordered me to the command of all the prisons west of the Savannah river, with leave to establish my temporary headquarters at Aiken, South Carolina, on account of the salubrity of its climate. I cannot fix dates after this with absolute precision, because all my official papers fell into the hands of the United States military authorities after the surrender of General Joseph E. Johnston to General Sherman; but for all essential purposes my memory enables me to detail events in consecutive order, and approximately to assign each to its proper date.

A few days after receiving my orders from General Winder, I reached Aiken, and visited Augusta, Georgia, and established an office there in charge of a staff officer, Lieutenant George W. McPhail, for prompt and convenient communication with the prisons of the department.

About my first official act was to dispatch Lieutenant-Colonel Bondurant on a tour of inspection of the prisons in my department, with instructions to report fully on their condition and management. Whilst Colonel Bondurant was on this service, I was forced to quit Aiken by the approach of Kilpatrick's cavalry, moving on the flank of Sherman's army. A detachment of this cavalry reached Aiken within four hours after I left it. I then made Augusta my permanent headquarters, residing, however, a few miles out on the Georgia railroad at Berzelia. Colonel Bondurant promptly discharged the duty assigned to him, and on the state of facts presented in his reports, I resolved to keep up but two prisons, the one at Andersonville and the other at Eufaula. I did this for economical reasons, and because it was easier to supply two posts than four or five so widely scattered; and besides the whole number of prisoners in the department then did not exceed 8,000 or 9,000—the great majority, about 7,500, being at Andersonville.

Before I received Colonel Bondurant's report, General Winder died, when, having no superior in command, I reported directly to the Secretary of War at Richmond. Communication with the War Office was at that period very slow and difficult. Great military operations were in progress. General Sherman was moving through the Carolinas. The Federal cavalry under Kilpatrick with Sherman, and Stoneman co-operating from Tennessee, almost suspended mail facilities between Georgia and Virginia, and the telegraph was almost impracticable, because the line was taxed almost to its

capacity in connection with active military operations. After the death of General Winder, I made repeated efforts to establish communication with the Secretary of War, and with Commissioner Ould, and obtain some instructions in regard to the prisons and prisoners under my charge. All these efforts failed, at least I received no reply by wire, mail or messenger to any of my inquiries. A newspaper fell into my hands in which, as an item of news, I saw it stated that Brigadier-General Gideon J. Pillow had been appointed General Winder's successor. General Pillow was then at Macon, but had received no official notification of his appointment, and I having none, could not, and did not, recognize him as entitled to command me, but cheerfully, as will appear further on, consulted him in regard to all important matters of administration.

Colonel Bondurant's report on the Andersonville prison, taken in connection with written applications from Captain Wirz which I had received, suggesting measures for the amelioration of the condition of the prisoners, strongly endorsed and approved by Colonel Gibbs, an old United States army officer, a cultivated, urbane and humane gentleman, commanding the post, made it apparent to my mind that I ought to make a personal examination into its condition. This was no easy undertaking, as I had to travel over almost impassible country roads through the desolated belt of country traversed by Sherman's army, in its march through Georgia, for a distance of over seventy miles, before I could reach a railroad to take me to Andersonville. I made the journey, however, in February.

On my arrival at Andersonville, unannounced and unexpected, I made an immediate personal inspection of everything—not only as then existing, but with the aid of the post and prison record, I went back several months, to the period when the mortality was so great, to ascertain, if possible, its cause.

The guard then on duty consisted of a brigade of Georgia State troops, under command of Brigadier-General Gartrell. The post was commanded by Colonel Gibbs, who, as before stated, was an old army officer; and the prison proper was under the immediate command of Captain Wirz, who was tried and executed at Washington, in 1865, most unjustly, as the verdict of impartial history will establish; just as will be the case in regard to Mrs. Surratt's horrible murder.

The officers first named, and all others on duty there, afforded me every facility to prosecute my investigations to the fullest extent, and were prompt to point out to me measures of relief that were practicable. I went within the stockade and conversed with many of the prisoners. I found the prison and its inmates in a bad condition: not as bad as our enemies have represented, yet unfortunately bad. The location of the stockade was good, and had been judiciously chosen for healthfulness. It occupied two gently sloping hillsides, with a clear flowing brook dividing them; and being in the sandy portion of the pine woods of Georgia, it was free from

local malaria, and had the benefit of a genial and healthy climate. It was of sufficient capacity for from 8,000 to 9,000 prisoners, without uncomfortable crowding. The great mortality of the previous year, I have no doubt, resulted in part from an excess of prisoners over the fair capacity of the stockade, and from the lack of sufficient shelter from the sun and rain. Before my arrival at Andersonville, Captain Wirz had, by a communication forwarded through Colonel Gibbs, and approved by him, called my attention to the great deficiency of shelter in the stockade, and asked authority to supply it. He had made a similar application, I was informed, to General Winder some time before, but it had not been acted on before the General's death. In consequence of this want of buildings and shedding within the stockade, the prisoners had excavated a great many subterranean vaults and chambers in the hillsides, which many of them occupied, to the injury of their health, as these places were not sufficiently ventilated.

The prisoners were very badly off for clothing, shoes and hats, and complained of this destitution, and of the quantity and kind of rations—corn bread and bacon chiefly—issued to them. I found, what I anticipated, that we had no clothing to give them. Many of the men on duty as guards were in rags, and either barefooted, or had their feet protected with worn out shoes held together with strings and thongs, and in lieu of overcoats many had to protect themselves against inclement weather with a tattered blanket drawn over the shoulders. Our own men being in this destitute condition, it can be well understood that we could not supply a large demand for clothing prisoners.

They also suffered greatly, and there had been great mortality, for want of suitable medicines to treat the diseases incident to their condition with any considerable success. From this cause, and this alone, I have no doubt thousands died at Andersonville in 1864, who would be living to-day if the United States Government had not declared medicines contraband of war, and by their close blockade of our coasts deprived us of an adequate supply of those remedial agents that therapeutical science and modern chemistry have produced for the amelioration of suffering humanity. The object of this barbarous decree against the Confederacy, it is now well understood, was to expose our soldiers, as well as our wives, children and families, without protection or relief, to the diseases common in our climate, and to make us an easy prey to death, approach us in what form he might; not foreseeing, perhaps, that when the grim monster stalked through our prisons he would find not alone *Confederates* for his victims, but the stalwart soldiers of the Government which had invoked his aid against us. At the time of my inspection, there was a good deal of sickness amongst the prisoners, but not a large percentage of mortality. Our medical officers, even with their scanty pharmacopæ, gave equal attention to sick friends and enemies, to guard and to prisoners alike.

I investigated particularly the food question, and found that no

discrimination was made in the issue of rations to guards and prisoners. In quantity, quality and kind the daily supply was exactly the same, man for man. It is true it was very scanty, consisting of a third or half a pound of meat a day, and usually a pint or pint and a half of corn meal, with salt. Occasionally there were small supplies of wheat flour, and sometimes a very few potatoes, but they were rarely to be had. Other vegetables we had none. General Lee's army in Virginia lived but little if any better. The food was sound and wholesome, but meagre in quantity, and not such in kind and variety as Federal soldiers had been accustomed to draw from their abundant commissariat. Our soldiers did very well on "hog and hominy," and rarely complained. The Federals thought it horrible to have nothing else, and but a scanty supply of this simple food. Great scoundrelism was detected amongst the prisoners in cheating each other. They were organized in companies of a hundred each in the stockade, and certain men of their own selection were permitted to come outside the stockade and draw the rations for their fellows, and cook them. Many of these rascals would steal and secrete a part of the food, and as opportunity offered sell it at an exorbitant rate to their famished comrades. Shortly before I went to Andersonville six of these villains were detected, and by permission of the prison authorities the prisoners themselves organized a court of their own, tried them for the offence, found them guilty, and hung them inside the stockade. This event led to a change in the mode of issuing rations, which precluded the possibility of such a diabolical traffic in stolen food.

Bad as was the physical condition of the prisoners, their mental depression was worse, and perhaps more fatal. Thousands of them collected around me in the prison, and begged me to tell them whether there was any hope of release by an exchange of prisoners. Some time before that President Davis had permitted three of the Andersonville prisoners to go to Washington to try and change the determination of their Government and procure a resumption of exchanges. The prisoners knew of the failure of this mission when I was at Andersonville, and the effect was to plunge the great majority of them into the deepest melancholy, home-sickness and despondency. They believed their confinement would continue till the end of the war, and many of them looked upon that as a period so indefinite and remote that they believed that they would die of their sufferings before the day of release came. I explained to them the efforts we had made and were still making to effect an exchange. A Federal captain at Andersonville, learning that I had a brother of the same rank (Captain F. M. Imboden, of the Eighteenth Virginia Cavalry) incarcerated at Johnson's Island, in Lake Erie, where he was in a fair way to die from harsh treatment and a lack of food, represented to me that he had powerful connections at Washington, and thought that if I would parole him he could effect his exchange for my brother, and perhaps influence a decision on the general question of exchanges. He agreed to return in

thirty days if he failed. I accepted his terms, and with some difficulty got him through the lines. He failed, and returned within our lines, but just in time to be set at liberty again, as will appear further on. I regret that I have forgotten his name, and have no record of it.

I have already alluded to Captain Wirz's recommendation to put up more shelter. I ordered it, and thereafter daily a hundred or more prisoners were paroled and set to work in the neighboring forest. In the course of a fortnight comfortable log houses, with floors and good chimneys—for which the prisoners made and burnt the brick—were erected for twelve or fifteen hundred men, and were occupied by those in feeble health, who were withdrawn from the large stockade and separated from the mass of prisoners. This same man (Captain Wirz), who was tried and hung as a murderer, warmly urged the establishment of a tannery and shoemaker's shop, informing me that there were many men amongst the prisoners skilled in these trades, and that some of them knew a process of very rapidly converting hides into tolerably good leather. There were thousands of hides at Andersonville, from the young cattle butchered during the previous summer and fall, whilst the country yet contained such animals. I ordered this, too; and a few weeks later many of the barefooted prisoners were supplied with rough, but comfortable shoes; one of them made and sent to me a pair that surprised me, both by the quality of the leather and the style of the shoes. Another suggestion came from the medical staff of the post that I ordered to be at once put into practice: it was to brew corn beer for those suffering from scorbutic taint. The corn meal—or even whole corn—being scalded in hot water and a mash made of it, a little yeast was added to promote fermentation, and in a few days a sharp acid beverage was produced, by no means unpalatable, and very wholesome. Captain Wirz entered warmly into this enterprise. I mention these facts to show that he was not the monster he was afterwards represented to be, when his blood was called for by infuriate fanaticism. I would have proved these facts if I had been permitted to testify on his trial after I was summoned before the court by the United States, and have substantiated them by the records of the prison and of my own headquarters, if these records were not destroyed, suppressed or mutilated at the time. But after being kept an hour in the court-room, during an earnest and whispered consultation between the President of the court and the Judge-Advocate, and their examination of a great mass of papers, the contents of which I could not see, I was politely dismissed without examination, and told I would be called at another time; but I never was, and thus Wirz was deprived of the benefit of my evidence. My personal acquaintance with Captain Wirz was very slight, but the facts I have alluded to satisfied me that he was a humane man, and was selected as a victim to the bloody moloch of 1865, because he was a foreigner and comparatively friendless. I put these facts on record now to vindicate, as far as

they go, his memory from the monstrous crimes falsely charged against him. No such charges ever reached me, whilst I was in a position to have made it a duty to investigate them, as those upon which he was tried and executed. He may have committed grave offences, but if so, I never knew it, and do not believe it.

After having given my sanction and orders to carry out every suggestion of others, or that occurred to my own mind for the amelioration of the condition of the prisoners as far as we possessed the means, and having issued stringent orders to preserve discipline amongst the guarding troops, and subordination, quiet and good order amongst the prisoners, I went to Macon to confer with General Howell Cobb and General Gideon J. Pillow as to the proper course for me to pursue in the event of our situation in Georgia becoming more precarious, or the chance of communication with the Government at Richmond being entirely cut off, which appeared to be an almost certain event in the very near future. After a full discussion of the situation, there was perfect accord in our views. General Pillow was expecting to receive official notice of his appointment as Commissary of Prisons, in which event he would become my commanding officer. General Cobb commanded the State troops of Georgia, and I was dependent on him for a sufficient force to discharge my duties and hold the prisoners in custody. There was eminent propriety, therefore, in our conferring with each other, and acting harmoniously in whatever course might be adopted. General Pillow took a leading part in the discussion, and in shaping the conclusions to which we came. In the absence of official information or instructions from Richmond, we acted upon what the newspapers announced as a recently established arrangement with General Grant, which was, in effect, that either side might deliver to the other on parole, but without exchange, any prisoners they chose, taking simply a receipt for them. We had no official information of any such agreement from our Government, but it was regarded by us as very probably true, and we decided to act upon it. The difficulty of supplying the prisoners with even a scanty ration of corn meal and bacon was increasing daily. The cotton States had never been a grazing country, and therefore we had few or no animals left there for food, except hogs. These States were not a large wheat producing region, and for that reason we had to depend mainly on corn for bread. Salt was scarce and hard to obtain. Vegetables we had none for army purposes. We were destitute of clothing, and of the materials and machinery to manufacture it in sufficient quantities for our own soldiers and people. And the Federal Government, remaining deaf to all appeals for exchange of prisoners, it was manifest that the incarceration of their captured soldiers could no longer be of any possible advantage to us, since to relieve their sufferings that government would take no step, if it involved a similar release of our men in their hands. Indeed, it was manifest that they looked upon it as an advantage to them and an injury to us to leave their

prisoners in our hands to eat out our little remaining substance. In view of all these facts and considerations, Generals Cobb and Pillow and I were of one mind that the best thing that could be done was, without further efforts to get instructions from Richmond, to make arrangements to send off all the prisoners we had at Eufaula and Andersonville to the nearest accessible Federal post, and having paroled them not to bear arms till regularly exchanged, to deliver them unconditionally, simply taking a receipt on descriptive rolls of the men thus turned over.

In pursuance of this determination, and as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made, a detachment of about 1,500 men, made up from the two prisons, was sent to Jackson, Mississippi, by rail and delivered to their friends. General "Dick" Taylor at that time commanded the department through which these prisoners were sent to Jackson, and objected to any more being sent that way, on the ground that they would pick up information on the route detrimental to our military interests. The only remaining available outlet was at Saint Augustine, Florida, Sherman having destroyed railway communication with Savannah. Finding that the prisoners could be sent from Andersonville by rail to the Chattahoochie, thence down that river to Florida, near Quincy, and from Quincy by rail to Jacksonville, within a day's march of Saint Augustine, it was resolved to open communication with the Federal commander at the latter place. With that view, somewhere about the middle of March, Captain Rutherford, an intelligent and energetic officer, was sent to Saint Augustine. A few days after his departure for Florida, he telegraphed from Jacksonville, "Send on the prisoners." He had, as he subsequently reported, arranged with the Federal authorities to receive them. At once all were ordered to be sent forward who were able to bear the journey. Three days' cooked rations were prepared, and so beneficial to health was the revival of the spirits of these men by the prospect of once more being at liberty, that I believe all but twelve or fifteen reported themselves able to go, and did go. The number sent was over 6,000. Only enough officers and men of the guard went along to keep the prisoners together, preserve order, and facilitate their transportation. To my amazement the officer commanding the escort telegraphed back from Jacksonville that the Federal commandant at Saint Augustine refused to receive and receipt for the prisoners till he could hear from General Grant, who was then in front of Petersburg, Virginia, and with whom he could only communicate by sea along the coast, and asking my instructions under the circumstances. Acting without the known sanction of the Government at Richmond, I was afraid to let go the prisoners without some official acknowledgment of their delivery to the United States, and knowing that two or three weeks must elapse before General Grant's will in the premises could be made known, and it being impossible to subsist our men and the prisoners at Jacksonville, I could pursue but one course. I ordered their

return to Andersonville, directing that the reason for this unexpected result should be fully explained to them. Provisions were hastily collected and sent to meet them, and in a few days all were back in their old quarters. I was not there on their return, but it was reported to me that their indignation against their Government was intense, many declaring their readiness to renounce allegiance to it and take up arms with us. The old routine was resumed at Andersonville, but it was not destined to continue long.

Before any further communication reached me from Saint Augustine, General Wilson, with a large body of cavalry, approached Georgia from the West. It was evident that his first objective point was Andersonville. Again conferring with Generals Cobb and Pillow, and finding we were powerless to prevent Wilson's reaching Andersonville, where he would release the prisoners and capture all our officers and troops there, it was decided without hesitation again to send the prisoners to Jacksonville and turn them loose, to make the best of their way to their friends at Saint Augustine. This was accomplished in a few days, the post at Andersonville was broken up, the Georgia State troops were sent to General Cobb at Macon, and in a short time the surrender of General Johnston to Sherman, embracing all that section of country, the Confederate prisons ceased to exist, and on the 3d of May, 1865, I was myself a prisoner of war on parole at Augusta, Georgia. A few days later I was sent with other paroled Confederates to Hilton Head, South Carolina, where I met about 2,000 of the Andersonville prisoners, who had been sent up from Saint Augustine, to be thence shipped North. Their condition was much improved. Many of them were glad to see me, and four days later I embarked with several hundred of them on the steam transport "Thetis" for Fortress Monroe, and have reason to believe that every man of them felt himself my friend rather than an enemy.

It has been charged that Mr. Davis, as President of the Confederate States, was responsible for the sufferings of prisoners held in the South. During my four months' connection with this disagreeable branch of Confederate military service, no communication, direct or indirect, was ever received by me from Mr. Davis, and, so far as I remember, the records of the prison contained nothing to implicate him in any way with its management or administration. I have briefly alluded to the causes of complaint on the part of prisoners, and even where these were well founded, I am at a loss to see how Mr. Davis is to be held responsible before the world for their existence, till it is proved that he knew of them and failed to remove delinquent officers.

The real cause of all the protracted sufferings of prisoners North and South is directly due to the inhuman refusal of the Federal Government to exchange prisoners of war, a policy that we see from the facts herein stated was carried so far as to induce a commanding officer, at Saint Augustine, to refuse even to receive, and acknowledge that he had received, over 6,000 men of his own side,

tendered to him unconditionally, from that prison in the South which, above all others, they charged to have been the scene of unusual suffering. The inference is irresistible that this officer felt that it would be dangerous to his official character to relieve the Confederacy of the burthen of supporting these prisoners, although he and his countrymen affected to believe that we were slowly starving them to death. The policy at Washington was to let Federal prisoners starve, if the process involved the Confederates in a similar catastrophe—and “fired the Northern heart.”

I have introduced more of my personal movements and actions into this recital than is agreeable or apparently in good taste, but it has been unavoidable in making the narrative consecutive and intelligible, and I trust will be pardoned, even if appearing to transcend the bounds of becoming modesty. In the absence of all my official papers relating to these subjects (which I presume were taken to Washington after I surrendered them, and are still there, unless it was deemed policy to destroy them when Captain Wirz was on trial), I have not been able to go into many minute details that might add interest to the statement, but nothing, I think, to the leading fact—that the United States refused an unconditional delivery of so many of its own men, inmates of that prison (Andersonville), which they professed then to regard as a Confederate slaughter-pen and place of intentional diabolical cruelties inflicted on the sick and helpless. Was this course not a part of a policy of deception for “firing the Northern heart”? Impartial history will one day investigate and answer this question. And there we may safely leave it, with a simple record of the facts.

Very truly, your friend,

J. D. IMBODEN.

The above documents seem to us to show beyond all controversy that whatever suffering existed at Andersonville (and it is freely admitted that the suffering was terrible), resulted from causes which were beyond the control of the Confederate Government, and were directly due to the cold-blooded, cruel policy of the Federal authorities, which not only refused to exchange prisoners, but rejected every overture to mitigate their sufferings.

The Federal Government has had possession of the Confederate archives for now nearly eleven years. The Confederate leaders and their friends have been denied all access to those archives, while partisans on the other side have ransacked them at will in eager search for every sentence which could be garbled out of its connection to prove the charges made, with reckless disregard of the truth, against the “Rebel crew.” It is fair to presume that those records contain no stronger proof of “Rebel cruelty to prisoners” than has already been brought to light, while some of us are fondly hoping

that before the *next* Centennial the people of the South will have the vindication which the records of the Confederacy afford. The strongest proof of the charges made against the Confederate Government which has yet been produced from those records is the

REPORT OF COLONEL D. T. CHANDLER,

which was introduced at the Wirz trial, and upon which the Radical press has been ringing the charges ever since. It has been recently thus put in a malignant reply, in a partisan sheet, to Mr. Davis' letter to Mr. Lyons:

On the 5th day of August, 1864, Colonel Chandler, an officer of the Confederate army, made a report to the Rebel War Department regarding the condition of Andersonville prison. He had made one six months before, but no attention had been paid to it. In his last report he said:

"My duty requires me respectfully to recommend a change in the officer in the command of the post, Brigadier-General J. H. Winder, and the substitution in his place of some one who unites both energy and good judgment with some feeling of humanity and consideration for the welfare and comfort (so far as it is consistent with their safe-keeping) of the vast number of unfortunates placed under his control; *some one who at least will not advocate deliberately and in cold blood the propriety of leaving them in their present condition until their number has been sufficiently reduced by death to make the present arrangement suffice for their accommodation*; who will not consider it a matter of self-laudation and boasting that he has never been inside of the stockade, a place *the horrors of which it is difficult to describe, and which is a disgrace to civilization*, the condition of which he might, by the exercise of a little energy and judgment, even with the limited means at his command, have considerably improved.

"D. T. CHANDLER,
"Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General."

This report was forwarded to the Secretary of War with the following endorsement:

"ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"August 18, 1864.

"Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War. The condition of the prison at Andersonville *is a reproach to us as a nation*. The Engineer and Ordnance Departments were applied to, and authorized their issue, and I so telegraphed General Winder. Colonel Chandler's recommendations are coincided in.

"By order of General Cooper.

"R. H. CHILTON,
"Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General."

Not content with this, Colonel Chandler testifies that he went to the War Office himself, and had an interview with the Assistant Secretary, J. A. Campbell, who then wrote below General Cooper's endorsement the following:

"These reports show a condition of things at Andersonville, which calls very loudly for the interposition of the Department, in order that a change may be made.

"J. A. CAMPBELL,
"Assistant Secretary of War."

Thus was the horrible condition of things at Andersonville brought home to the Secretary of War, one of the confidential advisers of the President, who was daily in consultation with him. If all was being done for the prisoners that could be done, how came such reports to be made? But what was the result? A few days after this report was sent in, Winder, the beast, the cruel, heartless coward—the man of whom the Richmond *Examiner* said, when he was ordered from that city to Andersonville, "Thank God that Richmond is at last rid of old Winder; God have mercy upon those to whom he has been sent"—this man was promoted by Mr. Davis, and made Commissary-General of all the prisons and prisoners in the Confederacy. We come now to a question which we challenge Mr. Davis to answer. Did he know of, or had his attention been called to, Colonel Chandler's report when he promoted General Winder? Dare he deny having made this latter appointment as a reward to Winder for his faithful services at Andersonville?

A writer in the *Sauk Rapids Sentinel* adds the statement (which is certainly news in this latitude) that upon this report General Winder was "indignantly removed by the Secretary of War," and that when he carried the order removing him to the President he not only reinstated him, but "immediately added to his power and opportunities for barbarity, by promoting him to the office of Commissary-General of all of the prisons and prisoners of the Southern Confederacy." This is, indeed, a terrible arraignment of Mr. Davis, if it were true, but there is really not one word of truth in any statement of that character. Mr. Davis not only never saw Colonel Chandler's report, but absolutely never heard of it until last year.

We are fortunate in being able to give a clear statement of the history of Colonel Chandler's report, and to show that so far from being proof of any purposed cruelty to prisoners on the part of the Confederate Government, the circumstances afford the strongest proof of just the reverse.

We inclosed the slip from the *Sauk Rapids Sentinel* to Hon. R. G. H. Kean, who was chief clerk of the Confederate War Department.

We may say (for the benefit of readers in other sections; it is entirely unnecessary in this latitude), that Mr. Kean is now Rector of the University of Virginia, and is an accomplished scholar and a high-toned Christian gentleman, whose lightest word may be implicitly relied upon. Mr. Kean has sent us the following letter, which, though hastily written and not designed for publication, gives so clear a history of this report that we shall take the liberty of publishing it in full:

Letter of Hon. R. G. H. Kean, Chief Clerk of the Confederate War Department.

LYNCHBURG, VA., March 22, 1876.

REV. J. WILLIAM JONES,

Secretary Southern Historical Society :

My Dear Sir—Yours of the 20th is received this A. M., and I snatch the time from the heart of a busy day to reply immediately, because I feel that there is no more imperious call on a Confederate than to do what he may to hurl back the vile official slanders of the Federal Government at Washington in 1865, when Holt, Conover & Co., with a pack of since convicted perjurers, were doing all in their power to blacken the fame of a people whose presence they have since found and acknowledged to be indispensable to any semblance of purity in their administration of affairs.

In September, 1865, I was required by the then commandant at Charlottesville to report immediately to him. The summons was brought to me in the field, where in my shirt sleeves I was assisting in the farming operations of my father-in-law, Colonel T. J. Randolph, and his eldest son, Major T. J. Randolph. I obeyed, and was sent by the next train to report to General Terry, then in command in Richmond. He informed me that I was wanted, and had long been sought for, to testify before the Commission engaged in trying Wirz, and I was sent to Washington by the next train. I attended promptly, but it was two or three days before I was examined as a witness. When I was, a paper taken from the records of our War Office was shown me—the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler of his inspection of the post at Andersonville. I remembered the paper well. This writer in the *Sauk Rapids Sentinel* is in error when he says this report was “delivered in person to the Confederate Assistant Secretary of War.” It had been sent through the usual channels, and reaching the hands of Colonel R. H. Chilton, Assistant Inspector-General, in charge of the inspection branch of the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s bureau, was brought into the War Office by Colonel Chilton and placed in my hands, with the endorsement quoted by this writer, or something to that effect. Colonel Chilton explained to me that the report disclosed such a state of things at Andersonville, that he had brought it to me, in order that it might receive prompt atten-

tion, instead of sending it through the usual routine channel. I read it immediately, and was shocked at its contents. I do not remember the passage quoted by this writer, but I do remember that it showed that the 32,000 men herded in the stockade at Andersonville were dying of scurvy and other diseases engendered by their crowded condition and insufficient supplies of medicines, suitable food, and medical attendance, at the rate of ten per cent., or about 3,000 a month. Shocked at such a waste of human life, produced by the fraudulent refusal to observe the cartel for exchange of prisoners, whom we had neither the force to guard in a large enclosure, nor proper food for when sick, nor medicines, save such as we could smuggle into our ports or manufacture from the plants of Southern growth, I took the report to Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, and told him of the horrors it disclosed. He read it, and made on it an endorsement substantially the same quoted, and carried it to Mr. Seddon, then Secretary of War. My office was between that of the Assistant Secretary and the Secretary, and the latter passed through mine with the paper in his hand. I testified to these facts before the Wirz Commission, and also to this further. As well as I remember it was early in August that these endorsements were made. In October, Colonel Chandler, who was, I think, a Mississippian, and with whom I had no previous acquaintance, presented himself in my office, and stated to me that he had been officially informed that General Winder, on being called on in August for a response to the parts of his report which reflected on or blamed him (Winder), had responded by making an issue of veracity with him (Chandler); that he (C.) had promptly demanded a court of inquiry, but that none had been ever ordered. He expressed himself as very unwilling to lie under such an imputation, and urgently desirous to have the subject investigated. His appearance and manner were very good—those of a gentleman and a man of honor; and, in sympathy with his feelings (though I told him that it was extremely improbable that officers of suitable rank could be spared from the service to conduct such an investigation at that time), I told him I would call the attention of the Secretary to the matter. Accordingly I got the report, and placing around it a slip of paper in the usual official manner, I endorsed to this effect: "Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler is here in person, urging that a court of inquiry be named to investigate the issues between him and General Winder touching this report. He seems to feel his position painfully"—addressed to the Secretary of War. Mr. Seddon told me afterwards that in the then state of things it was impossible to spare officers of suitable rank—so many were prisoners that the supply in the field was insufficient, or to that effect—and Colonel Chandler was so informed, either by me in person or by letter. This endorsement of mine, dated in October, 1864, was the thing which connected me with the report, and caused me to be summoned to Washington to trace it into the hands of the Secretary of War. The effort was assiduously made by Colonel

L. R. Chipman, the Judge-Advocate of the Wirz Commission, to show by me that this report was seen by President Davis, but that effort failed, because I knew nothing on that subject. This was substantially all that I knew of my own knowledge, and so was competent to prove as a witness, in respect to the report. But very much more came to my knowledge as hearsay, not competent legally, yet as credible as what I knew directly.

My observations, during the several days I was in attendance and watching the proceedings of the Commission, convinced me—whether rightly or wrongly subsequent events have in some degree developed—that the destruction of Wirz was a very subordinate object of his so-called trial; that the main objects were to blacken the character of the Southern Government, and, as I thought, to compass the death of Mr. Davis and Mr. Seddon, who were not technically on trial, but were alleged to have “conspired” with Wirz and others to kill and murder the Federal prisoners, &c. One was immured in irons in a casemate of Fortress Monroe, the other was in a casemate in Fort Pulaski. Believing that their lives were in danger, I sought Mr. L. Q. Washington, who was then in Washington, and communicated to him the apprehensions I felt, and urged him to communicate them to Mr. Seddon’s friends, with whom I knew him to be intimate. I learned that he did so; and Mrs. Seddon sent Captain Phillip Welford, a gentleman of great intelligence, to Washington to see what was best to be done to protect her helpless husband, who was being prosecuted while a prisoner six hundred miles away. The result of Captain Welford’s investigations and conferences with friends in Washington, was that it was not deemed judicious for Mr. Seddon to be represented directly by counsel, but that he should place his materials of defence and explanation touching the Chandler report in the hands of Wirz’s counsel; and this was done. The Government had gone into all this matter, and the response, therefore, on every principle of fair dealing or of law, was legitimate *in that cause*. Colonel Robert Ould and General J. E. Mulford, therefore, were summoned to show what the action of the Confederate Government on Colonel Chandler’s report was. Judge Ould attended, and General Mulford was prepared to do so and to corroborate him. Judge Ould, as Mr. Welford informed me, unless my memory is at fault, was prepared to state that as soon as Colonel Chandler’s report was presented to Mr. Seddon, the latter sent for him and showed the terrible mortality prevailing at Andersonville, instructed him to go down James river at once with his flag-of-truce boat, see General Mulford, inform him of the state of things there; that its causes, by reason of the blockade, were beyond our resources to prevent; but that we were unwilling that the breach of the cartel should entail such suffering; and to propose that the Federals might send as many medical officers to Andersonville and other prisons as they pleased, with such supplies, and funds, medicine, clothing, and whatever else would conduce to health and comfort, with power to organize their own

methods of distribution, and without other restriction than a personal parole of honor not to convey information prejudicial to us, on condition that we, too, should be allowed to relieve the sufferings of our men in Northern prisons by sending medical officers with like powers, who should take cotton (the only exchange we possessed) to buy supplies necessary for our people; that this was immediately communicated early in August, 1864, to General Mulford, who was informed of the state of things at Andersonville; that he communicated this proposition to his immediate superiors, and had no answer for some two or three weeks, and when the answer came it was a simple refusal; that General Mulford promptly communicated this to Judge Ould, and he to Mr. Seddon; that immediately thereon Mr. Seddon directed Colonel Ould to return down the river (James), see General Mulford and say that in three days from the time we were notified that transportation would be at Savannah to receive them, the Federals should have delivered them ten thousand of the sick from Andersonville, *whether we were allowed any equivalent in exchange for them or not*, as a mere measure of humanity; that this was promptly done; and General Mulford, as I was informed, would have stated that, so impressed was he with the enormous suffering, which it was the desire of our Government to spare, that not content with an official letter through the usual channels, he went in person to Washington, into the office of Secretary Stanton, told him the whole story, and urged prompt action, but got no reply. Nor was a reply vouchsafed to this offer until the latter part of December, 1864; meanwhile some fifteen thousand men had died. If these be the facts, who is responsible?

My deliberate conviction at the time, and ever since, has been that the authorities at Washington considered thirty thousand men, just in the rear of General Johnston's army in Georgia, drawing their rations from the same stores from which his army had to be fed, would be better used up there than in the Federal ranks, in view of the fact that they could recruit their armies, while we had exhausted our material; that the refusal to exchange prisoners, and the denial of our offers in regard to the sick at Andersonville, was part of the plan of *attrition*. It will be remembered that the friends of Federal soldiers in prison at the South had become clamorous about the stoppage of exchanges. The Northern press had taken the matter up, and the authorities had been arraigned as responsible. I have never doubted that one collateral object of the Wirz trial was by a perfectly unilateral trial (?), in which the prosecutor had everything his own way to manufacture an answer to these just complaints. And I feel a conviction that the truth will one day be vindicated; that, having reference to relative resources, Federal prisoners were more humanely dealt with in Confederate hands than Confederate prisoners were in Federal hands. It was their interest, on a cold-blooded calculation, to stop exchanges when they did it—and as soon as it was their interest, they did it

without scruple or mercy. The responsibility of the lives lost at Andersonville rests, since July, 1864, on General Meredith, Commissary-General of Prisoners, and (chiefly) on Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. No one of sound head or heart would now hold the Northern people responsible for these things. The blood is on the skirts of their then rulers; and neither Mr. Garfield nor Mr. Blaine can change the record.

I never heard that there was any particular "suffering" at Libby or Belle Isle, and do not believe there was. Crowded prisons are not comfortable places, as our poor fellows found at Fort Delaware, Johnson's Island, &c.

I have at this late day no means of refreshing my memory in regard to the general orders on the subject of prison treatment, but this as a general fact I do know, that Mr. Davis' humanity was considered to be a stronger sentiment with him than public justice, and it was a common remark that no soldier capitally convicted was ever executed, if the President reviewed the record of his conviction. He was always slow to adopt the policy of retaliation for the barbarities inflicted by local commanders on the other side. The controversy between General Winder and Colonel Chandler was never brought to an investigation, for the reasons mentioned above. What the result of that investigation would have been no one can now tell; but I will say in reference to this true old patriot and soldier—a genial man, whose zeal was sometimes ahead of his discretion—that if he was, at Andersonville, the fiend pretended by the "Bloody Shirt" shriekers, he had in his old age changed his nature very suddenly. I never saw any reason to consider Colonel Chandler's report wilfully injurious to General Winder, and supposed that it was the result of those misunderstandings which not unfrequently spring up between an inspecting officer and a post commander, when the former begins to find fault.

I have written hastily. In minor details, the lapse of twelve years may render my memory inaccurate, but of the general accuracy of the narrative I have given, as lying in my own knowledge or reported to me by those whose names I have mentioned, I vouch without hesitation.

Respectfully, yours truly,

R. G. H. KEAN.

We have also a

LETTER FROM SECRETARY SEDDON,

dated March 27th, 1876, from which we give the following extract:

"Unfortunately, during my imprisonment after the war, nearly all the papers and memoranda I had connected with the administration of the War Department were destroyed, and I have had so little satisfaction in dwelling upon the sad sacrifices and sufferings that attended and resulted from the futile though glorious efforts

of our people in their lost cause, that I have sought rather to allow my memories of events to be dimmed or obliterated, than to brighten or cherish them. I have not a copy of any of my own reports, nor of that of Colonel Chandler, to which you specially refer, and have of that by no means a lively recollection. I do remember however, generally, that it severely reflected on General Winder, and while it induced calls for explanation and defence from General Winder, it at the same time, from its terms, inspired an impression of controversy, and perhaps angry and incautious expressions between them, which warned to caution in receiving them as accurate representations of the facts. The Department was aware of the strict instructions which had been given, both verbally and by written orders, for the selection and preparation of the military prisons, especially that of Andersonville, with special view to the health and comfort of the prisoners, and for their humane treatment and supply on the same footing with our own troops, and could not hastily accept an account of such orders being wantonly disregarded by an old, regularly trained officer, rather noted as a rigid disciplinarian, or of cruel and unofficer-like treatment of prisoners on his part. The authorities, too, knew only too well the grave and growing deficiencies of all supplies, and the sad necessities the war was by its ruthless conduct imposing on all affected by its course. They also knew that unexpected events had forced the assemblage of a far greater number of prisoners than had been anticipated and provided for in the few safer points of confinement, before others had or could be provided for them, and we were daily looking and counting on a large number being removed by the liberal offer of some 10,000 of those suffering from sickness to be returned (without equivalent) to the Federals; and on the completion of new, safe prisons for the accommodation of others. The Department, under such circumstances, could not so hastily receive and act on the representations of this report, or condemn General Winder without investigation and response from him. His reports and explanations were of a very different character, and, as far as I now recollect, deemed exonerating. I cannot recall exactly the time or circumstances of his promotion as General, but certainly no advance was ever accorded under any conviction of inhumanity or undue severity to prisoners by him, much less as a support to him therein, or a reward for such conduct."

Do not these letters show beyond all cavil that so far from there being a deliberate purpose on the part of the Confederate Government to murder Federal prisoners, that a report of their suffering condition met the promptest attention; that General Winder was at once asked to explain the charges made against him, and did give satisfactory explanations; that Colonel Chandler's request for a court of inquiry was only postponed because officers to compose the court could not be spared from the field, and that without

waiting to hear General Winder's explanations, Mr. Seddon sent Judge Ould to tell the Federal Agent of Exchange of the reported suffering of the Federal prisoners, and to urge the acceptance of his humane proposition, that if they would not exchange, or allow their own surgeons to come to their relief, or allow the Confederate Government to buy medicines for them, they would at least *send transportation to Savannah and receive their sick without any equivalent*. And since the Federal Government turned a deaf ear to all of these appeals, are *they* not responsible before God and at the bar of history for every death that ensued?

If it could be proven beyond all doubt that the officers at Andersonville were the fiends incarnate that Northern hatred pictures them to be, there is not one scintilla of proof that the Government at Richmond ordered, approved or in any way countenanced their "atrocities." It is not, therefore, necessary for our purpose that we should go into any

DEFENCE OF GENERAL WINDER.

And yet, as an act of simple justice to the memory of this officer, we give the following letters:

SABOT HILL, December 29, 1875.

Mr. W. S. WINDER, *Baltimore* :

Dear Sir—Your letter reached me some two weeks since, and I have been prevented by serious indisposition from giving it an early reply.

I take pleasure in rendering my emphatic testimony to relieve the character and reputation of your father, the late General John H. Winder, from the unjust aspersions that have been cast upon them in connection with the treatment of the Federal prisoners under his charge during our late civil war.

I had, privately and officially, the fullest opportunity of knowing his character, and judging his disposition and conduct towards the Federal prisoners; for those in Richmond, where he was almost daily in official communication with me, often in respect to them, had been some time under his command before, in large measure from the care and kindness he was believed to have shown to them, he was sent South to have the supervision and control of the large number there being aggregated.

His manner and mode of speech were perhaps naturally somewhat abrupt and sharp, and his military bearing may have added more of sternness and imperiousness; but these were mere superficial traits, perhaps, as I sometimes thought, assumed in a manner to disguise the real gentleness and kindness of his nature.

I thought him marked by real humanity towards the weak and helpless—such as women and children, for instance—by that spirit

of protection and defence which distinguished the really gallant soldier.

To me he always expressed sympathy, and manifested a strong desire to provide for the wants and comforts of the prisoners under his charge. Very frequently, from the urgency of his claims in behalf of the prisoners while in Richmond, controversies would arise between him and the Commissary-General, which were submitted to me by them in person for my decision, and I was struck by his earnestness and zeal in claiming the fullest supplies the law of the Confederacy allowed or gave color of claim to. This law required prisoners to have the allowance provided for our own soldiers in the field, and constituted the guide to the settlement of such questions. Strict injunctions were invariably given from the Department for the observance of this law, both then and afterwards, in the South, and no departure was to be tolerated from it except under the direst straits of self-defence. Your father was ever resolved, as far as his authority allowed, to act upon and enforce the rule in behalf of the prisoners.

When sent South I know he was most solicitous in regard to all arrangements for salubrity and convenience of location for the military prisons, and for all means that could facilitate the supplies and comforts of the prisoners, and promote their health and preservation. That afterwards great sufferings were endured by the prisoners in the South was among the saddest necessities of the war; but they were due, in a large measure, to the cessation of exchange, which forced the crowding of numbers, never contemplated, in the limited prison bounds which could be considered safe in the South, to the increasing danger of attack on such places, which made Southern authorities and commanders hostile to the establishment of additional prisons in convenient localities, and to the daily increasing straits and deficiencies of supplies of the Confederate Government, and not to the want of sympathy or humanity on the part of your father, or his most earnest efforts to obviate and relieve the inevitable evils that oppressed the unfortunate prisoners. I know their sad case, and his impotency to remedy it caused him keen anguish and distress.

Amid the passions and outraged feelings yet surviving our terrible struggle, it may be hard still to have justice awarded to the true merits and noble qualities of your father, but in future and happier times I doubt not all mists of error obscuring his name and fame will be swept away under the light of impartial investigation, and he will be honored and revered, as he ought to be, among the most faithful patriots and gallant soldiers of the Southern Confederacy.

Very truly yours,

JAMES A. SEDDON.

[Copy.]

MONTREAL, 20th June, 1867.

My Dear Sir— * * * I have never doubted that all had been done for the comfort and preservation of the prisoners at An-

dersonville that the circumstances rendered possible. General Winder I had known from my first entrance into the United States army as a gallant soldier and an honorable gentleman. Cruelty to those in his power, defenceless and sick men, was inconsistent with the character of either a soldier or a gentleman. I was always, therefore, confident that the charge was unjustly imputed. * * * The efforts made to exchange the prisoners may be found in the published reports of our Commissioner of Exchanges, and they were referred to in several of my messages to the Confederate Congress. They show the anxiety felt on our part to relieve the captives on both sides of the sufferings incident to imprisonment, and how that humane purpose was obstructed by the enemy in disregard of the cartel which had been agreed upon. * * * *

I am, very respectfully and truly, yours,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

To R. R. STEVENSON, *Stewiacke, N. S.*

Special attention is called to the following from the venerable Adjutant-General of the Confederacy, whose endorsement upon the report of Colonel Chandler has been as widely copied (and perverted) as the reported action of Mr. Seddon "indignantly removing General Winder":

[Copy.]

ALEXANDRIA, VA., July 9, 1871.

Dear Sir—* * * I can, however, with perfect truth declare as my conviction that General Winder, who had the control of the Northern prisoners, was an honest, upright and humane gentleman, and as such I had known him for many years. He had the reputation in the Confederacy of treating the prisoners confided to his general supervision with great kindness and consideration, and fully possessed the confidence of the Government, which would not have been the case had he adopted a different course of action toward them; and this was exemplified by his assignment to Andersonville by the special direction of the President. Both the President and Secretary of War always manifested great anxiety that the prisoners should be kindly treated and amply provided with food to the extent of our means, and they both used their best means and exertions to these ends.

Yours truly,

S. COOPER.

To DR. R. R. STEVENSON, *Stewiacke, Nova Scotia:*

The two following letters need no comment, except to call attention to the fact that General Beauregard's call for the prisoners was avowedly *in retaliation* for General Sherman's previous course, and that General Winder's refusal to fill the requisition is a most significant refutation of the charge of brutality to prisoners made against him:

ALEXANDRIA, April 3, 1868.

My Dear Captain—Yours of the 2d has been received, and in reply I beg leave to say that I have no copies of the letters and orders referred to, but I have an entry in my journal of the date of the 9th of January, 1865, whilst headquarters were at Montgomery, Alabama. The entry is substantially as follows: "In pursuance of orders, I addressed a letter to General Winder, requesting him to turn over thirty Federal prisoners to Major Hottle, quartermaster, for the purpose of taking out *sub-terra* shells and torpedoes from the cuts in the West Point and Atlanta railroad. Shortly afterwards I received from General Winder a reply, stating that he could not comply with the request, as it would not only violate the orders of the War Department, but would be in contravention of the laws and usages of war."

I have no objection to your using this information on such occasions and terms as you may deem proper for the vindication of your father, but I would suggest this consideration: that a public use in the present heated and embittered condition of political affairs would result in no practical use, and might possibly create unnecessary prejudice against those now living and to Southern interests.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE W. BRENT.

NEW ORLEANS, February 15, 1876.

My Dear Sir—I regret to find from your letter of inquiry, that General Sherman seeks to extenuate one of those violations of the rules of civilized warfare, which characterized his campaign through Georgia and South Carolina, by the easily refuted slander upon the Confederate army to which you call my attention, namely: That in his employment of Confederate prisoners during that campaign to search and dig up torpedoes, he acted "only in retaliation" for the like employment of Federal prisoners by Confederate commanders—an assertion reckless even for General Sherman, whose heedlessness of what he writes and speaks was notorious before the appearance of his "Memoirs."

I myself can recall no occasion when Federal prisoners were or could have been employed, as alleged by that General, even had it been legitimate, and not a shocking inhumanity, to do so; that is to say, I do not believe General Sherman can specify, with date, any place that came into possession of the Confederates during the war, where torpedoes were planted, which they had to remove either by resort to the use of Federal prisoners or any other means. There certainly was never such a place or occasion in the departments which I commanded.

I recollect distinctly, however, learning immediately after the fall of Savannah, that General Sherman himself had put Confederate prisoners to this extraordinary use in his approach to that city, as also at the capture of Fort McAllister, and I thereupon made,

through my Chief of Staff, Colonel G. W. Brent, a requisition on our Commissary of Prisoners of War, General Winder, for a detachment of Federal prisoners, to be employed *in retaliation*, should the occasion occur. I further recollect that your brother answered that, under his instructions from the Confederate War Department, he could not comply; also that, in his belief, prisoners could not rightfully be so employed.

That General Sherman, as I had heard at the time, did so employ his prisoners, stands of record at page 194, vol. 2, of his Memoirs: "On the 8th (December, 1864), as I rode along, I found the column turned out of the main road, marching through the fields. Close by, on the corner of a fence, was a group of men standing around a handsome young officer, whose foot had been blown to pieces by a torpedo planted in the road. * * * *

He told me that he was riding along with the rest of his brigade staff of the Seventeenth Corps, when a torpedo, trodden on by his horse, had exploded, killing the horse and literally blowing off all the flesh from one of his legs. I saw the terrible wound and made full inquiry into the facts. There had been no resistance at that point; nothing to give warning of the danger; the Rebels had planted eight inch shells in the road with friction matches to explode them by being trodden on. This was no war, but murder, and it made me very angry. I immediately ordered a lot of Rebel prisoners to be brought from the provost guard with picks and shovels, and made them march in close order along the road, so as to explode or discover and dig them up. They begged hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly help laughing at their stepping so gingerly along the road where it was supposed sunken torpedoes might explode at each step, but they found no other till near Fort McAllister."

Here we have his own confession that he pushed a mass of unarmed men, prisoners of war, ahead of his column to explode torpedoes, which he apprehended were planted in the approaches to a strongly fortified position, his ability to carry which he greatly doubted, as may be seen from his "Memoirs." He does not there pretend that he acted "in retaliation" at all, but because, forsooth, he was "angry" that one of his officers had been badly wounded by a torpedo which had been planted in his path "without giving warning of danger"! Surely his own narrative, with its painful levity, gives as bad a hue to the affair as General Sherman's worst enemies could desire. It remains to be said that he omits mention of another instance of this unwarrantable employment of prisoners of war. After General Hazen (on December 13) had handsomely assaulted and carried Fort McAllister, General Sherman, in person, ordered the Confederate engineer officer of the fort, with men of that garrison then prisoners, to remove all the torpedoes in front of the fort which might remain unexploded; gallant soldiers who, under their commander, Major G. W. Anderson, had "only succumbed as each man was individually overpowered." (General Ha-

zen's official report). Major Anderson, in his report, says: "This hazardous duty (removal of the torpedoes) was performed without injury to any one; but it appearing to me as an unwarrantable and improper treatment of prisoners of war, I have thought it right to refer to it in this report." General Sherman might with equal right have pushed a body of prisoners in front of an assaulting column to serve as a gabion-roller.

His manner of relating the incidents, which I have quoted in his own words, is calculated to give the impression that the use of the torpedoes is something so abhorrent in regular warfare that he could subject his unarmed prisoners to the hazard of exploding them and deserve credit for the act! A strange obliquity in the general-in-chief of an army which has, at the present moment, a special torpedo corps attached to it as an important defensive resource to fortified places; in one who, moreover, was carefully taught at West Point how to plant the equivalent of torpedoes as known to engineers of that date—*i. e.*, "crows'-feet," "trous-de-loups," "fougasses," "mines," etc.

For my part, from the day of the capitulation of Fort Sumter, in 1861, when, in order to save a brave soldier and his command from all unnecessary humiliation, I allowed Major Anderson the same terms offered him before the attack—*i. e.*, to salute his flag with fifty guns, and to go forth with colors flying and drums beating, taking off company and private property—down to the close of the war, I always favored and practiced liberal treatment of prisoners. At the same time, however, I always urged the policy of rigid and prompt retaliation, at all cost, for every clear infraction of the settled laws of war; for history shows it to be the only effectual method of recalling an enemy from inhuman courses. Washington never hesitated to apply the painful remedy during our Revolutionary war.

I am yours, most truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

W. H. WINDER, Esq., New York, N. Y.

Since the foregoing was written we have seen a letter from Judge Ould, in the Saint Louis *Globe-Democrat*, which so ably refutes the charge made against him on the faith of a garbled letter of his, and brings out other points so clearly, that we give it entire except the introductory paragraphs:

RICHMOND, VA., October 5th, 1875.

* * * * *

"I will now give the history and contents of the letter which "S." produces as the sole proof of my premeditated complicity in the murder of Federal prisoners. When Richmond was evacuated in April, 1865, this letter was found among the scattered debris of General Winder's office. The first time I ever saw it published in full was in the Washington *Chronicle*, a well-known Republican

paper, of the date of August 25, 1868. It was then and there made the basis of a savage attack upon me. Of course, everything in the letter which could be damaging to me was set forth. The latter part of it was printed in italics. I will give the letter as it appeared in the *Chronicle*, and beneath it I will give the version of "S." I did not retain a copy, but I believe the letter as it appeared in the *Chronicle* is exactly the one which I did write. Here, then, are the two versions:

THE CHRONICLE VERSION.

CITY POINT.

Sir—A flag-of-truce boat has arrived with 350 political prisoners, General Barrow and several other prominent men amongst them.

I wish you to send me, at 4 o'clock Wednesday morning, all the military prisoners (except officers) and all the political prisoners you have. If any of the political prisoners have on hand proof enough to convict them of being spies, or of having committed other offences which should subject them to punishment, so state opposite their names. Also, state whether you think, under the circumstances, they should be released.

The arrangement I have made works largely in our favor. We get rid of a set of miserable wretches, and receive some of the best material I ever saw.

Ro. OULD, *Agent of Exchange*.

Brigadier-General WINDER.

THE VERSION OF "S."

"The arrangement I have made works largely in our favor; in getting rid of a miserable set of wretches, and receive in return some of the best material I ever saw. This, of course, is between ourselves."

"S." gives as the date of my letter, in his first communication, August 1, 1864. In his last communication "S." admits his mistake, or that of the compositor, and says that the true date is August 1, 1863. It will be seen, according to the copy in the *Chronicle*, that the letter has no date. It is the veriest pretence for "S." to shift his date from August 1, 1864, to August 1, 1863. I am confident the letter had no date, and that it was written long before August, 1863. Your readers can draw their own conclusion as to this double attempt to change the face of my letter.

But, dates aside, I ask your attention to the difference of the two versions. "S." not only cuts off the first part of the letter, which explains the purport of the latter part, but he adds to the original the words, "this of course is between ourselves." In his last communication he makes great ado about these words, and lo! they now turn out to be a forgery. I do not think they amount to much, nor would they be any cause of shame if I had written them. But "S." seems to think otherwise, and makes use of a plain forgery

to sustain his false charge against me. Could not "S." have been content with suppressing that portion of my letter which explained its last paragraph, without forging an addition to it? Moreover, the version of "S." makes me use worse grammar than is my wont. In addition to his attempt to show me to be a felon, does he desire to take from me "the benefit of clergy"? When this letter of mine appeared in the *Washington Chronicle*, in 1868, I addressed a communication to the *National Intelligencer*, which was published in that paper on the 29th August, 1868, explaining the circumstances under which it was written, and showing very clearly that the latter paragraph of it did not relate to soldiers at all. In that communication I stated what I now repeat—that some three hundred and fifty political prisoners had arrived at City Point, and being anxious not to detain the Federal steamer, I wrote to General Winder to send all the political prisoners he had in his charge, as well as soldiers; that it was as to these political prisoners that I wrote the last paragraph in the letter; that it so manifestly appeared from the context; that every word in the paragraph was true, both as to the class received and those sent off; that not one Confederate soldier in service was received at that time; that scarcely any one of the three hundred and fifty had been in prison a month; that all of them had been recently arrested as sympathizers with the Confederate cause; that those sent off were miserable wretches indeed, mostly robbers and incendiaries from Western Virginia, who were Confederates when Confederate armies occupied their country, and Unionists when Federal troops held it, and who in turn preyed upon one side and the other, and so pillaged that portion of the State that it had almost been given over to desolation; that they were men without character or principle, who were ready to take any oath or engage in any work of plunder; that I then reiterated what I had before written—that they were "a set of miserable wretches"; that the Federal soldiers who had passed through my hands knew well, I hoped, that I would not have applied any such phrase to them; and especially so if the calamities of prison life had prostrated them, and that inasmuch as in my letter I had referred to an arrangement which I had made, I must have referred to the exchange of political prisoners which I had just negotiated, and not to the exchange of military prisoners, which was negotiated by the cartel.

After this full and frank explanation of the letter, nothing more for some seven years was heard of it, until it was revived in a false, forged and garbled form by "S." a few weeks since.

Before its publication in the *Chronicle*, it had, however, appeared in the famous Wirz trial—whether in its true or false form, I do not know. In this respect the letter was more fortunate than I was, for I was not permitted to appear. Wirz had summoned me through the proper channel as a witness in *his* behalf. I went to Washington in obedience to the summons, and was in attendance upon the court martial. While in such attendance my subpoena

was revoked by the Judge-Advocate, and I was dismissed. I venture to assert that this was the first case where it ever happened, even in countries more unhappy than our own, that a witness who had been duly summoned for the defence was dismissed by the prosecution.

In my letter to Colonel Wood, the chief complaint that I made against "S." was that he published only a part of my letter to General Winder and ignored the remainder, which was a full explanation of what he did publish. The matter of dates to which I referred was merely incidental. Now, "S." in his reply has a good deal to say about the matter of dates, without pretending to excuse himself for garbling the body of the letter. Whether he has any excuse I know not, but I certainly do know that he has offered none. When I charge him with suppressing a material part of my letter, a part which gave full explanation, it will not do for "S." to ignore such charge; and launch out into explanations, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, about a mere change of dates.

In his last communication, "S." seeks to answer what I had declared in my letter to Colonel Wood, to wit: That the Federal authorities were responsible for the suffering of Federal prisoners. I referred to a certain statement of mine published in August, 1868, in the *Saint Louis Times* and *National Intelligencer*. I herewith send a copy of that statement, and beg, in the interest of the truth of history, that you will republish it. I ask it, not in the interest of hate, nor to revive sectional controversy, nor to inflame the now subsiding passions of war. Least of all do I desire to put any stigma upon the people of the North, for the sin was that of individuals, and they few in number. I think, if a due investigation were made, it would be found that the number of sinners would not exceed a half dozen. I substantially proposed in my statement to prove my case by Federal testimony. The witnesses are alive now, and the proofs at hand, if the archives have not been mutilated or destroyed. The due investigation of such matter, if prosecuted with judicial fairness, instead of increasing any feeling of hate between the North and South, would tend to allay it. It would conclusively show that the sections were not to be blamed; that the people on both sides were not justly amenable to any reproach; that honor, integrity and Christian civilization in the main reigned North and South; that maltreatment of the defenceless and suffering was loathed alike by Federal and Confederate people; that the story of their participation in or countenance of such wrongs is a shameless libel, and that our civil war, although necessarily harsh and brutal in its general aspect, was illustrated on both sides by high and shining examples of moderation, kindness, good faith, generosity and knightly courtesy. I do not believe that an investigation which would develop these facts would tend to fan into a flame the old passions of the war. So far from that, I believe it would serve to make us respect each other the more. It is true that the national wrath might fall upon a few persons who really are

the only ones who are responsible for the frightful miseries of the prisoners of the war; but such a result, even independent of the vindication of the truth, would be far better than that the people of either side should believe that the other, even under the promptings of evil passions, joined in a crusade against the helpless and suffering.

The statement which I ask you to publish contains a reference to only some of the points and some of the proofs which can be brought forward. I seek not to make myself prominent, or to bring myself unduly forward in this matter. I wish the cup could pass from me. But the official position which I occupied during the war, as well as the fact that the propositions looking to the relief of prisoners went through my hands, seems to require that I should step to the front. When I do, I hope that my conduct may be marked by becoming modesty and firmness.

In my letter to Colonel Wood, I stated that "every one of the many propositions for the relief of Federal prisoners, which I not only made, but pressed upon the Federal authorities, was uniformly disregarded." The proof of that is found in the statement which I now ask you to publish. "S." attempts to meet my charge by showing from the evidence given on the Wirz trial, that there was a large amount of stores near Andersonville during the time the Federal prisoners were confined there. I do not know whether this evidence conforms to the truth or not. But, admitting that it does, how does it answer the charge that I proposed to exchange officer for officer and man for man; or the charge that I proposed that the prisoners on each side should be attended by a proper number of *their own surgeons*, who, under rules to be established, should be permitted to take charge of their health and comfort, with authority, also, to receive and distribute such contributions of money, food, clothing and medicine, as might be forwarded for the relief of prisoners; or the charge that I offered to the United States authorities their sick and wounded, without requiring any equivalent; or the charge that I offered to make purchases of medicines from the United States authorities, to be used exclusively for the relief of Federal prisoners, paying therefor in gold, cotton or tobacco, at double or thrice the price, if required, and giving assurances that the medicines so bought would be used exclusively in the treatment of Federal prisoners, and, indeed, that they might be brought within our lines by Federal surgeons and dispensed by them?

In my letter to Colonel Wood, I stated that I offered the Andersonville prisoners, without requiring equivalents, in August, 1864; that I urged the Federal authorities to send transportation for them quickly, and that I accompanied the offer by an official statement of the monthly mortality, and set forth our utter inability to provide for the prisoners. "S." endeavors to assail the truth of this statement by showing that there were large supplies at Andersonville at or about that time. Admitting the truth of the figures of "S." (for as to their correctness I know nothing), how does that

fact disprove our utter inability? The mere fact that I offered these prisoners, without requiring equivalents, is very strong proof of itself of our inability. But were sick men to be physicked with "bacon, meal, flour, rice, syrup and whiskey," which were stored at Americus and elsewhere in Southwestern Georgia? I offered to send off the sick and wounded wherever they might be, at Andersonville and elsewhere. We had no medicines—the blockade was rigid—the Federal authorities had declined to send any medicines, even by the hands of their own surgeons, and therefore it was I said we were utterly unable to provide for the prisoners. It will be observed that my declaration of utter inability to provide for the prisoners follows immediately my statement of the monthly mortality at Andersonville. I referred more to medicine than to food, though I did not intend entirely to exclude the latter. But does not "S." know that there were others besides the prisoners at Andersonville, who were to be cared for? We had a large army in the field. We had our own hospitals to supply. Our armies everywhere were drawing from Georgia. It was because the stores at Americus, Albany and elsewhere were not sufficient to supply both prisoners and our own soldiers, that I made the propositions to the Federal authorities which I have heretofore mentioned.

"S." also denies that the mortality at Andersonville was greater after I proposed to deliver the Federal prisoners, without requiring their equivalents, than it was before. It is the truth, however much "S." may deny it. Of course I speak of the percentage of mortality, and not the aggregate. After August there were fewer prisoners at Andersonville. They were removed to other depôts. The mortality rate was greater after August than before. It could have been spared if transportation had been sent when I so requested.

I am sorry to tax your columns with so long a communication, but I could not well do justice to the subject in less space.

Yours, respectfully,

Ro. OULD.

We will add an explanation of another letter which purports to have been written by Judge Ould during the war, and which has been widely circulated in the Radical papers as proof positive of inexcusable cruelty to prisoners.

The popular version of this letter is as follows:

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, Virginia, March 21, 1863.

My Dear Sir—If the exigencies of our army require the use of trains for the transportation of corn, pay no regard to the Yankee prisoners. I would rather they should starve than our own people suffer.

I suppose I can safely put it in writing, "Let them suffer."

Very truly, your faithful friend,

Ro. OULD.

Colonel A. C. MYERS.

Judge Ould says that he does not remember ever to have written such a letter, and we have searched his letter-book (in which he was accustomed to have all of his letters copied) in vain for the slightest trace of it. We might simply *demand the production of the original letter*. But Judge Ould thinks it possible that in one of his many contests with Confederate quartermasters *in the interest of Federal prisoners* he may have complained that *transportation* was not promptly furnished the prisoners—that the parties complained of made explanations to the effect that they could not furnish the transportation at the time without seriously interfering with feeding the Confederate army, and that he may have made on the papers some such endorsement, referring to some special set of circumstances. The reference could not be to the general question of *feeding* the prisoners, for with that Judge Ould had nothing to do; and he defies the production of all of the papers in his department to show that he was ever otherwise than humane to prisoners.

We have thus given the other side the full benefit of about all they have been able in eleven years to garble from the Confederate records.

FIGURES OF SECRETARY STANTON.

Yet after all that has been said on this subject, the stubborn fact remains that *over three per cent. more Confederates perished in Northern prisons than of Federal prisoners in Southern prisons*. The figures to prove this statement have been several times given in this discussion, but they are so significant that we give them again in the form in which they were presented by Honorable B. H. Hill in his masterly reply to Mr. Blaine. Mr. Hill said:

“Now, will the gentleman believe testimony from the dead? The Bible says, ‘The tree is known by its fruits.’ And, after all, what is the test of suffering of these prisoners North and South? The test is the result. Now, I call the attention of gentlemen to this fact, that the report of Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War—you will believe him, will you not?—on the 19th of July, 1866—send to the library and get it—exhibits the fact that of the Federal prisoners in Confederate hands during the war, only 22,576 died, while of the Confederate prisoners in Federal hands 26,436 died. And Surgeon-General Barnes reports in an official report—I suppose you will believe him—that in round numbers the Confederate prisoners in Federal hands amounted to 220,000, while the Federal prisoners in Confederate hands amounted to 270,000. Out of the 270,000 in Confederate hands 22,000 died, while of the 220,000 Confederates in Federal hands over 26,000 died. The ratio is this:

More than twelve per cent. of the Confederates in Federal hands died, and less than nine per cent. of the Federals in Confederate hands died. What is the logic of these facts according to the gentleman from Maine? I scorn to charge murder upon the officials of Northern prisons, as the gentleman has done upon Confederate prison officials. I labor to demonstrate that such miseries are inevitable in prison life, no matter how humane the regulations."

An effort has since been made by the Radical press to discredit these figures, and it has been charged that "Jeff. Davis manufactured them for Hill's use." But with ample time to prepare his rejoinder, and all of the authorities at hand, Mr. Blaine did not dare to deny them. He fully admitted their truth, and only endeavored to weaken their force by the following explanation, of which we give him the full benefit:

"Now, in regard to the relative number of prisoners that died in the North and the South respectively, the gentleman undertook to show that a great many more prisoners died in the hands of the Union authorities than in the hands of the Rebels. I have had conversations with surgeons of the army about that, and they say that there were a large number of deaths of Rebel prisoners, but that during the latter period of the war they came into our hands very much exhausted, ill-clad, ill-fed, diseased, so that they died in our prisons of diseases that they brought with them. And one eminent surgeon said, without wishing at all to be quoted in this debate, that the question was not only what was the condition of the prisoners when they came to us, but what it was when they were sent back. Our men were taken in full health and strength; they came back wasted and worn—mere skeletons. The Rebel prisoners, in large numbers, were, when taken, emaciated and reduced; and General Grant says that at the time such superhuman efforts were made for exchange there were 90,000 men that would have re-enforced the Confederate armies the next day, prisoners in our hands who were in good health and ready for fight. This consideration sheds a great deal of light on what the gentleman states."

The substance of this extract is that Mr. Blaine does not deny the greater mortality of our prisoners in Northern prisons, but accounts for it on the supposition that our men were so much "*exhausted, so ill-clad, ill-fed and diseased,*" that they "*died of diseases that they brought with them.*"

Now, if this explanation were true it would contain a fatal stab to Mr. Blaine's whole argument to prove Confederate cruelty to prisoners. If our own soldiers were *so ill-clad and ill-fed* as to render them *exhausted, and so diseased* that when taken prisoners they died like sheep, despite the tender nursing and kind, watchful care

which (according to Mr. Blaine). they received at the hands of their captors, how could a Government which had not the means of making better provision for its own soldiers provide any better than we did for the thousands of prisoners which were captured by these emaciated skeletons? And what shall we say of General Grant and his splendid army of two hundred thousand hale, hearty, well equipped men, who, in the campaign of 1864, were beaten on every field by forty thousand of these "emaciated and reduced" creatures, until, after losing *over a third* of their men, they were compelled to skulk behind their fortifications at Petersburg, and absolutely refused "the open field and fair fight," which Lee and his "ragamuffins" offered them at every point from the Wilderness to Petersburg?

But, of course, the whole thing is absurd. Our men were on half rations, and in rags, it is true; but a healthier, hardier set of fellows never marched or fought, and they died in Northern prisons (as we shall hereafter show) because of inexcusably harsh treatment.

These official figures of Mr. Stanton and Surgeon-General Barnes tell the whole story, and nail to the counter the base slander against the Confederate Government.

FAILURE TO MAKE A CASE AGAINST MR. DAVIS.

But a crowning proof that this charge of cruelty to prisoners is false; may be more clearly brought out than it has been above intimated. In the proceedings against Wirz, Mr. Davis and other Confederate leaders were unquestionably on trial. Every effort that partisan hatred or malignant ingenuity could invent was made to connect Mr. Davis with and make him responsible for the "crimes of Andersonville." The captured Confederate archives were searched, perjured witnesses were summoned, and the ablest lawyers of the reigning party put their wits to work; but the prosecution utterly broke down. They were *unable to make out a case* upon which Holt and Chipman dared to go into a trial even before a military court, which was wont to listen patiently to all of the evidence for the *prosecution*, and coolly dismiss the witnesses for the *defence*. Does not this fact speak volumes to disprove the charge, and to show that no cases can be made out against our Government?

But an even stronger point remains. After despairing of convicting Mr. Davis on any testimony which they had or could procure, they tried to bribe poor Wirz to save his own life by

swearing away the life of Mr. Davis, who was then in irons at Fortress Monroe.

Mr. Hill thus strongly puts it:

Now, sir, there is another fact. Wirz was put on trial, but really Mr. Davis was the man intended to be tried through him. Over one hundred and sixty witnesses were introduced before the military commission. The trial lasted three months. The whole country was under military despotism; citizens labored under duress; quite a large number of Confederates were seeking to make favor with the powers of the Government. Yet, sir, during those three months, with all the witnesses they could bring to Washington, not one single man ever mentioned the name of Mr. Davis in connection with a single atrocity at Andersonville or elsewhere. The gentleman from Maine, with all his research into all the histories of the Duke of Alva and the massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the Spanish inquisition, has not been able to frighten up such a witness yet.

Now, sir, there is a witness on this subject. Wirz was condemned, found guilty, sentenced to be executed; and I have now before me the written statement of his counsel, a Northern man and a Union man. He gave this statement to the country, and it has never been contradicted.

Hear what this gentleman says:

"On the night before the execution of the prisoner Wirz, a telegram was sent to the Northern press from this city, stating that Wirz had made important disclosures to General L. C. Baker, the well known detective, implicating Jefferson Davis, and that the confession would probably be given to the public. On the same evening some parties came to the confessor of Wirz, Rev. Father Boyle, and also to me as his counsel, one of them informing me that a high Cabinet officer wished to assure Wirz that if he would implicate Jefferson Davis with atrocities committed at Andersonville, his sentence would be commuted. The messenger requested me to inform Wirz of this. In presence of Father Boyle I told Wirz next morning what had happened."

Hear the reply:

"Captain Wirz simply and quietly replied: 'Mr. Schade, you know that I have always told you that I do not know anything about Jefferson Davis. He had no connection with me as to what was done at Andersonville. I would not become a traitor against him or anybody else, even to save my life.'"

Sir, what Wirz, within two hours of his execution, would not say for his life, the gentleman from Maine says to the country to keep himself and his party in power.

The statement of Mr. Schade is confirmed by the following extract from the *Cycle*, of Mobile, Alabama:

In the brief report of the speech of Mr. Hill in Congress on Monday

last, copied in another place, it will be observed that he refers to a statement made by Captain Wirz to his counsel just before his death. The subjoined letter from Professor R. B. Winder, M. D., now Dean of the Baltimore Dental College, who was a prisoner in a cell near that of Wirz, will give a more detailed account of the same transaction. The letter was written in reply to an inquiry made in the course of investigation in the history of the transactions which have been made the subject of discussion in Congress.

Dr. Winder speaks of the statement as having been already several times published. We do not remember to have seen it before. At any rate, it will well bear repetition, and will come in very pertinently, *apropos* of the recent debate :

BALTIMORE, November 16, 1875.

Major W. T. WALTHALL :

My Dear Sir—Your letter of the 25th of last month was duly received, and except from sickness should have been replied to long ago. I take pleasure in giving you the facts which you request, but they have already been published several times in the different papers of the country.

A night or two before Wirz's execution, early in the evening, I saw several male individuals (looking like gentlemen) pass into Wirz's cell. I was naturally on the "*qui vive*" to know the meaning of this unusual visitation, and was hoping and expecting, too, that it might be a reprieve—for even at that time I was not prepared to believe that so foul a judicial murder would be perpetrated—so I stood at my door and directly saw these men pass out again. *I think, indeed I am quite certain, there were three of them.* Wirz came to his door, which was immediately opposite to mine, and I gave him a look of inquiry which he at once understood. He said: "These men have just offered me my liberty if I will testify against Mr. Davis and criminate him with the charges against the Andersonville prison; I told them that I could not do this, as I neither knew Mr. Davis personally officially, or socially, *but that if they expected with the offer of my miserable life to purchase me to treason and treachery to the South, they had undervalued me.*" I asked him if he knew who the parties were. He said "no," and that they had refused to tell him who they were—but assured him that they had full power to do whatever they might promise. This is all, and as you perceive, I did not *hear* the conversation, but merely report what Wirz said to me—but he also made the same statement to his counsel, Mr. Schade, of Washington city, and he has also, under his own signature, published these facts.

You will better understand the whole matter from the accompanying diagram of our respective jails. The doors opened immediately opposite, and it was such hot weather that they allowed the doors to be open—the corridor being always heavily guarded by sentinels, and a sentinel was always posted directly between these openings—but Wirz and myself were often allowed to converse.

Very truly yours,

R. B. WINDER.

Have we not made out *our* case so far as we have gone? But our material is by no means exhausted, and we shall take up the subject again in our next issue. We propose to discuss still further the question of *exchange*, and then to pass to a consideration of the treatment of Confederate prisoners by the Federal authorities. We ask that any of our friends who have material illustrating any branch of this subject will forward it to us *at once*.

We have a number of diaries of prison life by Confederates who did not find Elmira, Johnson's Island, Fort Delaware, Rock Island, Camp Douglas, Camp Chase, &c., quite so pleasant as Mr. Blaine's rose-colored picture of Northern prisons would make it appear. And we have also strong testimony from Federal soldiers and citizens of the North as to the truth of our version of the prison question. But we would be glad to receive further statements bearing on this whole question, as we desire to prepare for the future historian the fullest possible material for the vindication of our slandered people.

To those who may deprecate the reopening of this question, we would say that *we* did not reopen it. The South has rested in silence for years under these slanderous charges; and we should have, perhaps, been content to accumulate the material in our archives, and leave our vindication to the "coming man" of the future who shall be able to write a true history of the great struggle for constitutional freedom. But inasmuch as the question has been again thrust upon the country by a Presidential aspirant, and the Radical press is filled with these calumnies against our Government, we feel impelled to give at least an outline of our defence. We will only add that we have not made, and do not mean to make, *a single statement which we cannot prove before any fair-minded tribunal*, from documents in our possession.

Editorial Paragraphs.

OUR thanks are due to many friends who have pushed the circulation of our *Papers*, and to the press for the most kindly notices. Our subscription list is still rapidly increasing, but we bespeak the kind help of our friends to give us such a list as will enable us to make various improvements in the *get-up* of our *Papers*.

WE have no fixed day of the month for our issue, but we will use our best endeavors to let each number appear before the close of the month.

AN important typographical error in Judge Ould's letter to General Hitchcock, page 127, crept into the copy we used and was carelessly overlooked by us in reading the proof. The date ought, of course, to be "1864" instead of "1868."

WE are obliged to surrender this month so large a part of our editorial space that we omit much that we had desired to say.

Book Notices.

Memorial Virginia Military Institute. By Charles D. Walker, late Assistant Professor Virginia Military Institute. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

We are indebted to the courtesy of General F. H. Smith, Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute, for a copy of this book, which contains brief sketches of one hundred and seventy of the graduates and élèves of the Virginia Military Institute who gave their lives to the Confederate cause. The volume contains also a discourse on the life and character of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson by General F. H. Smith, a sketch of the battle of New Market by General Smith, and a memorial poem by James Barron Hope, Esq.

Mr. Walker has done his work admirably. He has called to his aid the pens of some of our most distinguished men, and has made a record of self-denying heroism and high military skill which reflects the highest credit upon the Institute, and should find a place in every home in the South, that our youth may study the characters and imitate the virtues of these noble men who freely yielded up their lives at the call of native land.

The Confederate Currency. By William Lee, M. D., of Washington, D. C.

The author has kindly sent us a copy of this pamphlet, together with plates.

illustrating the various issues of Confederate notes. It is a publication of rare interest and value, and we are not surprised to learn that a new edition has been called for.

Our Living and Our Dead.

The editor and proprietor, Colonel S. D. Pool, has donated to our library three beautifully bound volumes of this magazine, which he has been publishing in Raleigh, North Carolina. It contains a great deal of historic value, and is a highly prized addition to our library.

Books Received.

We acknowledge the receipt of the following books, which will be noticed more fully hereafter :

From D. Appleton & Co., New York :

Cooke's Life of General R. E. Lee.

A Military Biography of Stonewall Jackson. By Colonel John Esten Cooke. With an appendix (containing an account of the Inauguration of Foley's statue, &c.), by Rev. J. Wm. Jones.

General Joseph E. Johnston's Narrative.

Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes and Letters of General R. E. Lee. By Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D.

Sherman's Memoirs and Shuckers' Life of Chief Justice Chase.

From the publishers, Harper Brothers, New York (through West & Johnston, Richmond) :

Draper's Civil War in America.

From J. B. Lippincott, Philadelphia (through West & Johnston) :

Dixon's New America.

From West & Johnston, Richmond :

A beautiful lithograph of the Ordinance of Secession of Virginia, and the signatures of the members of the convention.

From the author (Dr. Joseph Jones, New Orleans) :

Medical and Surgical Memoirs, 1855-1876.

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Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

Vol. I.

Richmond, Va., April, 1876.

No. 4.

THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS DURING THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES.

[Compiled by the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society.]

We stated in our last issue that we should resume this subject in this number. But instead of finishing at this point the discussion of the *Exchange* question, we will first dispose of

THE TREATMENT OF CONFEDERATE PRISONERS BY THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES.

The *ex parte* reports of the Federal Congress, the reports of the United States officials, the reports of the Sanitary Commission, various books that partisan writers at the North have published, and the Radical press generally, have represented that while the Confederate authorities deliberately, wilfully, and persistently, starved, tortured, and murdered Union prisoners, the Federal authorities always treated their captives in the most considerate and humane manner. Indeed the impression sought to be made is that Confederates fared so much better in Federal prisons than they did in the Confederate army, that their capture was really a blessing to them—that they came to prison emaciated skeletons, and were sent back (except those who “died of diseases they brought with them”) sleek, hale, healthy men.

We might quote largely on this point from the writings alluded to, but we will only give an extract from the speech of Hon. James G. Blaine, uttered deliberately on the floor of the United States House of Representatives *eleven years after the close of the war*:

“Now I undertake here to say that there is not a Confederate soldier now living who has any credit as a man in his community, and who ever was a prisoner in the hands of the Union forces, who will say that he ever was cruelly treated; that he ever was deprived of the same rations that the Union soldiers had—the same food and the same clothing.

"Mr. COOK. Thousands of them say it—thousands of them; men of as high character as any in this House.

"Mr. BLAINE. I take issue upon that. There is not one who can substantiate it—not one. As for measures of retaliation, although goaded by this terrific treatment of our friends imprisoned by Mr. Davis, the Congress of the United States specifically refused to pass a resolution of retaliation, as contrary to modern civilization and the first precepts of Christianity. And there was no retaliation attempted or justified. It was refused; and Mr. Davis knew it was refused just as well as I knew it or any other man, because what took place in Washington or what took place in Richmond was known on either side of the line within a day or two thereafter."

Now we propose to meet this issue—and if we do not show by witnesses, of the most unimpeachable character, that Confederate prisoners *were* "cruelly treated"—that they *were* deprived of the same rations that the Union soldiers had—the same food and the same clothing"—if we do not show that the Federal authorities were themselves guilty of the crimes they charged against us, then we are willing to stand before the bar of history convicted of inability to judge of the weight of evidence.

And here again our work of compilation is rendered difficult only by the *mass* of material at hand. We have enough to make several large volumes—we can only cull here and there a statement.

Mr. Henry Clay Dean, of Iowa, who says in his introduction, "*I am a Democrat; a devoted friend of the Constitution of the United States; a sincere lover of the Government and the Union of the States*"—published in 1868 a book of 512 pages, entitled "Crimes of the Civil War," which we respectfully commend to the perusal of those who believe that the Federal Government conducted the war on the principles of "modern civilization and the precepts of Christianity."

We will extract only one chapter (pp. 120–141), and will simply preface it with the remark, that though some of the language used is severer than our taste would approve, the narrative bears the impress of truth on its face, and can be abundantly substantiated by other testimony:

NARRATIVE OF HENRY CLAY DEAN.

In the town of Palmyra, Missouri, John McNeil had his headquarters as colonel of a Missouri regiment and commander of the post.

An officious person who had acted as a spy and common informer, named Andrew Allsman, who was engaged in the detestable business

of having his neighbors arrested upon charges of disloyalty, and securing the scoutings and ravages from every house that was not summarily burned to the earth. This had so long been his vocation that he was universally loathed by people of every shade of opinion, and soon brought upon himself the fate common to all such persons in every country, where the spirit of self-defence is an element of human nature. In his search for victims for the prison which was kept at Palmyra, this man was missed; nobody knew when, or where, or how; whether drowned in the river, absconding from the army, or killed by Federal soldiers or concealed Confederates.

His failure to return was made the pretext for a series of the most horrible crimes ever recorded in any country, civilized or barbarous.

John McNeil is a Nova Scotian by birth, the descendant of the expelled tories of the American Revolution, who took sides against the colonists in the rebellion against Great Britain. He is by trade a hatter, who made some money in the Mexican war. He had lived in Saint Louis for many years, simply distinguished for his activity in grog-shop politics. He was soon in the market on the outbreak of the war, and received a colonel's commission. Without courage, military knowledge, or experience, he entered the army for the purpose of murder and robbery.

As the tool of McNeil, W. H. Strachan acted in the capacity of provost marshal general, whose enormities exceed anything in the wicked annals of human depravity.

At the instigation of McNeil, the provost marshal went to the prison, filled with quiet, inoffensive farmers, and selected ten men of age and respectability; among the rest an old Judge of Knox county, all of whom had helpless families at home, in destitution and unprotected.

These names, which should be remembered as among the victims of the reign of the Monster of the Christian era, were as follows:

William Baker, Thomas Huston, Morgan Bixler, John Y. McPheeters of Lewis, Herbert Hudson, John M. Wade, Marion Lavi of Ralls, Captain Thomas A. Snyder of Monroe, Eleazer Lake of Scotland, and Hiram Smith of Knox county, were sentenced to be shot without trial or any of the forms of military law, by a military commander whose grade could not have given ratification to a court-martial, had one been held; had the parties been charged with crime, which they were not.

Mr. Humphreys, also in prison, was to have been shot instead of one of those named above, but which one the author has not the means of knowing. The change in the persons transpired in this way:

Early on the morning of the execution, Mrs. Mary Humphreys came to see her husband before his death, to intercede for his release. She first went to see McNeil, who frowned, stormed, and let loose a volley of such horrible oaths at her for daring to plead for her husband's life that she fled away through fear, and when

she closed the door, the unnameable fiend cursed her with blasphemous assurances that her husband should be dispatched to hell at one o'clock. The poor affrighted woman, with bleeding heart, hastened to the provost marshal's office, and quite fainted away as she besought him to intercede with McNeil for the preservation of her husband's life. With a savage, taunting grin, Strachan said "that may be done, madam, by getting me three hundred dollars." This she did through the kindness of two gentlemen, who advanced the money at once.

She returned with the money and paid it to Strachan. Mrs. Humphreys had her little daughter by her side, when she sank into her seat with exhaustion. Scarcely had she taken her place, until Strachan told her that she had still to do something else to secure her husband's release. At this moment he thrust the little girl out of the door and threatened the fainting woman with the execution of her husband. She fell as a lifeless corpse to the floor. After he had filled his pockets with money and satiated his lust, the provost marshal released poor Humphreys. Another innocent victim was taken in his place to cover up the hideous crime. The newspapers were commanded to publish the falsehood that some one had volunteered to die in his stead. The additional murdered man was a sacrifice to the venality, murder and rape of the provost marshal. The victim was an unobtrusive young man, caught up and dragged off as a wild beast to the slaughter, without any further notice than was necessary to prepare to walk from the jail to the scene of murder.

The other eleven were notified of their contemplated murder some eighteen hours before the appointed moment of the tragedy. Rev. James S. Green, of the city of Palmyra, remained with them through the night.

Between eleven and twelve o'clock the next day, three Government wagons drove to the jail with ten rough boxes, upon which the ten martyrs to brutal demonism were seated.

This appalling spectacle was made more frightful by the rough jeering of the mercenaries who guarded the victims to the place of butchery. The jolting wagons were driven through street after street, which was abandoned by every human being; women fainting at the awful spectacle, clasping their children more closely to their bosoms, as the murderers, with blood pictured in their countenances, were screaming in hoarse tones the word of command.

The company of stranger adventurers, mercenaries, and the vilest resident population, formed a circle at the scene, in imitation of the Roman slaughter in the time of Nero, Caligula and Commodus, to feast their sensual eyes on blood and amuse themselves with the piteous shrieks of the dying men. This infernal saturnalia commenced with music. Everything was done which might harrow the feelings and torture the soul. The rough coffins were placed before them in such manner as to excite horror; the grave opened its yawning mouth to terrify them; but they stood unmoved amid

the frenzied, murderous mob. Captain Snyder was dressed in beautiful black, with white vest; magnificent head covered with rich wavy locks that fell around his broad shoulders like the mane of a lion. When the mercenaries were preparing to consummate this horrible crime, they at last seemed conscious of the character and the magnitude of this awful work, grew pale and trembled: even the brutal Strachan seemed alarmed at his own nameless and compounded crimes of lust, avarice and murder. Rev. Mr. Rhodes, a meek and unobtrusive minister of the Baptist Church, prayed with the dying men, and Strachan reached out his bloody hands to bid them adieu. They generously forgave their murderers.

To lengthen out the cruel tragedy, the guns were fired at different times that death might be dealt out in broken periods. Two of the men were killed outright. Captain Snyder sprang to his feet, faced the soldiers, pierced their cowardly faces with his unbandaged eagle eye, and fell forward to rise no more.

The other seven were wounded, mangled and butchered in detail, with pistols; whilst the ear was rent with their piteous groans, praying to find refuge in death. The whole butchery occupied some fifteen minutes.

The country was appalled at the recital of these crimes and incredulous of the facts.

The newspapers were suppressed to prevent their publication, and the exposure of the perpetrators. The punishment of the criminals was demanded by public justice and expected by everybody except the criminals, who well understood the cruelty and corruption of the Executive Department.

To cover up these crimes by a judicial farce, nearly two years afterwards charges were preferred against Strachan; he was convicted upon the foregoing state of facts, and sentence passed upon him. The sentence was remitted and Strachan promoted.

For this crime McNeil was promoted by Lincoln to Brigadier-General and kept in office. In all of the history of European wars, Asiatic butcheries, Indian cruelties, and negro atrocities, there can be found no parallel instance in which the murder of men without any of the forms of trial, was accompanied with the rape of the wives of those designated by the lottery of death as the price of the husband's liberty. There was nothing left undone to make the whole scene cruel, loathsome, and revolting.

This outrage unpunished, gave license for crime, cruelty, outrage and disorder everywhere. It would require the pen of every writer, the paper of every manufacturer, for a year, to recount them; the human imagination sickens in contemplation of them.

In the next year after the McNeil butchery, in the neighboring city of Hannibal, occurred a similar crime, equally monstrous in its details.

J. T. K. Heyward commanded a body of enrolled brigands in Marion county, known as the railroad brigade, who foraged upon the people and plundered the country.

Hugh B. Bloom, a drunken soldier of the Federal army, returning to his regiment, muttered some offensive words in the presence of Heyward's men. Bloom was immediately dragged from the steamboat upon which he was traveling and carried before Heyward.

Heyward improvised a military court, tried the drunken man, and condemned him to immediate death.

Whilst the poor wretch was unconscious of his condition, disqualified for self-defence, and unable to understand the fearful nature of his peril, he was hurried off to the most public place on the river side; the people of the town, trembling with fear, were compelled to witness the horrid scene.

The worst was yet to come. Old and respectable citizens, because known for their quiet demeanor and hatred of violence, were dragged down to witness the horrid spectacle. Twelve of these gentlemen were presented with muskets, and commanded to fire at the trembling inebriate sitting upon his coffin.

To enforce this fiendish order to make private gentlemen commit public murder, Heyward's brigands were placed immediately behind the squad of private citizens and commanded to fire upon the first who hesitated to fire at Bloom. As the shuddering man sank down beneath the terrible volley of musketry, Heyward turned upon the people and warned them of their impending fate in the murder of this man.

The spectacle was revolting in itself. It was terrible in view of the fact, that these militia were unauthorized by law for any such purpose; that the execution was without the shadow of law, that the victim was a Union soldier, who had committed no offence; that the men who were forced to do this horrid work were unwilling to commit the crime, and protested against being made the instruments of such bloody horror. But how ineffably shocking that the perpetrator, Heyward, should be a member of a Christian church, and assume the office of Sabbath-school teacher; that little children should look upon the horrible visage of the murderous wretch as their instructor.

This Heyward, secluded from the inquiring world, overawing and corrupting the press of his own neighborhood, was the most satanic of all the local tyrants of Missouri.

At one time he gathered all of the old and respectable citizens of Hannibal, including such highly cultivated gentlemen of spotless escutcheon as Hon. A. W. Lamb, into a dilapidated, falling house, and placed powder under it to blow it to atoms, in case Hannibal should be visited by rebels.

In Monroe county, two farmers were arrested by the provost marshal's guard, taken a short distance from home, shot down and thrown into the field with the swine.

On the next day the recognized fragments of the bodies were gathered up by the neighbors and carried to their respective houses, and prepared for interment.

The citizens were so respectable, the murder so brutal, the outrage

so revolting, that people gathered from a long distance around to bury in decency the remains of those who had been so shockingly destroyed.

When the funeral procession had been formed, the provost marshal sent his guard to disperse them; declaring that no person opposed to the war should have public burial.

The heart-broken families had to go unattended to the grave of their respective dead; each one dreading the danger that beset the highway upon their return home; and feeling even more in danger from marauders in the secret chambers of their own domicil.

During this drunken reign of horrors, innocent people were shot down upon their door sills, called into their gardens upon pretended business, butchered and left lying, that their families might not know their whereabouts until their bodies were decomposed. Women were ravished, houses burned, plantations laid waste.

Judge Richardson was shot whilst in the courthouse in which he presided, in Scotland county. Rev. Wm. Headlee, a minister of the gospel, was shot upon the highway; and all of these murderers, robbers and incendiaries, are yet a large.

Dr. Glascock, a physician, was dragged from his own house by soldiers, under pretence of taking him to court as a witness, against the earnest prayers of his children and slaves, was shot, mangled, disfigured and mutilated, then brought to his own yard and thrown down like a dead animal.

To prevent punishment by law, these criminals repealed the laws against their crimes; and provided in the constitution that crime should go unpunished if committed by themselves.

To make themselves secure in their crime and to give immunity from punishment, they disfranchised the masses of the people; and in the city of Saint Louis the criminal vote elected the criminal McNeil as the sheriff of the county of Saint Louis—the tool of the weakest and most malignant tyrants.

MILROY'S ORDER.

SAINT GEORGE, TUCKER Co., VA., November 28th, 1862.

MR. ADAM HARPER :

Sir—In consequence of certain robberies which have been committed on Union citizens of this county by bands of guerrillas, you are hereby assessed to the amount (\$285.00) two hundred and eighty-five dollars, to make good their losses; and upon your failure to comply with the above assessment by the 8th day of December, the following order has been issued to me by Brigadier-General R. H. Milroy:

You are to burn their houses, seize all their property and shoot them. You will be sure that you strictly carry out this order.

You will inform the inhabitants for ten or fifteen miles around your camp, on all the roads approaching the town upon which the enemy may approach, that they must dash in and give you notice,

and upon any one failing to do so, you will burn their houses and shoot the men.

By order Brigadier-General R. H. MILROY,
H. KELLOG, *Captain Commanding Post.*

Mr. Harper was an old gentlemen, over 82 years of age, a cripple, and can neither read nor write the English language, though a good German scholar. This gentlemen was one of twelve children, had served in the war of 1812, was the son of a Revolutionary soldier who bore his musket during the whole war, inherited a woodland tract, and built up a substantial home in the midst of Western Virginia.

His was only one of a class which swept over West Virginia, and left the beautiful valleys of Tygart and the Potomac rivers in ashes and desolation.

It is to pay for crimes like these, and keep in employment the men who committed them, that created the debt now weighing the people down. It was to pay such monsters, with their tools, that money was refunded by the General Government to the State of Missouri and West Virginia, and the taxes saddled upon the people of the country.

The following letter gives its own explanation:

MACON, GEORGIA, October 7, 1867.

HENRY CLAY DEAN, *Mount Pleasant, Iowa:*

Dear Sir—I have read your late communication addressed to "The prisoners of war, and victims of arbitrary arrests in the United States of America."

You allege that "the Congress of the United States refused to extend the investigation contemplated by a resolution, adopted by that body on the 10th of July, 1867, appointing certain parties to investigate the treatment of prisoners of war and Union citizens held by the Confederate authorities during the rebellion, to the prisoners of war, victims of 'arbitrary power and military usurpation by the authority of the Federal Administration.'"

Appreciating your object "to put the truth upon the record," and concurring in your patriotic suggestion that "it is the duty of every American to look to the honor of his country and the preservation of the truth of history," I have felt constrained to respond to the call made in your circular, so far as to acquaint the public, through you, with the following precise, simple, and unexaggerated statement of facts:

When the Capitol of the Confederate States was evacuated, the specie belonging to the Richmond banks was removed, with the archives of the Government, to Washington, Georgia. Early after the close of the war, a wagon train conveying this specie from Washington to Abbeville, South Carolina, was attacked and robbed of an amount approximating to \$100,000, by a body of disbanded cavalry of the Confederate army.

A few weeks subsequent to this event, Brigadier-General Edward A. Wild, with an escort consisting of twelve negro soldiers, under the command of Lieutenant Seaton, of Captain Alfred Cooley's company (156th Regiment of New York Volunteers), repaired to the scene of the robbery in the vicinity of Danburg, Wilkes county, Georgia. *By the order of General Wild*, and in his presence, A. D. Chenault, a Methodist minister, weighing 275 pounds, his brother, John N. Chenault, of moderate size, and a son of the latter, only 15 years of age, but weighing 230 pounds, were arrested and taken to an adjacent wood, where the money abstracted from the train, or a portion of it, was supposed to be concealed. Failing to produce the money upon the order of General Wild, these three citizens, who enjoy the esteem and confidence of all who know them, were suspended *by their thumbs*, with the view of extorting confessions as to the place of its concealment. Mr. John N. Chenault was twice subjected to this torture, and on one occasion until he fainted, and was then cut down. Rev. A. D. Chenault was also hung up twice by his thumbs, and until General Wild was induced only by his groans and cries to release him from his agony. The youth, A. F. Chenault, was hung up once, and until he exhibited evident signs of fainting, when he was cut down. Whilst this scene was being enacted, General Wild and his subaltern were both present, directing the whole operations. These citizens, with the exception of John N. Chenault, who was unable to be removed, were then sent under guard to Washington, fifteen miles distant.

By order of General Wild, a daughter of John N. Chenault, about the age of seventeen years, universally beloved in her neighborhood, and distinguished for her piety, was searched, by being stripped, in the presence of the Lieutenant, who was charged with the execution of the order. When her garments, piece by piece, were taken from her and the very last one upon her was reached, in the instincts of her native modesty, she threw herself upon a bed and sought to conceal her person with its covering, she was ordered to stand out upon the floor until stripped to perfect nakedness.

By order of General Wild, the wife of John N. Chenault was arrested and taken under guard to Washington, where she was incarcerated for several days, fed on bread and water, in one of the petit jury rooms of the courthouse, and after she had been forced to leave at her home her nursing infant, but nine months old, where it continued to remain until its mother was released.

During the period of her imprisonment, General Wild was waited upon at his hotel by three citizens of the county, to wit: Francis G. Wingfield, Richard T. Walton, and your correspondent, who importuned this officer to permit one of the party to take Mrs. Chenault to his residence in the village, each pledging his neck, and all tendering bond, with security in any amount which he would be pleased to nominate, for her appearance at any time and place in obedience to his order. This request General Wild promptly and emphatically refused, but graciously allowed her friends to supply her with suitable food at the place of her confinement.

The tortures and indignities thus inflicted upon this family, who are respected and esteemed by all who know them, failed to discover any evidence whatever of their complicity in the robbery, or any knowledge of the concealment of any of its fruits.

The facts thus detailed were reported in substance to Major-General James B. Steadman, then on duty at Augusta, Georgia, who immediately ordered his Inspector-General (whose name is not remembered) to Washington, with instructions to collect the evidence as to the truth of the representations made to him. After spending several days at Washington and its vicinity, in the examination of witnesses, this officer observed that the facts which he had elicited fully corroborated the statements which had been forwarded to General Steadman.

General Wild was removed by the order of General Steadman, and ordered to Washington city. Charges were also preferred against him, but the public is not advised that even as much as a reprimand was ever administered to him.

The foregoing statement of facts will be avouched by many citizens of Washington, and of Wilkes and Lincoln counties. You are respectfully referred to James M. Dyson, Gabriel Toombs, Green P. Cozart, Hon. Garnett Andrews, Dr. J. J. Robertson, Dr. James H. Lane, Dr. J. B. Ficklin, Richard T. Walton, Dr. John Haynes Walton and David G. Cotting, the present editor of the *Republican*, at Augusta.

Prompted by no spirit of personal malevolence, but in obedience alone to the instinct of a virtuous patriotism, I have thus "a round unvarnished tale delivered" of some of the actings and doings of this officer, studiously refraining from any denunciation, and suppressing every suggestion the least calculated to excite the prejudices or inflame the passions of the public.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN B. WEEMS.

An attempt to record the crimes committed during the civil war would fill volumes and excite horror.

We can only indicate the crimes rather than give detail of their circumstances.

One gentleman from Vicksburg writes in justly indignant language of the rape and robbery of his wife; that he has sought redress in vain of the military authorities. Another of the violation of two ladies by beastly mercenaries, until one dies, and the other lives a raving maniac.

A lady writes from Liberty, Missouri, that her father, Mr. Payne, a minister of Christ, was murdered by the military and left out from his dwelling for several days, until found by some neighbors in a mutilated condition.

A gentleman writes that a wretch named Harding boasts that he had beaten out the brains of a wounded Confederate prisoner at the battle of Drainesville.

The affidavit of Thomas E. Gilkerson states that negro soldiers were promoted to corporals for shooting white prisoners at Point Lookout, where he was a prisoner.

That he was transferred to Elmira, New York, where prisoners were starved into skeletons; were reduced to the necessity of robbing the night-stool of the meats which, being spoiled, could not be eaten by the sick, was thrown into the bucket of excrements, taken out and washed to satisfy their distressing hunger.

That for inquiring of Lieutenant Whitney, of Rochester, New York, for some clothes which the deponent believed were sent to him in a box, the deponent was confined three days in a dungeon and fed on bread and water.

That two men in ward twenty-two were starved until they eat a dog, for which offence they were severely punished.

That negroes were placed on guard. That while on guard, a negro called a prisoner over the dead line, which the prisoner did not recognize as such, and the negro shot him dead, and went unpunished.

That shooting prisoners without cause or provocation, was of frequent occurrence by the negro guards.

This affidavit was taken before Daniel Jackson, Justice of the Peace.

Joseph Hetterphran, from Fayetteville, Georgia, writes that he was captured on the 27th of January, 1864, in East Tennessee; searched and robbed with his companions of everything. They were hurried by forced marches to Knoxville, nearly frozen and starved; were then confined in the penitentiary, where the treatment all the time grew worse; were finally taken to Rock Island, where he had no blanket, was stinted in fuel, food and raiment. In this horrible place the prisoners ate dogs and rats. The poor fellows tried to get the crumbs that fell from the bread wagons; a great many died of diseases induced by starvation: others starved outright. In the meantime the sutler would sell provisions to the rich Confederates, whilst the poor were driven to starvation. This prison was guarded by negroes for a considerable time. The negroes frequently shot the prisoners down through wantonness, just as they did at Elmira. The officer who led negroes to kill the people of his own race, can sink to no lower depth of degradation.

Henry J. Moses writes from Woodbine, Texas, that he was taken prisoner at Gaines' Farm, near Richmond, Virginia, and confined at Point Lookout during the month of May, 1864, and then taken to Fort Delaware, where he remained until the 24th of August. When General Foster demanded the removal of six hundred of the prisoners, they were placed on board the steamer Crescent, and kept in the hold seventeen days, suffocating with heat, drinking bilge water, and eating salt pork and crackers in very stinted allowances. The hatchway was frequently closed, and all of the horrors of the African slave trade revived in their persons and treatment. After enduring this terrible form of torture, they were placed on

Morris' Island, under the fire of their own guns for forty-three days, guarded by negroes. The dead line rope was strètched as a pretext for shooting those who should even by accident touch it. Taunts, gibes, jeers, and insults of every kind were heaped upon the prisoners. Paul H. Earle, of Alabama, for no offence whatever, was shot at; another time the tent was fired into, and two sleeping soldiers badly wounded, by order of the lieutenant. As it always has been and ever will be, the negroes behaved much better than the white fiends who commanded them. How could it be otherwise? A man raised in Christian communities who would let loose barbarians to burn up and destroy the habitations of women and children of his own race, has not one conceivable iota of space in which to sink deeper in degradation.

After all of the acts of cruelty and ingenuity to starve these poor fellows, they were finally confined in Fort Pulaski, fed upon a pint of musty kiln-dried corn, with a rotten pickle each day. On this diet they were kept for forty-four days, when the scurvy broke out and killed over two hundred of the number. After such loathsome suffering as makes human nature shudder, incarcerated in damp cells without blankets, some with no coats, Mr. Moses adds that "nothing but the preserving hand of God kept us through those trying hours." How much greater was the crime of a Christian people, that the ministry in the peaceful regions were inflaming this horrible work, instead of alleviating the sufferings of the people. Added to all of the other atrocious crimes and cruelties, the insane were in like manner tortured. An old gentleman named Fitzgerald, infirm and insane, who ate opium to alleviate his pain, was denied his medicine for which he begged, until death kindly came to open the prison doors and release him from his agony. The prisoners say that Foster instigated these cruelties. The names and references of the parties clothe the whole statement with an unmistakable semblance of truth. The corroboration is conclusive.

John L. Waring, of Brandywine, Prince George's county, Maryland, states that he was a prisoner of war for more than two years; that a private soldier killed in his presence an inoffensive prisoner in Carroll prison, who sat by the window, and was promoted from the ranks to corporal for the crime.

Forney's *Chronicle*, in noticing the death, and apologizing for the crime, falsely stated that young Hardcastle, the prisoner killed, was cursing the guard.

The room-mate of Hardcastle, who, like Hardcastle, had been arrested upon no charges whatever, soon after this murder was released, but died shortly after in consequence of the cruel prison treatment.

Mr. Waring was removed from Carroll prison to Point Lookout, where the prisoners were detailed to load and unload vessels; were robbed by negroes of the trinkets made in prison; some were shot by negroes, carpet sacks were robbed of clothing, and hospital

stewards and sanitary commissions ate the provisions sent to prisoners and soldiers, or extorted exorbitant prices from the person to whom they had been sent.

The negroes offered every manner of indignity to the prisoners. Among other crimes they shot a dying man on his attempt to relieve nature. The conduct of the negroes at Point Lookout was incited by their white officers until it was frightful.

Henry H. Knight writes from Cary, Wake county, North Carolina, that he was captured at Gettysburg, taken to Fort Delaware, and suffered all that cold and mud could inflict upon their comfort and convenience. He was driven from poorly warmed stoves by Federal officers. The soldiers were beaten, starved and frozen to death. Seven were frozen one morning; others of them went to the hospital and died. At other times they were driven through the water, and were alternately robbed, frozen, tortured and starved. The great amount sent them by relatives was appropriated by the guards for their own use; and if they made complaint, the prisoners were shot, and the improbable story told that they had run guard, and that would be the last of their crime heard in the fort against the guards.

Some of these poor fellows were whole days without fire, when the snow was a foot deep, or the water covering the ground. The author saw hundreds of these prisoners in the city of Pittsburg in the early summer of 1865, on their way to the Southwest, in the most loathsome condition. Their pitiable suffering and mournful stories were sickening, and would crimson the cheek with unutterable shame and horror. No words can portray the picture that he saw with his own eyes. Swollen gums, teeth dropping from the jaws, eyes bursting with scurvy, limbs paralyzed, hair falling off of the heads, frozen hands and feet. These were those that escaped. The dead concealed the crimes of the murderers in the grave which was closed upon them, by hundreds.

W. C. Osborn, of Opelika, Alabama, states that he was captured on the 4th of July, 1863, and confined in Fort Delaware; that the rations were three crackers twice a day; most of the time no meat at all, but occasionally a very small piece of salt beef or pork. That he drank water within fifteen feet of the excrement of the fort, and could get no other. When cold weather returned, the beds of each man were searched, and only one blanket left him. The barracks were inferior, and men froze to death in the terrible winter of 1863-4. Prisoners were shot for the most trivial offences. One man's brains were blown out and scattered on the walls, where they remained for many days, for no offence other than looking over the bounds, unconsciously. For other offences, men were tied up by the thumbs just so that their toes might touch the ground, for three hours at a time, until they would turn black in the face. Others were placed astride of joists, and forced to remain in that attitude for hours at a time, the coldest weather. These crimes against the persons of the prisoners, and their starvation,

were carefully concealed from the public eye, and the Philadelphia papers made every effort to deceive the public in regard to these matters. On inspection days, when the people were admitted to the grounds, the prisoners got three times as much as upon other days. This was done to delude the people of the country, who never had any sympathy with these horrible crimes.

Presley N. Morris, of Henry county, Georgia, was captured by Wilder's brigade, was divested of everything, marched five days on one meal each day, carried through filthy cars to Camp Morton, Indiana, on the 19th of October, 1863, where he was imprisoned in an old horse stable on the Fair Ground, without blanket, thinly clad, and without fire, until January, 1864, when he received one blanket; his body covered with rags and vermin, when the snow was from six to ten inches deep. Two stoves were all that was used to warm three hundred men, and then wood for half the time only was allowed. The prisoners were compelled to remain out in the cold in this condition from nine o'clock, A. M., to four o'clock, P. M., no difference what was the condition of the weather. In October, 1864, the prisoners were drawn up in line, stripped of all their bedding, except one blanket, and robbed of all money; and Mr. Morris was robbed of three hundred dollars, with other valuables, none of which were ever returned; was beaten over the head because a piece of money was found near his feet, by one Fifer. Money sent him was purloined by the officers through whose hands it came.

Another says he belonged to Grigsby's regiment; was sent to Camp Morton; and corroborates the statement of Mr. Morris in regard to Camp Morton. He was soon, after his capture, sent to Camp Douglas near Chicago. In this place the prisoners were shot at by sharpshooters and Indians; sometimes were kept in close confinement for forty-eight hours. Sometimes a half dozen prisoners were placed upon a rude machine called "Morgan's horse," which was very sharp, and compelled to sit more than two hours at a time, with weights to their legs. Others were tied up by their thumbs. They were searched once every week. The prisoners were whipped with leather straps and sticks, after the manner of whipping brutes. Upon one occasion, when a guard discovered a beef bone thrown from the window of number six, he made all of the prisoners form in line and touch the ground with the fore finger without bending the knee. All who could not do this were beaten. A young man was shot for picking up snow to quench his thirst, when the hydrant had been closed for several days. New and cruel punishments were inflicted, as whim, passion, or pure malignity indicated.

Wm. Howard, a Baptist minister, sixty years of age, of Graves county, Kentucky, was taken, with his daughters, and beaten over the head with a sabre, until the sabre was broken; and he was otherwise cruelly treated.

Lucius T. Harding writes that on the 14th of October the large

steamer General Foster came to his place. The sailors entered the house, kicked his sick children, and robbed him of everything. That white officers led negro raids into Westmoreland and Richmond counties. Women were violated wherever they were caught by the negroes with the utmost impunity.

N. D. Hall, of Larkinsville, Alabama, a soldier of Western Virginia, during Hunter's, Crook's and Averill's horrible desolation of Virginia, says that the rebels found a negro man and child, both dead, and a negro woman stripped naked, whose bleeding person had been outraged by Averill's men.

That Averill's men offered to give to Dr. Patton's wife, in Greenbrier county, West Virginia, fifteen negro children which they had stolen, and which she refused to take from them. To rid themselves of the burden, and the children from suffering, they were thrown into Greenbrier river.

In the valley below Staunton, Crook's men tied an old gentleman, and violated his only daughter in his presence, until she fainted.

In Bedford county he saw the corpse of one, and the other sister a raving maniac, from violation of their persons. Desolation was left in the trail of these men.

An aged and respectable minister was hanged in Middletown, Virginia, by military order, for shooting a soldier in the attempt to violate his daughter in his own house in Greenbrier county.

David Nelson, of Jackson, was shot because his son was in the Confederate army.

Another person named Peters, a mere boy, was shot for having a pistol hidden.

Garland A. Snead, of Augusta, Georgia, said he was taken prisoner at Fisher's Hill, Virginia, September, 1864; sent to Point Lookout, which was in the care of one Brady, who had been an officer of negro cavalry.

He was starved for five days, had chronic diarrhœa; was forced to use bad water, the good water being refused them. Men died frequently of sheer neglect. He was sent off to make room for other prisoners, because he was believed to be in a dying condition; as it was manifestly the purpose to poison all that could be destroyed by deleterious food and water, or by neglect of their wants.

He said that negroes fired into their beds at night; and one was promoted for killing a prisoner, from the ranks to sergeant.

Claiborne Snead, of Augusta, Georgia, writes from Johnson's Island, that prisoners were frequently shot without an excuse; that prisoners having the small-pox were brought to Johnson's Island on purpose to inoculate the rest of the prisoners, and that many died of that disease; a crime for which civilized government visits the most terrible penalties. Yet this disease, thus planted, was kept there until it had spent its force.

That the rations were bad, and prisoners went to bed suffering the pangs of hunger.

That although Lake Erie was not one hundred yards distant, yet these prisoners were forced to drink from three holes dug in the prison bounds, surrounded by twenty-six sinks, the filth of which oozed into the water. This treatment, in no wise better than the inoculation of small-pox, and even more loathsome than that disease, caused many prisoners to contract chronic diarrhœa in a country where that disease is not common.

It is impossible for human language to portray the horrible criminality of the wicked men who inflicted these tortures upon human beings, and at the same time caused the detention of Northern prisoners in loathsome Southern prisons, through a fiendish love of suffering; and the unwillingness to have exchanges, paroles, and releases granted to the unfortunate, innocent men of both armies, unnaturally led to mutual destruction. What apology can the infidel ministry of the country offer for such crimes? and upon their head must the curse ever rest who sustained these thieves.

J. C. Moore, son of Colonel David Moore, of the Federal army, writes that he was taken prisoner at Helena, Arkansas, July 4, 1863, with 1,750 prisoners. The poor fellows, half starved, were met at Saint Louis by a supply of apples, cakes, tobacco and money. The officer having them in charge threatened the boys with imprisonment, who extended these friendships to these unfortunate men. That he was taken to the Alton prison, where men were kept with ball and chain at work in the street, for mere peccadilloes, where the keepers shot their victims and stabbed them, with all of the indignities usual in the prisons everywhere, which seemed under control of no military, but rather governed by the instigation of the devil.

L. P. Hall and Wm. Perry, of Chico Butte, California, were arrested; had their press destroyed; were handcuffed together in Jackson, Amada county, with ball and chain attached to their legs, and driven to labor on the Public Works at Alcatraz. Fifty-two others were treated in like manner. Hall and Perry were finally discharged without charges or trial. In the persons of these gentlemen, were violated all the rights of freedom of person, of the press, of speech, and finally they were starved, and released after enduring the most offensive insults at the hands of a cowardly enemy. This crime transpired in California, where war had not gone, and their imprisonment was without pretence.

T. Walton Mason, of Adairville, Logan county, Kentucky, says that he was surrendered by General Jno. Morgan, in Ohio, July 26th, 1863, and imprisoned at Camp Chase, then removed to Camp Douglas, where all of the horrors of that place were revived. In this camp Choctaw Indians were employed as guards. When money was given to the guards to buy provisions, they would pocket the money. The Indians shamed the whites for this breach of faith and petty theft. In November, 1863, seven escaped prisoners were returned, and subjected to the most cruel torture. They

were taken out in the presence of the garrison and tortured with the thumb-screw until they fainted with pain.

In February, 1864, the cruelty became extreme; they beat prisoners with clubs and a leather belt, with a United State buckle at the end of it. They shot prisoners without provocation. For spilling the least water on the floor, the prisoner was elevated on a four inch scantling fifteen feet high, and tortured for two or three hours. For any similar offence, when the perpetrator was not known, the whole regiment was marched out and kept in the cold all day, sometimes freezing their limbs in the effort. Because a sick man vomited on his floor, the whole of the prisoners, in the dead hour of a chilling cold night, were made to stand out in their night clothes, until frozen, and from which several died, whilst others lost their health, which they never recovered.

Mr. Mason was driven by this night's cruelty into the hospital, where, among empyrics, he refused to take their medicines; in turn his own physician was not allowed to see him.

From twelve to thirty prisoners died every day, during the months of July, August, September and October, from brutal treatment.

When James Wandle, a Virginia giant near seven feet high, died through neglect in the hospital, the ward-master could not lay him in the small coffin which was furnished, but his body in a most brutal manner was stamped down into its narrow limits to prepare it for the grave.

Such were the every day affairs of this loathsome place.

Again, in the coldest winter night, the prisoners were aroused and driven out in the storm barefooted, in their night clothes, and made to sit down until the snow melted under them.

Late in December, several hundred prisoners came from Hood's army, near Nashville, almost destitute of clothing; coming from a warm climate, they were kept out all night in the cold, shivering and freezing. Upon the next morning, nearly one hundred were sent to the hospital. As a consequence, many of their limbs were frozen and required amputation, and death kindly came to the relief of all.

J. Risque Hutter, late Lieutenant-Colonel Eleventh Regiment Virginia Infantry, writes that he was captured at Gettysburg, and was eighteen months in prison on Johnson's Island.

During the tyranny of a fellow of the name of Hill, rations were reduced and stinted; that prisoners were neglected in sickness; straw and other necessities were declared contraband.

That suffering from thirst was common, right on "the shores of the lake-bound prison."

That the rations were indifferent in quality and insufficient in quantity to satisfy hunger. Rats were eaten by hundreds of prisoners, who regarded themselves fortunate to get them, such was the reduced condition of the prisoners.

That Colonel Hutter's brother, an officer in the Confederate

army, on duty in Danville, Virginia, went to Lieutenant Bingham and agreed to furnish him with all of the comforts of life, if he would have the necessaries furnished Colonel Hutter through his friends at home. Colonel Hutter had Lieutenant Bingham furnished with everything he desired, and when arrangements were made to furnish similar articles to Colonel Hutter, on Johnson's Island, Hill would not permit it. When the matter was referred to Washington, the refusal was sustained.

The above abbreviated statement has been made from ably written details of individual wrongs—each gentleman giving name, date, place and specific charges. The latter would make a large bound volume of itself, which want of space only apologizes for the abridgment.

John M. Weiner, formerly Mayor of the city of Saint Louis, was arrested in that city and kept in prison without any charges against him whatever. After the cruel treatment common to Saint Louis prisons, he was transferred to Alton penitentiary, and from there made his escape, and was killed near Springfield, Missouri.

Mrs. Weiner sent for her husband's body for burial in Bellafontaine Cemetery. Whilst his wife and friends were preparing his body for burial, Samuel R. Curtis sent a squad of soldiers, who stole the corpse from his wife, and buried it in a secret place.

Mrs. Beatty was arrested for begging the release of Mayor Wolf, who was sentenced to be shot in retaliation. Wolf was respited and then exchanged; but Mrs. Beatty was put in prison, manacled, shackled, and chained with a heavy ball until the iron cut through her tender limbs, and the flesh rotted beneath the irons, until she was attacked with chills; and in a lone cell, not permitted to see a human being, when her mind gave way under the terrible treatment. The surgeon protested against this vicious cruelty; still it was continued, until the very sight of the poor creature was frightful. So she continued until Rosecrans was removed. After Rosecrans was broken down in the army, like Burnside, he tried to retrieve his lost fortunes by cruelty, but failed. Neither the release of Strachan from the penalties of the court-martial for his participation in the McNeil murders, and robbery and rape of Mrs. Mary Humphreys, nor his barbarity could save him from the contempt of the Radicals. After his brutalities in these cases, the Democrats loathed him, and he now lies hidden among the rubbish of the war, 'mid the remnants of abandoned barracks, rusty guns and broken wagons, to be heard of no more forever. Mrs. Beatty was tried by court-martial and acquitted, but will wear the marks of cruelty to the grave.

One of the most horrible murders of the State of Missouri, was that committed by an old counterfeiter named Babcock, who shot Judge Wright and his three sons, after decoying them from their own door. The details are too horrible for human pen.

This wretched criminal, Babcock, was elected to the legislature by disfranchising the people of his county by military force.

This murderer is a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and dispenses the gospel to the people.

Through disgust, horror and shame, I cast my pen aside, and sit in amazement, that for crimes like these an angry God has not, by His breath, cursed the earth, and sent it as a floating pandemonium throughout the immensity of space, as a warning to other worlds, if other worlds there be so depraved, corrupted and lost to the charities of life and the mercies of God.

Dr. Gideon S. Bailey, in wealth and character, is one of the finest citizens of the State of Iowa. He had attended Abraham Lincoln's reputed father in his last illness for many months, and had received not one cent in compensation. Yet Dr. Bailey was arrested, placed in the very same filthy place in which the author was imprisoned, and kept there for a number of days.

The weather was exceeding sultry; Dr. Bailey was in very feeble health when he was carried down to Saint Louis on the hurricane deck of a steamer. When in Saint Louis, he was placed in Gratiot street prison, where he was subjected to every manner of filth, torture and suffering.

The debt due him for the attendance upon Mr. Lincoln remains unpaid, though the doctor will bear the effects of his incarceration to the grave.

We will next give Rev. George W. Nelson's narrative of his prison life. Mr. Nelson is now rector of the Episcopal church in Lexington, Virginia. As an alumnus of the University of Virginia, a gallant Confederate soldier, and since the war a devoted, useful minister of the gospel, Mr. Nelson is widely known and needs no endorsement from us. The narrative was written not long after the close of the war, when the facts were fresh in his memory, and could be substantiated by memoranda in his possession. In a private letter to the editor, dated March 14, 1876, Mr. Nelson says of his narrative: "*It is all literal fact, understated rather than overstated.* I read it a few days since to Mr. Gillock of this place, (Lexington), who was my bunk-mate from Point Lookout until we were released, and he says that all of the facts correspond with his memory of them." Without further introduction, we submit the paper in full:

REV. GEORGE W. NELSON'S NARRATIVE.

I was captured on the 26th of October, 1863, under the following circumstances: I had just returned from within the enemy's lines to the home of my companion on the border. We were eating dinner; and thought ourselves perfectly secure. The sight of a blue coat at the window was the first intimation of the presence of the Yankees. We immediately jumped up and ran into another

room, expecting to escape through a back window, but to our dismay found that outlet also guarded. We next made tremendous exertions to get up into the garret of the house, but the trap-door was so weighted down as to resist our utmost strength. The effort to double up our long legs and big bodies in a wardrobe was equally unsuccessful. At last we threw ourselves under a bed and awaited our fate. A few minutes, and in they came—swords clattering, pistols cocked and leveled. They soon spied our legs under the bed. "Come out of that," was yelled out, then pistols were put in our faces, and I heard several voices call out "surrender," which we did with as good a grace as we could. The ladies of the family were much distressed and alarmed, particularly when the Yankees came up to us with their pistols leveled. They implored: "Don't shoot them—don't shoot them." The Yankees answered: "O, we aint going to hurt them." A few moments were given us to say good-bye, and then we were put upon our horses, (which they had found), placed in the column, with a trooper on each side and one in front leading our horses, thus precluding all chance of escape. We had gone about a mile, when an Orderly came up to us with an order from the Colonel to bring the ranking prisoner to the head of the column. Accordingly I was led forward. The Colonel saluted me, introduced a Captain Bailey who was riding with him, and said we should be treated with all possible courtesy while under his charge, and I must do him the justice to say he kept his word. He then proceeded to question me about our army. There were very few questions of this kind that I would have answered, but it happened that the Colonel and myself were both quite deaf, which gave rise to a ludicrous mistake, and resulted in putting a stop to the catechism. Overture: "Does Jeff. Davis visit the army often?" Answer: "O, yes, while we were camped about Orange Courthouse in the summer, the array of beauty was great, and the smiles of the fair ones fully compensated for the hardships of the Pennsylvania campaign." I thought he asked me whether the ladies visited the army. He asked me what I said. I repeated. I then noticed he had a puzzled look, and that Captain Bailey could hardly restrain his laughter. So I told him I was deaf, and had probably misunderstood his question. He answered that he was deaf, too. I came to the conclusion he thought I was quizzing, as he didn't ask any more questions. It is my intention to give full credit for every kindness I received, for stretched to the utmost, they make but two or three bright spots in a dark record of suffering and oppression. One of these occurred the evening of our capture. I had no gloves, and the night was very cold. Captain Bailey seeing this, gave me one of his, and the next day brought me a pair he had got for me. We halted the first night at a place called Ninevah. We were put for safe keeping in a small out-house, where we made our bed upon "squashes" and broken pieces of an old stove. This did not trouble us, however, as we intended to be awake all night in the hope of a chance for escape. But a

numerous and vigilant guard disappointed us. We reached Strasburg the next evening, where our captors gave us a dinner. We then went on to Winchester, where we spent the night. The Yankee officers gave us a first-rate supper. We reached Charlestown next day, where dinner was again given us—a very good one, too. The Yankee officers took us to their “mess,” and treated us very courteously. That evening the Colonel commanding took us to Harper’s Ferry. As we were starting, Captain Bailey very kindly gave us some tobacco, remarking, “You will find some difficulty in getting such things on the way.” The Colonel left us at the Ferry, and we found ourselves in the hands of a different set of men. We were put in the “John Brown Engine House,” where were already some twenty-five or thirty prisoners. There were no beds, no seats, and the floor and walls were alive with lice. Before being sent to this hole, we were stripped and searched. We stayed here about thirty-six hours, were then sent on to Wheeling, where we were put in a place neither so small nor so lousy as the one we had left, but the company was even less to our taste than lice, viz: Yankee convicts. We remained here two or three days, and then were taken to Camp Chase. We reached there in the night—were cold and wet. After undergoing a considerable amount of cursing and abuse, we were turned into prison No. 1, to shift for ourselves as best we could. At Camp Chase I made my first attempt at washing my clothes—having no change, I had to be minus shirt, drawers and socks during the operation. I worked so hard as to rub all the skin off my knuckles, and yet not enough to get the dirt out of my garments. We stayed at this place about twenty days. We were then started off to Johnson’s Island. My friend had ten dollars good money when we reached Camp Chase, which was taken from him and sutlers’ checks given instead. When about to leave for Johnson’s Island, where, of course, Camp Chase checks would be useless, the sutler made it convenient not to be on hand to redeem his paper, so my friend lost all the little money he had. We marched from Camp Chase to Columbus, where we took the cars. This march was brutally conducted. Several of our number were sick, and yet the whole party was made to double quick nearly the whole distance—five miles.* The excuse was, that otherwise “we would be too late for the train.” But why not have made an earlier start? or why not have waited for the next train? We traveled all day, reached Johnson’s Island in the night, worn out and hungry. I stayed at Johnson’s Island from about November 20th to April 26th. During this time, in common with many others, I suffered a good deal. Prisoners who were supplied by friends in the North got along very well, but those altogether dependent upon the tender mercies of the Government were poorly off indeed. I was among the latter for sometime—not having been able to communicate with my friends until the middle of December. But the New Year brought me supplies and *letters more precious* than bank notes, even to a half starved, shivering prisoner.

The building in which I stayed was a simple weather-boarded house, through which the wind blew and the snow beat at will. It is true many of the buildings were quite comfortable, but I speak of my own experience. The first of January, 1864, was said by all to be the coldest weather ever known at that point. It was so cold that the sentinels were taken off for fear of their freezing. Wherever the air struck the face the sensation was that of ice pressed hard against it. Yet cold as it was, we were without fire in my room from 3 o'clock in the evening to 9 o'clock next morning. I went to my bed, which consisted of two blankets, one to lie upon and one to cover with, but sleep was out of the question under such circumstances. So I got up, got together several fellow-prisoners, and kept up the circulation of blood and spirits until day light by dancing. My chum, unfortunately, stayed in our bunk—the consequence was, he was unable to get his boots on, so badly were his feet frost-bitten. During my stay in this prison, there was at times a scarcity of water, sufficient not only to inconvenience us, but to cause actual suffering. The wells from which we got our supply were shallow, and were generally exhausted early in the afternoon. We were surrounded by a lake of water, whence we might have been allowed a plentiful supply, but the fear of our escaping was so great that we were never allowed to go to the lake except through a long line of guards. This opportunity was given once a day, except when the wells were frozen so that no water could be got from them at all, then we had access to the lake twice a day. In this prison, as in all others in which it was my misfortune to be confined, we were liable to be shot at at any time, and for nothing. I remember three different times that the room I stayed in was fired into at night because the sentinel said we had lights burning, when to my certain knowledge there was no light in the room. The authorities had rules stuck up, the observance of which, they said, would insure safety. It is true, the non-observance of them would almost certainly entail death or a wound, but the converse was by no means true. Sentinels interpreted rules as they pleased, and fired upon us at the dictation of their cowardly hearts. In no instance have I seen or heard of their being punished for it, though it was clearly proven that the sufferer violated no rule. This prison afforded opportunity for the exhibition of a spirit characteristic of our people, and which, now they are overpowered and under the heel of oppression, is still manifested. It is that spirit of self-reliance and submission to the will of Providence, which, added to a conscious rectitude of purpose, bids men make the best of their circumstances. This spirit showed itself at Johnson's Island in the efforts made to pass the time pleasantly and profitably. Schools, debating clubs, and games of all kinds were in vogue. There were all kinds of shops. Shoemaker, blacksmith, tailor, jeweler, storekeeper, were all found carrying on their respective business. The impression is upon my mind of many disagreeable, unkind, and oppressive measures taken by the author-

ities, but the very severe treatment to which I was afterwards subjected so far threw them into the shade that they have escaped my memory. I must not omit a statement about food. At Camp Chase my rations were of a good quality and sufficient. At Johnson's Island they were not so good nor near so plentiful, though sufficient to keep a man in good health. While at Johnson's Island, I made two attempts to escape. My first attempt was in December. Six of us started a tunnel from under one of the buildings, with the intention of coming to the surface outside of the pen surrounding the prison. Our intention then was to swim to the nearest point of mainland, about a quarter of a mile distant, and then make across the country for the South. We had with infinite labor, during three or four nights, made a considerable hole, and were in high spirits at the prospect, when one night there came a tremendous rain, which caved in our tunnel and blasted our hopes for that time. My next attempt was on the 2d of January, 1864, during the intensely cold weather. I succeeded in getting to the fence where the sentinel was posted, but the guard was so vigilant it was impossible to get over. I lay by the fence until nearly frozen. The moon shone out brightly, and I had to run for my life. In the beginning of spring an exchange of sick and disabled prisoners was agreed upon between the two Governments. I had been very unwell for some three months. Accordingly I went before the board of physicians, which decided I was a fit subject for exchange. On the 26th of April, in company with one hundred and forty sick, I left Johnson's Island, fully believing that in a few days I would be once more in dear old Dixie. We traveled by rail to Baltimore, thence we went by steamer to Point Lookout. Here I drank to the dregs the cup of "Hope deferred that maketh the heart sick." Every few days we were told we would certainly leave for the South by the next boat—once all of us were actually called up to sign the parole not to take up arms, etc., until regularly exchanged—but the order was countermanded before one-third of us had signed the roll. I never before nor since felt so sick at heart as then. My disappointments of the same character have been many, but that overstepped them all. All faith in the truth of any Government official was then shattered forever. The greater part of my time at Point Lookout was passed in the hospital, where I was very well treated. The sick were not closely guarded, and had the privilege of the whole Point. It was no small consolation to sit for hours on the beach, the fresh breeze blowing in your face, the free waters rolling endless before you (moodful as nature's own child, sparkling with infinite lustre in the sunshine of a calm day, kissing with a soft murmur of welcome the gentle breeze or struggling with an angry roar in the embrace of the tempest), and miles distant was the Virginia shore, and I have often thought I might claim a kindred feeling with the prophet viewing from Pisgah the land he might not reach. About the middle of May the hospital was crowded with wounded

Yankees sent from Butler's line. This necessitated our removal. Accordingly we were sent out to the regular prison. There we lived in tents. We still had one luxury—sea bathing. The drinking water here was very injurious—caused diarrhœa. About this time rations were reduced. We were cut down to two meals a day. Coffee and sugar were stopped. The ration was a *small* loaf of bread per day, a small piece of meat for breakfast, and a piece of meat, and what was *called* soup, for dinner. About the 20th of June I was removed to Fort Delaware. We were crowded in the hold and between decks of a steamer for three days, the time occupied in the trip. I thought at the time this was terrible, but subsequent experience taught me it was only a small matter. On reaching Fort Delaware we underwent the "search" usual at most of the prisons. What money I had I put in brown paper, which I placed in my mouth in a chew of tobacco. I thus managed to secure it. An insufficiency of food was the chief complaint at Fort Delaware. I did not suffer. My friends supplied me with money, and I was allowed to purchase from the sutler what I needed. While at Fort Delaware, one of our number, Colonel Jones, of Virginia, was murdered by one of the guard. Colonel Jones had been sick for sometime. One foot was so swollen he could not bear a shoe upon it, and it was with difficulty he walked at all. One evening he hobbled to the sinks. As he was about to return a considerable crowd of prisoners had collected there. The sentinel ordered them to move off, which they did. Colonel Jones could not move fast. The sentinel ordered him to move faster. He replied that he was doing the best he could, he could not walk any faster, whereupon the sentinel shot him, the ball passing through the arm and lungs. He lived about twenty-four hours. He remarked to the commandant of the post: "Sir, I am a murdered man—murdered for nothing—I was breaking no rule." The prisoners at Fort Delaware were great beer drinkers. The beer was made of molasses and water—was sold by prisoners to each other for five cents per glass. Every few yards there was a "beer stand." Beer was drank in the place of water—the latter article being very warm, and at times very brackish. While at Fort Delaware we were kept on the rack by alternate hope and disappointment. Rumors, that never came to anything, of an immediate general exchange, were every day occurrences. On the 20th of August, 1864, six hundred of us were selected and sent to Morris' Island, in Charleston harbor, to be placed under the fire of our own batteries. We were in high spirits at starting, for we firmly believed we were soon to be exchanged for a like number of the enemy in Charleston. In some instances men gave their gold watches to some of the "lucky ones," as they were termed, to be allowed to go in their places. On the evening of the 20th we were all (600) stowed away between decks of the steamer "Crescent." Bunks had been fixed up for us. They were arranged in three tiers along the whole length of the ship, two rows of three tiers.

each on each side of the vessel, leaving a very narrow passageway, so narrow that two men could with difficulty squeeze by each other. In the centre of the rows the lower and centre tiers of bunks were shrouded in continual night, the little light through the port holes being cut off by the upper tier of bunks. My bunk, which was about five feet ten inches square, and occupied by four persons, was right against the boiler, occasioning an additional amount of heat, which made the sensation of suffocation almost unbearable. Here we lay in these bunks, packed away like sardines, in all eighteen days, in the hottest part of summer. In two instances the guard placed in with us fainted. I heard one of them remark: "A dog couldn't stand this." Perspiration rolled off us in streams all the time. Clothes and blankets were saturated with it, and it constantly dripped from the upper to the lower bunks. Our sufferings were aggravated by a scarcity of water. The water furnished us was condensed, and so intense was the thirst for it, that it was taken from the condenser almost boiling hot and drunk in that state. One evening, during a rain, we were allowed on deck. Several of us carried up an old, dirty oil-cloth, which we held by the four corners until nearly full of rain water. We then plunged our heads in and drank to our fill. I remember well the sensation of delight, the wild joy with which I felt the cool water about my face and going down my throat. On one occasion, hearing that the surgeon gave his medicines in ice water, I went to him and asked for a dose of salts, which he gave me, and after it a glass of ice water. He remarked upon the indifference with which I swallowed the physic. I told him I would take another dose for another glass of water, which he was kind enough to give me minus the salts. It was strange that none of us died during this trip. I can account for it only by the fact that we were sustained by the hope every one had of being soon exchanged and returning home. Our skins, which were much tanned when we started, were bleached as white as possible during this trip. We lay for some days off Port Royal, while a pen was being made on Morris' Island in which to confine us. While at anchor, three of our number attempted their escape. They found some "life preservers" somewhere in the ship. With these they got overboard in the night, swam some eight or ten miles, when two of them landed; the third kept on swimming, and I have never heard of him since. The other two got lost among the islands and arms of the sea, and after scuffling and suffering for three days were re-captured and brought back to their old quarters. On the 7th of September, 1864, we landed on Morris' Island. We disembarked during the middle of the day, under a scorching sun, but yet the change from the close, and by that time, filthy hold of the ship, was delightful. During the voyage we were guarded by white soldiers. They were now relieved by blacks, and they were certainly the blackest I ever saw. But black, uncouth and barbarous as they were, we soon found that they were far preferable to the white officers who com-

manded them. If physiognomy is any index of character, then surely these officers were villainous. But not one of them, in looks or deeds, could compare with their Colonel. I always felt in his presence as if I had suddenly come upon a snake. He used frequently to come into the pen and talk with some of the prisoners. He seemed to take a fiendish pleasure in our sufferings. A prisoner said to him, on one occasion: "Colonel, unless you give us more to eat, we will starve." His reply was: "If I had my way I would feed you on an oiled rag." Once he told us we must bury the refuse bones in the sand to prevent any bad smell from them. One of our number answered: "If you don't give us something more to eat, there will not only be nothing to bury, but there won't be any of us left to bury it." "Ah, well," he replied, "when you commence to *stink*, I'll put you in the ground too." The bread issued us was spoiled and filled with worms. Some one remonstrated with him about giving men such stuff to eat. His answer was: "You were complaining about not having any *fresh* meat, so I thought I would supply you." The pen in which we were confined had an area of one square acre. It was nearly midway between batteries Gregg and Wagner, perfectly exposed to the shot and shell fired at the two batteries. The principal firing was from mortars, and was done mostly at night. We lived in tents, and had not the least protection from the fire. This, however, troubled us but little. Our great concern was at the small amount and desperate quality of the food issued. One of our greatest pleasures was in watching the shells at night darting through the air like shooting stars, and in predicting how near to us they would explode. Sometimes they exploded just overhead, and the fragments went whizzing about us. But, strange to say, during our stay there, from September 7th to October 19th, not one of our number was struck, though there was firing every day and night, and sometimes it was very brisk. The negro guard was as much exposed as ourselves. One of them had his leg knocked off by a shell—the only person struck that I heard of. In this place we lived in small A tents—four men to a tent. The heat was intense during the day, but the nights were cool and pleasant—the only drawback to sleep being the constant noise from exploding shell and from the firing of the forts by us. Our camp was laid off in streets, two rows of tents facing each other, making a street. These rows were called A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H. A negro sergeant had charge of each row, calling it "his company." His duties were to call the roll three times per diem, issue rations, and exercise a general superintendence. These sergeants were generally kind to us, expressed their sorrow that we had so little to eat. We had a point in common with them, viz: intense hatred of their Colonel. Their hatred of him was equalled only by their fear of him. His treatment of them, for the least violation of orders, or infraction of discipline, was barbarous. He would ride at them, knock and beat them over the head with his sabre, or draw his pistol and

shoot at them. Our rations were issued in manner and quantity as follows: The sergeant came around to each tent with a box of hard biscuit, issued to each prisoner three, generally, sometimes two, sometimes one and a half. Towards the last of our stay five were issued, which last was the number allowed by the authorities. The sergeant next came around with a box of small pieces of meat, about the width and length of two fingers. One of them was given to each man. This was breakfast. At dinner time the sergeant went around with a barrel of pea soup—gave each man from one-third to half a pint. Supper was marked by the issue of a little mush or rice. This, too, was brought around in a barrel. I have before spoken of the *lively* nature of the bread. Any one who had not seen it would hardly credit the amount of dead animal matter in the shape of white worms, which was in the mush given us. For my own part, I was always too hungry to be dainty—worms, mush and all went to satisfy the cravings of nature. But I knew of several persons, who, attempting to pick them out, having thrown out from fifty to eighty, stopped picking them out, not because the worms were all gone, but because the little bit of mush was going with them.

While at Morris' Island we considered ourselves in much more danger from the guns of the guard than from our batteries. The negroes were thick-headed, and apt to go beyond their orders, or misunderstand. They were, therefore, very dangerous. Fortunately they were miserable shots, else several men would have been killed who really were not touched. A sutler was permitted to come in once a week to sell tobacco, stationery, molasses, cakes, etc., to those who had money. Inside the enclosure and all around the tents was a rope: this was the "Dead Line." To go beyond, or even to touch this rope, was death—that is, if the sentinel could hit you. When the sutler came in we were ordered to form in two ranks, faced by the flank towards the "Dead Line." Every new comer had to fall in behind, and await his turn. On one occasion, one of our number, either not knowing or having forgotten the order, walked up to the "Dead Line" on the flank of the line of men. He was not more than five yards from a sentinel. An officer was standing by the sentinel, and ordered him to fire, which he did, and wonderful to say, missed not only the man at whom he shot, but the entire line. The officer then pulled his pistol, and fired it at the prisoner. He also missed. The prisoner, not liking a position where all the firing was on one side, then made good his retreat to his tent.

Our authorities in Charleston and the Yankee authorities on the island exchanged a boat load of provisions, tobacco, etc., for their respective prisoners. Bread, potatoes, meat, and both smoking and chewing tobacco, were sent us by the Charleston ladies. Never was anything more enjoyed, and never, I reckon, were men more thankful. I had as much as I could eat for once, even on Morris' Island. All the prisoners seemed to squirt out tobacco juice, and

puff tobacco smoke, with a keener relish from knowing where it came from, and by whom it was sent. There, as elsewhere, we were constantly expecting to be exchanged. No one counted upon being there more than ten days; and, at the end of that ten days, "why, we will surely be in Dixie before another ten days passes." One freak of the Yankees I have never been able to account for. They took us out of the pen one morning, marched us down to the opposite end of the island, put us on board two old hulks, kept us there for the night, then marched us back to our old quarters. About the 18th of October we were ordered to be ready to leave early the next morning. In compliance with this order, we got up earlier than usual, in order to bundle up our few possessions and wash our faces before leaving. The guard took this occasion to shoot two of our number, one through the knee, the other through the shoulder. Early on the morning of the 18th of October we were drawn up in line, three days' rations were issued, viz: fifteen "hard tack" and a right good-sized piece of meat. I felt myself a rich man. I remember well the loving looks I cast upon my dear victuals, and the tender care with which I adjusted and carried my trusty old haversack. A few moments more and we took up the line of march for the lower end of Morris' Island, with a heavy line of darkey guards on either side. The distance was only three miles, but this to men confined for over a year, and for two months previous existing upon such light rations, was a very considerable matter. Several of our number gave out completely, and had to be hauled the remaining distance. Arrived at the wharf, we exchanged our negro guards for white ones, the 157th New York Volunteers, Colonel Brown commanding. This officer and his men, though we afterwards while in their hands were subjected to the most severe treatment, as far as they were concerned individually always treated us with kindness. We were put in two old hulks fitted up for us, and then were towed out to sea. The first evening of the journey I fell upon my "victuals," and was so hungry that I ate my three days' rations at once. To a question from a friend, "What will you do for the rest of the time?" I replied: "I reckon the Lord will provide." But I made a mistake. I might have known the Almighty would use such instruments as were about us only as ministers of wrath. The evening of the third day we anchored off Fort Pulaski. By this time I was nearly famished. We did not land until the next morning, when we were marched into the fort and provisions given us. On the journey a party attempted to escape. They had succeeded in cutting a hole in the side of the vessel, and were just letting themselves down into the water when they were discovered and brought back.

Fort Pulaski is a brick work, mounts two tiers of guns, the lower tier in casemates. The walls enclose about an acre of ground. We were placed in the casemates, where bunks in three tiers were prepared for us. The flooring was mostly brick. This was very damp, which, together with the cold, damp air, rendered us very

uncomfortable. A heavy guard was thrown around our part of the fort, and for additional security iron grates were placed in the embrasures. Twenty prisoners at a time were allowed to walk up and down the parade ground within the fort for exercise. Doors and windows were generally kept shut, and our abiding place was dark and gloomy enough.

Nothing remarkable happened until the end of the old year. A tolerable amount of rations was issued, and our life was pretty much the same with prison life elsewhere. The new year brought a terrible change. General Foster ordered us to be retaliated upon for alleged ill treatment of prisoners at Andersonville, Georgia. Our rations were reduced to less than one pint of meal and about a half pint of pickle per day. No meat and no vegetables of any kind were allowed us. The meal issued was damaged. It was in lumps larger than a man's head, and as hard as clay: it was sour, and generally filled with bugs and worms. We either had to eat this or lie down and die at once. This regimen lasted forty-three days. I cannot do justice to the misery and suffering experienced by myself and seen everywhere around me during this period. It is only one year since, and yet I can hardly believe I really passed through such scenes as memory brings before me. Our diet soon induced scurvy. This loathsome disease, in addition to the pangs of hunger, made life almost insupportable. The disease first made its appearance in the mouth, loosening the teeth, and in many cases making the gums a mass of black, putrid flesh. It next attacked the limbs, appearing first in little spots, like blood blisters. One of them, after being broken, would become a hard, dark-colored knot. These spots would increase until the whole limb was covered, by which time the muscles would have contracted and the limb be drawn beyond all power of straightening. I have seen cases where not only the legs and arms but the back was thus affected. Another feature of the disease was the fainting produced by very slight exercise. I have walked down the prison, and stumbled upon men lying on the floor to all appearance dead, having fainted and fallen while exerting themselves to get to the "sinks."

Terrible as was the above state of things, our sufferings were increased by as heartless and uncalled-for a piece of cruelty as has ever been recorded. Our poor fellows generally were supplied, and that slimly, with summer clothing, such as they brought from Fort Delaware in August. United States blankets (and many had no other kind) had been taken away at Morris' Island. Not only were blankets and clothing not issued, but *we were not allowed to receive what friends had sent us*. We had only so much fuel as was needed for cooking. Can a more miserable state of existence be imagined than this? Starved almost to the point of death, a prey to disease, the blood in the veins so thin that the least cold sent a shiver through the whole frame! No fire, no blankets, scarcely any clothing! Add to this the knowledge on our part that a few

steps off were those who lived in plenty and comfort! Crumbs and bones were there daily thrown to the dogs or carried to the dunghill, that would have made the eyes of the famished men in that prison glisten. The consequence of all this was that the prisoners died like sheep. Whatever the immediate cause of their death, that cause was induced by starvation, and over the dead bodies of nine-tenths of those brave, true men there can be given but one true verdict: "Death by *starvation*." I remember one instance that, suffering as I was myself, touched me to the heart. One poor fellow, who had grown so weak as not to be able to get off his bunk, said to his "chum": "I can't stand this any longer, I must die." "O, no," said the other, "cheer up, man, rations will be issued again in two days, and I reckon they will certainly give us *something* to eat then—live until then anyhow." The poor fellow continued to live until the day for issuing rations, but it brought no change—the same short pint of damaged meal and pickle, and nothing more. As soon as the poor fellow heard this, he told his friend not to beg him any more, for he could not live any longer, and the next evening he died.

Fortunately for some of us, there were a great many cats about the prison. As may be imagined, we were glad enough to eat them. I have been partner in the killing and eating of three, and besides friends have frequently given me a share of their cat. We cooked ours two ways. One we fried in his own fat for breakfast—another we baked with a stuffing and gravy made of some corn meal—the other we also fried. The last was a kitten—was tender and nice. A compassionate Yankee soldier gave it to me. I was cooking at the stove by the grating which separated us from the guard. This soldier hailed me: "I say, are you one of them fellers that eat *cats*?" I replied, "Yes." "Well, here is one I'll shove thro' if you want it." "Shove it thro'," I answered. In a very few minutes the kitten was in frying order. Our guards were not allowed to relieve our sufferings, but they frequently expressed their sympathy. The Colonel himself told us it was a painful duty to inflict such suffering, but that we knew he was a soldier and must obey orders.

The 3d of March, 1865, dawned upon us laden with rumors of a speedy exchange. The wings of hope had been so often clipped by disappointment, one would have thought it impossible for her to rise very high. "Hope springs," etc., received no denial in our case. Each man was more or less excited. Strong protestations of belief that nothing would come of it were heard on all sides. But the anxiety manifested in turning the rumor over and over, the criticisms upon the source from which it came, and especially the tenacity with which they clung to it in spite of professed disbelief, showed that in the hearts of all the hope that deliverance was at hand had taken deep root. On the 4th the order came to be ready to start in two hours. Soon after one of our ranking officers was told by one of the officials that an order was just received from

Grant to exchange us immediately. We were wild with hope. The chilling despair which had settled upon us for months seemed to rise at once. All were busy packing their few articles. Cheerful talk and hearty laughter was heard all through the prison. "Well, old fellow, off for Dixie at last," was said as often as one friend met another. The alacrity with which the sick and crippled dragged themselves about was wonderful. Soon the drum beat, the line was formed and the roll called. "Forward, march!" Two by two we passed through the entrance to the Fort, over the moat, and then Fort Pulaski was left behind us forever!

One sorrowful thought accompanied us. Our joy could not reach the poor fellows who had suffered with us and fallen victims to hunger and disease, and whose remains lay uncared for, unhonored, aye! unmarked. A good many head-boards, with the name, rank and regiment of the dead had been prepared by friends, but an opportunity to put them up was not given, although it had been promised. We reached Hilton Head without anything remarkable happening. Then we took on our party which had been sent there at the beginning of the retaliation, or "Meal and Pickles," as we used to call it. This party had undergone the same treatment. The greeting between friends was: "How are you, old fellow, ain't dead yet? you are hard to kill." "I'm mighty glad to see you. Have some pickles—or here is some sour meal if you prefer it." The boat in which we started was now so crowded that there was not room for all to sit down. It was so overloaded, and rolled so, that the Captain refused to put to sea unless a larger ship was given to him. Accordingly we were transferred to the ship "Illinois." The sick, about half our number, occupied the lower deck—the rest of us were packed away in the "hole." But no combination of circumstances could depress us as long as we believed we were "bound for Dixie." So we laughed at our close quarters, at ourselves and each other, when sea sick. We were almost run away with by lice, but we off shirts and skirmished with these varmints with the "vim" inspired by "bound for Dixie."

We reached Fort Monroe on the third day. By this time the filth in the ship was awful—language can't describe the condition of the deck where the sick were. The poor fellows were unable to help themselves, and sea sickness and diarrhoea had made their quarters unendurable. The stench was terrible—the air suffocating. We expected to go right up the James river and be exchanged at City Point. We were most cruelly disappointed. Orders were received to carry us to Fort Delaware. When we learned this we were in despair. The stimulus which had enabled us to bear up all along was gone; we were utterly crushed. The deaths of three of our number during the day and night following told the tale of our utter wretchedness. Their death excited little or no pity. I think the feeling towards them was rather one of envy. I remember hardly anything of our passage from Fort Monroe to

Fort Delaware. A gloom too deep for even the ghost of hope to enter was upon my spirits. I noticed little and cared less. Upon reaching Fort Delaware seventy-five of our number were carried to the prison hospital, and had there been room many more would have gone. We were marched into the same place we had left more than six months before. I had no idea what a miserable looking set of men we were until contrasted with the Fort Delaware prisoners—our old companions. I thought they were the fattest, best dressed set of men I had ever seen. That they looked thus to me, will excite no surprise when I describe my own appearance. A flannel shirt, low in the neck, was my only under-garment. An old overcoat, once white, was doing duty as shirt, coat and vest; part of an old handkerchief tied around my head served as a hat; breeches I had none—an antiquated pair of red flannel drawers endeavored, but with small success, to fill their place. I was very thin and poor and was lame, scurvy having drawn the muscles of my right leg. When I add that I was in better condition, both in flesh and dress than many of our crowd, some idea can be formed of the appearance we made. The prisoners came to our rescue, gave us clothes, subscribed money, and bought vegetables for us. For a long time after our arrival, whenever any one was about to throw away an old crumb or piece of meat or worn out garment, some bystander would call out: "Don't throw that away, give it to some of the poor Pulaski prisoners." The fall of Richmond, Lee's surrender, and, finally, the capitulation of Johnston's army, soon swept from us every hope of a Southern Confederacy. But one course remained, viz: swear allegiance to the Government in whose power we were. Upon doing this, I was released on the 13th of June, 1865.

We next give the following extract from a private letter, written August 4th, 1865, from Great Barrington, Massachusetts, by a Confederate officer, to a lady of Richmond, the full truth of which can be abundantly attested:

I was captured on Tuesday, the 4th of April, near evening. Some four hundred or more, that had been collected during the day, were marched a few miles and stowed away for the night in a *small* tobacco barn. The next morning we were told that if we could find any meat on the remains of three slaughtered cattle (that had already been closely cut from) we were welcome. No bread or salt was offered, yet it could be had for money. From Tuesday till Friday all that I had given me to eat was *two* ears of *musty* corn and four crackers! During that time we were exposed to the rain, which was continued for days. We were marched through mud and water to City Point, a distance of near one hundred miles by the route taken. The first sustaining food I received was from Mrs. Marable, at Petersburg, and I shall *ever* feel grateful to her for it. We arrived at Point Lookout at night, and

mustered for examination next morning over eighteen hundred. After searching my package and person, taking from me nearly everything that my captors had left me, I was assigned, with two others, to a tent having already twenty-three occupants. I cannot describe the appearance of that tent and the men in it. If there is a word more comprehensive than *filthy* I would use it. It would require a combination of similar adjectives to give any description. There was given me a half loaf of bread and a small rusty salt mackerel, which I was informed was for next day's rations. I declared I would not sleep in the tent, but was told there was no alternative, as the guards or patrol would shoot me if I slept outside. It was a *horrible* night. Wary, exhausted, almost heart-broken, I ate a part of my scanty loaf, and placed the remainder under my head with the fish. I soon forgot my troubles in sleep. Waked in the morning and found I had been relieved of any further anxiety for my bread, as it had been taken from me by some starving individual, (a common occurrence). The mackerel was left as undesirable. A *chew* of tobacco would purchase two, so little demand was there for them—for many had no means of cooking them. A few hours of reflection—that ever to be remembered morning. There were none there that I had ever seen, except the few acquaintances made on the march. All looked dark, dismal—and the thought I might remain there for months came nearer to making my heart sink in despair than ever before. I thought that must be surely the darkest hour of my existence. While thus lamenting my fate, and almost distrustful of relief, a boy near me asked what regiment I belonged to. I told him the Washington Artillery. "Why," says he, "there is a whole company of them fellows here captured near Petersburg." I began to revive a little on that. For though the saying goes, that "Misery seeks strange bed fellows," I sought for old acquaintances, and soon found them. The surprise was mutual. By the kindness of Mr. Vinson, I had good quarters with him, and was more comfortable. We had a small tent, and *only* six in it. True, we were "packed like sardines" at night, but we were friends, and each one had a pride and disposition to keep as cleanly as we could. The food allowed was as follows: In the morning, early, the men are marched by companies (each about one hundred and fifty) to the "cook houses," and receive a small piece of boiled beef or pork. I do not think the largest piece ever given would weigh three ounces. There is no bread given at this time, and it is a common occurrence for the men to have eaten their scanty allowance in a few mouthfuls without bread. At or near twelve o'clock, M., there is issued to each a half of a small loaf of bread, (eight ounce loaves). The men can then go to the cook-houses and receive a *pint* of miserable soup. That is the last meal for the day. I never tasted of the soup (so called) but once. It was revolting—I might say *revolving* to my stomach. Sometimes, in place of meat, is given salt mackerel or codfish—never of good quality. The

water at the "Point" was horrible, being strongly tinctured with copperas and decayed shells, &c. It was obtained from wells in different parts of the enclosure. Near the officers quarters' was one pump from which a little better water was sometimes received by favored ones. This location for a prison was once condemned by a Board of Surgeons on account of the poisonous composition of the water. Many persons were greatly affected by the water, and the food given would barely sustain life—in many cases it did not—and I feel confident that money deaths were caused solely from scanty and unhealthy food, and this too by a Government that had plenty.

Whenever any complaint was made of the food or treatment, the reply would be: "'Tis good enough for you, and far better than Andersonville." I depended very little upon the food issued, as in a week after my imprisonment I received money from my friends and was enabled to purchase coffee, etc., and lived well. Most of the Washington Artillery fared well, but it was by purchase rather than favor. The sutlers were most happy to receive our money, and charged more than double the market value for their supplies.

We were fortunate even thus, for there were thousands of that motley group that for months had not a sufficiency of food. I have seen them many times fishing out from the barrels (in which all the filth and offal of the camp is thrown) crusts of bread, potato peelings, onion tops, etc., etc.—in fact, anything from which they might find little sustenance. I had never before witnessed to what great extremity hunger would drive a human being. The discipline of the prison was very strict. The guard was most of the time of colored troops, who, when (as they usually were) badly treated by their officers, would vent their rage upon the prisoners.

Much is said in the papers of the "Dead Line," over which so many "blue coats" had "accidentally" passed and were shot for their "imprudence." In all prisons the penalty for passing the "Dead Line" is well known, and there can be no excuse in such attempt. At Point Lookout Confederate soldiers were shot for being at the pumps for water, which had always been permitted at all hours of night, till the self-constituted restriction of the negro guard caused several men to be severely wounded. I was an eye-witness of many disgusting scenes, almost brutal on the part of the guard, towards simple and ignorant prisoners. That prison was said to be the best of all the Yankee prisons—if so, I am truly sorry for those that were in the others. I know not what Andersonville was. I do not doubt but there was great suffering, but all was done by the Government that could be, and we had not the resources of the world as had the Yankees.

Thus have I given you some particulars. It is really an "unvarnished tale," but *it is true*, and I can safely challenge the denial of a word of it.

HON. A. M. KEILEY'S NARRATIVE.

In 1866 Hon. A. M. Keiley, (then of Petersburg, but for some years past the scholarly and popular Mayor of Richmond), published a volume on his prison life at Point Lookout and Elmira, which we would be glad to see read by all who really wish to know the truth concerning those prisons. We make the following extracts concerning Point Lookout:

The routine of prison-life at Point Lookout was as follows: Between dawn and sunrise a "reveille" horn summoned us into line by companies, ten of which constituted each division—of which I have before spoken—and here the roll was called. This performance was hurried over with much as haste as is ascribed to certain marital ceremonies in a poem that it would be obviously improper to make a more particular allusion to; and those whose love of a nap predominates over fear of the Yankees, usually tumble in for another snooze. About eight o'clock the breakfasting began. This operation consisted in the forming of the companies again into line, and introducing them under lead of their sergeants into the mess-rooms, where a slice of bread and a piece of pork or beef—lean in the former and fat in the latter being contraband of war—were placed at intervals of about twenty inches apart. The meat was usually about four or five ounces in weight. These we seized upon, no one being allowed to touch a piece, however, until the whole company entered, and each man was in position opposite his ration (universally pronounced *raytion*, among our enemies, as it is almost as generally called with the "a" short among ourselves, symbolical, you observe, of the *shortness* of provant in Dixie). This over, a detail of four or five men from each company—made at morning roll-call—formed themselves into squads for the cleansing of the camp; an operation which the Yankees everywhere attend to with more diligence than ourselves. The men then busied themselves with the numberless occupations which the fertility of American genius suggests, of which I will have something to say hereafter, until dinner-time, when they were again carried to the mess-houses, where another slice of bread, and rather over a half-pint of watery slop, by courtesy called "soup," greeted the eyes of such ostrich-stomached animals as could find comfort in that substitute for nourishment.

About sunset, at the winding of another horn, the roll was again called, to be sure that no one had "flanked out," and, about an hour after, came "taps;" after which all were required to remain in their quarters and keep silent.

The Sanitary Commission, a benevolent association of exempts in aid of the Hospital Department of the Yankee army, published in July, 1865, a "Narrative of Sufferings of United States Officers and Soldiers, Prisoners of War," in which a parallel is drawn be-

tween the treatment of prisoners on both sides, greatly to the disadvantage, of course, of "Dixie."

An air of truthfulness is given to this production by a number of affidavits of Confederate prisoners, which made many a Confederate stare and laugh to read.

They were generally the statements of "galvanized" rebels, "so called;" that is, prisoners who had applied for permission to take the oath, or of prisoners who had little offices in the various pens, which they would lose on the whisper of any thing disagreeable, and *their* testimony is entitled to the general credit of depositions taken "under duress."

But among these documentary statements, in glorification of the humanity of the Great Republic, is one on page 89, from Miss Dix, the grand female dry-nurse of Yankee Doodle (who, by the by, gave, I understand, unpardonable offence to the pulchritude of Yankeedom, by persistently *refusing to employ any but ugly women as nurses*—the vampire)—which affirms that the prisoners at Point Lookout "were supplied with vegetables, with the best of wheat bread, and fresh and salt meat three times daily in abundant measure."

Common gallantry forbids the characterization of this remarkable extract in harsher terms than to say that it is untrue *in every particular*.

It is quite likely that some Yankee official at Point Lookout made this statement to the benevolent itinerant, and her only fault may be in suppressing the fact that she "*was informed*," etc., etc. But it is altogether inexcusable in the Sanitary Commission to attempt to palm such a falsehood upon the world, knowing its falsity, as they must have done. For my part, I never saw any one get enough of any thing to eat at Point Lookout, except the soup, and a teaspoonful of that was *too much* for ordinary digestion.

These digestive discomforts were greatly enhanced by the villainous character of the water, which is so impregnated with some mineral as to offend every nose, and induce diarrhoea in almost every alimentary canal. It colors every thing black in which it is allowed to rest, and a scum rises on the top of a vessel if it is left standing during the night, which reflects the prismatic colors as distinctly as the surface of a stagnant pool. Several examinations of this water have been made by chemical analysis, as I was told by a Federal surgeon in the prison, and they have uniformly resulted in its condemnation by scientific men; but the advantages of the position to the Yankees, as a prison pen, so greatly counterbalanced any claim of humanity, that Point Lookout I felt sure would remain a prison camp until the end of the war, especially as there are wells outside of "the Pen," which are not liable to these charges, the water of which is indeed perfectly pure and wholesome, so that the Yanks suffer no damage therefrom. The ground was inclosed at Point Lookout for a prison in July, 1863, and the first instalment of prisoners arrived there on the 25th of that

month from the Old Capitol, Fort Delaware and Fort McHenry, some of the Gettysburg captures. One hundred and thirty-six arrived on the 31st of the same month from Washington, and on the 10th of August another batch came from Baltimore, having been captured at Falling Waters. Every few weeks the number was increased, until they began to count by thousands.

During the scorching summer, whose severity during the day is as great on that sand-barren as anywhere in the Union north of the Gulf, and through the hard winter, which is more severe at that point than anywhere in the country south of Boston, these poor fellows were confined here in open tents, on the naked ground, without a plank or a handful of straw between them and the heat or frost of the earth.

And when, in the winter, a high tide and an easterly gale would flood the whole surface of the pen, *and freeze as it flooded*, the sufferings of the half-clad wretches, many accustomed to the almost vernal warmth of the Gulf, may easily be imagined. Many died outright, and many more will go to their graves crippled and racked with rheumatisms, which they date from the winter of 1863-4. Even the well-clad sentinels, although relieved every thirty minutes (instead of every two hours, as is the army rule), perished in some instances, and in others lost their feet and hands, through the terrible cold of that season.

During all this season the ration of wood allowed to each man was an arm-full for five days, and this had to cook for him as well as warm him, for at that time there were no public cook-houses and mess-rooms.

An additional refinement of cruelty was the regulation which always obtained at Point Lookout, and which I believe was peculiar to the prison, under which the Yanks stole from us any bed-clothing we might possess, *beyond one blanket!* This petty larceny was effected through an instrumentality they called *inspections*. Once in every ten days an inspection was ordered, when all the prisoners turned out in their respective divisions and companies *in marching order*. They ranged themselves in long lines between the rows of tents, with their blankets and haversacks—those being the only articles considered orthodox possessions of a rebel. A Yankee inspected each man, taking away his extra blanket, if he had one, and appropriating any other superfluity he might chance to possess; and this accomplished, he visited the tents and seized every thing therein that under the convenient nomenclature of the Federals was catalogued as “contraband”—blankets, boots, hats, any thing. The only way to avoid this was by a judicious use of greenbacks—and a trifle would suffice—it being true, with honorable exceptions, of course, that Yankee soldiers are very much like ships: to move them, you must “slush the ways.”

In the matter of clothing, the management at Point Lookout was simply infamous. You could receive nothing in the way of clothing without giving up the corresponding article which you might

chance to possess; and so rigid was this regulation, that men who came there barefooted have been compelled to beg or buy a pair of worn-out shoes to carry to the office in lieu of a pair sent them by their friends, before they could receive the latter. To what end this plundering was committed I could never ascertain, nor was I ever able to hear any better, or indeed any other reason advanced for it, than that the possession of extra clothing would enable the prisoners to bribe their guards! Heaven help the virtue that a pair of second-hand Confederate breeches could seduce!

As I have mentioned the guards, and as this is a mosaic chapter, I may as well speak here as elsewhere of the method by which order was kept in camp. During the day, the platform around the pen was constantly paced by sentinels, chiefly of the Invalid (or, as it is now called, the Veteran Reserve) Corps, whose duty it was to see that the prisoners were orderly, and particularly, that no one crossed "the dead-line." This is a shallow ditch traced around within the inclosure, about fifteen feet from the fence. The penalty for stepping over this is death, and although the sentinels are probably instructed to warn any one who may be violating the rule, the order does not seem to be imperative, and the negroes, when on duty, rarely troubled themselves with this superfluous formality. Their warning was the click of the lock, sometimes the discharge of their muskets. These were on duty during my stay at the Point every third day, and their insolence and brutality were intolerable.

Besides this detail of day-guard, which of course was preserved during the night, a patrol made the rounds constantly from "taps," the last horn at night, to "reveille." These were usually armed with pistols for greater convenience, and as they are shielded from scrutiny by the darkness, the indignities and cruelties they oftentimes inflicted on prisoners, who for any cause might be out of their tents between those hours, especially when the patrol were black, were outrageous. Many of these were of a character which could not by any periphrase be decently expressed—they were, however, precisely the acts which a set of vulgar brutes, suddenly invested with irresponsible authority, might be expected to take delight in; and, as it was of course impossible to recognize the perpetrators, redress was unattainable, even if one could brook the sneer and insult which would inevitably follow complaint. Indeed, most of the Yankees did not disguise their delight at the insolence of these Congoes.

Under date of Thursday, June 16th, he writes:

Saw to-day, for the first time, the chief provost-marshal, Major H. G. O. Weymouth. He is a handsome official, with ruddy face, a rather frank countenance, and a cork-leg. He conducts this establishment on the "*laissez faire*" principle—in short, he lets it alone severely. Whatever the abuses or complaints, or reforms, the only way to reach him is by communications through official channels, said channels being usually the authors of the abuses!

It may be easily computed how many documents of this description would be likely to meet his eye.

Two or three times a week he rides into camp with a sturdy knave behind him, at a respectful distance—makes the run of one or two streets, and is gone, and I presume sits down over a glass of brandy and water, and indites a most satisfactory report of the condition of the “rebs,” for the perusal of his superior officer, or plies some credulous spinster with specious fictions about the comfort, abundance, and general desirableness of Yankee prisons. The Major bears a bad reputation here, in the matter of money; all of which, I presume, arises from the unreasonableness of the “rebs,” who are not aware that they have no rights which Yankees are bound to respect.

Friday, June 17th.—A salute of thirteen guns heralded this morning the arrival of General Augur, who commands the department of Washington. About twelve M., the general, with a few other officials, made the tour of camp, performing, in the prevailing perfunctory manner, the official duty of inspection.

Nothing on earth can possibly be more ridiculous and absurd than the great majority of official inspections of all sorts; but this “banged Bannagher.” General Augur did not speak to a prisoner, enter a tent, peep into a mess-room, or, so far as I saw, take a single step to inform himself how the pen was managed.

Weymouth probably fixed up a satisfactory report, however, when the general’s brief exhibition of his new uniform to the appalled “rebs” was over.

Visited all my comrades to-day, and, with one exception, found them all suffering like myself from exhausting diarrhoea, induced by the poisonous water.

In his narrative of prison life at Elmira, after speaking in high terms of the kindly feeling towards the prisoners shown by Major Colt, the commandant of the prison, Mr. Keiley writes as follows:

In the executive duties of his office, Major Colt was assisted by fifteen or twenty officers, and as many non-commissioned officers, chiefly of the militia or the veteran reserves. Among them were some characters which are worth a paragraph.

There was a long-nosed, long-faced, long-jawed, long-bearded, long-bodied, long-legged, endless-footed, and long-skirted curiosity, yclept Captain Peck, ostensibly engaged in taking charge of certain companies of “rebs,” but really employed in turning a penny by huckstering the various products of prisoners’ skill—an occupation very profitable to Peck, but generally unsatisfactory, in a pecuniary way, to the “rebs.” Many of them have told me of the impossibility of getting their just dues from the prying, round-shouldered captain, who had a snarl and an oath for every one out of whom he was not, at that instant, making money.

Another rarity of the pen was Lieutenant John McC., a braw

chiel frae the land o' cakes, who was a queer compound of good-nature and brutality. To some of us he was uniformly polite, but he had his pistol out on any occasion when dealing with the majority of the "Johnnies," and would fly into a passion over the merest nothing, that would have been exceedingly amusing, but for a wicked habit he had of laying about him with a stick, a tent pole—any thing that fell into his hands. He was opening a trench one day, through the camp, when, for the crime of stepping across it, he forced a poor, sick boy, who was on his way to the dispensary for medicine, to leap backwards and forwards over it till he fell from exhaustion amid the voluble oaths of the valiant lieutenant. One Lieutenant R. kept McC. in countenance by following closely his example. He is a little compound of fice and weasel, and having charge of the cleaning up of the camp, has abundant opportunities to bully and insult, but being, fortunately, very far short of grenadier size, he does not use his boot or fist as freely as his great exemplar. No one, however, was safe from either of them, who, however accidentally and innocently, fell in their way, physically or metaphorically.

Of the same block Captain Bowden was a chip: a fair-haired, light-moustached, Saxon-faced "Yank"—far the worst type of man, let me tell you, yet discovered—whose whole intercourse with the prisoners was the essence of brutality. An illustration will paint him more thoroughly than a philippic. A prisoner named Hale, belonging to the old Stonewall brigade, was discovered one day rather less sober than was allowable to any but the loyal, and Bowden being officer of the guard, arrested him and demanded where he got his liquor. This he refused to tell, as it would compromise others, and any one but a Yankee would have put him in the guard-house, compelled him to wear a barrel shirt, or inflicted some punishment *proportionate to his offence*. All this would have been very natural, but not Bowdenish, so this valorous Parolles determined to apply the torture to force a confession! Hale was accordingly tied up by the thumbs—that is, his thumbs were fastened securely together behind his back, and a rope being attached to the cord uniting them, it was passed over a cross bar over his head and hauled down, until it raised the sufferer so nearly off the ground that the entire weight of his body was sustained by his thumbs, strained in an unnatural position, his toes merely tonching the ground. The torture of this at the wrists and shoulder joints is exquisite, but Hale persisted in refusing to peach, and called on his fellow-prisoners, many of whom were witnesses of this refined villainy, to remember this when they got home. Bowden grew exasperated at his victim's fortitude, and determined to gag him. This he essayed to accomplish by fastening a heavy oak tent-pin in his mouth; and when he would not open his mouth sufficiently—not an easy operation—he struck him in the face with the oaken billet, a blow which broke several of his teeth and covered his mouth with blood!

On the other hand, some of the officers were as humane and merciful as these wretches were brutal and cowardly, and all who were my fellow-prisoners will recall, with grateful remembrance, Captain Benjamin Munger, Lieutenant Dalgleish, Sergeant-Major Rudd, Lieutenant McKee, Lieutenant Haverty, commissary of one of the regiments guarding us, a whole-souled Fenian, formerly in the book-business in New York, and still there probably, and one or two others.

These officers were assigned in the proportion of one to every company at first, but to every three hundred or four hundred men afterwards, and were charged with the duty of superintending roll-calls, inspecting quarters, and seeing that the men under their charge got their rations; and *the system* was excellent.

During the month of July, four thousand three hundred and twenty-three prisoners were entered on the records of Elmira prison, and by the 29th of August, the date of the last arrivals, nine thousand six hundred and seven.

The barrack accommodations did not suffice for quite half of them, and the remainder were provided with "A" tents, in which they continued to be housed when I left the prison in the middle of the following October, although the weather was piercingly cold. Thinly clad as they came from a summer's campaign, many of them without blankets, and without even a handful of straw between them and the frozen earth, it will surprise no one that the suffering, even at that early day, was considerable.

As I left, however, the contributions of the Confederate Government, which, despairing of procuring an exchange, was taxing its exhausted energies to aid the prisoners, began to come in.

An agent was in New York selling cotton for the purpose, and many boxes of blankets and coarse clothing were furnished from the proceeds of the sale.

This tender regard was a happy contrast to the barbarity of Washington management, which seemed to feel the utmost indifference to the sufferings of its soldiers, and embarrassed their exchange by every device of delay and every suggestion of stubbornness.

As I have spoken of the military government of Elmira prison, it may not be inappropriate to pursue the statistical view, now that I am in it, by a brief chapter on the Medical and Commissary Departments, before I resume the thread of the more personal portion of my narrative.

The chief of the former department was a club-footed little gentleman, with an abnormal head and a snaky look in his eyes, named Major E. L. Sanger. On our arrival in Elmira, another surgeon, remarkable chiefly for his unaffected simplicity and virgin ignorance of everything appertaining to medicine, played doctor there. But as the prisoners increased in numbers, a more formal and formidable staff was organized, with Sanger at the head.

Sanger was simply a brute, as we found when we learned the

whole truth about him *from his own people*. If he had not avoided a court-martial by resigning his position, it is likely that even a military commission would have found it impossible to screen his brutality to the sick, although the fact that the United States hanged no one for the massacre of Indian women and sucking infants during the year 1865, inspires the fear that this systematic * * * * of Confederate prisoners would have been commended for his patriotism.

He was assisted by Dr. Rider, of Rochester, one of the few "copperheads" whom I met in any office, great or small, at the North. My association was rather more intimate with him than with any one of the others, and I believe him to have been a competent and faithful officer. Personally, I acknowledge his many kindnesses with gratitude. The rest of the "meds" were, in truth, a motley crew in the main, most of them being selected from the impossibility, it would seem, of doing any thing else with them. I remember one of the worthies, whose miraculous length of leg and neck suggested "crane" to all observers, whose innocence of medicine was quite refreshing. On being sent for to prescribe for a prisoner, who was said to have bilious fever, he asked the druggist, a "reb," in the most *naïve* manner, what was the usual treatment for that disease! Fortunately, during his stay at Elmira, which was not long, there were no drugs in the dispensary, or I shudder to picture the consequences. This department was constantly undergoing changes, and I suspect that the whole system was intended as part of the education of the young doctors assigned to us, for as soon as they learned to distinguish between quinine and magnesia they were removed to another field of labor.

The whole camp was divided into wards, to which physicians were assigned, among whom were three "rebel" prisoners, Dr. Lynch, of Baltimore, Dr. Martin, of South Carolina, and Dr. Graham, formerly of Stonewall Jackson's staff, and a fellow-townsmen of the lamented hero. These ward physicians treated the simplest cases in their patients' barrack, and transferred the more dangerous ones to the hospitals, of which there were ten or twelve, capable of accommodating about eighty patients each. Here every arrangement was made that *carpenters* could make to insure the patients against unnecessary mortality, and, indeed, a *system* was professed which would have delighted the heart of a Sister of Charity; but, alas! the practice was quite another thing. The most scandalous neglect prevailed even in so simple a matter as providing food for the sick, and I do not doubt that many of those who died perished from actual starvation.

One of the Petersburg prisoners having become so sick as to be sent to the hospital, he complained to his friends who visited him that he could get nothing to eat, and was dying in consequence, when they made application for leave to buy him some potatoes and roast them for him. Dr. S. not being consulted, the request was granted, and when, a few hours afterwards, the roasted potatoes

were brought in, the poor invalids on the neighboring cots crawled from their beds and begged the peelings to satisfy the hunger that was gnawing them.

When complaint was made of this brutality to the sick, there was always a convenient official excuse. Sometimes the fault would be that a lazy doctor would not make out his provision return in time, in which case his whole ward must go without food, or with an inadequate supply, till the next day. Another time there would be a difficulty between the chief surgeon and the commissary, whose general relations were of the stripe characterized by S. P. Andrews as "cat-and-dogamy," which would result in the latter refusing to furnish the former with bread for the sick! In almost all cases the "*spiritus frumenti*" failed to get to the patients, or in so small a quantity after the various *tolls* that it would not quicken the circulation of a canary.

But the great fault, next to the scant supply of nourishment, was the inexcusable deficiency of medicine. During several weeks, in which dysentery and inflammation of the bowels were the prevalent diseases in prison, there was not a grain of any preparation of opium in the dispensary, and many a poor fellow died for the want of a common medicine, which no family is ordinarily without—that is, if men ever die for want of drugs.

There would be and is much excuse for such deficiencies in the South—and this is a matter which the Yankees studiously ignore—inasmuch as the blockade renders it impossible to procure any luxuries even for our own sick, and curtails and renders enormously expensive the supply of drugs of the simplest kind, providing they are exotics; but in a nation whose boast it is that they do not feel the war, with the world open to them and supplies of all sorts wonderfully abundant, it is simply infamous to starve the sick as they did there, and equally discreditable to deny them medicines—indispensable according to Esculapian traditions. The result of the ignorance of the doctors, and the sparseness of these supplies, was soon apparent in the shocking mortality of this camp, notwithstanding the healthfulness claimed for the situation. This exceeded even the reported mortality at Andersonville, great as that was, and disgraceful as it was to our government, if it resulted from causes which were within its control.

I know the reader, if a Northern man, will deny this, and point to the record of the Wirz trial. I object to the testimony. There never was, in all time, such a mass of lies as that evidence, for the most part, could have been proved to be if it had been possible to sift the testimony or examine, before a jury, the witnesses. I take, as the basis of my comparison, the published report made by four returned Andersonville prisoners, who were allowed to come North on their representation that they could induce their humane Government to assent to an exchange. *Vana spes*. Edwin M. Stanton would have seen the whole of them die before he would give General Lee one able-bodied soldier.

These prisoners alleged (I quote from memory) that out of a population of about thirty-six thousand at that pen, six thousand, or *one-sixth of the whole*, died between the first of February and the first of August, 1864. Now at Elmira the quota was not made up till the last of August, so that September was the first month during which any fair estimate of the mortality of the camp could be made. NOW, OUT OF LESS THAN NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PRISONERS ON THE FIRST OF SEPTEMBER, THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIX DIED THAT MONTH.

At Andersonville the mortality averaged a thousand a month out of thirty-six thousand, or *one thirty-sixth*. At Elmira it was three hundred and eighty-six, out of nine thousand five hundred, or *one twenty-fifth of the whole*. At Elmira it was four per cent.; at Andersonville, less than three per cent. If the mortality at Andersonville had been as great as at Elmira, the deaths should have been one thousand four hundred and forty per month, or fifty per cent. more than they were.

I speak by the card respecting these matters, having kept the morning return of deaths for the last month and a half of my life in Elmira, and transferred the figures to my diary, which lies before me; and this, be it remembered, in a country where food was cheap and abundant; where all the appliances of the remedial art were to be had on mere requisition; where there was no military necessity requiring the government to sacrifice almost every consideration to the inaccessibility of the prison, and the securing of the prisoners, and where Nature had furnished every possible requisite for salubrity.

And now that I am speaking of the death-record, I will jot down two rather singular facts in connection therewith.

The first was the unusual mortality among the prisoners from North Carolina. In my diary I find several entries like the following :

Monday, October 3d.—Deaths yesterday, 16, of whom 11 N. C.
Tuesday, October 4th.—Deaths yesterday, 14, of whom 7 N. C.

Now, the proportion of North Carolinians was nothing, even approximating what might have been expected from this record. I commit the fact to Mr. Gradgrind. Can it be explained by the great attachment the people of that State have for their homes?

The second was the absolute absence of any death from intermittent fever or any analogous disease.

Now I knew well that many of the sick died from this and kindred diseases produced by the miasma of the stagnant lake in our camp; but the reports, which I consolidated every morning, contained no reference to them. I inquired at the dispensary, where the reports were first handed in, the cause of this anomaly, and learned that Dr. Sanger would sign no report which ascribed to any of *these diseases the death of the patient!* I concluded that he must have committed himself to the harmlessness of the lagoon in question,

and determined to preserve his consistency at the expense of our lives—very much after the fashion of that illustrious ornament of the profession, Dr. Sangrado, who continued his warm water and phlebotomy merely because he had written a book in praise of that practice, although “in six weeks he made more widows and orphans than the siege of Troy.”

I could hardly help visiting on Dr. Sanger the reproaches his predecessor received at the hands of the persecuted people of Valladolid, who “were sometimes very brutal in their grief,” and called the doctor and Gil Blas no more euphonious name than “ignorant assassins.”

Any post in the medical department in a Yankee prison-camp is quite valuable on account of the opportunities of plunder it affords, and many of the virtuous “meds” made extensive use of their advantages. Vast quantities of quinine were prescribed that were never taken, the price (eight dollars an ounce) tempting the cupidity of the physicians beyond all resistance; but the grand speculation was in whiskey, which was supplied to the dispensary in large quantities, and could be obtained for a consideration in any reasonable amount from a “steward” who pervaded that establishment.

I ought not to dismiss this portion of my description of matters medical without adding that the better class of officers in the pen were loud and indignant in their reproaches of Sanger’s systematic inhumanity to the sick, and that they affirmed that he avowed his determination to stint these poor helpless creatures in retaliation for alleged neglect on the part of our authorities! And when at last, on the 21st of September, I carried my report up to the major’s tent, with the ghastly record of TWENTY-NINE DEATHS YESTERDAY, the storm gathered, which in a few weeks drove him from the pen, but which never would have had that effect if he had not, by his rudeness, attained the ill-will of nearly every officer about the pen whose good-will was worth having.

I ascend from pills to provender.

The commissary department was under the charge of a cute, active ex-bank officer, Captain G. C. Whiton. The ration of bread was usually a full pound *per diem*, forty-five barrels of flour being converted daily into loaves in the bake-shop on the premises. The meat-ration, on the other hand, was invariably scanty; and I learned, on inquiry, that the fresh beef sent to the prison usually fell short from one thousand to twelve hundred pounds in each consignment. Of course when this happened many had to lose a large portion of their allowance; and sometimes it happened that the same man got bones only for several successive days. The expedients resorted to by the men to supply this want of animal food were disgusting. Many found an acceptable substitute in rats, with which the place abounded; and these Chinese delicacies commanded an average price of about four cents apiece—in greenbacks. I have seen scores of them in various states of preparation, and have been assured by those who indulged in them that worse things have been eaten—an estimate of their value that I took on trust.

Others found in the barrels of refuse fat, which were accumulated at the cook-house, and in the pickings of the bones, which were cut out of the meat and thrown out in a dirty heap back of the kitchen, to be removed once a week, the means of satisfying the craving for meat, which rations would not satisfy. I have seen a mob of hungry "rebs" besiege the bone-cart, and beg from the driver fragments on which an August sun had been burning for several days, until the impenetrable nose of a Congo could hardly have endured them.

Twice a day the camp poured its thousands into the mess-rooms, where each man's ration was assigned him; and twice a day the aforesaid rations were characterized by disappointed "rebs" in language not to be found in a prayer-book. Those whose appetite was stronger than their apprehensions frequently contrived to supply their wants by "flanking"—a performance which consisted in joining two or more companies as they successively went to the mess-rooms, or in quietly sweeping up a ration as the company filed down the table. As every ration so flanked was, however, obtained at the expense of some helpless fellow-prisoner, who must lose that meal, the practice was almost universally frowned upon; and the criminal, when discovered, as was frequently the case, was subjected to instant punishment.

This was either confinement in the guard-house, solitary confinement on bread and water, the "sweat-box" or the barrel-shirt. The war has made all these terms familiar, except the third, perhaps; by it I mean a wooden box, about seven feet high, twenty inches wide and twelve deep, which was placed on end in front of the major's tent. Few could stand in this without elevating the shoulders considerably; and when the door was fastened all motion was out of the question. The prisoner had to stand with his limbs rigid and immovable until the jailer opened the door, and it was far the most dreaded of the *peines fortes et dures* of the pen. In midsummer, I can fancy that a couple of hours in such a coffin would inspire Tartuffe himself with virtuous thoughts, especially if his avoirdupois was at all respectable.

Rev. Dr. I. W. K. Handy, of the Presbyterian Church of Virginia, who was arrested on an utterly frivolous charge and made a prisoner at Fort Delaware, and whose evangelical labors among the prisoners were so greatly blessed, has published a volume of 670 pages, entitled "United States Bonds," in which he gives a vivid account of the indignities, cruelties and sufferings to which the prisoners there were subjected. We regret that we have only space for a brief extract. Under date of November the 6th, 1863, Dr. Handy thus writes in his diary:

A letter is found in the Philadelphia *Inquirer* of to-day, giving a terrible account of the sufferings of the Yankee prisoners at Rich-

mond. The statement is, palpably, exaggerated and highly colored, and bears the impress of prejudice and great effort for effect. Almost every illustration adduced in the article will apply to Fort Delaware, and to these may be added instances of individual cruelty and oppression, which would put to shame the unscrupulous statements of this writer, who claims to have been a Federal chaplain.

It has not been uncommon here for our half-clothed, half-fed Confederates at the barracks to be ordered about in the coarsest and roughest manner by their inferiors, and to be knocked on the head with sticks, or to be stuck with bayonets, for the slightest offences; and, sometimes (for no crime whatever), men have been shot at or cruelly murdered by sentinels, who bore malice, and justified themselves upon the plea that they were trying to prevent escapes. Sick men have been kept at the barracks until perfectly emaciated from diarrhœa, without the necessary sick vessels, and have been obliged to stagger, through the quarters, to the out-house on the bank of the river, with filth streaming upon their legs; and then, unable to help themselves, they have fallen upon the pathway, and have been found dead in the morning—victims of cruel neglect. Barefooted, bareheaded and ragged men, tottering with disease, have been left to suffer long for the necessary clothing or medicines, which might have been abundantly supplied; men scarcely convalescent have been made to *walk* from one end of the Island to the other in changing hospitals, thus bringing on a relapse in almost every case, and have died in a few days thereafter. Physicians, in contract service, have gone daily into the hospitals, saturated with liquor, and without looking at the tongue or feeling the pulse, have tantalized the poor sufferers with the prescription, "Oh, you must eat! You must eat!" and without either furnishing them with medicine or meat, have left them to die. Sick men, on entering the hospitals, have been denuded of their clothing, and when getting a little better, have been forced to walk over damp floors in their stocking-feet and drawers to the water closet, at a remote end of the building—thus exposing themselves to cold and the danger of a relapse. Men have been dismissed from the hospitals to go to Point Lookout without hat, shoes or blanket; hundreds have been exposed to the danger of contracting the small-pox from coffins filled with loathsome bodies, left for hours together on the wharf, whilst prisoners have been embarking for exchange; the dispensary has remained not only for days, but for weeks together, without some of the most important and common medicines; prisoners have been "bucked and gagged" for the most trivial offences; and the very dead have been robbed of their last shirts, placed in rough coffins, perfectly naked, and then hurried into shallow, unmarked graves.

Much of all this cruelty and inhumanity may not have been designed by those highest in authority, and had they known it, might not have received their sanction, but it has occurred under their administration, and they are, to a greater or less extent, accountable for it all. Were full details given in relation to these matters, they

would be astounding and perhaps incredible. In this place they are referred to with no disposition to exaggerate, nor to prejudice. Some of them could not, perhaps, have been well avoided, but are recorded simply as an offset to the "Chaplain's" details.

The murder of Colonel E. P. Jones by a sentinel is thus described by Dr. Hardy in his diary, under date of July 3d, 1864:

A lamentable affair occurred at "the rear," about dusk, this evening. Many persons are now suffering with diarrhœa, and crowds are frequenting that neighborhood. The orders are to go by one path and return by the other. Two lines of men, going and coming, are in continual movement. I was returning from the frequented spot and, in much weakness, making my way back; when, suddenly, I heard the sentinel challenge from the top of the water-house. I had no idea he was speaking to me, until some friends called my attention to the order. I suppose my pace was too slow for him. I passed on; and as frequent inquiries were made in regard to my health, I was obliged to say to friends, "we have no time to talk; the sentinel is evidently restless or alarmed, and we are in danger."

I had scarcely reached my quarters, before a musket fired; and it was, immediately, reported that Colonel E. P. Jones had been shot.

The murder of Colonel Jones is the meanest, and most inexcusable affair that has occurred in the officers' quarters; or that has come under my own observation since my imprisonment at Fort Delaware. I did not see him fall; but have learned from Captain J. B. Cole, who was an eye-witness to the whole scene, that although he was standing within ten steps of the man that killed him, he heard no challenge, nor any order to move on. The first intimation he had of the sentinel's displeasure was the discharge of the musket, and the simultaneous exclamation of the Colonel—"Oh, God! Oh, God! My God, what did you shoot me for? Why didn't you tell me to go on? I never heard you say anything to me!"—and with a few such exclamations, he sank upon the ground; and then fell, or rather rolled, down the embankment.

Colonel Jones has been in the barracks so short a time, that I have not had the pleasure of making his acquaintance. I have only learned that he is an intelligent physician, of considerable property and influence, and that he is from Middlesex county, Virginia. Since he came to Fort Delaware, he has been, constantly, suffering with some affection of the feet, causing lameness.

At the time he was shot, he was hobbling along, with one shoe, and was carefully stepping down a rough place, near the water-house, buttoning his pants. He could not have been more than twenty steps from the point of the musket. It is said that the murderer seemed, all day, to be seeking an opportunity to shoot some one. It is also reported that Captain Ahl was seen on the top of the shanty, giving some orders, only a few moments before

the catastrophe. These are all the facts that I can learn, concerning this melancholy affair, except that Colonel Jones has been taken to the hospital, and that there is no prospect of his recovery.

Friday, 8th.—The boy who shot Colonel Jones is again on guard, this morning; and it is reported that he has been promoted to a corporalecy. He belongs, I think, to an Ohio regiment, is about eighteen years old, and is known as "Bill Douglas."

Unusual watchfulness prevailed during the night. New sentinels were on guard, in every direction. A noisy fellow tramped under my window until daylight. Guards have been posted inside of "the pen," and everything indicates apprehension, on the part of the Yankees, and danger to the prisoners.

General Schœpf visited "the pen," accompanied by Captain Ahl, and other officers. They were evidently excited, and moved quickly from place to place. Some of the officers were anxious to have an interview, and pressed upon them for a word. I succeeded in halting the General, and spoke to him myself, about the recklessness of the sentinels, and the great danger to which I was personally exposed just before the shooting last night. He referred to the repeated attempts which had, lately, been made to effect escape; spoke decidedly of his purpose to put a stop to the whole thing; and excused the guards. "They shoot down any man," said he, "who tries to get away."

Captain Ahl averred that Colonel Jones had been challenged; and justified the sentinel. Several bystanders insisted, that he was quietly returning from "the rear," and that there was no cause for the murder. Ahl affirmed that he was near by when the shooting took place, and that he had ordered the sentinel to fire at the first man that stopped on the thoroughfare.

I appealed to General Schœpf, to hear a statement of the case; and told him that I had always supposed him to be a humane officer, and disposed to do what was right. He was evidently embarrassed by the presence of Ahl; and nervously moved off towards the gate, followed by his attendants. He was there surrounded by another company of prisoners, who tried to get an audience. He refused to hear them; and referred them to "Dr. Handy," urging as he went out—"He knows I want to do right."

Colonel Jones lingered a few hours, and died in great agony.

Dr. Handy has kindly placed in our hands his private letter-book containing a large number of statements of prison experience by his fellow-prisoners. We can only extract one of these.

STATEMENT OF REV. GEORGE HARRIS, OF UPPERVILLE, VIRGINIA.

On the morning of the 30th of August our quiet village was thrown into excitement by a report of the approach of Yankees. From the fact that private citizens had recently been arrested and carried from their homes by raiding parties, nearly every male inhabitant of the village felt it to be unsafe to remain at home;

and I have reason to believe that I was the only man left in town upon their arrival. I relied upon my sacred calling for security from molestation, and as usual awaited in my own house their coming. Shortly after their arrival, I observed 'a man coming around my house to the *back* door, as though ashamed to approach by the front entrance, and according to my usual custom, I advanced to meet him and learn his business, when the following conversation ensued:

Yankee. Are you the man of this house?

Answer. I am.

Yankee. What's yer name?

Answer. My name is Harris; what is yours?

Yankee. My name? Why my name is ——.

Then looking around, he espied some of the servants in the kitchen, a detached building, and awkwardly moved off to see them. I returned to my seat at my secretary and resumed my occupation of reading. In a few minutes he returned, and leaning against the lintel of the door, said: "Guess you can go with me." "Go with you," said I; "Where shall I go with you?" "Up to headquarters." I arose, took my cane, and walked about a quarter of a mile to the main body of the command. The first officer with whom I met was a brainless, conceited Lieutenant, whose name I never learned. He, without any kind of salutation, accosted me in a manner meant to be extremely scornful, and asked why I had not sent Mosby word they were coming and wanted to meet him. I said to him, "Sir, if you really wished to see Mosby, and desired me to notify him of your coming, why did you not inform me of the fact in time?" "Do you think he would have come?" he queried. "It is extremely probable he would," I replied. He ordered me then to be conducted to the Major. I was taken up to his quarters, and there learned that the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, commanded by Major Waite, a little dapper newspaper correspondent formerly, as I have learned, were my captors. I demanded of this man the cause of my arrest. He replied that he was carrying out his instructions. I asked if I might know what those instructions were. He said, to arrest all men between seventeen and fifty. I reminded him that I was a minister of the gospel, and not subject to military duty. He replied, that if upon my arrival in Washington that fact should appear, I would be released. He ordered me to be taken to a Captain Townsend, who had charge of the prisoners. I declared my purpose to return home for a change of underclothing before I would consent to go, and he might use his pleasure either to take my pledge to return, or to send a man with me as a guard. Yankee-like, he preferred the latter alternative, as, having no such regard for his own word as to prefer faithfulness to a pledge to life itself, he could not believe it to be a trait in the character of any other.

I was obliged to make my few preparations in the most hurried manner, and having commended my family to God, I proceeded

to report myself to my captors again. I found on my return that a large number of citizens had been picked up, among the rest, General Asa Rogers, a gentleman over sixty years of age, and Rev. O. A. Kinsolving, of the Episcopal church. We were moved off, I suppose, about 2 P. M., and proceeded to Aldie, about thirteen miles. Here we halted, and immediately the men scattered to plunder, and every hen-roost in the village was despoiled in a few minutes. Women and children were running through the streets, some screaming, all looking for officers to protect them. Of the nature and extent of their depredations we could only judge by the declarations of such as passed us; all were crying that they were being robbed of everything they had. After remaining here long enough to sack the village completely, they hurried us on to Mt. Zion Meeting House, five miles below Aldie, where we bivouacked on the ground, without blankets, and only a few hard crackers—all any of us had had since morning—for supper. The following morning they issued to us more of the "hard-tack," as they termed it, and some salt pork, which we broiled by sticking it upon the ends of twigs and holding in the blaze of the fire.

As soon as breakfast was over we were once more on the road, and at a most rapid pace. Proceeding nearly to Drainesville, the rear of the column was fired upon, when our gallant Major, dreading an ambuscade, tacked nearly right about, and at an increased speed proceeded nearly to Fairfax Courthouse, and then turning again toward the Potomac, carried us on to Falls Church, halting only about an hour in a very strong position to feed their horses. Thus these gallant fellows who, about 700 strong, had started out, as they said, expressly to catch Mosby, succeeded in capturing thirty-two *citizens*, in stealing some twenty-five horses, robbing private citizens along the whole line of their march of all kinds of supplies, and through fear of an attack made, on their return, a march of not less than forty-five or fifty miles in one day. On the morning of September 1st, Major Waite took occasion to insult us by his profane language and vain boasting of what he had done and was yet to do. His pickets being fired on, however, the camp was thrown into the utmost commotion, and we were hurried off again toward Washington.

Owing to various delays, we were not brought to Washington until afternoon. Near the city we were turned over to Captain Berry and Lieutenant Trask, who treated us with the utmost politeness, and seemed desirous to do all in their power to oblige us and render us comfortable. On arriving in the city we were remanded to the Old Capitol Prison, and paraded through the streets to show to the good and loyal citizens of the capital of "the greatest nation on earth," that the "good work was going bravely on." At the Old Capitol our fare was horrible for several days; the meat given us was putrid, and few of us could eat our bread with the meat before us. A change for the better, however, took place pretty soon after we had an interview with the superintendent, and the fare became

pretty palatable. We were shown many indulgencies, too, until it was ascertained that the most of us would not even take a parole such as they were administering to many citizen prisoners; when suddenly we were informed that we were to be sent off to Fort Delaware, to be subjected at that abode of horrors to severe treatment, in retaliation for treatment of a similar character alleged to have been extended to citizens of the North in Southern prisons. And here we are, exposed in a degree that threatens seriously our health, if not the lives of some of our party. But "hitherto hath the Lord helped us," and in Him is our trust; we will not fear what man can do unto us.

Mr. Harris, one the most devoted and useful ministers in Virginia, contracted disease at Fort Delaware, from which he was a great sufferer until, a few years after the war, death came to "set the prisoner free."

The following deposition of Mr. T. D. Henry was originally written at Oak Grove, Kentucky, in 1866, and was sent to us a few weeks ago:

DEPOSITION OF T. D. HENRY.

Seeing that the Congress of the United States has appointed a committee to investigate the treatment of Federal prisoners in Southern prisons, I have determined, in my feeble manner, to give an account of what I saw and know to be true, as happening in Federal prisons. I was captured with General Morgan at Salenville, Ohio, July 26th, 1863. After capture was carried to Camp Chase, Ohio, where I remained about one month. I was then, together with all the prisoners at that place, carried to Camp Douglas, Illinois. Prison life from September 1863, until the 12th of April 1864, was comparatively such as a man who, according to the fates of war, had been captured might expect, especially when a captive of a boasted Christian nation. Rations were of very good quality and quantity, the only thing unpleasant was the various and severe punishments which the commandant of the camp (Colonel C. V. Deland) saw fit to inflict. If you bribed one of his guards or escaped by any other means, and was afterwards recaptured and brought back, he would have you tied up by the thumbs just so as the toe would reach the ground. I have known men punished thus, until they would grow so deathly sick that they would vomit all over themselves, their heads fall forward and almost every sign of life become extinct; the ends of their thumbs would burst open; a surgeon standing by would feel their pulse and say he thought they could stand it a little longer. Sometimes he would say they had better be cut down. If this failed to cause them to tell who assisted them in escaping, they were then thrown into an iron-clad dungeon ten by ten square, with a single window ten inches by ten. Think of a man staying in this place forty or fifty days, when it was as full as it could be, their only privy being a little hole in the floor,

from which all the odor arose in the room. When this failed a sixty-four pound ball and chain was placed upon their leg, with chain so short as to compel its wearer to carry the ball in their hand, or get some one to pull it in a little wagon while they walked at the side, the chain about twenty-eight inches in length. Some of the balls were worn more than six months. A great many escaped by tunneling. On one occasion a tunnel was discovered under the barrack occupied by (Cluke's regiment) the eighth Kentucky cavalry. Without trying to find out who dug the tunnel, the whole regiment was formed in column of eight deep, and a guard placed around them with instructions to shoot the first man who sat down; this was just after sun up; at two o'clock a man who had just returned the day before from the small-pox hospital, unable to stand longer fell; a guard saw him and fired; one man was killed dead, two others were wounded, one of them losing an arm, as it was afterwards cut off. This same fellow, who did the shooting, was promoted to a corporal's position, whether for this act or not, it is impossible to say, for he affirmed that he would not take \$100 for his gun, as that was the eleventh prisoner he had shot with it. This shooting was carried to such an extent that if a man in going from his barrack to the privy should stop at night he was shot at. If more than five were seen together in the day, or if two at night, the same thing occurred. If any one was heard to whisper at night, or the least ray of light was seen, the guard would fire into the barracks at once. In each barrack there was only two stoves to two hundred men, and for a stove to warm one hundred men, it was frequently red hot. When taps were sounded (*i. e.* "lights out") the fire in the stoves could not be put out immediately. The boys were afraid to go to the stove, for some one was nightly killed in the attempt to extinguish the light. A ball fired from a gun which would ordinarily shoot a thousand yards, would, when fired at a close object, go through three or four barracks, sometimes flattening itself against the barrack, more often burying itself in the vitals of some sleeper, who little thought that that was to be his last sleep on this earth. On one occasion as the flag which floated in front of the commandant's quarters was being hoisted the rope broke, letting the flag fall, which being seen by the regiment to which I belonged (second Kentucky cavalry), a terrific yell was given. This so incensed the Yankees that a certain valiant Captain, Gaffeny by name, marched his company, some eighty strong, up to our barracks; had the regiment formed and went up and down the line kicking the men, and swearing that his company, about eighty strong, could whip the whole camp of about five thousand.

About this time Colonel Deland was ordered to the front. He was succeeded by Colonel B. J. Sweet as commandant of camp, Colonel Skinner as commissary of prisoners, and a fiend named Captain Webb Sponable as inspector of prisoners.

From this time forward the darkest leaf in the legends of all tyranny could not possibly contain a greater number of punishments.

Our whole camp was rearranged; the parapet guard were ordered not to fire unless some one tried to escape; a police guard was placed in the prison to do all the devilment which the infernally fertile mind of Captain Sponable could invent; starvation was carried on quite systematically. Our rations for breakfast consisted of five ounces of bread and six ounces of fresh beef. As the rations for two hundred men were boiled in a sixty-gallon kettle, it was necessary in order to cook it done, to boil it to shreds. In fact there was no more nutritious matter in it than in an old dish cloth, for dinner one pint bean soup and five ounces of bread, *this was our living*. This was not regularly issued, for the slightest offence would cause the captain's direful anger to be aroused. and as he would make most by stopping our rations this was quite a favorite punishment.

His mildest punishment was to get a scantling two inches wide, shave it down until it was only half inch thick on top and put legs about seventeen feet long to it. (This horse, when finished, was called Morgan). Now, for the slight offence of looking at a guard the boys have been placed on this horse for hours, their feet hanging down. Sometimes the Yanks would laugh and say, I will give you a pair of spurs, which was a bucket of sand tied to each foot; also to set the boys astraddle the roof of a dog house. I have seen men who had been left in this condition until the skin and flesh was cut nearly to the bone. Men in the winter would get so cold that they would fall off. When warmed they were put back. Another slight punishment was to saw a barrel in two, cut a hole in one end so as to allow a man's head to go through, but leave the barrel around his shoulders, then march him in the sun until the rays reflected from the barrel would swell his head almost twice its natural size. I have seen men's faces peel all over from this innocent amusement of the guards.

If the least sign of water or spit was seen on the floor the order was, "Come, go to the horse or point for grub," which was to stand with the legs perfectly straight, reach over, and touch the ground with the fingers. If the legs were bent in the least, a guard was present with a paddle, which he well knew how to use. When the guards grew weary of this punishment, another was to make the men pull down their pants and sit, with nothing under them, on the snow and frozen ground. I have known men to be kept sitting until you could see their prints for some days afterwards in the snow and ice. When they got weary of this, they commenced whipping, making the men lay on a barrel, and using their belts, which had a leaden clasp with sharp edge, the belt would often gather wind so as to turn the clasp edgeways; every lick inflicted thus cut entirely through the skin.

If more than five men were seen together, or if anyone was heard to whisper or spit upon the floor, it was certain to be followed by one of these punishments. Frequently men sick in barracks were delirious; sometimes one or two in a barrack were crazy. These

were the cause of a whole barrack of men being mounted on a horse or punished in other ways. Sometimes a guard would come in, and swear he heard some one whispering. He would make four or five men get up, with nothing but their underclothes to protect them against a climate where the thermometer stood twenty degrees below zero. Shooting about this time was less frequent. The fiends were satisfied with such punishment as would most likely end in death. At this period we were reinforced by the prisoners captured in front of Nashville. They, after being cooped up in the cars four or five days, were nearly dead for water. The hydrants were frozen up, and we had eaten all the snow inside the prison. The poor fellows would lay down at or as close to the dead-line as possible, and reach their arm through and pull the snow to them. I saw one of the guards standing twenty-five steps from a prisoner thus engaged shoot at him three times. Fortunately the police guards were armed with pistols; had it been a rifle the poor fellow must have died the first shot.

Think of a man's mind being racked by all of these punishments, for the innocent suffered as well as the guilty, and as frequently, when no one was to blame, were all punished; and it is almost a miracle that anyone should have remained there twenty months without losing his reason.

T. D. HENRY,
*Company E, Duke's Regiment, Second Kentucky Cavalry, General J.
H. Morgan's command.*

Sworn to before me this third day of March, 1876.

WILL. A. HARRIS,
Notary Public in and for San Bernardino county, State of California.

The following statement of Major Robert Stiles of Richmond, Virginia, will be received by his large circle of friends and acquaintances as the testimony of a gentleman "without fear and without reproach."

STATEMENT OF MAJOR ROBERT STILES.

I was a prisoner of war at Johnson's Island and Fort Lafayette from April to October, 1865, having been captured at Sailor's creek. During this time I did not suffer seriously to my own person from bad treatment, but saw and heard no little of the suffering of others.

The Southern field officers were released from Johnson's Island in May or June, but I was held a prisoner because I declined to take the somewhat remarkable oath propounded to us, and refused to give in addition my word of honor that I would say nothing against the Government of the United States.

At Johnson's Island all the formidable nomenclature and enginery of prison discipline were in vogue. We had our "dead line" within and up some distance from the tall fence which formed "the pen,"

which line, if a prisoner crossed, the guard, posted on a plank walk near the top of the fence, was under orders to fire upon him. We had our "*lights out*"—after which, if, for any cause, a lamp or fire was lit, the guard had orders to fire upon the offending light. These orders were sometimes executed with fatal result; and it was currently reported that at least one man of the guard had been promoted to a sergeantcy, for killing a wretched prisoner who, unable to endure the frightful cold, had risen to kindle a fire. We had our "*black-hole*" in which "*refractory*" prisoners were punished, solitary, dark, damp and cramped.

At this, as at all other Federal prisons, the *rations* of prisoners were at sundry times reduced below the amount confessedly indispensable to the maintenance of a man in full health—in retaliation as was alleged for the starvation of Federal prisoners in Confederate prisons. During my stay on the Island, the war being substantially over, the *discipline* and management were more liberal, and the ration, though meagre, larger than it had been; the sutler, too, was open, and the few prisoners fortunate enough to obtain money lived reasonably well, but the majority still suffered from lack of food. After being an inmate of the pen for a few days and observing the really pitiful hunger and destitution, I organized a system of collection from the messes who had money, and patronized the sutler and distribution among the less favored who starved on the prison ration. I fed from a hundred to a hundred and fifty men every day, and this moment can well recall the scene at the daily distribution. I would form them in line, count them off in squads or messes of ten, appointing an orderly for each mess, and then separating my provisions, consisting of scraps more or less fragmentary, into as many piles as there were orderlies, deliver one pile to each orderly for distribution among his mess. After this was done the poor fellows would break ranks and scuffle on the bare ground under the table for the crumbs. These men were all officers of the Confederate armies—most of them field officers.

The *clothing* issued to our prisoners was quite as scanty as the rations, the post surgeon's certificate, that it was absolutely necessary in each individual case, being required to entitle a man to an overcoat—and that for Southern men exiled on a bleak island swept by chill tempests, with the thermometer frequently more than twenty degrees below zero. In order to get one of these certificates, a man was required to stand in line in the open air scantily clad, waiting his time to enter the surgeon's office and submit to an examination to test the condition of his lungs, &c. It can readily be imagined how many were saved from pneumonia and consumption by this humane distribution of overcoats. It is well known that the supply of blankets was totally inadequate until the offer of our Government to trade cotton for clothing for our prisoners was accepted. Of course I did not personally suffer from exposure to cold, being on the Island only during the spring and summer months, but I not only heard of these scenes and regulations from many men

who had wintered on this desert isle, but just before my release, I talked with a gentleman who had resigned or been removed from the place of post surgeon because of his repeated but fruitless protests that it was impossible to maintain men in health while half fed and half clad, and who in particular had attempted to evade the barbarous regulation about overcoats, by giving out certificates, as rapidly as he could write or sign them, that the bearer needed an overcoat on the score of health.

At Fort Lafayette we were well fed; but I have never been able to understand by what rule or principle of civilized warfare, an honorable prisoner of war could be immured for weeks in a stone casemate, among deserters, and prisoners under charges for violating the laws of war.

It gives me pleasure to state that I experienced great kindness from some of the Federal officers during my imprisonment, and especially from a Major Lee, who succeeded Colonel Hill at Johnson's Island. He had lost an arm I think in Gen. Sickles's corps at Gettysburg. The surgeon of whose humanity mention was made above, was not the only Federal officer who during my brief prison experience protested to his superiors against the inhumanity of the prison regimen.

The following statement can be vouched for as strictly accurate :

ROCK ISLAND PRISON, 1864-5.

By Charles Wright, of Tennessee.

I record here my experience in Rock Island Prison, simply as a contribution to history. For the truth of what I state, in some cases I refer to official documents, and in others I refer to thousands of witnesses yet living.

The treatment of prisoners in Northern prisons is a subject that has received little attention from the press, and consequently is little understood. The charges of cruelty to prisoners, made with such confidence against the South, on a recent occasion, for the purpose of political aggrandizement, and which recalls the old story of "Stop thief," where the thief bawled the loudest, makes it necessary in common justice to ventilate the Northern prisons. This could not have been done within the past eleven years for obvious reasons.

The Federal soldier returning home to a land of plenty, his necessities anticipated by benevolent associations, his spirits cheered by the sympathy of a grateful people, and his services rewarded with bounties and pensions by a generous Government, found leisure and encouragement to recount his sufferings and privations to eager listeners, and the air was filled with cries for vengeance on his jailors. But the Confederate soldier returning home from a Northern prison to a land of famine, found his substance wasted and his energies enfeebled; disfranchised and beggared, he forgot

his past sufferings in his present wretchedness; he had neither the time to lament, nor the inclination to talk about his treatment in prison; he was thankful if his health permitted him to labor for those dearer to him than himself, and for the cripple and the invalid there was no resource. There was no lack of sympathy, but his friends were the poor. Thus it happened that the cruelty practised in Northern prisons never came to light. The victor monopolized the story of suffering as well as the spoils.

I arrived at Rock Island prison, Illinois, on the 16th January, 1864, in company with about fifty other prisoners, from Columbus, Kentucky. Before entering the prison we were drawn up in a line and searched; the snow was deep, and the operation prolonged a most unreasonable time. We were then conducted within the prison to Barrack No. 52, and again searched—this time any small change we had about our persons was taken away and placed to our credit with an officer called the Commissary of Prisoners. The first search was probably for arms or other contraband articles. The prison regulations were then read, and we were dismissed. Rock Island is in the Mississippi river, about fifteen hundred miles above New Orleans, connected with the city of Rock Island, Illinois, on the East, and the city of Davenport, Iowa, on the West, by a bridge. It is about three miles in length.

The prison was 1,250 feet in length by 878 feet in width, enclosing twenty-five acres. The enclosure was a plank fence, about sixteen feet high, on the outside of which a parapet was built about twelve feet from the ground. Here sentinels were placed overlooking the prison. About twenty feet from the fence, on the inside, was what was called the "Dead Line"—at first marked with stakes, afterwards by a ditch—over which it was death to pass. The barracks were sixty feet from the fence, the width between each barrack thirty feet, and streets one hundred feet wide between each row of barracks. Two avenues, one the length of the prison, and ninety feet wide, the other in length the width of the prison, and one hundred and thirty feet wide, divided the space enclosed into four equal divisions each containing twenty-one barracks, making a total of eighty-four. These barracks were each one hundred feet long by twenty-two feet wide, and contained three tiers of bunks—platforms of rough plank for sleeping. About fifteen feet of the rear of the room was partitioned off for a cook-room, and was furnished with a stove and boiler. The main room had two stoves for burning coal—this article being cheap and abundant. Each barrack was constructed to receive one hundred and twenty men. The sinks were first erected in the centre of the streets, but afterwards built on the dead line; there being no sewerage, tubs were used, and details of prisoners every morning carried the tubs to the river, a most disgusting duty. Towards the end of the war a sewer was made in one of the avenues extending to the river, the prisoners being employed in blasting rock for that purpose.

The chief executive officers were a commandant of the post and a provost marshal, the latter having the immediate care and government of the prisoners, assisted by a number of deputies. The parapet was first guarded by a regiment of old men, called Greybeards, afterwards by the 197th Pennsylvania Volunteers, and from July, 1864, by the 108th United States Colored Infantry. The duty of calling the roll of prisoners was performed by several companies of the Fourth Veteran Reserve Corps. These men were soldiers who had seen service in various regiments, and on account of wounds or other disabilities were formed into corps for prison duty. Each barrack was in charge of a prisoner appointed by the provost marshal, called the orderly of the barrack. All orders concerning the prisoners were communicated to these orderlies by the provost marshal. The roll was called three times a day, and the barracks inspected every morning. One letter only could be written each week, not to exceed a page, and no subject concerning the prison or its regulations could be referred to. Newspapers were prohibited. The last two precautions were, however, frequently evaded. Thrifty Federal soldiers employed in the prison would receive a number of letters collected by a prisoner, and mail them outside the prison for a fee of twenty-five cents on each letter. Newspapers were brought in by the same parties and sold for twenty-five cents a number. Occasionally they were searched and discovered, and tied up by the thumbs. Frequent searches were made of the barracks for clothing. In these searches the provost marshal's men would carry off whatever *they* considered surplus clothing, leaving scant wardrobes to those unfortunates who had not prepared for the visit by secreting their extra drawers, shirt, &c. The sutler of the post supplied prisoners who had money to their credit with the commissary of prisoners with such articles as they needed. This was done through orders, the sutler's wagon delivering the goods once a week. This arrangement, however, ceased as regards any article of food, in August, 1864. I refer to the order in another place.

The winter of 1863-4 was intensely cold. During this time some poor fellows were without blankets, and some even without shoes. They would huddle around the stoves at night and try to sleep. The feet of those who had no shoes, or were poorly protected, became sore and swollen, and in one case that I saw, mortification no doubt ensued, for the man was taken from my barrack to the hospital and died in a few days.

The severity of the weather caused cleanliness of person and clothing to be disregarded by some, and as a consequence scarcely a man escaped the itch. Early in 1864 the small-pox broke out in the prison. The authorities were not prepared for the appearance of this fearful disease—the hospitals not being finished. The infected and the healthy men were in the same barrack. The disease spread so rapidly there was no room in the buildings outside the prison, and certain barracks within the enclosure were set apart for

small-pox hospitals. Prisoners who had had the small-pox were detailed for nurses to those who were sick. The surgeons vaccinated the men at intervals, but apparently with little effect. The death rate at this time was alarming. On the 9th March, 1864, twenty-nine men had died in the hospital from my barrack, which did not have its full complement of men. I noted the names of the men to that date. They are the following :

R. Shed, T. J. Smith, Allen Screws, D. W. Sandlin, Joe Shipp, D. L. Trundle, J. H. Wood, J. J. Webster, J. J. Akins, Thomas Pace, William Tatum, W. H. Dotson, W. R. Jones, C. E. Middleton, R. R. Thompson, William T. St. John, Samuel Hendrix, Jere. Therman, E. Stallings, E. Sapp, Thomas Burton, M. E. Smithpeter, J. M. Ticer, J. L. Smith, John Graham, T. W. Smallwood, Jonathan Faw, G. L. Underwood, C. R. Mangrum.

Now assuming the barrack contained one hundred and twenty men, which was its full complement, the death rate to March 9, 1864, was twenty-five per cent.

The provost marshal's abstract for May 12, 1865, has the following figures :

Number of prisoners received,	-	-	-	12,215
Died,	-	-	-	1,945
Entered United States navy,	-	-	-	1,077
Entered United States army, (frontier service),	-	-	-	1,797
Released,	-	-	-	1,386
Transferred,	-	-	-	72
Escaped,	-	-	-	45
Exchanged,	-	-	-	3,729
				<hr/> 10,051
Remaining in prison May 12, 1865,	-	-	-	<hr/> <u>2,164</u>

As all the prisoners were discharged in June, 1865, this date (May 12) is near enough for our purpose. It shows that nearly sixteen per cent. died during the eighteen months Rock Island was used as a prison. This number (1,945) includes those who were killed by the sentinels—the killed not being classified by the provost marshal.

The number released (1,386) includes those who having offered to join the United States navy or army were rejected by the surgeons as physically disqualified. More than fifty per cent. of the released were of this class. The balance were principally Missourians, captured during Price's last raid. These claimed to be Union men, and having proved their loyalty to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War, were released by his order. The prisoners transferred were officers originally brought to Rock Island, but afterwards sent to Johnson's Island or other military prisons.

In April, 1864, the sentinels on the parapet commenced firing at the prisoners and into the barracks, and this practice continued

while I remained. I am ignorant as to the orders the sentinels received, but I know that the firing was indiscriminate, and apparently the mere caprice of the sentinels. Going to the sinks at night was a most dangerous undertaking, for they were now built on the "dead line," and lamps with reflectors were fastened to the plank fence—the sentinel above being unseen, while the man approaching the sink was in full view of the sentinel. Frequently they would halt a prisoner and make him take off his pants in the street, and then order him to come to the sink in his drawers, (if he had any). I have heard the cocking of a gun presented at myself while going to the sink at night, but by jumping into an alley between the barracks I saved myself the exercise of walking to the sink in my drawers or from receiving the contents of the gun. I find this entry in my diary on June 10, 1864: "Attacked with diarrrhœa in the night. Afraid to go near the sink." I cannot say that the sentinels had positive orders to shoot on each occasion, but that they received encouragement to do so, and were relieved of all responsibility for such acts, is certain from the following orders, which were publicly promulgated to the orderlies of barracks by the provost marshal, to wit:

May 12, 1864.—Ordered, that no prisoner be out of his barracks after "taps."

May 13, 1864.—Ordered, any prisoner shouting or making a noise will be shot.

It was noticed and discussed among the prisoners, that the shooting was most violent immediately after a Confederate success. I noted some cases that came under my own observation, but by no means a complete list; in fact, the prisoners became so accustomed to the firing from the parapet, that unless it occurred near his side of the prison, a man would take little notice of it.

1864.

April 27—Prisoner shot by sentinel.

May 27—One man killed and one wounded in the leg.

June 9—Franks, Fourth Alabama Cavalry, killed last night at barrack No. 12. He was shot by the sentinel on the parapet as he was about to step into the street. His body fell into the barrack, and lay there till morning. The men afraid to go near him during the night.

22—Bannister Cantrell, Co. G., 18th Georgia, and James W. Ricks, Co. F., 50th Georgia, were shot by the sentinel on the parapet. They were on detail working in the ditch, and had stopped to drink some fresh water just brought to them.

26—Prisoner shot in leg and arm while in his bunk at barrack 55.

During August, and part of September, I was confined to my bunk with dysentery, and have few entries in my diary.

1864.

- September 26—William Ford, Co. D, Wood's Missouri Battery, of barrack 60, killed by sentinel on the parapet. He was returning from the sink, and shot through the body at the rear of barrack 72.
- 26—T. P. Robertson, Co. I, Twenty-fourth South Carolina, shot by sentinel on parapet, and wounded in the back, while sitting in front of barrack 38, about 8 o'clock this morning.
- 26—T. J. Garrett, Co. K, Thirteenth Arkansas, shot by sentinel on parapet during the night while going to the sink.
- 27—George R. Canthew, of barrack 28, shot by sentinel on parapet.
- 28—Sentinel shot into barrack No. 12 through the window.
- October 4—Man killed in the frontier pen by negro sentinel.
- 21—I was taken out of the prison and paroled, to remain at headquarters of the post.

In none of the above cases were the men attempting to escape or violating any of the known rules of the prison.

The firing of the 26th September was regarded as the parting salute of the 197th Pennsylvania Volunteers, that regiment being relieved at guard-mount by the 108th United States Colored Infantry.

The first call for prisoners to join the United States service was in March, 1864. It was proposed to release all who offered to enter the Navy, and were rejected by the surgeon. According to the provost marshal's abstract 1,077 recruits were obtained. The next call was on the 11th September, 1864. This was for the purpose of organizing regiments for frontier service, that is, for the Indian country. For a time very few availed themselves of this chance to get something to eat, and repeated calls were made. At length, a separate enclosure being built, it was announced that the gates would be open all night, and candidates would be received at any time. Then a remarkable change took place. The frontier service became quite popular. Men who had ridiculed others for joining, decamped during the night and enrolled *themselves* in the frontier service. This latter arrangement partook rather of the character of a private speculation. A certain Judge Petty, of the oil regions of Pennsylvania, came to Rock Island with authority from the President of the United States, and offered a bounty of \$100 to each man enlisted, with the assurance that such as were rejected by the surgeon should be released. Each man enlisted was a substitute for a citizen of Venango, Clarion, and other adjoining counties of Pennsylvania, who had been drafted to serve in the United States army. It was reported that these citizens paid \$300 each to Judge Petty to obtain a substitute, but whatever he received, I know

that only \$100 each was paid the enlisted men for the frontier service. Captain H. R. Rathbone, United States army, came from Washington, and mustered the men into service. I was detailed to assist in preparing the muster-rolls, and can vouch for all the foregoing except the \$300, which I leave with the citizens of Venango, Clarion, and other counties represented in the war by the prisoners of Rock Island. If the report be true, Judge Petty "struck oil" at Rock Island for 1,797 times \$200, or \$359,400.

Until June 1st, 1864, no reasonable complaint could be made in regard to the food furnished the prisoners; but from that date until June, 1865, the inmates of Rock Island were subjected to starvation and all its attendant horrors. I know that this charge was denied by the officers of that prison at the very time the atrocity was being perpetrated. God may forgive whoever caused the deed to be done, but surely there is little hope for whoever denies it now. The following is a copy of a circular from the Commissary General of Prisoners, dated June 1st, 1864. It is the ration ordered for each prisoner per day:

Pork or Bacon.....	10 ounces,	in lieu of fresh beef.	
Fresh beef.....	14 ounces.		
Flour or soft bread....	16 ounces.		
Hard bread.....	14 ounces,	in lieu of flour or soft bread.	
Corn meal.....	16 ounces,	in lieu of flour or soft bread.	
Beans or peas.....	12½ pounds,	} to 100 rations.	
Or rice or hominy.....	8 pounds,		
Soap.....	4 pounds,		
Vinegar.....	3 quarts,		
Salt	3¾ pounds,		

Now all this means only bread and meat—sixteen ounces of the former, and fourteen ounces of the latter; and we will add one-hundredth part of eight pounds of hominy. For let the reader observe that if hominy is issued, rice or peas or beans is not issued. Here, then, we have only three articles of food according to the official document, but in so far as that represents the quantities and the kind of articles issued to the prisoners, it is a fraud; as Paul wrote the Galatians, "Behold, before God, I lie not." Here is what the prisoners actually received:

Twelve ounces corn bread, four and a half ounces salt beef (usually unfit for human food). No man can conceive the effect of this diet. To realize what he *would* eat at the end of a month he must experience this treatment for a month. Did the prisoners eat rats and mice and dogs when they could get them? What would they not eat? The cravings of hunger were never relieved. One continued gnawing anguish, that sleep aggravated rather than appeased was ever present. They did eat rats and mice to my knowledge.

The dogs were missing, and who will doubt that the starved wretches, who ate rats, had feasted on the dogs. What difference is there between my statement and the official circular? I say twelve ounces bread; it says sixteen ounces. I say four and a half ounces salt beef; it says ten ounces salt pork. I say two articles of

food, the circular mentions three. The bread we received was made of corn meal, in loaves shaped like bricks, and about as hard. The salt beef had a most offensive odor. An orderly asked an officer of the prison to step into his barrack and smell the beef; he did so, but merely remarked he had often eaten worse. Depravity had reached its limit in his case, for he was doing violence to his stomach in even smelling that beef.

I find this note in my diary July 10, 1864: "Nothing to eat till one o'clock," and again September 18th: "Nothing to eat at all this day." For some reason the bread wagon did not come in; the bread was issued daily, and the meat which was issued every ten days, had been consumed. There is not at first glance very much difference between my statement and the commissary's circular, and for a few days the difference in *quantity* would be immaterial, but when the *quality* of the food, and the weary sameness through many months is considered, even the commissary's allowance would have been a sumptuous repast. Think of it for a moment. We will take his bacon, and his beans, and his soft bread, that is all to be sure, but what a meal, when compared with the stinking salt beef, and the hard corn bread.

When the order reducing the ration, dated June 1st, 1864, went into effect, those prisoners who were fortunate enough to have money to their credit with the commissary, could still obtain flour from the sutler, and large quantities were brought in every week. The commissary's journal would prove this, and at the same time show the scarcity of bread within the prison.

Prisoners who had no money wrote to their friends for food; and those who had no friends who were able to send them food, were not all neglected; for the Christian women of the North came to their assistance, with food and clothing; and continued active and untiring, even in the face of official insolence, until the order from the Commissary General of Prisoners, dated Washington, August 10th, 1864, cut the prisoners off from the outside world, and all hope of assistance. No more food from friends; no more flour from the sutler; no more clothing; no prospect of exchange; no hope of release, no more visits from wife or mother. Under these circumstances the wonder is that more men did not join the United States army. Disease followed as a matter of course, and the death rate is fully accounted for.

On the 10th October, 1864, being a British subject, I addressed a protest to Lord Lyons, then the British minister at Washington, from which I make the following extracts:

* * * I further declare that the food issued to us is unwholesome, insufficient and productive of disease; * * * that we are strictly prohibited by circular No. 4, dated Office of Commissary General of Prisoners, Washington, D. C., August 10th, 1864, from receiving, by purchase or otherwise, vegetables or other provisions, in consequence scurvy is prevalent and other diseases generated. * * * Subject as I am to the pangs of hunger, to disease, to a

violent death, I appeal to your lordship to demand a mitigation of the rigor of my present situation."

This was made known to the United States Government, by the British minister, in a letter to Mr. Seward, dated October 20th, 1864, in these words: * * * "Wright complains very much of the quantity and quality of the food he gets as being insufficient and generative of disease. I hope that his case may be attended to, and that I may hear something soon upon the subject."

A few days after this I was paroled to assist in the clerical duties of the post adjutant's office, and remained there until released in June, 1865.

It must not be supposed that my correspondence with the British minister left the prison in the prescribed channel. I had tried that, and found that certain letters of mine did not reach him. My communications were smuggled out in the manner I have described in this paper, and sent under cover to friends in St. Louis and Albany, who mailed them. I mention this because the Secretary of War took some credit to himself for liberality in my case, as will be seen from the following extract of a letter addressed to Mr. Seward:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY,
October 12th, 1864.

* * * * *

Mr. Wright makes no complaint of harsh treatment, and the papers which he presents show that the officers who have had him in charge have rendered him every facility in submitting his appeal.

* * * * *

If Mr. Seward was misled by this statement in regard to my treatment, he was certainly undeceived when he received the British minister's note, dated October 20th, of which I have given an extract.

The wretched condition of the prisoners at Rock Island was well known to the citizens of Rock Island City and Davenport.

At the request of Judge Grant of the latter city, on the 20th of September, 1864, I made a faithful statement of the treatment and condition of the prisoners; and for this purpose, in company with others, I visited a number of barracks. The bread and the meat were carefully weighed, and the quality of the food truthfully reported. The judge desired a plain statement, without exaggeration or comment, to use in an effort he was about to make at Washington to ameliorate the condition of the prisoners. As no change for the better took place, the presumption is that Judge Grant did not succeed in his benevolent mission. I have mentioned that the officers of the prison denied the charge of cruelty, at a time when the poor wretches within the walls were sinking under the starvation diet I have described. That denial was made necessary in

consequence of the following letter, which appeared in the *New York News* in January, 1865:

[From a Private Letter.]

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, December 27, 1864.

* * * "The condition and suffering of the Rebel prisoners at Rock Island is a source of agony to every heart not absolutely dead to the feelings of common humanity and the scantiest Christian mercy. There are from six to eight thousand confined here. Many have taken 'the oath'—any oath to save themselves from actual starvation. These released prisoners, though liberated at different intervals of time, all tell the same story. The allowance to each man has been one small loaf of bread (it takes three to make a pound), and a piece of meat two inches square per day. This was the rations! Lately it has been reduced. Think of it reduced! All the released ones say that no man can live on the rations given, and that there are men that would do anything to get enough to eat! Such is the wretched, ravenous condition of these poor starving creatures, that several dogs which have come to the barracks with teams have fallen victims to their hunger, and they are trapping rats and mice for food, actually to save life. Many of them are nearly naked, bare-footed, bare-headed, and without bed-clothes; exposed to ceaseless torture from the chill and pitiless winds of the upper Mississippi. Thus, naked and hungry, and in prison, enduring a wretchedness which no tongue can describe, no language tell, they suffer from day to day—each day their number growing less by death—death, their only comforter—their only merciful visitor!

God in heaven! Shall these things continue? Can we hope for success in our cause? Will a merciful and just God bless and prosper it, if such cruel inhumanity is practiced by our rulers? May we not provoke a terrible and just chastisement at His hands? No Christian heart, knowing the facts, can feel otherwise.

Many charitable persons, influenced by no other motives than common humanity and Christian duty, have sent supplies of clothing to these prisoners, but they have not been permitted to reach them. I have heard of sales of such clothing having been made across the river at Davenport, at very low prices. Is it possible that the authorities at Washington know of and approve these things.

A good many have taken the oath, stating afterwards to citizens that they did so really to save them from starvation. I learn that there are about five thousand confined here, who have resolved to die rather than do so. Although they are wrong, is there not a sublime heroism in the adherence of these men, amid such trials, to a cause which they believe to be right?"

This exposure was denounced by a Chicago paper as "An infamous Rebel falsehood," and "an attempt to justify the Rebels in starving our prisoners." The Chicago journalist may be excused on the ground of ignorance, but not so the officers of the prison;

as principals or as tools they committed this outrage on humanity for the sake of their commissions, like the Irish jurors portrayed by Curran, "Conscience swung from its moorings, and they sought safety for themselves in the surrender of the victims."

But hunger was not the only cause of suffering, clothing was prohibited. The provost marshal took possession of all boxes and packages addressed to prisoners—these were opened and examined—and until August, 1864, with the exception of some pilfering, usually reached the owner; but after that date, the prisoners were not permitted to receive anything sent by friends or relatives. How much clothing and provisions fell into the hands of the provost marshal and his men after August, will never be known. What they did with the booty may be readily guessed. On the 22d February, 1865, three Confederate officers arrived, and distributed clothing to the prisoners, but the worst part of the winter had then been endured, for want of that covering the jailors had taken away. I have given my own experience until October, 1864, but I know that the suffering was even more terrible during the following winter. In a climate where the well clothed sentinels were relieved at short intervals to prevent their freezing to death, nature demands a generous food to sustain life; but the last winter in Rock Island prison presented a scene of destitution only to be equaled by a crew of cast-aways in the frozen ocean, and this too where the sound of Sabbath bells were heard. It was a pleasant sound to many who felt that their troubles were nearly ended; it seemed a prelude to the melody that awaited them in a better land. But to those who could not die, whose vitality doomed them to suffer, what a mockery the sound seemed to them; what rebellious thoughts of God's injustice took possession of their souls, and would not down while tortured with the cravings of hunger. I have realized these things. I have noted one day that I tasted no food. It was Sunday the 18th September, 1864. I was recovering from a severe attack of dysentery. I was very hungry. The church bells were ringing as I eagerly watched the great gate of the prison hoping it would open, and the bread wagon would come in, but hour after hour passed away, and there was no sign, evening came on and I gave up all hope. I had lingered near that gate all day. Hunger is delirium, and the gospel is not for the famished body. The good men who sometimes preached for us had had their breakfasts. The Government that sent us preachers would not send us bread.

Dr. Handy has preserved in his letter-book an original copy of

PRISON RULES AT FORT DELAWARE,

which we give in full:

HEADQUARTERS FORT DELAWARE,
July 8th, 1864.

- I. Roll call at reveille and retreat.
- II. Police call at 7 A. M. and 4 P. M.
- III. Breakfast call at 8 A. M.; dinner, 2 P. M.
- IV. Sergeants in charge of the prisoners will exact from them a strict compliance with the above calls, which will be regularly enforced, and must promptly report to the officer in charge, the number present and absent, sick, etc.; and any who are guilty of insubordination, or any violation of the rules of this prison. They must also notify their men that if they do not promptly obey any order given them by a sentinel, officer, or men in charge of them, they will be shot.
- V. Sergeants in charge will be held responsible for the due execution of these rules, and for the regular accounting for the number of their men.

By command A. Schœpf, Brigadier-General.

(Signed)

GEORGE W. AHL,
Captain and A. A. G.

We have received a paper from Mr. John A. Bateson, of Pioche, Nevada, one of the Federal guard at Rock Island, which is a strong confirmation of the above statement of Mr. Wright.

Mr. Bateson is vouched for by a district judge and a prominent lawyer of Pioche as a gentleman of "perfect truthfulness and reliability"; and he refers to a number of leading Republicans in the Northwest, with whom he has always been politically associated, "for an endorsement of his character as a staunch Republican and honorable man."

His, therefore, is not "Rebel" testimony, but that of a Union soldier, and "a truly loyal Republican," whom Mr. Blaine cannot dismiss with the cry of "traitor."

TESTIMONY OF A FEDERAL SOLDIER.

PIOCHE, February 19, 1876.

During a period of ten months I was a member of the garrison of the Rock Island Military Prison. There were confined there about ten thousand men. Those men were retained in a famishing condition by order of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. That order was approved by Abraham Lincoln. It was read before the inside garrison of the prison sometime in January, 1864. It was

read at assembly for duty on the 2d, in front of the prison. It went into effect on the following day. It continued in force until the expiration of my term of service, and, I have understood, until the close of the war.

When it was read, Colonel Shaffner, of the Eighth Veteran Reserves, was acting Provost Marshal of Prisoners. I think that it was Captain Robinson who read the order. It reduced the daily allowance of the captives to about ten ounces of bread and four ounces of meat per man.

Some time in January a batch of prisoners arrived. They were captured at Knoxville. Sixty of them were consigned to barracks under my charge. They were received by me at about 3 in the afternoon. One of the prisoners inquired of me when they would draw rations. I told him not until the following day. He said that in that case some of his comrades must die, as they had eaten nothing since their capture several days before—the exact period I cannot state. That evening at roll call one of the prisoners exhibited symptoms of delirium. He moved from the ranks, and seemed to grasp for something, which I understood to be a table loaded with delicacies. I returned him to the ranks, where he remained until roll-call was over, when I left. On the following morning he and two others were dead.

The mortality report among the *new Rebs* was extraordinarily large. I think it amounted to about ten per cent. of the entire number. It created an interest among the company commandants, and was the subject of many expressions. From the Rebel orderlies I learned that the symptoms in each case were the same. There was no complaint; no manifestation of illness. Some dropped while standing on the floor; others fell from a sitting posture. All swooned and died without a struggle.

Some of the prisoners had money sent them. It was deposited with the Provost Marshal, and their orders on the sutler were at first honored, but supplies from this direction were soon prohibited; the sutler's wagon was excluded from the prison. Supplies from relatives of prisoners, consisting of clothes, food and stationery came for some. The parcels containing them were distributed from "Barrack Thirty." The boxes were examined, everything in the shape of subsistence was removed, and the box and its contents delivered to the prisoner; the food it contained was destroyed before the face of the tantalized captive.

Small tufts of a weed, called parsley, grew under the sides of the prison. It was over the dead-line, where prisoners dare not go. At their earnest entreaty I have sometimes plucked and handed it to some of them. They told me it was a feast. Squads of prisoners under guard were sent to work in different parts of the Island. They sometimes purchased raw potatoes and onions for their comrades suffering with scurvy. They were searched at the prison gate, and those articles taken from them.

I am ready to swear that in my opinion the Knoxville prisoners were starved to death.

As to the torture endured by the scurvy patients, the shooting of prisoners by the guards on the parapets, the smashing of their skulls with revolvers by officers of the prison, such misfortunes are incident to prison life, and neither the Government nor the Republican party can be held responsible for them.

The weather on January 1st was the most intensely cold I ever experienced; and from all parts of the prison came intelligence of prisoners frozen to death. One died in one of my companies. He was reported to me, and I placed my hand on the corpse; it was frozen. This is the first time I have mentioned it. I cannot say that he froze to death.

JOHN A. BATESON,
115th E. V. R. C., *Second Battalion.*

We have a long

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. VAN-ALLEN,

of Watkins, Schuyler county, New York, from which we make the following extract:

Late in the fall of 1864, and when the bitter sleets and biting frosts of winter had commenced, a relief organization was improvised by some of the generous ladies and gentlemen of the city of Baltimore for the purpose of alleviating the wants of those confined in the Elmira Prison, where there were then several thousand prisoners.

I had the honor to be appointed by that organization to ascertain the needs of the prisoners, to distribute clothing, money, etc., as they might require. I had formerly lived at Elmira, where I studied my profession, but then (as now) I resided at this place, twenty miles distant from Elmira, where I have resided for nearly twenty-five years, and was well known at Elmira.

As soon as appointed I journeyed to that delightful paradise for Confederate prisoners (according to Walker, Tracy and Platt), and stated the object of my visit to the commanding officer, and asked to be permitted to go through the prison in order to ascertain the wants of the prisoners, with the request that I might distribute necessary blankets, clothing, money, medicines, etc.

He treated me with consideration and kindness, and informed me that they were very destitute of clothing and blankets; that not one-half of them had even a single blanket; and that many were nearly naked, the most of them having been captured during the hot summer months with no other than thin cotton clothes, which in most instances were in tatters. Yet he stated that he could not allow me to enter the prison gate or administer relief, as an order of the War Department rendered him powerless. I then asked him to telegraph the facts to the War Department and ask a revocation or modification of the order, which he did; and two or three days were thus consumed by me in a fruitless endeavor

to procure the poor privilege of carrying out the designs of the good Samaritans at Baltimore who were seeking to alleviate in a measure the wants of the poor sufferers, who were there dying off like rotten sheep from cold and exposure. The officer in command was an army officer, and his heart nearly bled for those poor sufferers; and I know he did all in his power to aid me, but his efforts were fruitless to assist me to put a single coat on the back of a sufferer. The brutal Stanton was inexorable to all my entreaties, and turned a deaf ear to the tale of their sufferings. The only proposition that could be entertained was this: If I would fetch clothing only of a gray color (Confederate uniforms) I could place it in the hands of some under-strappers of the *loyal persuasion*, as well as such moneys as I might wish to leave in the same hands, and they would distribute the same as they liked.

This could not be allowed to be done by the commanding officer, but must be done by one of the *loyal* (?) gentry, who I became satisfied would absorb it before any poor Confederate soldier would even catch a glimpse at its shadow; and I was actually forced to give the matter up in despair.

The nearest I could get to the poor skeletons confined in that prison, was a tower built by some speculator in an adjoining field across the way from the prison pen, for which privilege a money consideration was exacted and paid. On taking a position upon this tower what a sight of misery and squalor was presented! My heart was made sick, and I blushed for my country—more because of the inhumanity there depicted. Nearly all of the many thousands there were in dirty rags. The rain was pouring, and thousands were without shelter, standing in the mud in their bare feet, with clothes in tatters, of the most unsubstantial material, without blankets. I tell the truth, and Mr. Charles C. B. Watkins dare not deny it, when I say these men suffered bitterly for the want of clothing, blankets and other necessities. I was denied the privilege of covering their nakedness.

The above statement needs no comment. The refusal of Mr. Stanton to allow this high-minded, Northern gentleman to distribute supplies among these destitute suffering prisoners, was of a piece with his insolent reply to Hon. A. J. Beresford Hope, who wrote for permission to use a sum of money raised by English gentlemen to alleviate the condition of Confederate prisoners at the North, and received for answer, that the United States Government *was rich enough to provide for its prisoners, and needed no foreign help.*

Yes! the United States Government *was* amply able to provide for its captives; but it chose to adopt a system of cold-blooded cruelty, and to seek to avoid the verdict of history by the most persistent slanders against the Confederate authorities.

We give in full the following statement of a medical officer of

the United States army, who was on duty at the Elmira prison. His letter was originally published in the *New York World*, and dated from Brooklyn, New York:

STATEMENT OF A UNITED STATES MEDICAL OFFICER.

To the Editor of the World:

Sir—I beg herewith (after having carefully gone through the various documents in my possession pertaining to the matter) to forward you the following statistics and facts of the mortality of the Rebel prisoners in the Northern prisons, more particularly at that of Elmira, New York, where I served as one of the medical officers for many months. I found, on commencement of my duties at Elmira, about 11,000 Rebel prisoners, fully one-third of whom were under medical treatment for diseases principally owing to an improper diet, a want of clothing, necessary shelter and bad surrounding; the diseases were consequently of the following nature: Scurvy, diarrhœa, pneumonia, and the various branches of typhoid, all superinduced by the causes, more or less, aforementioned.

The winter of 1864-5 was an unusually severe and rigid one, and the prisoners arriving from the Southern States during this season were mostly old men and lads, clothed in attire suitable only to the genial climate of the South. I need not state to you that this alone was ample cause for an unusual mortality amongst them. The surroundings were of the following nature, viz: narrow, confined limits, but a few acres of ground in extent, and through which slowly flowed a turbid stream of water, carrying along with it all the excremental filth and debris of the camp; this stream of water, horrible to relate, was the only source of supply, for an extended period, that the prisoners could possibly use for the purpose of ablution, and to slake their thirst from day to day; the tents and other shelter allotted to the camp at Elmira were insufficient, and crowded to the utmost extent—hence, small pox and other skin diseases raged through the camp.

Here I may note that, owing to a general order from the Government to vaccinate the prisoners, my opportunities were ample to observe the effects of spurious and diseased matter, and there is no doubt in my mind but that syphilis was engrafted in many instances; ugly and horrible ulcers and eruptions of a characteristic nature were, alas, too frequent and obvious to be mistaken. Small pox cases were crowded in such a manner that it was a matter of impossibility for the surgeon to treat his patients individually; they actually laid so adjacent that the simple movement of one of them would cause his neighbor to cry out in agony of pain. The confluent and malignant type prevailed to such an extent, and of such a nature, that the body would frequently be found one continuous scab.

The diet and other allowances by the Government for the use of the prisoners were ample, yet the poor unfortunates were allowed

to starve; but why, is a query which I will allow your readers to infer, and to draw conclusions therefrom. Out of the number of prisoners, as before mentioned, over three thousand of them now lay buried in the cemetery located near the camp for that purpose; a mortality equal, if not greater than that of any prison in the South. At Andersonville, as I am well informed by brother officers who endured confinement there, as well as by the records at Washington, the mortality was twelve thousand out of say about forty thousand prisoners. Hence it is readily to be seen that range of mortality was no less at Elmira than at Andersonville.

At Andersonville there was actually nothing to feed or clothe the prisoners with, their own soldiers faring but little better than their prisoners; this, together with a torrid sun and an impossibility of exchange, was abundant cause for their mortality. With our prisoners at Elmira, no such necessity should honestly have existed, as our Government had actually, as I have stated, most bountifully made provision for the wants of all detained, both of officers and men. Soldiers who have been prisoners at Andersonville, and have done duty at Elmira, confirm this statement, and which is in nowise in one particular exaggerated; also, the same may be told of other prisons managed in a similarly terrible manner. I allude to Sandusky, Delaware and others. I do not say that all prisoners at the North suffered and endured the terrors and the cupidity of venal sub-officials; on the contrary, at the camps in the harbor of New York, and at Point Lookout, and at other camps where my official duties from time to time have called me, the prisoners in all respects have fared as our Government intended and designated they should. Throughout Texas, where food and the necessaries of life were plentiful, I found our own soldiers faring well, and to a certain extent contented, so far, at least, as prisoners of war could reasonably expect to be.

Our Government allowed the prisoners of war the following rations: Twelve ounces of pork or bacon, or one pound of salt or fresh beef; one pound six ounces of soft bread or flour, or one pound of corn meal; and to every one hundred rations, fifteen pounds of beans or peas and ten pounds of rice or hominy, ten pounds of green coffee or five pounds of roasted ditto, or one pound eight ounces of tea, fifteen pounds of sugar, four quarts of vinegar, thirty pounds of potatoes, and if fresh potatoes could not be obtained, canned vegetables were allowed. Prisoners of war will receive for subsistence one ration each, without regard to rank; their private property shall be duly respected, and each shall be treated with regard to his rank, and the wounded are to be treated with the same care as the wounded of our army.

How faithfully these regulations were carried out at Elmira is shown by the following statement of facts: The sick in hospitals were curtailed in every respect (fresh vegetables and other antiscorbutics were dropped from the list), the food scant, crude and unfit; medicine so badly dispensed that it was a farce for the med-

ical man to prescribe. At large in the camp the prisoner fared still worse; a slice of bread and salt meat was given him for his breakfast, a poor hatched-up, concocted cup of soup, so called, and a slice of miserable bread, was all he could obtain for his coming meal; and hundreds of sick, who could in nowise obtain medical aid died, "unknelled, uncoffined and unknown." I have in nowise drawn on the imagination, and the facts as stated can be attested by the staff of medical officers who labored at the Elmira prison for the Rebel soldiers.

EX-MEDICAL OFFICER UNITED STATES ARMY.

We could multiply such statements as are given above almost indefinitely.

We have the diary of the prison experience of Rev. L. W. Allen (a prominent Baptist minister of Virginia), the diary of Captain Robert E. Park, of Georgia, the narrative of Benjamin Dashiels, of Colonel Snowden Andrews' Maryland Artillery, who was most inhumanly punished at Fort Delaware for refusing to give the names of friends in Maryland who were secretly ministering to the suffering prisoners, and a number of other MSS., which all go to prove the points we have made. Indeed, it would be a very easy task to compile from MSS. in our possession several large volumes on the cruelties of Federal prisons. But we cannot now go into this subject more fully. Nor can we now even touch upon the cruelties practiced towards civil prisoners who were arrested by the United States authorities on mere suspicion, and treated with the utmost rigor without even the forms of a trial.

We have on our shelves no less than eight volumes giving detailed accounts of these false imprisonments, besides a number of MS. accounts, and we may at some future time let our readers hear "the tinkle of Mr. Seward's little bell."

But we cannot now give more space to the treatment received by Confederates in Northern prisons. We think we have fairly met Mr. Blaine's "issue," and that we have shown by incontrovertible testimony that Confederate prisoners *were* cruelly treated in Northern prisons, and that they did *not* "receive the same rations and clothing as Union soldiers." And we have traced this cruel treatment directly to the Federal authorities who were constantly slandering the Confederate Government.

We now pass to a further discussion of the

EXCHANGE QUESTION,

for after all this is the real gist of the whole matter. The Govern-

ment that is responsible for the failure to exchange prisoners is really responsible for the suffering which ensued on both sides.

We think we have already proven that this responsibility rests with the authorities at Washington; but we will strengthen the proof still further. We have published the cartel agreed upon on the 22d of July, 1862, and have called attention to the fact that a strict observance of its terms would have released all prisoners on both sides within ten days of their capture.

Where difficulties arose in reference to particular classes of prisoners, the cartel provided that these should be passed by until they could be adjusted, and the cartel continue in force as to other prisoners. *This was done so long as the Confederates held the excess of prisoners.*

Soon after the signing of the cartel, a correspondence ensued, which would unquestionably have stopped all exchange of prisoners *had the Confederates not held a large excess of prisoners.* The following

LETTER FROM GENERAL LEE

clearly sets forth the points at issue :

[Copy.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES,
Near Richmond, Virginia, August 2, 1862.

To the General Commanding United States Army, Washington :

General—In obedience to the order of his Excellency, the President of the Confederate States, I have the honor to make to you the following communication :

On the 22d of July last a cartel for a general exchange of prisoners of war was signed by Major-General John A. Dix, on behalf of the United States, and by Major-General D. H. Hill, on the part of this Government. By the terms of that cartel it is stipulated that all prisoners of war hereafter taken shall be discharged on parole until exchanged.

Scarcely had the cartel been signed when the military authorities of the United States commenced a practice changing the character of the war from such as becomes civilized nations into a campaign of indiscriminate robbery and murder.

A general order, issued by the Secretary of War of the United States, in the city of Washington, on the very day that the cartel was signed in Virginia, directs the military commander of the United States to take the property of our people for the convenience and use of the army, without compensation.

A general order, issued by Major-General Pope on the 23d of July last, the day after the date of the cartel, directs the murder of our

peaceful citizens as spies, if found quietly tilling their farms in his rear, *even outside of his lines.*

And one of his Brigadier-Generals, Steinwehr, has seized innocent and peaceful inhabitants to be held as hostages, to the end that they may be murdered in cold blood if any of his soldiers are killed by some unknown persons, whom he designated as "bush-whackers."

Some of the military authorities of the United States seem to suppose that their end will be better attained by a savage war, in which no quarter is to be given and no age or sex to be spared, than by such hostilities as are alone recognized to be lawful in modern times. We find ourselves driven by our enemies, by steady progress, towards a practice which we abhor, and which we are vainly struggling to avoid.

Under these circumstances this Government has issued the accompanying general order, which I am directed by the President to transmit to you, recognizing Major-General Pope and his commissioned officers to be in a position which they have chosen for themselves—that of robbers and murderers, and not that of public enemies, entitled, if captured, to be treated as prisoners of war.

The President also instructs me to inform you that we renounce our right of retaliation on the innocent, and will continue to treat the private enlisted soldiers of General Pope's army as prisoners of war; but if, after notice to your Government that we confine repressive measures to the punishment of commissioned officers, who are willing participants in these crimes, the savage practices threatened in the orders alluded to, be persisted in, we shall reluctantly be forced to the last resort of accepting the war on the terms chosen by our enemies, until the voice of an outraged humanity shall compel a respect for the recognized usages of war.

While the President considers that the facts referred to would justify a refusal on our part to execute the cartel, by which we have agreed to liberate an excess of prisoners of war in our hands, a sacred regard for plighted faith, which shrinks from the semblance of breaking a promise, precludes a resort to such an extremity. Nor is it his desire to extend to any other forces of the United States the punishment merited by General Pope and such commissioned officers as choose to participate in the execution of his infamous orders.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully your obedient servant,
(Signed)

R. E. LEE,
General Commanding.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Richmond, August 1, 1862.

General Orders, No. 54.

I. The following orders are published for the information and observance of all concerned:

II. Whereas, by a general order, dated the 22d July, 1862, issued

by the Secretary of War of the United States, under the order of the President of the United States, the military commanders of that Government within the States of Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas, are directed to seize and use any property, real or personal, belonging to the inhabitants of this Confederacy, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, and no provision is made for any compensation to the owners of private property thus seized and appropriated by the military commanders of the enemy:

III. And whereas, by General Order, No. 11, issued on the 23d July, 1862, by Major-General Pope, commanding the forces of the enemy in Northern Virginia, it is ordered that all "commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades and detached commands, will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines or within their reach, in rear of their respective commands. Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall be permitted to remain at their homes and pursue in good faith their accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall be conducted South, beyond the extreme pickets of this army, and be notified that if found again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. If any person, having taken the oath of allegiance as above specified, be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his property seized and applied to the public use":

IV. And whereas, by an order issued on the 13th July, 1862, by Brigadier-General A. Steinwehr, Major William Steadman, a cavalry officer of his brigade, has been ordered to arrest five of the most prominent citizens of Page county, Virginia, to be held as hostages, and to suffer death in the event of any of the soldiers of said Steinwehr being shot by "bushwhackers," by which term are meant the citizens of this Confederacy who have taken up arms to defend their homes and families:

V. And whereas it results from the above orders that some of the military authorities of the United States, not content with the unjust and aggressive warfare hitherto waged with savage cruelty against an unoffending people, and exasperated by the failure of their effort to subjugate them, have now determined to violate all the rules and usages of war, and to convert the hostilities hitherto waged against armed forces into a campaign of robbery and murder against unarmed citizens and peaceful tillers of the soil:

VI. And whereas this Government, bound by the highest obligations of duty to its citizens, is thus driven to the necessity of adopting just such measures of retribution and retaliation as shall seem adequate to repress and punish these barbarities; and whereas the orders above recited have only been published and made known to this Government since the signature of a cartel for exchange of prisoners of war, which cartel, in so far as it provides for an exchange of prisoners hereafter captured, would never have been signed or

agreed to by this Government if the intention to change the war into a system of indiscriminate murder and robbery had been known to it; and whereas a just regard to humanity forbids that the repression of crime which this Government is thus compelled to enforce should be unnecessarily extended to retaliation on the enlisted men in the army of the United States, who may be the unwilling instruments of the savage cruelty of their commanders, so long as there is hope that the excesses of the enemy may be checked or prevented by retribution on the commissioned officers, who have the power to avoid guilty action, by refusing service under a Government which seeks their aid in the perpetration of such infamous barbarities:

VII. Therefore, it is ordered that Major-General Pope, Brigadier-General Steinwehr, and all commissioned officers serving under their respective commands, be and they are hereby expressly and specially declared to be not entitled to be considered as soldiers, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of the cartel for the parole of future prisoners of war. Ordered, further, that in the event of the capture of Major-General Pope or Brigadier-General Steinwehr, or of any commissioned officers serving under them, the captive so taken shall be held in close confinement so long as the orders aforesaid shall continue in force and unrepealed by the competent military authorities of the United States; and that in the event of the murder of any unarmed citizen or inhabitant of this Confederacy by virtue or under pretext of any of the orders hereinbefore recited, whether with or without trial, whether under pretence of such citizen being a spy or hostage, or any other pretence, it shall be the duty of the Commanding General of the forces of this Confederacy to cause immediately to be hung, out of the commissioned officers, prisoners as aforesaid, a number equal to the number of our own citizens thus murdered by the enemy.

By order.

S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

Now here was a fine opportunity for the authorities at Washington to stop the cartel and charge the "Rebels" with bad faith. They would doubtless have done so had we not held the excess of prisoners; but they simply indulged in a little high rhetoric, continued the cartel, and caused Pope to cease his high-handed outrages. And so the cartel continued until July, 1863—the Federal authorities frequently violating its provisions, and the Confederates carrying them out to the letter.

The Report of Judge Ould, our Commissioner of Exchange, of December, 1863, and the accompanying documents, fully sustain this allegation, and we regret that our space will not allow us to give these documents in full.

We give the preliminary report, which indicates the points made:

COMMISSIONER OULD'S REPORT.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmón.d, Virginia, December 5th, 1863.

Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON, *Secretary of War*:

Sir—I have the honor to submit the accompanying correspondence between the Federal Agent of Exchange and myself:

I have selected from the mass of correspondence, such letters as relate to matters of general interest, and especially to the subjects of controversy between us.

1. Papers from one to twelve, inclusive, relate the arrest and detention of non-combatants. The Federal authorities have persistently refused to observe any reciprocal rule as to such parties. Their military commanders seem to have been permitted to make arrests of non-combatants without regard to their age, sex or situation. After arrest, they have been thrown into prison and there indefinitely retained, in most cases, without charges. I have persistently contended that the whole subject of their capture of non-combatants, should be determined by rule, and not by arbitrary practice. This reasonable proposal, not receiving the assent of the enemy, the Confederate authorities have been forced, in some instances, to retain Federal non-combatants as a measure of retaliation.

2. Papers from thirteen to sixteen, inclusive, relate to the retention of exchanged and unexchanged officers and men. There are officers and men now in Federal prisons, who have been there ever since the adoption of the cartel. I have brought to the attention of the United States authorities again and again the names of some of the parties who were confined in violation of the exchange agreements. In some cases, after long delay, the parties were released. Others, however, are still languishing in confinement.

3. Papers from seventeen to forty, inclusive, relate to the general orders of the enemy and their connection with declarations of exchange. So anxious has the Confederate Government been to remove all obstacles to a general exchange of prisoners, that when the computation and adjustment of paroles was made a subject of difficulty by the enemy, we promptly agreed to determine the whole matter in accordance with the general orders, issued at Washington. This very liberal proposition has not been accepted by the Federal authorities, I have, however, by virtue of the provisions of the cartel, proceeded to make declarations of exchange, upon the basis of those general orders. In those declarations of exchange, I have not exceeded the valid paroles, which are on file in my office. The reply of the Federal agent to my letter of October 31st, 1863, was so personally offensive, that I was compelled to return it to him without any answer.

4. Papers from forty-one to forty-seven, inclusive, relate to the confinement of General John H. Morgan and his officers in the penitentiary, at Columbus, Ohio. Though the Federal agent on the 30th of July, 1863, notified me that General John H. Morgan and his officers would be placed in close confinement, he informed me two months afterwards, that "the United States authorities had nothing to do with the treatment that General Morgan and his command received when imprisoned at Columbus."

5. Papers from forty-eight to fifty-seven, inclusive, relate to the detention of surgeons. Before the date of the cartel, surgeons were unconditionally released after capture. That rule was first adopted by the Confederate commanders, and was subsequently followed by the Federals. Some time ago, one Rucker was indicted by a grand jury in Virginia, for several felonies. Although Rucker was never a surgeon in the Federal service, the enemy held Surgeon Green of the Confederate navy, in retaliation. This caused retaliation on our part, in return, and surgeons were afterwards held in captivity on both sides. In this instance, the Federal authorities proved that they were ready to sacrifice their own medical officers in an endeavour to secure the release of a felon in no way connected with their medical service. Rucker having recently escaped from jail, the surgeons on both sides have been released.

6. Papers from fifty-eight to sixty-three, inclusive, relate to persons captured upon our rivers and the high seas. By agreement made with the Federal Agent of Exchange, all such who were captured before December 10th, 1862, were declared exchanged. In spite of that agreement, some of our pilots and sea captains were kept in confinement. The correspondence will fully show the refusal of the Federal authorities to adopt any fair and reciprocal rule, as to the further exchange of such persons.

7. Papers numbered sixty-four and sixty-five, show the pretensions of the enemy as to such persons as have been tried under the laws of a sovereign State for offences against the same.

8. Papers from sixty-six to seventy-two, inclusive, embrace all the correspondence in which General E. A. Hitchcock has borne a part. It seems there are two commissioners of exchange on the part of the Federal Government. How far the authority of each extends, or how far one is subordinate to the other, has not as yet clearly appeared. The future may, perhaps, explain that they may be put to separate uses. The last letter of General Hitchcock, bearing date November 23d, 1863, I returned, with the following endorsement, to wit: "Protesting that the statement of facts contained in this paper is incorrect, I return it to its author as unfit to be either written or received."

With this brief notice of the correspondence, I respectfully submit it as my report.

Respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Ro. OULD, *Agent of Exchange.*

We can only cull a letter or two from this correspondence, which we hope some day to publish in full as a triumphant vindication of the course of our authorities :

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LUDLOW TO MR. OULD.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
SEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 8, 1863.

Hon. ROBERT OULD, *Agent for Exchange of Prisoners :*

Sir—The best mode of arranging all questions relating to exchange of officers, is to revoke, formally or informally, the offensive proclamation relating to our officers.

I simply ask that you say, by authority, that such proclamation is revoked. The spirit of that proclamation was the infliction of personal indignities upon our officers, and as long as it remains unrepealed, it can be at any moment put in force by your authorities. What assurance have we that it will not be ?

I earnestly desire a return to the cartel in all matters pertaining to officers, and until such be the case, and uniformity of rule be thereby established, our exchanges of officers must be special. Some of our officers, paroled at Vicksburg, were subsequently placed in close confinement, and are now so held. If, hereafter, we parole any of your officers, such paroles will be offset against any which you may possess. At present the exchanges will be confined to such equivalents as are held in confinement on either side.

I hope you will soon be able to remove all difficulties about officers by the revocation I have mentioned.

By reference to the map, you will see that Fort Delaware is en route to Fort Monroe. It is used as a depot for the collecting of prisoners, sent from other places for shipment here, and is, from its peculiar position, "*well adapted for convenience for exchange.*"

If any mistake be found in the account of men paroled by Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, at Oxford, Mississippi, on the 22d of December, 1862, it can be rectified when we meet.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. LUDLOW,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.

MR. OULD TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LUDLOW.

RICHMOND, April 11th, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM H. LUDLOW, *Agent of Exchange :*

Sir—Your letters of the 8th instant have been received.

I am very much surprised at your refusal to deliver officers for those of your own who have been captured, paroled, and released by us since the date of the proclamation and message of President

Davis. That refusal is not only a flagrant breach of the cartel, but can be supported by no rule of reciprocity or equity. It is utterly useless to argue any such matter. I assure you that not one officer of any grade will be delivered to you until you change your purpose in that respect.

You have charged us with breaking the cartel. With what sort of justice can that allegation be supported, when you delivered only a few days ago over ninety officers, most of whom had been forced to languish and suffer in prisons for months before we were compelled by that and other reasons to issue the retaliatory order of which you complain? Those ninety-odd are not one-half of those whom you unjustly hold in prison. On the other hand, I defy you to name the case of one who is confined by us, whom our agreement has declared exchanged. Is it your idea that we are to be bound by every strictness of the cartel, while you are at liberty to violate it for months, and that, too, not only in a few instances, but in hundreds? You know that our refusal to parole officers, was a matter exclusively of retaliation. It was based only upon your refusal to observe the requirements of the cartel. All that you had to do to remove the obnoxious measure of retaliation, was to observe the provisions of the cartel and redress the wrongs which had been perpetrated.

Your last resolution, if persisted in, settles the matter. You need not send any officers to City Point with the expectation of getting an equivalent in officers, so long as you refuse to deliver any for those whom we have released on parole in Tennessee and Kentucky. If captivity, privation, and misery are to be the fate of officers on both sides hereafter, let God judge between us. I have struggled in this matter, as if it had been a matter of life and death to me. I am heartsick at the termination, but I have no self reproaches.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT OULD,
Agent of Exchange.

Judge Ould thus closes his correspondence with Colonel Ludlow :

MR. OULD TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LUDLOW.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, Virginia, July 26, 1863.

Colonel WILLIAM H. LUDLOW, *Agent of Exchange :*

Sir—Your communication of the 22d contests my declaration of exchanges of officers made on the 17th instant. You say "the cartel provides for the exchange of equal ranks, until such are exhausted, and then for equivalents." If you had been at Fortress Monroe, where you could have seen the cartel, instead of New York, from which your letter is dated, you would have written

no such paragraph. There is nothing in the cartel which contains any such doctrine, or which favors it. Every provision is against it. Your own and my practice have been opposed to it. I again say to you what I have already stated in my communication of the 17th instant, that your assent is not needed to the declared exchange, and I shall not notify the officers, whom I have declared exchanged, as you request. I have allowed you to declare exchanges when the number of prisoners in our hands has been the greater. This has been the case from the day when we first met in the fall of last year, to the capture at Vicksburg. Now, when you have scarcely received official advices of your superiority in prisoners, you boast of the fact, and declare that I cannot give an equivalent for the general officers I have declared exchanged. The point you make is worth nothing, even as you have stated it. You know we have no lieutenant-generals or major-generals of yours in our hands. For that reason I have declared them exchanged in privates or inferior officers at your election. I had the right, under the cartel, to make the choice myself, but I preferred that you should do it, and therefore, I gave you the notification which I did. If, at any time, you present officers for exchange who have been paroled, and we have no officers of similar rank on parole, you can declare their exchange in privates. If, at this time, you have any officers of the rank I have declared exchanged, or of any other rank, or if you have any particular organization of privates or non-commissioned officers whom you wish exchanged, you have only to state such fact and your selection will be approved. If you hold the paroles of our officers of any rank as you state, you have only to present them, and whatever is in our hands, whether on parole or in captivity, will be freely given in exchange for them. You say you have again and again invited me to a return to the cartel. Now that our official connection is being terminated, I say to you in the fear of God—and I appeal to Him for the truth of the declaration—that there has been no single moment, from the time when we were first brought together in connection with the matter of exchange to the present hour, during which there has not been an open and notorious violation of the cartel by your authorities. Officers and men, numbering over hundreds, have been, during your whole connection with the cartel, kept in cruel confinement, sometimes in irons, or doomed to cells, without charges or trial. They are in prison now, unless God, in His mercy, has released them. In our parting moments, let me do you the justice to say that I do not believe it is so much your fault as that of your authorities. Nay more, I believe your removal from your position has been owing to the personal efforts you have made for a faithful observance, not only of the cartel, but of humanity in the conduct of the war.

Again and again have I importuned you to tell me of one officer or man now held in confinement by us, who was declared exchanged. You have, to those appeals, furnished one—Spencer

Kellog. For him I have searched in vain. On the other hand, I appeal to your own records for the cases where your reports have shown that our officers and men have been held for long months and even years in violation of the cartel and our agreements. The last phase of the enormity, however, exceeds all others. Although you have many thousands of our soldiers now in confinement in your prisons, and especially in that horrible hold of death, Fort Delaware, you have not, for several weeks, sent us any prisoners. During those weeks you have dispatched Captain Mulford with the steamer New York to City Point, three or four times, without any prisoners. For the first two or three times some sort of an excuse was attempted. None is given at this present arrival. I do not mean to be offensive when I say that effrontery could not give one. I ask you with no purpose of disrespect, what can you think of this covert attempt to secure the delivery of all your prisoners in our hands, without the release of those of ours who are languishing in hopeless misery in your prisons and dungeons?

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT OULD,
Agent of Exchange.

Though there were these difficulties in reference to exchange, and these evasions and violations of the cartel by the Federal authorities, the paroles given captured prisoners were respected until July, 1863, when the following order was issued by the Federal Secretary of War:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, July 3, 1863.

General Orders No. 209.

1. The attention of all persons in the military service of the United States is called to article 7 of the cartel agreed upon July 22d, 1862, and published in General Orders No. 142, September 25th, 1862. According to the terms of this cartel all captures must be reduced to actual possession, and all prisoners of war must be delivered at the places designated, there to be exchanged or paroled until exchange can be effected. The only exception allowed is the case of commanders of two opposing armies, who were authorized to exchange prisoners or to release them on parole at other points mutually agreed upon by said commanders.

2. It is understood that captured officers and men have been paroled and released in the field by others than commanders of opposing armies, and that the sick and wounded in hospitals have been so paroled and released in order to avoid guarding and removing them, which in many cases would have been impossible. Such paroles are in violation of general orders and the stipulations of the cartel, and are null and void. They are not regarded by the enemy, and will not be respected by the armies of the United

States. Any officer or soldier who gives such parole will be returned to duty without exchange, and, moreover, will be punished for disobedience of orders. It is the duty of the captor to guard his prisoners, and if through necessity or choice he fails to do this, it is the duty of the prisoner to return to the service of his Government. He cannot avoid this duty by giving an unauthorized military parole.

3. A military parole not to serve until exchanged must not be confounded with a parole of honor to do or not to do a particular thing not inconsistent with the duty of a soldier; thus a prisoner of war actually held by the enemy may, in order to obtain exemption from a close guard or confinement, pledge his parole of honor that he will make no attempt at escape. Such pledges are binding upon the individuals giving them; but they should seldom be given or received, for it is the duty of a prisoner to escape if able to do so. Any pledge or parole extorted from a prisoner by ill usage is not binding.

4. The obligations imposed by the general laws and usages of war upon the combatant inhabitants of a section of country passed over by an invading army closes when the military occupation ceases, and any pledge or parole given by such persons, in regard to future service, is null and of no effect.

By order of the Secretary of war.

[Signed]

E. D. TOWNSEND, *A. A. G.*

Upon this order General J. A. Early, in a recent communication, makes the following eminently just comments:

It is very manifest that that order was issued for the purpose of embarrassing General Lee's army with the guarding and feeding of the prisoners, amounting to several thousand, then in our hands; and in consequence of the order, information of which reached us immediately, General Lee sent a flag of truce to Meade on the 4th of July, after the close of the battle, with a proposition to exchange prisoners. The latter declined the proposition, alleging a want of authority to make the exchange, or, from his own views of policy, he positively declined to entertain the proposition; I am not certain which.

According to the laws of war in the earliest ages a captive in war forfeited his life. Subsequently, in the cause of humanity, the penalty of death was commuted to slavery for life; and this continued to be a law of war for more than one-half of the Christian era, notwithstanding it has been so often said that slavery disappeared in Europe before the spirit of Christianity; in fact, it was the vast number of captives in war reduced to slavery from among the Sclavi or Sclavonians, in the eighth century, under that bulwark of the Church, Charlemagne, that caused the distinctive and modern appellation of "slaves" to be applied to all those held to involuntary servitude. In the age of chivalry, when knights-

errant, and more especially the Crusaders, wanted money more than they did slaves, they sold their slaves their freedom; and the practice of releasing prisoners for a ransom was resorted to, and continued to be a law of war until a comparatively modern date, when, with the growth of regular armies, the practice of releasing prisoners on parole became a recognized rule of civilized warfare among Christian nations. It has never, however, been a law of war that the obligation of a prisoner to observe his parole depends upon the assent of his own Government; but, on the contrary, the right of a prisoner to obtain his release from captivity by giving his parole of honor not to serve against his captors until exchanged or otherwise released is derived from the fact that by his captivity he is placed beyond the protection of his Government, and therefore has the right to provide for his own safety by giving the requisite pledge, and all civilized nations recognize the binding force of that pledge or parole.

The rule is laid down by Vattel, pp. 414 and 415, as follows:

"Individuals, whether belonging to the army or not, who happen singly to fall in with the enemy are, by the urgent necessity of the circumstance, left to their own discretion, and may, so far as concerns their own persons, do everything which a commander might do with respect to himself and the troops under his command. If, therefore, in consequence of the situation in which they are involved, they make any promise, such promise (provided it do not extend to matters which can never lie within the sphere of a private individual) is valid and obligatory, as being made with competent powers. For, when a subject can neither receive his sovereign's orders nor enjoy his protection, he resumes his natural rights, and is to provide for his own safety by any just and honorable means in his power. Hence, if that individual has promised a sum for his *ransom*, the sovereign, so far from having the power to discharge him from his promise, should oblige him to fulfil it.

"The good of the State requires that faith should be kept on such occasions, and that subjects should have this mode of saving their lives or recovering their liberty.

"Thus, a prisoner who is released on his parole is bound to observe it with scrupulous punctuality, nor has the sovereign a right to oppose such observance of his engagement; for had not the prisoner thus given his parole he would not have been released."

The same doctrine is laid down by publicists generally.

The question of exchange of prisoners is a matter for agreement between the opposing powers, but the question of the parole is not. The paroles stipulated for in the cartel of July, 1862, were paroles with a view to subsequent exchange, and the stipulation did not create the right of a prisoner of war to be released from captivity on his parole, that existed prior to and independent of the cartel. It existed by virtue of a "higher law" [if I may be permitted to use a phrase so much in vogue in former times among those who now attach so much importance to unwavering fidelity to the Con-

stitution, in their view of it], than an order from the Federal Secretary of War—the law of self-preservation. If I had found myself at any time during the war a prisoner in the hands of the enemy, about to be dragged to a Northern prison, where I am sure confinement for a very short time would have killed me or run me mad, and my captors had been humane enough to release me on my parole of honor not to serve again until exchanged, I am sure I would have thought my Government more barbarous than the enemy if it had required of me a violation of my parole and a return to duty without exchange; but I feel confident no such dishonor would ever have been required of me by that Government, for I do know that the paroles of some of my own men, captured at Williamsburg on the 5th of May, 1862, more than two months before the cartel was adopted, and for special reasons paroled within a week of their capture, were respected, and they were regularly exchanged.

Mr. Stanton, in issuing the order of the 3d of July, 1863, violated the laws of civilized warfare, and the statement contained therein that the Confederate Government ("the enemy") had pursued the same course was a mere pretext to give color to his own unwarrantable act. But for that order all the prisoners captured by us at Gettysburg, amounting to fully six thousand, would have been paroled; and, in fact, the proper staff officers were proceeding to parole them, and had actually paroled and released a large number of them, when the news came of the order referred to. Why did Mr. Stanton object to the parolling of those prisoners? and why did he prefer that they should be confined in prisons in the South—"prison pens," as Northern Republicans are pleased to call them—rather than that they should be sent to their own homes on parole, there to remain in comfort until duly exchanged, if it was not to embarrass the Confederate Government with the custody and support of them, regardless of any consideration for their health or their lives? If he did not think proper to exchange Confederate prisoners in his hands for them he could have refused to do so; and certainly their presence at their own homes could have done no harm to his cause; most assuredly not more than their confinement in a prison, in a climate to which they were unaccustomed. If the rule asserted in his order is among the laws and usages of war, then it must follow that if General Lee had not been able to guard or feed the prisoners in his hands he would have had the right to resort to that dread alternative to which the first Napoleon resorted in Egypt when he found the paroles granted by him not respected, and destroy the prisoners in his hands. If any of the prisoners brought from Gettysburg, or subsequently captured, lost their lives at Andersonville, or any other Southern prison, is it not palpable that the responsibility for their deaths rested on Edwin M. Stanton?

In consequence of the order one division commander, who fell into our hands, wounded, whom we could have brought off, though

at the risk of his life, and a large number of other prisoners who were paroled (two or three thousand), were returned to duty in the Federal army without exchange; and among them was a Colonel, who pledged his honor that he would surrender himself and his regiment (paroled at the same time) if the validity of the parole was not recognized by his Government.

Unfortunately, the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the captures at Gettysburg, now gave the Federal Government a large excess of prisoners actually in hand, and enabled them to carry out the policy which they had all along evidently preferred. Instead of fulfilling the terms of the cartel, they coolly notified Judge Ould that henceforth "*exchanges will be confined to such equivalents as are held in confinement on either side.*" The plain meaning of this was that the Federal Government treated as a nullity the terms of the cartel, and the large number of *paroles* which the Confederates held against them, and proposed to exchange man for man of *those actually in prison*, which would have released every single prisoner held by the Confederacy, and left some thousands of our own brave soldiers to languish and die in hopeless captivity, notwithstanding the fact that the Confederates (carrying out the terms of the cartel) had already paroled their equivalents of Federal soldiers. The Confederate Commissioner, of course, indignantly rejected this proposition, and the subsequent correspondence until August 10th, 1864, abounds in earnest efforts on the part of Judge Ould to induce the Federal authorities to return to the cartel, and their quibbles, excuses, and evasions. We very much regret that we have not space to publish this correspondence in full. Indeed we could desire no better vindication of the Confederacy than the publication of every letter which passed between the commissioners. Our cause suffered nothing in the hands of our able and high-minded commissioner, Judge Ould.

On the 10th of August, 1864, seeing the hopelessness of effecting further exchanges on any fair terms, Judge Ould wrote the letter (which we gave in our last number), proposing to *accept the terms offered by the other side*, and to exchange man for man of actual captives.

Notwithstanding the fact that this was their own proposition, and would have worked largely in their favor as it ignored the thousands of *paroles* held by the Confederates and would have released all Federal prisoners and have left a large number of Confederates in captivity, the Federal authorities *never deigned to give an answer*

to this letter. They would neither carry out the terms of the parole, nor abide by their own proposition when it was accepted.

There were various complications which arose during the suspension of the cartel, but the plain meaning of them all was that the Federal Government had deliberately adopted as their war policy the non-exchange of prisoners.

We will briefly notice several of these complications.

In December, 1863, *Major-General B. F. Butler* was appointed Special Commissioner for the exchange of prisoners on the part of the Federal Government. The infamous conduct of this officer in New Orleans had excited the detestation of the civilized world, and had caused the Confederate Government to declare him an outlaw. And yet Mr. Stanton, in selecting an agent to overcome difficulties in the way of exchange, passed by all of his other officers and selected this most obnoxious personage. What fair-minded man can doubt that the object in selecting this agent was really to prevent an exchange? But in their eager desire to effect an exchange, the Confederates finally determined to treat even with General Butler, and accordingly Judge Ould went to Fortress Monroe and had a protracted interview with him. To do General Butler justice, he seemed even more liberal in the matter of exchange than his superiors had been, and after a full discussion of all the points at issue a new cartel was agreed upon.

When all of the points had been agreed to on both sides, and copies of the new cartel made, Judge Ould said to him: "Now, General, I am fully authorized to sign that paper in behalf of my Government, and we will close the matter by signing, sealing and delivering it here and now." General Butler replied that he had not the authority to sign the paper, but would refer it to his Government, and use all of his influence to induce its approval. *Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant* disapproved of the arrangement, and the Federal Government refused to confirm it. We have the proof of this in several forms.

We clip the following from a Northern paper published not long after the close of the war:

General Butler said at Hamilton, Ohio, the other day, that while he never answered anonymous newspaper attacks, he felt it his duty here at Hamilton to refute a slander which had been circulated from this platform a few days ago by a gentleman of standing in advocating the election of the Democratic candidate.

He has chosen to say that I am responsible for the starvation of

our prisoners at Belle Isle and Andersonville, by refusing to exchange soldiers because the Rebels did not recognize the negroes in our service as regular soldiers.

I don't propose to criticise anybody, or to say who was right or who was wrong, but I propose to state the exact facts, because it has been widely charged against me, that in order to rescue the negro soldiers I preferred that 30,000 of our men should starve rather than agree that the negro should not be exchanged.

Whatever I might have thought it best to have done, I am only here to-day to say that I did not do it. The duties of Commissioner of Exchange were put in my hands. I made an arrangement to have an exchange effected—man for man, officer for officer. I communicated my plan to General Streight, of Indiana, who is here to-day, and who had then just escaped from the Libby. I told him how I proposed to get our negro soldiers out of rebel hands.

We had 60,000 or thereabout of their prisoners. They had 30,000 of ours, or thereabout. I don't give the exact numbers, as I quote from memory; but these are the approximate numbers.

I proposed to go on and exchange with the rebels, man for man, officer for officer, until I got 30,000 of our men, and then I would still have had 30,000 of theirs left in my hands. And then I proposed to twist these 30,000 until I got the negroes out of the Rebels. [Applause.] I made this arrangement with the Confederate Commissioner. This was on the 1st of April, before we commenced to move on that campaign of 1864, from the Rapid Arm to the James, around Richmond. At that time the Lieutenant-General visited my headquarters, and I told him what I had done. He gave me certain verbal directions. What they were I shall not say, because I have his instructions in writing. But I sent my proposition for exchange to the Government of the United States. It was referred to the Lieutenant-General. He ordered me not to give the Confederates another man in exchange.

I telegraphed back to him in these words:

"Your order shall be obeyed, but I assume you do not mean to interfere with the exchange of the sick and wounded?"

He replied: "Take all the sick and wounded you can get, but don't give them another man."

You can see that even with sick and wounded men this system would soon cause all exchanges to stop.

It did stop. It stopped right there, in April, 1864, and was not resumed until August, 1864, when Mr. Ould, the Rebel Commissioner, again wrote me: "We will exchange man for man, officer for officer," and saying nothing about colored troops.

I laid this dispatch before the Lieutenant-General. His answer, in writing, was substantially: "If you give the rebels the 30,000 men whom we hold, it will insure the defeat of General Sherman and endanger our safety here around Richmond." I wrote an argument, offensively put, to the Confederate Commissioners, so that they could stop all further offers of exchange.

I say nothing about the policy of this course; I offer no criticism of it whatever; I only say that whether it be a good or a bad policy, it was not mine, and that my part in it was wholly in obedience to orders from my commanding officer, the Lieutenant-General.

Upon another occasion General Butler used this strong language:

"The great importance of the question; the fearful responsibility for the many thousands of lives which, by the refusal to exchange, were sacrificed by the most cruel forms of death; from cold, starvation, and pestilence of the prison pens of Raleigh and Andersonville, being more than all the British soldiers killed in the wars of Napoleon; the anxiety of fathers, brothers, sisters, mothers, wives, to know the exigency which caused this terrible—and perhaps as it may have seemed to them useless and unnecessary—destruction of those dear to them, by horrible deaths; each and all have compelled me to this exposition, so that it may be seen that these lives were spent as a part of the system of attack upon the rebellion, devised by the wisdom of the General-in-chief of the armies, to destroy it by depletion, depending upon our superior numbers to win the victory at last.

"The loyal mourners will doubtless derive solace from this fact, and appreciate all the more highly the genius which conceived the plan and the success won at so great a cost."

The *New York Tribune* will also be accepted as competent authority. Referring to the occurrences of 1864, the *Tribune* editorially says:

"In August the Rebels offered to renew the exchange, man for man. General Grant then telegraphed the following important order: 'It is hard on our men, held in Southern prisons, not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man released on parole or otherwise becomes an active soldier against us at once, either directly or indirectly. *If we commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on till the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more than dead men. At this particular time, to release all Rebel prisoners North would insure Sherman's defeat, and would compromise our safety here.*'"

Here is even a stronger statement from a Northern source:

"NEW YORK, August 8th, 1865.

"Moreover, General Butler, in his speech at Lowell, Massachusetts, stated positively that he had been ordered by Mr. Stanton to put forward the negro question to complicate and prevent the exchange. * * * * * Every one is aware that, when the exchange did take place, not the slightest alteration had occurred in the question, and that our prisoners might as well have been released twelve or eighteen months before

as at the resumption of the *cartel*, which would have saved to the Republic at least twelve or fifteen thousand heroic lives. That they were not saved is due alone to Mr. Edwin M. Stanton's peculiar policy and dogged obstinacy; AND, AS I HAVE REMARKED BEFORE, HE IS UNQUESTIONABLY THE DIGGER OF THE UNNAMED GRAVES THAT CROWD THE VICINITY OF EVERY SOUTHERN PRISON WITH HISTORIC AND NEVER-TO-BE-FORGOTTEN HORRORS.

"Once for all, let me declare that I have never found fault with any one because I was detained in prison, for I am well aware that that was a matter in which no one but myself, and possibly a few personal friends, would feel any interest; that my sole motive for impeaching the Secretary of War was that the people of the loyal North might know to whom they were indebted for the cold-blooded and needless sacrifice of their fathers and brothers, their husbands and their sons.

"JUNIOUS HENRI BROWNE."

General Butler also produced upon another occasion the following telegram, which ought to be conclusive on this question:

"CITY POINT, August 18th, 1864.

"To General Butler—I am satisfied that the chief object of your interview, besides having the proper sanction, meets with my entire approval. I have seen, from Southern papers, that a system of retaliation is going on in the South, which they keep from us, and which we should stop in some way. On the subject of exchange, however, I differ from General Hitchcock; it is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man released on parole, or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us at once, either directly or indirectly. If we commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more than dead men. At this particular time, to release all Rebel prisoners North would insure Sherman's defeat, and would compromise our safety here.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General."

We think that the above testimony settles beyond all controversy that General U. S. Grant, Secretary Stanton, and Mr. Lincoln, were responsible for the refusal to exchange prisoners in 1864.

But the following extract from the

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GRANT

before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, given February 11th, 1865, may be added as an end of controversy on this point:

Question. It has been said that we refused to exchange prisoners

because we found ours starved, diseased, unserviceable when we received them, and did not like to exchange sound men for such men?

Answer. There never has been any such reason as that. That has been a reason for making exchanges. *I will confess that if our men who are prisoners in the South were really well taken care of, suffering nothing except a little privation of liberty, then, in a military point of view, it would not be good policy for us to exchange, because every man they get back is forced right into the army at once, while that is not the case with our prisoners when we receive them.* In fact, the half of our returned prisoners will never go into the army again, and none of them will until after they have had a furlough of thirty or sixty days. Still, the fact of their suffering as they do is a reason for making this exchange as rapidly as possible.

Question. And never has been a reason for not making the exchange?

Answer. It never has. Exchanges having been suspended by reason of disagreement on the part of agents of exchange on both sides before I came in command of the armies of the United States, and it then being near the opening of the spring campaign, *I did not deem it advisable or just to the men who had to fight our battles to reinforce the enemy with thirty or forty thousand disciplined troops at that time.* An immediate resumption of exchanges would have had that effect without giving us corresponding benefits. The suffering said to exist among our prisoners South was a powerful argument against the course pursued, and I so felt it.

We had intended to discuss fully

THE NEGRO QUESTION

in its bearing upon exchange of prisoners, but find that we have barely space to state it. When the war began the Federal Government distinctly declared that it had *no power and no desire to interfere with slavery in the States.* But as it progressed the slaves were not only declared free, but were enlisted as soldiers in the United States armies. The question at once arose whether the Confederate Government should recognize these captured slaves as prisoners of war, or should remand them to their masters, from whom they had been forcibly taken. The Confederates, of course, took the ground that as both the constitution of the United States and that of the Confederacy recognized slaves as the property of their owners, when these slaves were abducted and enlisted in the Federal army, their masters had a right to reclaim them whenever and wherever they could recapture them.

General Butler says that he was directed by his Government to *put forward this question offensively, in order to stop exchanges;* but

even General Butler agreed to a cartel which virtually settled, or at least postponed the question, and we have most abundant evidence that this was a mere subterfuge *to prevent exchange*.

Nor are we able at present to enter more fully into the

EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDERACY TO EFFECT AN EXCHANGE.

The mission of Vice-President A. H. Stephens, in 1863, resulted in failure, because Vicksburg and Gettysburg made the United States authorities feel that they were in a position to refuse even an audience to the "Rebel" commissioner.

General Lee's overtures to General Grant and to the Federal Government (through the United States Sanitary Commission) were equally futile; and the delegation of Andersonville prisoners, which Mr. Davis paroled to visit the President of the United States and plead for an exchange, were denied an audience, and were spurned from Washington, to carry back the sad tidings that their Government held out no hope of their release.

We have a letter from the wife of the chairman of that delegation (now dead), in which she says that her husband always said that he was *more contemptuously treated by Secretary Stanton than he ever was at Andersonville*.

We add upon this point the following letter in the *Philadelphia Times*, which was elicited by the recent discussion:

CLIFTON, PENNSYLVANIA, February 7th, 1876.

I am certainly no admirer of Jefferson Davis or the late Confederacy, but in justice to him and that the truth may be known, I would state that I was a prisoner of war for twelve months, and was in Andersonville when the delegation of prisoners spoken of by Jefferson Davis left there to plead our cause with the authorities at Washington; and nobody can tell, unless it be a shipwrecked and famished mariner, who sees a vessel approaching and then passing on without rendering the required aid, what fond hopes were raised, and how hope sickened into despair waiting for the answer that never came. In my opinion, and that of a good many others, a good part of the responsibility for the horrors of Andersonville rests with General U. S. Grant, who refused to make a fair exchange of prisoners.

HENRY M. BRENNAN,
Late Private Second Pennsylvania Cavalry.

We will close our case, for the present, with the following important testimony, which should surely, of itself, be sufficient to settle this question before any fair tribunal:

LETTER OF CHIEF-JUSTICE SHEA.

The New York *Tribune* of the 24th January, 1876, publishes the following letter from Judge Shea, which was called forth by Mr. Blaine's accusations on the floor of the House of Representatives. The *Tribune* introduces the letter, with the following additional comments:

Chief-Justice George Shea, of the Marine Court, who sends us an interesting letter about Jefferson Davis, was, as is well known, the principal agent in securing the signatures of Mr. Greeley, Gerrit Smith, and others to Mr. Davis's bail bond. The essential point of his present statement is that Mr. Greeley and the other gentlemen whom he approached on that subject were unwilling to move in the matter until entirely satisfied as to Mr. Davis's freedom from the guilt of intentional cruelty to Northern prisoners at Andersonville; that Judge Shea, at the instance of Mr. Greeley and Vice-President Wilson, went to Canada to inspect the journals of the secret sessions of the Confederate Senate—documents which up to this time have never passed into the hands of our Government, or been accessible to Northern readers; that from these secret records, including numerous messages from Davis on the subject, it conclusively appeared that the Rebel Senate believed the Southern prisoners were mistreated at the North; that they were eager for retaliation, and that Davis strenuously and to the end resisted these efforts; and that he attempted to send Vice-President Stephens North to consult with President Lincoln on the subject. No more important statements than these concerning that phase of the civil war have been given to the public. They shed light upon the course of Mr. Greeley and other eminent citizens of the North; and it seems to us clear that, on many accounts, the Rebel authorities owe it to themselves and to history to give to the public the documents which Judge Shea was permitted to see. It is not likely that they will have any material effect upon the fate of Mr. Davis, or upon political questions now pending. But they are of vital consequence to any correct history of the rebellion, and their revelations, if sustaining throughout the portions submitted to Judge Shea, might do as much to promote as the late Andersonville debate did to retard the reconciliation of the sections.

To the Editor of the Tribune:

Sir—I apprehend no one will accuse me with having ever harbored disunion proclivities, or of any inclination toward secession heresies. But truth is truth, justice is justice, and an act of proposed magnanimity should not be impaired by both an untruth

and an injustice. The statement in the House of Representatives on Thursday last, made by General Banks during the debate on the proposed amnesty bill, was more entirely correct than, perhaps, he had reason to credit.

What I now relate are facts : Mr. Horace Greeley received a letter, dated June 22d, 1865, from Mrs. Jefferson Davis. It was written at Savannah, Georgia, where Mrs. Davis and her family were then detained under a sort of military restraint. Mr. Davis himself, recently taken prisoner, was at Fortress Monroe; and the most conspicuous special charge threatened against him by the "Bureau of Military Justice" was of guilty knowledge relating to the assassination of President Lincoln. The principal purpose of the letter was imploring Mr. Greeley to bring about a speedy trial of her husband upon that charge, and upon all other supposed cruelties that were inferred against him. A public trial was prayed that the accusations might be as publicly met, and her husband, as she insisted could be done, readily vindicated. To this letter Mr. Greeley at once forwarded an answer for Mrs. Davis, directed to the care of General Burge, commanding our military forces at Savannah. The morning of the next day Mr. Greeley came to my residence in this city, placed the letter from Mrs. Davis in my hand, saying that he could not believe the charge to be true; that aside from the enormity and want of object, it would have been impolitic in Mr. Davis, or any other leader in the Southern States, as they could not but be aware of Mr. Lincoln's naturally kind heart and his good intentions toward them all; and Mr. Greeley asked me to become professionally interested in behalf of Mr. Davis. I called to Mr. Greeley's attention that, although I was like-minded with himself as to this one view of the case, yet there was the other pending charge of cruel treatment of our Union soldiers while prisoners at Andersonville and other places, and that, unless our Government was willing to have it imputed that Wirz was convicted and his sentence of death inflicted unjustly, it could not now overlook the superior who was, at least popularly, regarded as the moving cause of those wrongs; and that if Mr. Davis had been guilty of such breach of the rules for the conduct of war in modern civilization, he was not entitled to the right of, nor to be manumitted as a mere prisoner of war. I expressed the thought that my services before a military tribunal would be of little benefit. I hesitated; but finally told Mr. Greeley that I would consult with some of our common friends, whose countenance would give strength to such an undertaking, if it was discovered to be right, and that none but Republicans and some of the radical kind were likely to be of positive aid; indeed, any other would have been injurious. It occurred to me, from recollecting conversations with Mr. Henry Wilson, the previous April, while we were together at Hilton Head, South Carolina, that if Mr. Davis were guiltless of this latter offence, an avenue might be opened for a speedy trial, or for his manumission as any other prisoner of war. I did consult with

such friends, and Mr. Henry Wilson, Governor John A. Andrew, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, and Mr. Gerrit Smith were among them. The result was that I thereupon undertook to do whatever became feasible. Although not in strictness required to elucidate our present intent, it is, nevertheless, becoming the history of the case simply to mention that Mr. Charles O'Connor was, from the first, esteemed the most valuable man to lead for the defence by Mr. Greeley and Mr. Gerrit Smith. A Democrat of pronounced repute, still his appearance would import no partisan aspect to the great argument, and would excite no feelings but those of admiration and respect among even extreme men of opposite opinion. Public expectation looked to him, and soon after it was made known that he had already volunteered his services to Mr. Davis. Mr. O'Connor's course during the war was decided, understood, and consistent, but never offensive nor intrusive; his personal honor without reproach; his courage without fear; his learning, erudition, propriety of professional judgment conceded as most eminent.

There was a general agreement among the gentlemen of the Republican party whom I have mentioned that Mr. Davis did not, by thought or act, participate in a conspiracy against Mr. Lincoln; and none of those expressed that conviction more emphatically than Mr. Thaddeus Stevens. The single subject on which light was desired by them was concerning the treatment of our soldiers while in the hands of the enemy. The *Tribune* of May 17th, 1865, tells the real condition of feeling at that moment, and unequivocally shows that it was not favorable to Mr. Davis on this matter. At the instance of Mr. Greeley, Mr. Wilson and, as I was given to understand, of Mr. Stevens, I went to Canada the first week in January, 1866, taking Boston on my route, there to consult with Governor Andrew and others. While at Montreal, General John C. Breckinridge came from Toronto, at my request, for the purpose of giving me information. There I had placed in my possession the official archives of the Government of the Confederate States, which I read and considered—especially all those messages and other acts of the Executive with the Senate in its secret sessions concerning the care and exchange of prisoners. I found that the supposed inhuman and unwarlike treatment of their own captured soldiers by agents of our Government was a most prominent and frequent topic. That those reports current then—perhaps even to this hour—in the South were substantially incorrect is little to the practical purpose. From those documents—not made to meet the public eye, but used in secret session, and from inquiries by me of those thoroughly conversant with the state of Southern opinion at the time—it was manifest that the people of the South believed those reports to be trustworthy, and they individually, and through their representatives at Richmond, pressed upon Mr. Davis, as the Executive and as the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, instant recourse to active measures of retaliation, to the end that the supposed cruelties might be stayed. Mr. Davis's conduct under such urgency

and, indeed, expostulation, was a circumstance all-important in determining the probability of this charge as to himself. It was equally and decisively manifest, by the same sources of information, that Mr. Davis steadily and unflinchingly set himself in opposition to the indulgence of such demands, and declined to resort to any measure of violent retaliation. It impaired his personal influence, and brought much censure upon him from many in the South, who sincerely believed the reports spread among the people to be really true. The desire that something should be attempted from which a better care of prisoners could be secured seems to have grown so strong and prevalent that, on July 2d, 1863, Mr. Davis accepted the proffered service of Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, the Vice-President, to proceed as a military commissioner to Washington. The sole purpose of Mr. Davis in allowing that commission appears, from the said documents, which I read, to have been to place the war on the footing of such as are waged by civilized people in modern times, and to divest it of a savage character, which, it was claimed, had been impressed on it in spite of all effort and protest; and alleged instances of such savage conduct were named and averred. This project was prevented, as Mr. Stephens was denied permission by our Administration to approach Washington, and intercourse with him prohibited. On his return, after this rejected effort to produce a mutual kindness in the treatment of prisoners, Southern feeling became more unquiet on the matter than ever; yet it clearly appears that Mr. Davis would not yield to the demand for retaliation.

The evidence tending to show this to be the true condition of the case as to Mr. Davis himself was brought by me and submitted to Mr. Greeley, and in part to Mr. Wilson. The result was, these gentlemen, and those others in sympathy with them, changed their former suspicion to a favorable opinion and a friendly disposition. They were from this time kept informed of each movement as made to liberate Mr. Davis, or to compel the Government to bring the prisoner to trial. All this took place before counsel, indeed before any one acting on his behalf, was allowed to communicate with or see him.

The *Tribune* now, at once, began a series of leading editorials demanding that our Government proceed with the trial; and on January 16, 1866, incited by those editorials, Senator Howard, of Michigan, offered a joint resolution, aided by Mr. Sumner, "recommending the trial of Jefferson Davis and Clement C. Clay before a military tribunal or court-martial, for charges mentioned in the report of the Secretary of War, of March 4, 1866." It will be interesting to mention now that if a trial proceeded in this manner, I was then creditably informed, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens had volunteered as counsel for Mr. Clay.

After it had become evident that there was no immediate prospect of any trial, if any prospect at all, the counsel for Mr. Davis became anxious that their client be liberated on bail, and one of

them consulted with Mr. Greeley as to the feasibility of procuring some names as bondsmen of persons who had conspicuously opposed the war of secession. This was found quite easy; and Mr. Gerrit Smith and Commodore Vanderbilt were selected, and Mr. Greeley, in case his name should be found necessary. All this could not have been accomplished had not those gentlemen, and others in sympathy with them, been already convinced that those charges against Mr. Davis were unfounded in fact. So an application was made on June 11, 1866, to Mr. Justice Underwood, at Alexandria, Virginia, for a writ of *habeas corpus*, which, after argument, was denied, upon the ground that "Jefferson Davis was arrested under a proclamation of the President charging him with complicity in the assassination of the late President Lincoln. He has been held," says the decision, "ever since, and is now held, as a military prisoner." The *Washington Chronicle* of that date insisted that "the case is one well entitled to a trial before a military tribunal; the testimony before the Judiciary Committee of the House, all of it bearing directly, *if not conclusively*, on a certain intention to take the life of Mr. Lincoln, is a most important element in the case." This was reported as from the pen of Mr. John W. Forney, then clerk of the Senate, and is cited by me as an expression of a general tone of the press on that occasion. Then, the House of Representatives, on the motion of Mr. Boutwell, of Massachusetts, the following day passed a resolution "that it was the opinion of the House that Jefferson Davis should be held in custody as a prisoner and subject to trial according to the laws of the land." It was adopted by a vote of 105 to 19.

It is very suggestive to reflect just here that, in the intermediate time, Mr. Clement C. Clay had been discharged from imprisonment without being brought to trial on either of these charges, upon which he had been arrested, and for which arrest the \$100,000 reward had been paid.

This failure to liberate Mr. Davis would have been very discouraging to most of men; but Mr. Greeley, and those friends who were acting with him, determined to meet the issue made, promptly and sharply, and to push the Government to a trial of its prisoner, or to withdraw the charge made by its board of military justice. The point was soon sent home, and was felt. Mr. Greeley hastened back to New York, and the *Tribune* of June 12, 1866, contained, in a leader from his pen, this unmistakable demand and protest:

"How and when did Davis become a prisoner of war? He was not arrested as a public enemy, but as a felon, officially charged, in the face of the civilized world, with the foulest, most execrable guilt—that of having suborned assassins to murder President Lincoln—a crime the basest and most cowardly known to mankind. It was for this that \$100,000 was offered and paid for his arrest. And the proclamation of Andrew Johnson and William H. Seward offering this reward says his complicity with Wilkes Booth & Co. is established 'by evidence now in the Bureau of Military Justice.' So there was no need of time to hunt it up.

"It has been asserted that Davis is responsible for the death by exposure and famine of our captured soldiers; and his official position gives plausibility to the charge. Yet while Henry Wirz—a miserable wretch—a mere tool of tools—was long ago arraigned, tried, convicted, sentenced, and hanged for this crime—no charge has been officially preferred against Davis. So we presume none is to be."

The *Tribune* kept up repeating this demand during the following part of that year, and admonished the Government of the increasing absurdity of its position, not daring, seemingly, to prosecute a great criminal against whom it had officially declared it was possessed of evidence to prove that crime. On November 9th, 1866, the *Tribune* again thus emphasized this thought:

"Eighteen months have nearly elapsed since Jefferson Davis was made a State prisoner. He had previously been publicly charged by the President of the United States with conspiring to assassinate President Lincoln, and \$100,000 offered for his capture thereupon. The capture was promptly made and the money duly paid; yet, up to this hour, there has not been even an attempt made by the Government to procure an indictment on that charge. He has also been popularly, if not officially, accused of complicity in the virtual murder of Union soldiers while prisoners of war, by subjecting them to needless, inhuman exposure, privation and abuse; but no official attempt has been made to indict him on that charge. * * A great government may deal sternly with offenders, but not meanly; it cannot afford to seem unwilling to repair an obvious wrong."

The Government, however, continued to express its inability to proceed with the trial. Another year had passed since the capture of Mr. Davis, and now another attempt to liberate him by bail was to be made. The Government, by its conduct, having tacitly abandoned those special charges of inhumanity, a petition for a writ was to be presented, by which the prisoner might be handed over to the civil authority to answer the indictment for treason. In aid of this project, Mr. Wilson, chairman of the Committee of Military Affairs, offered in the Senate, on the 18th of March, 1867, a resolution urging the Government to proceed with the trial. The remarkable thoughts and language of that resolution were observed at the time, and necessarily caused people to infer that Mr. Wilson, at least, was not under the too common delusion that the Government really had a case on either of those two particular charges against Mr. Davis individually; and a short time after this Mr. Wilson went to Fortress Monroe and saw Mr. Davis. The visit was simply friendly, and not for any purpose relating to his liberation.

On May 14th, 1867, Mr. Davis was delivered to the civil authority; was at once admitted to bail, Mr. Greeley and Mr. Gerrit Smith going personally to Richmond, in attestation of their belief that wrong had been done to Mr. Davis in holding him so long accused

upon those charges, now abandoned, and as an expression of magnanimity toward the South. Commodore Vanderbilt, then but recently the recipient of the thanks of Congress for his superb aid to the Government during the war, was also represented there, and signed the bond through Mr. Horace F. Clark, his son-in-law, and Mr. Augustus Schell, his friend.

The apparent unwillingness of the Government to prosecute, under every incentive of pride and honor to the contrary, was accepted by those gentlemen and the others whom I have mentioned as a confirmation of the information given to me at Montreal, and of its entire accuracy.

These men—Andrew, Greeley, Smith and Wilson—have each passed from this life. The history of their efforts to bring all parts of our common country once more and abidingly into unity, peace and concord, and of Mr. Greeley's enormous sacrifice to compel justice to be done to one man, and he an enemy, should be written.

I will add a single incident tending the same way. In a consultation with Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, at his residence on Capitol Hill, at Washington, in May, 1866, he related to me how the chief of this "Military Bureau" showed him "the evidence" upon which the proclamation was issued charging Davis and Clay with complicity in the assassination of Mr. Lincoln. He said that he refused to give the thing any support, and that he told that gentleman the evidence was insufficient in itself, and incredible. I am not likely ever to forget the earnest manner in which Mr. Stevens then said to me: "Those men are no friends of mine. They are public enemies; and I would treat the South as a conquered country and settle it politically upon the policy best suited for ourselves. But I know these men, sir. They are gentlemen, and incapable of being assassins."* Yours, faithfully,

GEORGE SHEA.

No. 205 WEST 46TH STREET, NEW YORK, January 15, 1876.

And now it only remains that we make a brief

SUMMING UP

of this whole question of the treatment of prisoners during the war. We think that we have established the following points:

1. The laws of the Confederate Congress, the orders of the War Department, the regulations of the Surgeon-General, the action of our Generals in the field, and the orders of those who had the immediate charge of the prisoners, all provided that prisoners in the hands of the Confederates should be kindly treated, supplied with the same rations which our soldiers had, and cared for when sick in hospitals placed on *precisely the same footing as the hospitals for Confederate soldiers.*

* NOTE.—This and the former statement concerning Mr. Stevens are confirmed to me by his literary executor and biographer, Hon. Mr. Dickey, of Pennsylvania.—G. S.

2. If these regulations were violated in individual instances, and if subordinates were sometimes cruel to prisoners, it was without the knowledge or consent of the Confederate Government, which always took prompt action on any case reported to them.

3. If the prisoners failed to get their full rations, and had those of inferior quality; the Confederate soldiers suffered in precisely the same way, and to the same extent, and it resulted from that system of warfare adopted by the Federal authorities, which carried desolation and ruin to every part of the South they could reach, and which in starving the Confederates into submission brought the same evils upon their own men in Southern prisons.

4. The mortality in Southern prisons (fearfully large, although *over three per cent. less than the mortality in Northern prisons*), resulted from causes beyond the control of our authorities—from epidemics, &c., which might have been avoided, or greatly mitigated, had not the Federal Government declared medicines “contraband of war”—refused the proposition of Judge Ould, that each Government should send its own surgeons with medicines, hospital stores, &c., to minister to soldiers in prison—declined his proposition to send medicines to its own men in Southern prisons, without being required to allow the Confederates the same privilege—refused to allow the Confederate Government to buy medicines for gold, tobacco or cotton, which it offered to pledge its honor should be used only for Federal prisoners in its hands—refused to exchange sick and wounded—and neglected from August to December, 1864, to accede to Judge Ould’s proposition to send transportation to Savannah and receive *without equivalent* from ten to fifteen thousand Federal prisoners, notwithstanding the fact that this offer was accompanied with a statement of the utter inability of the Confederacy to provide for these prisoners, and a detailed report of the monthly mortality at Andersonville, and that Judge Ould, again and again, urged compliance with his humane proposal.

5. We have proven, by the most unimpeachable testimony, that the sufferings of Confederate prisoners, in Northern “prison pens,” were terrible beyond description—that they were starved in a land of plenty—that they were frozen where fuel and clothing were abundant—that they suffered untold horrors for want of medicines, hospital stores and proper medical attention—that they were shot by sentinels, beaten by officers, and subjected to the most cruel punishments upon the slightest pretexts—that friends at the North were refused the privilege of clothing their nakedness or feeding

them when starving—and that these outrages were perpetrated not only with the full knowledge of, but under the orders of E. M. STANTON, U. S. SECRETARY OF WAR. We have proven these things by Federal as well as Confederate testimony.

6. We have shown that all the suffering of prisoners on both sides could have been avoided by simply carrying out the terms of the cartel, and that for the failure to do this the *Federal authorities alone* were responsible; that the Confederate Government originally proposed the cartel, and were always ready to carry it out in both letter and spirit; that the Federal authorities observed its terms only so long as it was to their interest to do so, and then repudiated their plighted faith, and proposed other terms, which were greatly to the disadvantage of the Confederates; that when the Government at Richmond agreed to accept the hard terms of exchange offered them, these were at once repudiated by the Federal authorities; that when Judge Ould agreed upon a new cartel with General Butler, Lieutenant-General Grant refused to approve it, and Mr. Stanton repudiated it; and that the policy of the Federal Government was to refuse all exchanges, while they “fired the Northern heart” by placing the whole blame upon the “Rebels,” and by circulating the most heartrending stories of “Rebel barbarity” to prisoners.

If either of the above points has not been made clear to any sincere seeker after the truth, we would be most happy to produce further testimony. And we hold ourselves prepared to maintain, against all comers, *the truth of every proposition we have laid down in this discussion*. Let the calm verdict of history decide between the Confederate Government and their calumniators.

Editorial Paragraphs.

OUR MARCH NUMBER has excited great interest, and has received the warmest commendation from the press generally throughout the South. Some of the Northern papers have contained very kindly notices. We have seen no attempt to refute the points made; and we would esteem it a favor if our friends would forward us anything of the kind which they may observe. We have letters from leading Confederates warmly endorsing our array of documents and facts, and have reason to feel that in defending the Confederate Government from the charge of systematic cruelty to prisoners, we have rendered a service highly appreciated by our Southern people.

OUR SUBSCRIPTION LIST is steadily increasing; but we can find room for other names, and beg our friends to help us swell the number of our readers.

VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS to our archives are constantly coming in. A patriotic lady of this city (Mrs. Catharine P. Graham) has recently presented us with war files of several Richmond papers. She refused to sell them for a large price, and insisted on giving them to our Society.

John McRae, Esq., of Camden, S. C., has placed us under the highest obligations by presenting the following newspaper files:

Charleston Courier from May 1856 to February 1865.

Richmond Dispatch from April 1861 to April 1864.

Charleston Mercury from July 1859 to February 1865 and from November 1866 to November 1868.

Columbia Daily Carolinian from 1855 to October 1864.

Charleston Daily News and "*News and Courier*" from June 1866 to this date.

Camden Journal from January 1856 to this date.

Southern Presbyterian from June 1858 to this date.

And Dr. J. Dickson Bruns, of New Orleans, has sent us a bound volume of the *Charleston Mercury* for 1862.

We have received recently other valuable contributions, which we have not space even to mention.

OUR PRESENT NUMBER has been delayed by causes over which we have had no control; but we think that we can promise that hereafter our Papers will appear promptly near the latter part of each month.

A CONFEDERATE ROSTER has been a desideratum exceedingly difficult to supply. The capture, or destruction, of so large a part of our records has rendered a compilation of a full and correct Roster a work of almost insuperable difficulty. We are happy to announce, however, that Colonel Charles C. Jones, Jr., of New York (formerly of Savannah), who has been for some ten years patiently at work on such a Roster, has brought his labors to a conclusion, and has generously placed his MSS. at the disposal of the Society. It shows the marks of patient and laborious investigation, and (so far as we are able to judge) is much more accurate and complete than could have been expected. We propose to begin its publication in our next number, and to have it stereotyped, and so arranged that it can be bound, when completed, into a neat volume, which will be a most valuable addition to our War History.

WE desire that each and all of our readers should keep before them the fact that there is an Association incorporated by the State of Virginia, whose trust it is to obtain funds for a monument to be erected at Richmond in memory of General Robert E. Lee. We will not offend good taste by offering a word in commendation of this effort to do honor to the great captain; we rather assume that every reader of these Papers will gladly and promptly forward a liberal contribution to the Treasurer at Richmond. The Association is administered by a Board of Managers composed of the Governor of Virginia, the Auditor and the Treasurer. The Hon. R. M. T. Hanter is the treasurer, and Col. S. Bassett French is the secretary of the Board. Address, Richmond, Va.

THE "LEE MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION," with headquarters at Lexington, Va., has been quietly working for its simple object, which is to decorate the tomb of Lee. Having secured Valentine's splendid recumbent figure of Lee—which is, beyond all question, one of the most superb works of art on the continent—they are now raising funds with which to build the *Mausoleum* which is to contain it. Surely the admirers of our great chieftain ought to supply at once the means necessary for this noble object. Send contributions to the Treasurer, C. M. Figgatt, Lexington, Virginia.

Book Notices.

Cooke's Life of General R. E. Lee. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

This book was published in 1871, and has been so long before the public that it need now receive no extended review at our hands. Colonel Cooke wields a facile pen, and his books are always *entertaining*. There are errors in the strictly Military part of this biography which a more rigid study of the official reports would have avoided; but the account given of General Lee's private character and domestic life is exceedingly pleasing and very valuable. We are glad to note that an (unintentional) injustice done to the gallant General Edward Johnson, in the account of the battle of Spotsylvania Court-

house, which appeared in a previous edition, has been corrected in the edition before us.

A Military Biography of Stonewall Jackson. By Colonel John Esten Cooke. With an appendix (containing an account of the Inauguration of Foley's statue), by Rev. J. Wm. Jones. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

Cooke's Life of Jackson was originally published during the war, and was rewritten, and republished in 1866. The enterprising publishers have brought out a new edition with an Appendix added, which contains a full account of the Inauguration of Foley's statue, including the eloquent address of Governor Kemper, and the noble oration of Rev. Dr. Moses D. Hoge. The book is gotten up in the highest style of the printer's art, the engravings add to its attractiveness, and we hear it is meeting with a large sale.

It is to be regretted that the publishers did not give Colonel Cooke the opportunity of revising and correcting his work, for while the book is very readable, and gives some exceedingly vivid pictures of old Stonewall on his rawbone sorrel, there are important errors in the narrative which ought by all means to be corrected.

Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes and Letters of General R. E. Lee. By Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

We cannot, of course, give an unbiased judgment of this book. But we may say this, that the *letters* of General Lee, which the author was so fortunate as to secure, are among the most charming specimens of letter-writing in all the wide range of Literature, and that the view of his private, domestic, and Christian character thus given presents him to the world as one of the noblest specimens of a man with whom God ever blessed the earth. And so large a part of the book is made up of these private letters, and of the contributions of others, that even *we* may say, without impropriety, that we would be glad to see the book widely circulated—more especially as a part of every copy sold goes into the treasury of the "Lee Memorial Association" at Lexington.

We may add that the steel engravings of General Lee and Mrs. Lee in this book are the best likenesses of them we have ever seen, and that the publishers have gotten up the volume in superb style.

General Joseph E. Johnston's Narrative. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

General Johnston wields one of the most graceful, trenchant pens of any man who figured in the late war, and whatever difference of opinion may honestly exist concerning controverted points upon which he touches, all will desire to read this really able narrative, and to place it among the comparatively few books which one cares to preserve for future reference and study. As it has been intimated that General Johnston is now preparing a revised and enlarged edition, in which he replies to criticisms which have been made upon his Narrative, we shall look forward with interest to its appearance.

Other Book Notices are crowded out, and will be given hereafter.

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

Vol. I.

Richmond, Va., May, 1876.

No. 5.

Reminiscences of the Confederate States Navy.

By Captain C. W. READ.

[The following is one of what we hope to make a series of sketches of the Confederate States navy. We are anxious that no branch of our service shall be neglected, and that those who *made* the history shall record it.]

When I received intelligence that my native State, Mississippi, had by the sovereign will of her people, severed her connection with the American Union, I was serving as a midshipman on board the United States steam frigate "Powhatan," then stationed at Vera Cruz, Mexico. I immediately tendered my resignation, which was duly forwarded by the Commodore to the Secretary of the Navy at Washington. By the steamer from New Orleans, which arrived at Vera Cruz about the last of February, 1861, I received private advices that my resignation had been accepted, but no official information to that effect reached me. The day after the arrival of the mail steamer the United States sloop-of-war "Macedonian" joined the squadron, and brought orders for the Powhatan to proceed to the United States. On the 13th of March we arrived and anchored off the Battery, in the harbor of New York. The following day I started for the South, and was soon in Montgomery, the capital of the Confederate States. I called on Mr. Mallory, the Secretary of the Navy, who received me kindly, and informed me that no doubt my services would soon be needed by the Government. I also called on Mr. Davis, with whom I was acquainted. He asked me many questions about the Naval Academy, and the naval service, and seemed anxious to know how the officers of the navy from the South regarded the secession of the States. He said he hoped there would be no war, but if coercion was attempted, that the army of the South would be the place for a young man with a military education.

I met several naval officers in Montgomery who, like myself, had

resigned from the United States service, among them the gallant Lieutenant Hartstine, of Arctic exploration fame. There were a great many strangers, from the different sections of the country, at that time in the capital of the Confederacy. I formed the acquaintance of quite a number of them, and received my first information of how the people of the South regarded the events of the day. From what I could learn, the people of the South were almost unanimously in favor of the secession of the States, for the reason that they could see no other way of protecting their rights; but they hoped for peace and the friendship of the people of the North, and a great many hoped for a reunion, in which there would be no contentions, and in which the people of the South would be guaranteed equal rights with all the States.

I had been in Mississippi but a few days, when the country was aware that war had commenced, and that the stronghold of Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor, had been compelled to surrender to the Southern forces. Soon news came that Lincoln had called for 75,000 men to march upon the States which had swung loose from the Federal Union. The youth of the South sprung to arms in obedience to the call of their President, and everywhere the fife and drum were heard. It was, indeed, hard for me to keep from volunteering for the army, but I remembered that the South had but few sailors and would need them all on the water.

On the 1st day of May, 1861, I reported, in obedience to an order from the Secretary of the Navy, to Captain Rosseau, of the Confederate States navy, at New Orleans for duty on the Confederate steamer *McRae*. I was directed by Captain Rosseau to go over to Algiers and report to Lieutenant T. B. Huger, the commander of the steamer. I found Lieutenant Huger an agreeable gentleman, and felt that he was just the man I would like to serve under. He directed me to take charge of the sailing master's department, and to push ahead as rapidly as possible, as he was desirous of getting the ship ready for sea before the blockade could be established. The *McRae* was a propeller of about 600 tons, barque rigged, and mounted six thirty-two pounders, one nine-inch Dahlgreen gun on pivot, and one twenty-four pounder brass rifle, also on pivot, making in all eight guns. The line officers above me were Lieutenants Warley, Egleston and Dunnington, all of the old navy. The midshipmen were Stone, John Comstock, Blanc and Morgan. Our surgeon was Dr. Linah, of South Carolina, and the purser was the best old gentleman in the world, Mr. Sample. The steamer

Sumter, a propeller of 400 tons, mounting five guns and commanded by Commander R. Semmes, was fitting out near us. Captain Semmes was untiring in his efforts to get his vessel ready for sea, and finally threw his guns aboard in a half fitted state, started down the river, and in a few days was on the ocean destroying the commerce of the enemy.

While the McRae was getting ready for sea, Captain Higgins, formerly of the navy, but at that time on the staff of General Twiggs, proposed an expedition to capture the Launches of the enemy that were raiding in the Mississippi Sound, and called on Captain Huger for volunteers, which were readily furnished. So taking one thirty-two pounder, one eight-inch gun and two howitzers, we armed and manned two of the lake steamers. We went through the Sound but did not find the boats of the enemy. It was decided by Captain Higgins that we would land our guns on Ship Island and hold on there until troops could be brought from New Orleans. We commenced landing about 4 P. M., and after very hard work got our guns through the soft sand, up to the highest point of the island, and parapets around them before dark. Our steamers left as soon as the guns were on shore. About dark a steamer was made out coming in from seaward, and it was evident to all that she was a gun-boat of the enemy. The light on the island had been kept burning as usual since the war commenced, but on this night it was extinguished. After dark the gun-boat fired a couple of guns, as it seemed, to let the light-keeper know that a light was needed. However, the gun-boat came in and anchored within a mile of our position. The next morning at dawn of day Lieutenant Warley, who commanded us, directed me to open fire on the steamer with the eight-inch gun. As soon as the first shot had been fired, some one on lookout on the light-house reported that the steamer had up a white flag. As it was rather misty, it was believed by the commanding officer that the enemy had surrendered. Smoke was seen issuing from his funnel however, and some of us suspected that he meant anything else than striking his colors. In a few minutes all doubts were dispelled by a thirty-two pound shell, which came whizzing from the steamer, knocking the sand in our faces and exploding amongst us. We now opened with all of our guns, but with what effect we could not ascertain. The gun-boat replied briskly, but fired wildly. In about an hour, the steamer having raised steam, withdrew out of range and proceeded out to sea. That afternoon our steamers re-

turned, bringing the Fourth Louisiana Regiment, in charge of Colonel Allen. Our sailors embarked and went back to the city.

The *McRae* was soon out of the hands of the carpenters, and started up to Baton Rouge for her ordnance stores. Near that place some portion of her machinery gave way, and we were compelled to return to New Orleans for repairs. In a few weeks our engines were reported in good order, and every preparation for sea having been completed, we bade adieu to our friends in the city and steamed down the river. Arriving at the forts, some forty miles from the sea, we anchored and let our steam go down. The "*Joy*," a side-wheel river boat, formerly a tow-boat, occasionally reconnoitered the river below. Once and awhile the *McRae* got under way and went down the river as far as the Jump, or up as far as the quarantine. One day, while at the Jump, a steamer was discovered coming up the river. We went to quarters and awaited under way the report of the *Joy*, which was in advance of the approaching steamer. The stranger proved to be a French man-of-war, and informed us that he had arrived off the Southwest Pass the night before; had grounded in trying to get over the bar; that he saw no blockading vessels until 10 o'clock next day, when a small side-wheel gun-boat called the "*Water Witch*" arrived off the Pass.

Captain Geo. N. Hollins had now arrived in New Orleans and assumed command of all our naval forces in the Mississippi river. He was aware that the Government was anxious for the *McRae* to get to sea, and he at once commenced preparations to open the river. Some enterprising and patriotic citizens of New Orleans had purchased a very staunch, fast double propeller of about 300 tons, which had been a tow-boat on the river, and was known as the "*Enoch Train*."

This steamer was arched over from the water line with 20 inches of oak, and covered with two-inch iron plates. An iron prow was placed on her. She mounted one 9-inch gun, which could be fired only right ahead. She was commanded by Captain Stevenson, who was part owner and designer of the ram. The *McRae* was at the forts when the ram (now called the "*Manassas*") came down on her trial trip. By order of Commodore Hollins, Lieutenant Warley, senior lieutenant of the *McRae*, took the ram from her owners and assumed command of her. The enemy's vessels had now ascended the river and were at anchor at the Passes. They consisted of one large sloop-of-war, the "*Richmond*," carrying a formidable

battery of 20 guns; two sailing sloops-of-war, and a small steamer, the "Water Witch." Commodore Hollins determined to attack the enemy and endeavor to sink the Richmond and drive the sailing ships ashore or destroy them with fire rafts. So on the night of — our fleet, consisting of the "Manassas," the McRae, Joy, Calhoun, and the tug-boats Tuscarora and Watson, each with a fire raft, started from the forts. On arriving at about ten miles from the head of the Passes, where the enemy's gun-boats lay, the Manassas was directed to proceed in advance and run into the Richmond at full speed. The tugs followed, and were instructed to set fire to their combustible rafts, or barges, as soon as the Manassas should throw up a rocket, which was the signal that she had obeyed her instructions. The night was dark, and we all waited anxiously for the signal. Presently a rocket was seen to shoot high in the air, and in a few minutes the thunder of a broadside told us the Yankee blue-jackets were at their guns. The fire rafts were lighted and drifted down the river with the current; a few colored lights were seen down the river, and all was quiet. Those were anxious moments for us on the McRae, who, standing afar off in the dark, were waiting for daylight to tell us of the fate of our friends on the Manassas. At early dawn the ram was alongside of the bank of the river near the head of the Passes. We soon ascertained that she had run into a ship; had entangled her propellers, disabled her engines, and carried away her smoke-stacks. All of our vessels now proceeded down the Southwest Pass, and soon we made out the Richmond and Vincennes aground on the bar. On arriving at extreme range we fired a few shots—all of which fell short. One of the enemy's shells falling near the "Joy," who had ventured nearer than the other boats, signal was made to "withdraw from action" and we steamed gallantly up the river. At the head of the Passes a small schooner, loaded with coal, was found aground; also a small boat belonging to the Richmond. There were no blockading vessels off Pass a'Loue, and Captain Huger was about to proceed to sea in obedience to his orders from the Secretary of the Navy, and to take advantage of what was regarded as the object of the expedition, when the McRae was ordered to follow the other boats up the river to the forts. The belief was general that the "Manassas" had sunk one of the enemy's ships, but which one, no one could tell, as two were on the bar and the other two were off Southwest Pass at sea. It was afterwards ascertained that the "Manassas" had run in between the Richmond and the coal schooner alongside of her,

and had injured neither. All on the *McRae* thought we would go down the following night, but great was our disappointment when we found that we were neither to attack the enemy again nor attempt to go to sea. We went to New Orleans, and I am sorry to say the good people of that city applauded us. After remaining several days off New Orleans, the *McRae* filled up with coal and proceeded down the river to run the blockade. Our engines not working smoothly, we returned to the city for repairs, after which we managed to get down as far as the quarantine, where most of our men took the swamp fever, and where we finally received orders not to run the blockade.

The three senior line officers were now ordered to other duty and I became executive officer. We sent down our spars, unbent our sails, and became a river gun-boat. The commanding officer having accompanied Commodore Hollins, by rail to Columbus, Kentucky, I was directed to proceed with the *McRae* up the river to that point where in due season we arrived. Columbus was then held by the Confederate forces under General Polk. The battle of Belmont had just been fought, and the enemy was concentrating at Cairo. The Yankees had two small wooden gun-boats above Columbus. A number of iron-clads had arrived at Cairo, but they were without guns or sailors. The Confederates had at Columbus, the *Manassas*, *McRae* (8), *Polk* (5), *Jackson* (2), and *Calhoun* (2). A small fort below Cairo was all the Confederate gun-boats would have to encounter. An advance was urged by many of us. The enemy's gun-boats were allowed to take on board their armaments, to receive their sailors, and with a fleet of transports and men to bring the first disaster to the Southern arms—the capture of forts Donalson and Henry. Columbus was evacuated and the guns of the fortifications were placed in position on Island 10, a short distance. Our gun-boats now dropped down to New Madrid to assist in defending that place. The gun-boats *Pontchartrain* and *Joy* joined our squadron, which was known out West by the title of “Hollins’ fleet.”

The enemy's fleet under their intrepid Commander Foote, appeared in front of No. 10 and commenced throwing their mortar shells into our works. Occasionally the fight was varied by a sharp stand up fight between the gun-boats and the batteries, in which the forts seemed to get the best of it. The Yankee gun-boats were mostly Mississippi river steam-boats, strengthened and casemated with wood and covered with felt and iron, and were designated “tin-clads.” They could resist field pieces, but not heavy artillery.

New Madrid is situated on the right bank of the river, and is about ten miles below Island 10. A good road leads to Cape Gerideau, a point on the river above Cairo. Hence, New Madrid was an important point as long as we held No. 10. The place was poorly fortified, had an insufficient garrison, and was commanded by an Arkansas demagogue by the name of Gant. Jeff. Thompson, with his few "Jayhawkers," galloped around the town occasionally, and once brought in a Yankee cavalryman too Dutch to give any account of himself.

On the 3d day of March, 1862, the enemy's forces under Pope appeared in front of New Madrid, and entrenching themselves commenced an investment. Our gun-boats shelled them continually and did very good service, and the Confederate batteries annoyed the enemy's working parties considerably. I saw Gant when the Yankee shells first began to fall in our lines. He took the "shell fever" quicker than any man I ever saw. This man Gant, afterwards deserted the Confederate cause when it began to wane before the overwhelming legions of foreign mercenaries that flocked over the sea in 1864 to get good rations and \$900 bounties! On the night of March 13th it was decided to evacuate New Madrid. A darker and more disagreeable night it is hard to conceive; it rained in torrents, and our poor soldiers, covered with mud and drenched with rain, crowded on our gun-boats, leaving behind provisions, camp equipments and artillery. Gant was so demoralized that he forgot to call in his pickets.

Our fleet was at this time strengthened by the arrival of the "Maurapas," a large side-wheel steamer, having her machinery protected by an iron-clad casemate. She was commanded by Lieutenant Joseph Fry. She mounted five rifle guns—pivots. A similar gun-boat, the Livingston, Commander Pinckney, also arrived. Our gun-boats after landing from New Madrid, took a position at Tiptonville, a point 30 miles below No. 10, by the river, but only four miles by land. It was therefore an important point. We had been at Tiptonville but a few days, when early one morning we perceived a number of men on the opposite side of the river from us, engaged in throwing down a large pile of wood that had been placed on the bank for the use of our transports. About the time Commodore Hollins had made up his mind to send over and ascertain who the party were, a puff of smoke was seen to rise near the men, and a shell came screaming across the river, striking the bank near us. Fortunately our boats had steam up. The signal was hoisted on

the McRae to engage the battery at "close quarters." The gun-boat "Maurapas" was the first boat under way, and followed by the "Polk" and "Pontchartrain," thundered away at the Yanks. The McRae fired away at long range, but soon perceiving a small yawl-boat adrift (which had been cut from the "Maurapas" by a shell), we ceased firing, and went a mile below to pick up the boat. In the meantime the Polk had received a shot between wind and water, and signalized that she was leaking badly. The Yankees had left all their guns except one and were firing slowly and wildly, when the McRae signalized to "withdraw from action." So we all steamed down the river five or six miles and anchored. The next day the enterprising Yankees opened fire on us from the shore with some light guns; we replied for a few minutes, and again "withdrew from action." The Commodore stated that it was useless to fight batteries with wooden gun-boats, as the guns on shore were protected by parapets, and that nothing was to be gained even if he did succeed in killing a few artillerymen. Our gun-boats were ridiculed by Confederate soldiers and citizens, and treated with contempt by the enemy. By the urgent request of the commander of our troops at Island 10, one of our gun-boats was sent up to Tiptonville with supplies every night, and though the enemy's batteries fired at them regularly, not one of their shots ever took effect.

The night of April 4th, 1862, was one of those dark, stormy, rainy nights that they have up there at that season of the year. On that night one of the enemy's gun-boats ran the batteries at No. 10. She was a tin-clad called the "Carondelet," and mounted 13 guns. For a few days she remained under the guns at New Madrid; but perceiving that our gun-boats were not disposed to molest her, she went along the east bank of the river below New Madrid, and attacked in detail our small batteries which had been constructed to prevent the crossing of troops. One day we received information that the tin-clad was ferrying the men of General Pope's army over to a point above Tiptonville, and the general commanding at No. 10, urged Commodore Hollins to attack the gun-boat with his fleet, for if the enemy got possession of Tiptonville, and the road by which supplies were sent to No. 10, the evacuation or capture of that place was certain. Commodore Hollins declined to comply with the request of the general, saying that as the "Carondelet" was iron-clad, and his fleet were all wooden boats, he did not think he could successfully combat her. Lieutenants Dunnington, Fry and Carter, of the gun-boats "Pontchartrain," "Maurapas" and

"Polk," begged Commodore Hollins to allow them to attack the enemy's gun-boat, but the old commodore was firm in his decision to remain inactive. The three gun-boats mounted together 17 guns, 8 and 9-inch smooth bores, 6 and 7-inch rifles. That same gun-boat "Carondelet" was afterwards engaged in the Yazoo river by the "Arkansas," under the heroic I. N. Brown, and after an action of twenty minutes (the "Arkansas," using only her two bow guns, 8-inch), the "Carondelet" was driven ashore riddled, disabled and colors down. Pope's army having been safely crossed by the "Carondelet," moved on the rear of No. 10, and in a few days that place with all its fine ordnance and several thousand men surrendered to the enemy. Our fleet steamed down the river, and anchored under the guns of Fort Pillow, the next fortified place below. News now reached us that the fleets of Farragut and Porter had entered the Mississippi river, and had commenced to throw their mortar shells into Forts Jackson and Saint Phillip. Commodore Hollins telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy for permission to go with all the vessels of his fleet to the assistance of the forts below New Orleans. The Secretary replied to Commodore Hollins to remain where he was, and to "harrass the enemy as much as possible." The Commodore answered that as all of the enemy's gun-boats on the upper Mississippi were iron-clad, while those on the lower river were wood like our own, he was of the opinion that he could be of more service with his fleet below New Orleans than at Fort Pillow. Without waiting to hear further from the department, the Commodore started down the river on the "Joy," and ordered the flag ship McRae to follow as soon as the next in command, Commodore Pinckney, should arrive from Memphis, where he was on leave. The fleet thus left was now under command of the commander of the McRae, Lieutenant Huger; the day after the commodore left, the fleet proceeded up the river to reconnoiter. We steamed all day and saw nothing of the enemy. Just after dark our attention was attracted by some one on shore, hailing and waiving a torch. On sending in to ascertain what was wanted, we were informed that the enemy's fleet was anchored a few miles above, around a bend in the river. We therefore anchored for the night. The next morning the "Pontchartrain" went up to reconnoiter, and sure enough found the fleet of the enemy. The Yankee gun-boats, consisting of seven tin-clads, came down in line abreast, and our flotilla started down the river at full speed. The McRae being of great draught, was obliged to follow the channel of the river. We were forced to

steam hard to keep out of range. When we reached Fort Pillow the enemy's fleet was only three or four miles astern. The Yanks came to, above the fort a few miles, and without delay began to shell it.

A few vessels now arrived at Fort Pillow from New Orleans belonging to what was known as the "Montgomery fleet." The State of Louisiana had appropriated a large sum of money for the defence of the Mississippi river. The funds were given to General Lovel, at New Orleans, and he at once set to work and had all of the powerful, fast and staunch tow-boats and ocean steamers at New Orleans fitted as rams and gun-boats. They were all strengthened and protected with wood and iron, and were really the most serviceable and formidable war vessels of the river on either side. The general superintendence of the fitting out and manning of these boats was entrusted to a steamboat captain by the name of Montgomery, who afterwards played commodore of a portion of them. Each of these gun-boats had a frigate's complement of officers, and they all wore the blue uniform of the United States navy. The officers of the "Montgomery fleet" were mostly river steamboat men, and of course were very much prejudiced against gentlemen and officers of the regular naval service; and everywhere on the river, from New Orleans to Fort Pillow, ridicule of the graduates of the naval school could be heard in all the bar-rooms and like places that steamboat men frequented and fought the battles of the Confederacy. The idle talk of those sort of people did not annoy our officers of the navy, and we all hoped that the fresh water sailors would fight up to their "brags."

Commander Pinckney having returned to Fort Pillow and assumed command of our fleet, the "McRae," in obedience to the order of Commodore Hollins, proceeded down to New Orleans, where she arrived in a few days.

The authorities of New Orleans were thoroughly alarmed for the safety of the city, and men were kept working night and day on the two great iron clads, "Mississippi" and "Louisiana." The "McRae" was ordered to fill up with coal and to go down to the forts without delay. Shortly after our arrival at New Orleans, I called on Commodore Hollins, at the St. Charles Hotel, and was very glad to learn that he proposed to give us a brush with the enemy. He told me that he intended taking the Louisiana without waiting for her engines to be finished, but to use her as a floating battery, and with the ram "Manassas" and "Montgomery"

rams (six or eight of them), the "McRae" and a number of fire-rafts, and to attack the enemy's fleet of wooden ships below the forts and drive them out of the river. A few hours afterwards I heard that the Commodore had received a dispatch from the Navy Department ordering him to Richmond.

The "McRae" arrived at the forts on the 16th of April, 1862, and anchored close into the bank just above Fort St. Phillip. The enemy's fleet was around the bend below Fort Jackson, and his mortar-boats were throwing about ten shells every minute in and around the forts. The river was obstructed by schooners anchored across the river, in line abreast, between the forts, and chains and lines were passed from vessel to vessel; but a passage was left open near each bank. The forts were well garrisoned and had a large number of the heaviest guns. There were six Montgomery rams, one Louisiana ram called the "Governor Moore," the ram "Manassas" and the "McRae," and also a number of fire-rafts and tow-boats—all on the Fort St. Phillip side of the river between that fort and the point above. On the 20th of April the large iron-clad Louisiana, mounting 16 guns of the largest and most approved pattern, arrived and anchored just above the obstructions. She was in command of Commander McIntosh, of the navy. Captain Jno. K. Mitchell was placed in command of all the boats of the Confederate navy, viz: "Louisiana," "Manassas" and "McRae." The Montgomery rams were under the command of Captain Stevenson, the designer of the "Manassas." The "Governor Moore," of the "Louisiana navy," was in charge of Lieutenant Kennon, formerly of the navy. Captain Mitchell endeavored to get control of everything afloat, but succeeded only in obtaining the consent of the other "naval" commanders to co-operate with him if they should think proper, but under no circumstances were they to receive or obey orders from any officer of the regular Confederate navy.

The "Louisiana" was in an unfinished condition; several of her guns were unmounted, and a few could not be used on account of the carriages being too high for the ports. Her machinery was not all in, and as a steamer she was regarded as a failure; it was believed by competent engineers that she would not have power sufficient to enable her to stem the current of the Mississippi river during high water. Mechanics labored day and night to get the Louisiana ready, as Captain Mitchell designed to move on the enemy as soon as that vessel could be used as a steamer. General Duncan, who commanded the fortifications of the department, and

Colonel Ed. Higgins, who commanded the forts, were both of the opinion that Captain Mitchell should drop the Louisiana below Fort St. Phillip and drive the enemy's mortar-boats out of range. The mortar shells had injured Fort Jackson somewhat, eight or ten guns having been rendered unserviceable. Fort St. Phillip was entirely uninjured, as but few shell could reach it. Captain Mitchell objected to placing the Louisiana in the position desired by the army officers, because he proposed to attack the enemy in a few days—that is, as soon as the Louisiana was ready, and he thought Fort Jackson could stand the mortars for that time; furthermore, he thought it was hazardous to place the Louisiana in mortar range, as she was not ironed on her decks, and as mortar shells fall almost perpendicularly, if one should strike her on deck it would probably sink her.

On the afternoon of April 23d I visited Fort Jackson, and with Colonel Higgins observed from the parapet of the fort the fleet below; their light spars had been sent down, and the ships were arranging themselves in lines ahead. We were both of the opinion that a move would be made on the forts the following night. So, when I returned on board the "McRae," I directed the cable to be got ready for slipping and a man stationed to unshackle it at a moment's warning; one-half of the men to be on deck; steam to be up; the guns cast loose and loaded with 5-section shell. I remained on deck until after midnight, when, retiring to my room, I cautioned the officer of the deck to keep a bright lookout down the river and call me the moment anything came in sight. At 3 A. M., I was called and informed that a steamer was coming up. In less than a minute the McRae was under way and her guns blazing at the approaching ships of the enemy. I saw the rams "Governor Moore" and "Stonewall Jackson" rushing for one of the Yankee steamers, but they were soon lost in the smoke, and I saw them no more. The commanders, officers and men of the Montgomery rams (except those of the Stonewall Jackson) deserted their vessels at the first gun and fled wildly to the woods. The enemy's gun-boats were soon through the obstructions, and turning their attention to the Confederate flotilla made short work of it. The deserted rams were set on fire and served as beacons through the darkness and smoke which hung over the river. On the McRae we had little trouble to find something to fire at, for as we were out in the river the enemy was on every side of us, and gallantly did our brave tars stand to their guns, loading and firing their guns as rapidly as

possible. Our commander, Lieutenant Huger, was what we all expected—cool and fearless, and handled the *McRae* splendidly. One of the enemy's shell, fired from one of the howitzers aloft, went through our decks and exploded in the sail-room, setting the ship on fire; and as there was only a pine bulkhead of 2-inch boards between the sail-room and magazine, we were in great danger of being blown up. Just then one of the large sloops-of-war ranged alongside and gave us a broadside of grape and canister, which mortally wounded our commander, wounded the pilot, carried away our wheel ropes and cut the signal halyards and took our flag overboard. New tiller ropes were rove and soon we were at close quarters with a large steamer. Just after daylight, being close into the west bank of the river, about three miles above Fort Jackson, we found one of the Montgomery rams, the "*Resolute*," ashore, with a white flag flying. I sent Lieutenant Arnold, with twenty men, to take charge of her and to open fire with her two heavy rifle pivots. At 7.30 A. M. we ceased firing, being at that time about four miles above the forts. In going around, to return to the batteries, our wheel ropes were again shot away, and the ship ran into the bank before her headway could be checked. Captain Mitchell sent one of the tugs to our assistance and we were soon afloat. At 8.30 we anchored near the "*Louisiana*." While we were aground the ram "*Manassas*" was discovered floating helplessly down the river. I sent a boat to her, and ascertained that she was uninjured, but had her injection pipes cut, and that it would be impossible to save her.

It was afterwards ascertained that the enemy's fleet, consisting of twenty ships, under the command of Commodore Farragut, had endeavored to run by the forts; only thirteen succeeded in passing. The advance was made in two lines *en echelon*, and the steamers passed through the gaps in the line of obstructions near each bank. The guns of the forts, being mounted mostly in *barbette*, were silenced as soon and as long as the gun-boats were in canister range. The passages through which General Duncan thought the enemy could not pass were the very ones Farragut preferred; for, as his ships carried heavy guns, and plenty of them, it was his object to get within point-blank range, so as to drive the Confederates away from the *barbette* guns by keeping a steady rain of canister on them. Had the "*Montgomery rams*" fought, or towed the fire rafts out into the current, it is very doubtful if any of the gun-boats would have passed. One of the enemy's gun-boats, the *Veruna* (9

guns), was gallantly assaulted by the rams "Governor Moore" and "Stonewall Jackson." The "Governor Moore" hung on to his enemy like an avenging fate, and did not quit him till he sunk him.

Every night, previous to the one the fleet passed, a fire-raft had been sent down below the obstructions, and burnt for the purpose of lighting up the river; but by a strange chance no raft was sent down that night. The importance of having the fire-raft below on that night has been greatly exaggerated; for, after the firing commenced, the smoke was so dense along the river that a dozen fire-rafts would have done but little in showing the ships to the forts. Captain Mitchell has been blamed by many for not placing the "Louisiana" in the position desired by General Duncan. Had the "Louisiana" been moored below Fort Saint Phillip there can be no doubt that she would have driven the mortar boats out of range of Fort Jackson. But by occupying that position she would have done nothing towards deterring Farragut in executing his bold move; and it is quite certain that she would not have been more serviceable against steamers under way in one place more than another. The day after the fleet passed the forts I was ordered by Captain Mitchell to transfer all the officers and men (except barely enough to run the vessel) from the "McRae" to the "Louisiana," and to carry on board all the Confederate sick and wounded, and to proceed to New Orleans under a flag of truce. The "McRae" had been badly cut up in upper works and rigging during the action, besides having several large shots through her near the water-line, which caused her to leak badly; her smoke-stack was so riddled that it would scarcely stand, and the draft was so much affected that it was difficult to keep steam in the boilers.

I applied to Captain Mitchell for permission to take the "McRae's" crew, get the ram "Resolute" afloat, and at night to go down, ram one of the mortar fleet, and go on a raid on the coast of New England. The "Resolute" was well protected; had two large pivot guns, was full of coal and supplies, was a sea-going steamer, and was faster than any war vessel the enemy had. Captain Mitchell replied that my proposition would be considered. The following day the enemy's fleet at the quarantine attacked the "Resolute" and succeeded in planting a shell forward below the water line, which exploded and rendered her useless.

On the morning of the 26th the "McRae" started up the river under a flag of truce. At the quarantine I went on board the

steamer "Mississippi," and received permission from the commanding officer of the squadron to pass his lines with the cartel. On account of the condition of the "McRae's" smoke-stack we could get but a small head of steam, and consequently but slow progress against the strong current. We passed various floating wrecks, which told us too plainly of the destruction of our shipping at New Orleans. While we all deplored the loss of our rams and gunboats, and the successful advance of such a large number of formidable ships of the enemy, we confidently expected that the Confederate commanders at New Orleans would use our resources above in such a way as to make Farragut repent his bold undertaking; for we well knew that the iron-clad "Mississippi" had been launched at New Orleans and was nearly ready for service, and that the rest of Hollins' fleet and eight Montgomery rams, then above Memphis, could soon descend the rapid current of the Mississippi river; besides, the large number of river and ocean steamers on the river could have been readily and easily converted into rams and used successfully against Farragut's wooden fleet. The "Mississippi" was a most formidable iron-clad, with plenty of power, and was to mount twenty of the heaviest guns. She could have been ready for action within ten days after the enemy passed the forts. The lower forts were uninjured, and had six months' provisions, and were supported by the iron-clad battery "Louisiana."

About 10 A. M., April 27, the "McRae" arrived in front of the city. Farragut's fleet was anchored in the stream abreast of New Orleans, and was treating for the surrender. Getting permission to land our wounded, the "McRae" was anchored at the foot of Canal street, and all of our poor fellows were landed safely that afternoon. I went on shore to see our commander, Lieutenant Huger, carried to his residence, and returned on board about 6 P. M. The donkey-engine had been going steadily since the fight, but having become disabled the water was rapidly gaining. I put the crew to work at the bilge-pumps. The steamer commenced dragging just after dark. All the chain was paid out, but she would not bring up; but getting in the eddy, near the Algiers shore, she swung around several times, striking once against one of the sunken dry docks, which caused the ship to make water more freely. The pumps were kept going until daylight next morning. The shot holes having got below the water, the steamer settled fast, and we were obliged to abandon her. The crew had hardly reached the

shore when our good old ship went down. I went on board the enemy's flag-ship and reported the occurrence. On the 29th I had prepared to return to the forts in one of the small boats of the "McRae," when, going to the mayor's office to get the flag-of-truce mail, I was astonished to learn that the forts had surrendered, and that the "Louisiana" had been blown up. I went down on the levy and met a number of the officers and men of the forts and gun-boats, and learned that the surrender had been brought about by a mutiny in Fort Jackson. Late on the night of the 27th the officers of that fort awoke to find that about two hundred of the garrison were under arms, had spiked some of the guns, and demanded that the very liberal terms offered the day previous by Commodore Porter, of the enemy's mortar fleet, be accepted. General Duncan and officers appealed to the men to stand by their colors and country; that the forts were in good condition and could hold out many months. But the mutineers were firm, and insisted on an immediate surrender. General Duncan then promised that the forts should be surrendered at daylight.

The men who thus deserted their country in her dark hour were mostly of foreign birth and low origin, and had been demoralized by the mortar shells, the contentions between the military and naval commanders, the discouraging tone of army officers' conversations, and the liberal terms offered by Porter. So at early dawn a boat was sent down to inform the enemy that his terms would be accepted. Fort Saint Phillip, on the opposite side of the river, was entirely unhurt, and was well supplied and had a full garrison of true men. The "Louisiana" mounted sixteen heavy guns, and was invulnerable. Comment is unnecessary.

Before the fleet passed the forts I talked freely with the officers ashore and afloat, and but one of them would admit the bare possibility of the enemy's steamers being able to run the batteries. Colonel Edward Higgins (afterwards Brigadier-General and one of the most gallant soldiers in the Confederate army) told me on the afternoon of the 23d of April—the eve of the attack—that the fleet could pass at any time, and probably would pass that very night! When the "McRae" came down the river, in the summer of 1861, Duncan had command of the forts. I heard him say one day that all the vessels in the world could not pass his forts; that the forts had once driven back the fleet of Great Britain; and that at that time the forts were nothing compared to what they were in 1861. It did not seem to occur to Duncan that the English ships were sailing ves-

sels, sailing against a strong current; that they were "crank and tall," and mounted 24-pounders, long-nines, and such like small ordnance. He was oblivious of the fact that modern war ships carried huge 11-inch pivots and 9-inch broadside guns, and that double stand of grape and canister were prescribed by the naval manual of the United States.

At Jackson, Mississippi, shortly after the fall of New Orleans, I met several of my naval friends, who had been in the city when the news of Farragut's passing the forts was known, and from them I heard the particulars of the destruction of the great iron-clad steamer "Mississippi." There was no real effort made to get that vessel up the river; two river steamboats, poorly commanded and miserably handled, made a show of trying to tow the iron-clad, humbugged a few minutes, and then set her on fire. The assertion that the Mississippi could not have been towed up to Vicksburg by the steamers at New Orleans is perfectly absurd. The large flat-bottomed, square-ended floating battery, built at New Orleans, was easily towed up to Columbus. The naval steamer "Joy" was a regular lower river tow-boat. The magnificent steam ship "Star of the West," one of the Pacific mail steamers, a powerful double walking beam engine ship of over 3,000 tons, was in command of a Lieutenant Bier, but instead of taking hold of the "Mississippi"—the hope of the great Southwest—he steamed gallantly away. The "Mississippi" could have towed under the guns at Vicksburg, and in ten days would have been ready for service. She was invulnerable to any shot the enemy had at that time, and as the enemy had only wooden ships below, there can be no doubt that Farragut's fleet would have been driven out of the river or destroyed.

After the fall of New Orleans I proceeded to Richmond, and there received orders to report to Commander Pinkney for duty in the fleet formerly commanded by Commodore Hollins. I lost no time in getting out West. At Memphis I got on a river steamer and started up to report. At this time the ridicule of "Hollin's fleet" was so great and general, that I was really ashamed to own that I was on my way to join it, and it was only the hope of getting on detached duty that prevented me from throwing up my commission in the navy and joining the army. At Randolph, a few miles below Fort Pillow, I found Commander Pinkney with the gun-boats "Polk" and "Livingston." He gave me command of two heavy guns, mounted on a bluff four miles below Randolph. The guns of the "Polk" and "Livingston" had been placed in

batteries on shore at Randolph. It was hard to understand why the guns had been taken off the gun-boats. Randolph could not hold out if Fort Pillow fell, and as Pinkney had no infantry supports, he was at the mercy of the Yankee raiders by land. At this time there were eight of the "Montgomery" rams at Fort Pillow; they had had an engagement with the enemy, and all the steam-boatmen were jubilant. On the 4th of May, 1862, General Jeff. Thompson was placed in command of the "Montgomery" fleet, and at once determined to see what they could do. The enemy's fleet of tin-clads, mortar-boats and transports, were around the bend above Fort Pillow. Thompson proposed to ram the tin-clads, and asked Commander Pinkney to go up and use the guns of his four gun-boats against the mortar-boats, and against light draft-boats that might run into shoal water; but the "Artful Dodger" could not see it, and so old Jeff. went up with the rams, and without much system went in, rammed one or two of the Yankee vessels, which were only saved from sinking by running into shoal water. The fight lasted only a few minutes, and the Confederates dropped back under the guns of Fort Pillow. The Montgomery rams were uninjured, having resisted the heaviest shot at close quarters. Had Pinkney co-operated more might have been accomplished.

One month after this attack the Confederates evacuated Fort Pillow. As soon as Commander Pinkney heard of the evacuation, he hurried away, leaving everything standing—the executive officer of the Polk, Lieutenant Stone, disobeyed orders, and saved two guns. The gun-boats left Randolph twenty-four hours before the last transport got away from Fort Pillow. The gun-boats "Maurapas" and "Pontchartrain" had already been sent up White river, where, under the gallant Commanders Fry and Dunnington, they did efficient service. The "Livingston" and "Polk" succeeded in getting up the Yazoo river to Liverpool landing. As soon as the enemy learned that Fort Pillow had been evacuated, Foote's fleet started down, and on June 5th arrived in sight of Memphis. The bluffs at Memphis were crowded with people upon the approach of the enemy's fleet. The Montgomery rams, jeered, hooted and cheered by the populace, turned and advanced to meet the Yankee gun-boats, but their courage failed them under fire, and they ignominiously burnt the rams, and the crews crawled and scampered over the levees for safety. One of the rams, the "Van Dorn," being a "little lame"—unable to steam over 15 miles an hour—started on a retreat early, and hence escaped, and joined Pinkney up the Yazoo.

I had been in command of the battery below Randolph but a few days, when I received orders to dismount my guns and ship them up White river to Lieutenant Fry. I was then sent to Vicksburg to recruit men for Pinkney's boats.

Just before the evacuation of Fort Pillow the Confederates had launched at Memphis a very pretty little gun-boat called "Arkansas." She was about four hundred tons, double propeller, was to be iron-clad, and to mount ten guns. When the news reached Memphis that our people were evacuating Fort Pillow, the "Arkansas" and all of the river transports were run up the Yazoo river, where they were protected by batteries on shore and a raft across the stream. Pinkney's boats and the "Van Dorn" arrived at Liverpool landing too late to get above the raft. The two guns saved by Lieutenant Stone were placed on shore, and several smaller guns were also mounted. The sailors and Mississippi troops manned the batteries. The crews of the gun-boats lived on board.

The unfinished "Arkansas" was towed up to Yazoo City. The officer in charge of her seemed indifferent as to the time of her completion. The leading citizens of the town telegraphed to Richmond and asked that an energetic officer be placed in command and the steamer be got ready without delay. Accordingly the Department detailed Lieutenant I. N. Brown, of the navy, to superintend the work and to assume command. When Lieutenant Brown arrived in Yazoo City he found the "Arkansas" without any iron on her, her ports not cut, and in fact quite a lot of work to be done by carpenters and machinists. The barge which had brought down the iron for the shield or covering for the casemate had been carelessly sunken in the Yazoo river. Lieutenant Brown was untiring in his efforts to complete his vessel. He took some stringent measures; imprisoned several people who were disposed to trifle with him; he allowed no one under his command to be idle; he issued orders to press all the blacksmiths and mechanics in the country for a hundred miles around; the barge of iron was raised; officers were dispatched with all haste to hurry forward guns, carriages, ammunition, etc., and all workmen were obliged to live on board a transport steamer alongside the "Arkansas"; work was continued day and night; the sound of the artisan's hammer did not cease until the ship was ready for battle.

A few days after Lieutenant Brown took charge of the "Arkansas" I arrived in Yazoo City and reported to him for duty. He directed me to load a steamer with cotton and go down to Liverpool land-

ing and protect the gun-boats "Polk" and "Livingston" with cotton bales, to moor their head down stream, to keep steam up, and be prepared to ram any boats of the enemy that might venture up. Lieutenant Brown went down with me, but when we got there Commander Pinkney informed us that he had changed his mind, and would not leave until the arrival of Commodore Lynch, who was on his way to the command of all the naval forces of the West. Having placed the cotton as directed, I returned with Captain Brown to Yazoo City. A day or two afterwards Commodore Lynch arrived. Captain Brown had orders to obey all orders from General Van Dorn, and to make no move without the sanction of that officer. Commodore Lynch, having inspected the "Arkansas," ordered me to Jackson, Mississippi, to telegraph the Secretary of War as follows: "The 'Arkansas' is very inferior to the 'Merrimac' in every particular; the iron with which she is covered is worn and indifferent, taken from a railroad track, and is poorly secured to the vessel; boiler-iron on stern and counter; her smoke-stack is sheet-iron." When I returned to Yazoo City the "Arkansas" was ready for service. Her battery consisted of ten guns—viz: two 8-inch columbiads in the two forward or bow ports, two 9-inch Dahlgren shell guns, two 6-inch rifles, and two 32-pounders smooth bores in broadside, and two 6-inch rifles astern. Her engines were new, having been built at Memphis, and on the trial trip worked well. As the ship had two propellers and separate engines, she could be worked or handled conveniently. The boilers were in the hold and below the water line. The speed was fair—say nine knots. We had a full complement of officers and about two hundred men. All were anxious for the time to come when we could show the enemy that he could not lay idly in our waters. We started down the river the day the work was finished. On our way down we received intelligence that a small steamer of the enemy was some miles below the rafts and batteries. So we hurried on down, firing a gun now and then to let Pinkney and the batteries know we were coming. On rounding the point above the obstructions or rafts, we could see the men at the guns on the bluffs, but as they had not fired we were satisfied that the enemy was not yet in range. Our attention was soon attracted to the gun-boats "Polk" and "Livingston," moored just below the obstructions. Smoke was seen issuing from their cabins and hatches. Captain Brown promptly ordered all our small boats manned, and sent them to extinguish the fire; but they got alongside the boats

too late, as Pinkney had done his cowardly work too well. We soon ascertained that a small stern-wheel, high-pressure, river steamboat, protected with hay, had approached nearly as far as Sartarsia, or about five miles off the batteries, when, perceiving our fortifications, had quickly retreated. The two gun-boats fired and abandoned by Pinkney, being full of cotton, burned rapidly; and the lines by which they had been fastened to the banks being consumed, the boats drifted down the river. One of them getting foul of the iron-clad ram "Van Dorn" set her on fire, and she too was added to the loss of the "Polk" and "Livingston."

The following day I was sent with one of the pilots to sound the bar at Sartarsia. We found plenty of water for the "Arkansas," but the pilot stated that if the river continued to fall as it had been doing for several days, that in five more days there would not be enough water for the "Arkansas" to get down. The man who had placed the rafts said they could not be moved inside of a week. Captain Brown instructed Lieutenants Grimball, Gift and myself to examine the obstructions, and report if it was practicable to remove them, so as to allow the "Arkansas" to pass through; and if so, in what time the work could be done. We visited the rafts, and after a careful examination reported that they could be removed in less than half an hour.

A short time before this the large up-river fleet of the enemy (now under command of Commodore Davis, United States navy), which had fought its way from Columbus, Kentucky, had arrived above Vicksburg, and had been joined by the victorious fleet of sea-going ships under the indomitable Farragut. The mortar fleets above and below Vicksburg were thundering away at that stronghold, and a large land force were ready to act in concert with the enemy's overwhelming armada.

Captain Brown, the commander of the "Arkansas," while being very anxious to comply with the unanimous wish of his officers and men—to attack the enemy—was of the opinion that the ship should remain above the obstruction strictly on the defensive. He said that there were a large number of fine steamers in the Yazoo, and the valley of that river was capable of furnishing an immense amount of supplies to our armies, and that the river and valley could be held by the "Arkansas" and proper batteries; that if the "Arkansas" went down and attacked the combined fleets of the enemy, it would be impossible to destroy them or even to cripple them seriously. But if the Government or General Van Dorn de-

sired it, he (Captain Brown) would willingly go down and do his best. Captain Brown decided therefore to consult with General Van Dorn without delay; so I was directed to go to Vicksburg and explain our position and Captain Brown's views, and ask for instruction. I was also to reconnoiter the position of the enemy's fleets above Vicksburg. About sunset, July, 1862, I left Liverpool landing, and set out on my mission, riding all night—some fifty miles. I was in Vicksburg about eight o'clock next morning. On entering the town I was fortunate enough to come upon the headquarters of Colonel Withers, of the artillery, where I was hospitably received, had a good breakfast, and went with the Colonel to call on General Van Dorn. The General thoroughly appreciated the importance of holding the Yazoo river, but he thought that as the "Arkansas" could only be used during the high-water season, that she could not materially assist in defending the river. He thought that the "Arkansas" could run by the gun-boats above Vicksburg and attack the "Brooklyn" and mortar-schooners below town, or run by everything about Vicksburg and destroy the small gun-boats scattered along the lower river in detail, pass out of the Mississippi river and go to Mobile. He therefore ordered Captain Brown to move at once with his steamer, and act as his judgment should dictate.

After leaving General Van Dorn's headquarters I proceeded, in company with one of Colonel Withers' officers, up the bank of the river to reconnoiter. It was late in the afternoon before we got up abreast with the fleets. The woods were so dense and entangled with vines and briars that we were obliged to dismount and grope our way through the best we could. I had a good field-glass, and watched the vessels carefully some time. Farragut's fleet consisted of thirteen heavy sloops-of-war, mounting tremendous batteries, and were anchored in line ahead near the east bank. I was satisfied that none of them had steam up. The fleet of Commodore Davis numbered over thirty iron-clads and six or eight rams. They were moored to the west bank, nearly opposite Farragut's fleet. Below Davis' fleet were about thirty mortar-boats. Davis' vessels appeared to have steam up. While we were making our observations a man-of-war cutter landed near us, but the crew did not suspect our presence. About dark that night I left Vicksburg and rode until two o'clock next morning, when, feeling much fatigued, I stopped at a planter's house and rested until daylight. The following day I arrived at Liverpool landing. The next morning a

passage was made in the obstruction. The "Arkansas" dropped through and below the bar at Sartarsia. Commodore Lynch now arrived from Yazoo City and proposed to go down with us. When he informed Captain Brown of his intentions, Brown remarked, "Well, Commodore, I will be glad if you go down with us, but as this vessel is too small for two captains, if you go I will take charge of a gun and attend to that." Commodore Lynch replied, "Very well, Captain, you may go; I will stay. May God bless you!" The good old Commodore then called all the officers around him, and said he knew they would do their duty; and he hoped they would all go through the fight safely, and live to see our country free from her invaders. He then bade us all good-bye and returned to the city.

The next morning, July 14th, 1862, the "Arkansas" started down the river, and arrived at Hames' Bluff just after dark, where we anchored until 2 A. M. next day, when getting under way the ship was cleared for battle, and we steamed slowly down. Daylight found us seven or eight miles above the mouth of the river. The morning was warm and perfectly calm; the dense volume of black smoke which issued from our funnel, rose high above the trees, and we knew that the enemy would soon be on the lookout for us. Pretty soon we discovered smoke above the trees below, winding along the course of the crooked Yazoo. The men of the "Arkansas" were now all at their stations, the guns were loaded and cast loose, their tackles in the hands of willing seamen ready to train; primers in the vents; locks thrown back and the lanyards in the hands of the gun captains; the decks sprinkled with sand and touniquets and bandages at hand; tubs filled with fresh water were between the guns, and down in the berth deck were the surgeons with their bright instruments, stimulants and lint, while along the passage-ways stood rows of men to pass powder, shell and shot, and all was quiet save the dull thump, thump, of the propellers. Steadily the little ship moved onward towards her enemies, but she had not gone far, when about a mile below, a large iron-clad mounting 13 heavy guns steamed slowly around a bend, and was no doubt terribly astonished to see the "Arkansas" making for him, for he turned around as quickly as he could and started down the river. Our two forward guns opened on him with solid shot. He replied with his three stern guns, his shot passing over us, or striking harmlessly on our shield forward. Two wooden gun-boats soon came up, and passing their fleeing consort advanced boldly to meet us, but a few

well directed shot made them turn tail and again pass their friend, who knew what a tartar they had caught! Slowly but surely we gained on the iron-clad, our shot raking him and making dreadful havoc on his crowded decks. The wooden vessels ahead of her kept up a brisk fire with their rifle guns. One of their shot striking our pilot house, drove in some fragments of iron, which mortally wounded both the Yazoo river pilots, and slightly wounded Captain Brown in the head. As one of the pilots was being taken below, he said "keep in the middle of the river." We had decreased our distance from the iron-clad rapidly, and were only a hundred yards astern, our shot still raking him, when he ceased firing and sheered into the bank; our engines were stopped, and ranging up alongside, with the muzzles of our guns touching him, we poured in a broadside of solid shot, when his colors came down. As we had no pilot, Captain Brown considered it unsafe to stop. So on we pushed, driving the two fleeing boats ahead of us, our speed decreasing all the time, owing to shot holes in the smoke stack; but in a few minutes the "Arkansas" glided out into the broad Mississippi, right into the midst of the hostile fleet. The Yankee tars were soon at their guns, and shot and shell came quick and fast upon our single little ship. Enemies being on all sides of us, our guns were blazing destruction and defiance in every direction. Soon three large rams were seen rushing down the river towards us. The "Arkansas" turned and steamed up to meet them; the leading ram had got within a hundred yards of us, when a well aimed shot, fired by the cool and intrepid Lieutenant Gift, from one of the bow guns, struck the ram's boiler and blew him up. The other two rams, fearing a similar fate, turned and fled. Our steam was now so low that we could manœuvre with difficulty. Turning head down stream we made for Farragut's fleet, and gave them the best we had at close quarters; they replied briskly and seldom missed us; two of their eleven-inch solid shot crushed through our sides, doing fearful execution amongst our men. Slowly we went, fighting our way right and left, until presently we had passed our enemies, and were received with loud hurrahs from the Confederate soldiers on the heights of Vicksburg.

With much difficulty the "Arkansas" was rounded to and secured to the bank in front of the city. The iron on her port side, though pierced but twice, had been so often struck with heavy projectiles that it was very much loosened. A few more shots would have caused nearly all of it to have fallen from the vessel. Our

dead were sent on shore to be buried; the sick and wounded carried to the hospital; the decks were washed down, and the crew went to breakfast. We were visited by Generals Van Dorn and Breckinridge, who complimented us highly and offered us any assistance we required.

Below Vicksburg there was only one sloop-of-war—the “Brooklyn”—and Porter’s mortar-schooners and a number of steam-transports. As soon as the “Arkansas” had appeared in front of Vicksburg one of the schooners was set on fire, and it was apparent that the enemy was much alarmed. Had the “Arkansas” been in a condition to have manœuvred she could easily have captured or destroyed that entire flotilla. Our engineers went to work at once to repair the smoke-stack, but it was late in the afternoon before it was in any kind of shape, and it was then considered too late to make a move. Had not our gun-boats in the Yazoo been uselessly destroyed by Pinkney, there can be no doubt that Captain Brown could, with their assistance, have injured the enemy far more than he did with the “Arkansas” alone. The “Polk” and the “Livingston” had been well protected with cotton; and the “Van Dorn” was an ironclad ram, had great speed, was easily handled, and had resisted shot that could penetrate the sides of the “Arkansas.” Had those three steamers been with the “Arkansas,” the enemy’s fire would not have been concentrated as it was on that vessel, and she could have fought to more advantage.

Just before dark the enemy’s gun-boats above Vicksburg were observed to be in motion, and we had no doubt that Farragut meant to fight. After dark we noticed a range light on the opposite bank abreast of us, evidently intended to point out our position. So we shifted our moorings a few hundred yards lower down. A severe thunder-storm now came on, accompanied by torrents of rain. Shortly rapid and heavy firing was heard at the upper batteries, and a signal came to us that the gun-boats were passing down. We went to our guns, and in a minute were ready for battle. And we had not long to wait, for a large sloop-of-war was observed moving slowly down near the bank, until he was opposite the light on the other shore, when he delivered a broadside into the bank where the “Arkansas” had been laying before dark. As soon as he had fired, our two bow-guns told him where we were; and as he ranged up alongside of us our broadside guns rattled their heavy shells through him; and when he passed, our two stern-rifles turned him over to the lower batteries. Soon another vessel came on as

the first had done, and was served the same way. Another and another came, until fourteen had passed. The "Arkansas" was struck only once, and that was a well-directed shot (11-inch) fired from the "Richmond." It struck near the water-line, passed through the port-side into the dispensary, on the berth-deck opposite the engine-room, mashed up all the drugs, etc., carried in an ugly lot of iron fragments and splinters, passed over the engine-room, grazed the steam-chimney, and lodged in the opposite side of the ship. Several of the firemen and one of the pilots were killed and an engineer wounded.

The next morning (July 16th) at nine o'clock the enemy opened on us from all their mortar-boats above and below town, throwing their huge 13-inch shells thick and fast around us. As the mortar-shells fell with terrible force almost perpendicularly, and as the "Arkansas" was unprotected on upper-decks, boilers amidship, a magazine and shell-room at each end, it was very evident that if she was struck by one of those heavy shells, it would be the last of her. Her moorings were changed frequently to impair the enemy's range; but the enterprising Yankees shelled us continually, their shell often exploding a few feet above decks and sending their fragments into the decks.

When the "Arkansas" started down the Yazoo her crew were seamen with the exception of about fifty soldiers—volunteers from a Mississippi regiment. The seamen had been on the Yazoo swamps some time, and in consequence were troubled with chills and fever. Many had been killed, a large number wounded, and a greater portion of the remainder sent to the hospital on our arrival at Vicksburg. The day after we reached the city the Missouri volunteers, who had agreed to serve only for the trip, went on shore and joined their commands; so we were now very short-handed. Captain Brown asked General Van Dorn to fill up our complement from the army, which he readily assented to do, provided the men would volunteer, and make application for transfer through proper channels. At first quite a number volunteered, but when they got on board and saw the shot-holes through the vessel's sides, and heard sailors' reports of the terrible effect of shell and splinters, and were made aware of the danger of the mortar-shell that fell continually around the ship, those volunteers found many pretexts to go back to their commands; many took the "shell fever" and went to the hospital. As a general thing, soldiers are not much use on board ship, particularly volunteers, who are not accustomed

to the discipline and routine of a man-of-war. A scene that occurred on board the "Arkansas" one day at Vicksburg is illustrative. We were engaged hauling the ship into a position near one of our batteries; but having but few sailors to haul on the wharf we were progressing slowly, when Lieutenant Stevens, the executive officer, came on deck, and perceiving a crowd of volunteers sitting on deck playing cards, he said, rather sharply, "Come, volunteers, that won't do; get up from there and give us a pull." One of the players looked up at Lieutenant Stevens and replied, "Oh! hell! we aint no deck hands;" and eyeing the man sitting opposite to him, was heard to say, "I go you two better!"

Both of our surgeons being sick, Captain Brown telegraphed out into the interior of Mississippi for medical volunteers. In a day or two a long, slim doctor came in from Clinton; and as he was well recommended, Captain Brown gave him an acting appointment as surgeon, and directed him to report to Lieutenant Stevens for duty. It was early in the morning when he arrived; the enemy had not commenced their daily pastime of shelling us; the ship's decks had been cleanly washed down, the awnings spread, and everything was neat and orderly. The doctor took breakfast in the ward-room, and seemed delighted with the vessel generally. Before the regular call to morning inspection the officer of the powder division started around below to show the new medical officer his station during action, and the arrangement for disposing of the wounded, etc., etc. In going along the berth-deck the officer remarked to the doctor that in a battle there was plenty to do, as the wounded came down in a steady stream. The "medico" looked a little incredulous; but a few minutes afterwards, when he perceived the road through which an 11-inch shell had come, his face lengthened perceptibly; and after awhile, when the big shell began to fall around the vessel, he became rather nervous. He would stand on the companion-ladder and watch the smoke rise from the mortar-vessels, and would wait until he heard the whizzing of the shell through the air, when he would make a dive for his state-room. As soon as the shell fell he would go up and watch out for another. Occasionally, when a shell would explode close to us, or fall with a heavy splash alongside, he would be heard to groan, "Oh! Louisa and the babes!"

At daylight on the 22d of July, 1862, the iron-clad fleet above Vicksburg dropped down and commenced firing rapidly at our upper batteries. Farragut's fleet engaged the lower batteries, and

the mortar fleets opened upon the city and forts. The "Arkansas" was cleared for battle, but when the crew were mustered only 41 men answered to their names on the gun-deck. The cannonading was tremendous, and fairly shook the earth. In about half an hour after the firing had begun, a large iron-clad, the "Essex," emerged from the smoke above and made directly for the "Arkansas." When he was fifty yards from us our two bow guns were discharged at him, but on he came, and running against us fired a ten-inch solid shot into our larboard forward port; the shot ranging aft, swept 20 men, more than half the force on the gun-deck. The iron-clad swung alongside of us, when we gave him our port broadside with guns depressed—which apparently disabled him, for he ceased firing and drifted down the river. We had not reloaded our guns when a large ram was discovered steaming at full speed for us. The "Arkansas" was headed for him, and the vessels collided with an awful crash, broadside to broadside. The ram passed around the stern of the "Arkansas" and ran into the bank under the batteries. Had our stern guns been loaded then we could have destroyed the ram, as his bows were entirely out of the water, and he was but a short distance from us. The ram kept backing hard, and soon got afloat. Another ram now came down, but a broadside from the Arkansas disabled him, and his consort took him in tow, and succeeded in getting him up the river out of the range. The gun-boats then withdrew from action, and the firing ceased on both sides.

On the afternoon of July 24th, 1862, all of the enemy's vessels, above and below, were seen to be under way. We got ready, expecting a general attack; but were agreeably disappointed, for they all steamed away and abandoned the siege.

Though a great many shell had been thrown into Vicksburg, very little damage had been done. The citizens began to return, and business to some extent was resumed.

A number of Mechanics came from Jackson and Mobile and went to work repairing the injuries the "Arkansas" had received. The old pilot-house was taken off, and a new one was to be made. Captain Brown being in bad health, took a few days leave of absence, leaving Lieutenant Stevens in command.

Major-General John C. Breckinridge now proposed an expedition, and wished the "Arkansas" to co-operate. It was known that the enemy had several thousand men at Baton Rouge, and that the iron-clad "Essex" and a small wooden gun-boat was all the

force afloat. It was proposed that General Breckinridge should move with his division by rail to Tangipahoa, a station on the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, thirty miles from Baton Rouge, and make a forced night march to that place, which he would attack at daylight. The "Arkansas" was to attack the gun-boats simultaneously. Lieutenant Stevens did not like to move with the "Arkansas" while Captain Brown was absent, and he preferred that General Breckinridge would wait until the repairs were completed and until Captain Brown should return. But General Breckinridge was anxious for the vessel to go without delay. As no Confederate could refuse to comply with the wish of one so universally loved and respected as General Breckinridge, Lieutenant Stevens consented to go, and at once began getting the ship ready. A full complement of men was obtained and organized, and at two A. M., August 4th, we started down the river. The "Arkansas" behaved well, and made with the current about fifteen miles an hour. We steamed on down during all the next day, passing many signs of the wanton and barbarous destruction of property by the enemy. The people on the river banks gathered around the burnt and charred remains of their once happy homes, and hailed with exclamations of delight the sight of their country's flag, and the gallant little "Arkansas" moving down to chastise the savage foe.

The next morning at one o'clock, being about fifteen miles below Port Hudson, the engines suddenly stopped. I was officer of the deck at the time, and learning from the engineer that he could not go ahead for some time, I rounded the vessel to, and let go the anchor. All of the engineers were called and started to work to get the machinery in order. Each engineer had a different idea of what should be done. On the Yazoo, and until the "Arkansas" arrived at Vicksburg, we had a chief engineer who was a thorough mechanic and engineer, but at Vicksburg he was taken with the fever, and was at the hospital unable for duty when the steamer started for Baton Rouge. All of the other engineers were incompetent to run such engines as those of the "Arkansas," but they were the only ones to be had there at that time. They were mostly engineers who had served their time with the simple high-pressure engines of the Mississippi river boats; a few were navy engineers who had been in the service but a year or two, and had no practical experience. But they were all true, good men, and no doubt did their best.

At daylight we were under way again, and proceeded on our way down. We could hear the guns of Breckinridge, and we had hopes of being able to reach Baton Rouge in time to be of service. As we were steaming rapidly down the river, around the point above Baton Rouge, our crew at quarters, and the sound of the conflict on shore cheering our anxious men, the starboard engine stopped; the port engine continuing to go ahead at full speed, turned the vessel quickly towards the bank, when, an eddy catching her bow and the swift current sweeping her stern down stream, she was irresistibly shoved ashore, where she wedged herself amongst the cypress stumps hard and fast. The engineers went to work to repair damages. An anchor was run out into the stream, and every exertion made to get the vessel afloat. In the afternoon a messenger arrived on board from General Breckinridge, saying that the enemy had been driven through the town, and that they were on the river bank protected by the gun-boats; that if we could get down by next morning at daylight, General Breckinridge would attack again, and would probably bag the whole party of Yankees. About sunset the "Arkansas" was afloat and the engines reported in order. Lieutenant Stevens decided to go up about two miles and take in coal, until it was time to start down.

In going into the landing at the coal pile, one of the engines gave way again and the vessel grounded, but was soon got afloat, and in an hour or two was again reported all right. At 3 A. M. next day we got under way and proceeded down the river, and arriving near the point, something broke about the machinery, and we were obliged to stop. The steamer was secured to the bank. Lieutenant Stevens now thought that the engines could not be depended upon, and determined to get the vessel in a good position for defence, and to hold on as long as possible, or until good engineers could be obtained, and the engines put in proper order. Accordingly the vessel was hauled, stern in, to a gap in the bank and secured. She thus presented her strongest points to the river.

About seven o'clock that morning, several gun-boats were seen coming up from Baton Rouge, but they approached the "Arkansas" cautiously, for though they were aware of her being disabled, they knew how hard she could hit. The iron-clad "Essex" came up within a quarter of a mile of us, and opened fire with his three bow guns. The senior engineer now came on deck, and reported in a loud voice: "The engines are in good order, sir." The crew cheered;

Lieut. Stevens gave the order to let go the lines; the engines started ahead slow, and the little ship moved out into the stream. The bell was struck to go ahead at "full speed," when the port engine went ahead fast and the starboard engine stopped. The vessel went into the bank on top of the stumps, with her stern towards the enemy. The stern guns being in my division, I opened as soon as they bore, and had fired a few rounds, when I was ordered by Lieut. Stevens to take my men on shore with their small arms. The steamer was set on fire, and soon blew up. The stern of the *Arkansas* had only boiler iron to protect it, and as any shot striking there could not fail to penetrate the magazines or boilers, Mr. Stevens thought it useless to run the risk of having his entire crew blown up. A truer friend to the South, a cooler or braver man than Lieutenant Stevens never lived, though there were not wanting newspaper editors and other bomb-proof critics to defame him as a coward and traitor.

The crew of the *Arkansas* proceeded to Jackson, Mississippi, where we were soon joined by our men who had recovered from the swamp fever and slight wounds, so that we then mustered 400 strong. Captain Brown having returned from leave, took command of us, and shortly afterwards we were ordered to Port Hudson.

When we arrived at that place, we found four twenty-four pound siege guns (rifled), and one 42-pounder, smooth bore. We manned those guns and kept a sharp lookout for our old friend, the *Essex*, and a small gun-boat that had gone on a pirating expedition up the river.

On the night of September 7th, our lookout signaled that the "*Essex*" was coming down. We waited quietly at quarters until the *Essex* and her consort alongside of her got close under the battery, when we opened fire; our men worked lively and we pounded away in fine style. The "*Essex*," after getting at "long taw," fired a few wild shots and passed on down.

Large working parties soon arrived at Port Hudson, and commenced to throw up batteries all along the bluffs, and to construct field works in the rear. Some cavalry, light artillery, and a regiment of heavy artillerymen, arrived under command of General Beal, who took charge of us all.

About a week afterwards I was ordered by General Beal to proceed to Atlanta, Georgia, and attend to forwarding ordnance stores. When I had got as far as Jackson, Mississippi, I was taken with the fever, and had to lay by. I telegraphed my orders to Lieutenant McCorkle, and then went out to Raymond to get well. In a few

days I received a letter from Captain Brown, saying that his command had been ordered to Yazoo City, and for me to join him there as soon as I was able to travel. On my way to take the train, I received a dispatch from Lieutenant Commanding John N. Maffitt, at Mobile, stating that I had been ordered to the steamer Florida, and to hurry on and join her. Being perfectly delighted with the prospect of getting to sea, I lost no time in reporting on board that ship.

C. W. READ,

New Orleans, Louisiana.

Letter from Captain William L. Ritter.

REV. JOHN WILLIAM JONES,

Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:

Dear Sir—The February number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* contains an article from Major J. L. Brent in relation to the capture of the iron-clad "Indianola," in which mention is made of the name of Sergeant Edward H. Langley, of the Third Maryland Artillery, who had immediate charge of the two Parrot-guns aboard the "Queen of the West." As Sergeant Langley belonged to the battery of which I was a member, I desire to relate a few incidents connected with the closing scenes of his life, and to mention the fate of his successor, Lieutenant William Thompson Patten.

When the two gun detachments were put aboard the steamer "Archer," January 23d, 1863, and sent down the river in charge of Sergeant Langley, there was but one commissioned officer with the battery in Vicksburg, the others having not yet arrived from Tennessee.

On the 26th the steamer "De Soto," a ferry-boat, was captured by the enemy at Johnson's Landing, a few miles below Vicksburg, on the west side of the river, where the Captain had stopped the boat to take on some wood. February 2d the "Queen of the West" passed by the batteries at Vicksburg and steamed down the river. On the 4th she returned to Johnson's Landing, where she remained a few days; and then, in company with the "De Soto," proceeded down the Mississippi and up Red river to Fort De Russey, where she was captured by our forces. As soon as the "Queen" was repaired, Sergeant Langley's two gun detachments were transferred from the "Archer" to the "Queen."

A correspondent, in speaking of the fight with the "Indianola," says: "In closing this article, we cannot refrain mentioning specially the conduct of Sergeant E. H. Langley, one of the Third Maryland Artillery. He had on the 'Queen' two detachments of his artillery, and was placed in charge of the two Parrot guns. He himself took command of the 86-pounder gun on the bow of the 'Queen,' where he remained during the action, neither he or his gallant comrades ever leaving their posts for a moment. While the bow of the 'Queen' was still resting against the side of the 'Indianola' he still manned and fired his guns, though he and his men were without the least covering or protection. In addition to this courage, the skill and judgment he showed in manœuvering his piece mounted on wheels, within a most contracted space, is certainly deserving of the very highest commendation."

The 1st of March, 1863, Lieutenant Patten, of the Third Maryland Artillery, was ordered to Shreveport, Louisiana, to take command of the section which up to this time had been so efficiently commanded by Sergeant Langley.

Early on the morning of the 14th of April, 1863, Captain A. E. Fuller, now in command of the Queen, with the Lizzie Simmons as a supply boat, attacked the enemy's fleet on Grand Lake, Louisiana, consisting of the Calhoun, Estrella and Arizona, but before the vessels came within short rang, an incendiary percussion shell from the Calhoun penetrated the deck of the Queen, exploded and set the vessel on fire. About twenty minutes afterward the fire reached the magazine, and the career of this celebrated boat was closed. After discovering the boat to be on fire, Lieutenant Patten rolled a cotton bale off the side of the vessel and jumped upon it, but it turned with him and he sank, not being able to swim. Thus perished one of the noblest and bravest of the Marylanders who went South. He was a man of commanding physique, polished manners, and rare attainments, a soldier who reflected credit upon the cause he espoused; and in his death the battery sustained an irreparable loss, and the service a gallant, brave and faithful officer.

Sergeant Langley and all but four of his men remained upon the Queen, and were lost in the general destruction of the vessel. Captain Fuller jumped off the Queen and was picked up by the men of one of the enemy's boats. The Lizzie Simmons escaped capture.

Yours, very respectfully,

WM. L. RITTER.

Baltimore, Maryland, April 24, 1876.

Letter from General Wilcox in Reference to Seven Pines.

BALTIMORE, March 23, 1876.

Rev. J. WILLIAM JONES,

Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:

Dear Sir—The February number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* has in it a letter from General Johnston, pointing out errors as to the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia in the beginning of June, 1862; these errors being, as he alleges, in the account of the "Seven Days Fighting," now being published by the Society.

The last paragraph of the letter referred to our losses at Seven Pines, as follows: "The author gives our loss at Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg road, at about 4,800. General Longstreet, in his official report, dated June 11th—when, if ever, the number of killed and wounded must have been known—gives it roughly at 3,000. General D. H. Hill, whose division did all the fighting on that road from three o'clock (when it began) to six, and four-fifths of it from six to seven, when it ended, sets his down at 2,500, leaving 500 for that of R. H. Anderson, who came into the front line at six on the 31st, and Pickett's and part (two regiments) of Pryor's, June 1st, which is consistent. According to the writer, two brigades and a half in two hours lost about as heavily as four brigades in four hours of hard fighting."

The two brigades and a half mentioned by General Johnston were not all of Longstreet's division that fought on the 31st of May and June 1st. After the capture of the enemy's entrenchments and artillery on the right of the road in a field, and near several houses, a portion of the Eleventh Alabama, of Wilcox's brigade, under Colonel Nydenham Moore, was ordered to drive the enemy from the woods near a small house, several hundred yards to the right and a little to the front. In executing his orders, Colonel Moore's horse was killed and he himself received two wounds, one of which proved mortal, he dying about one month subsequently. The fraction of his regiment under him at the time lost heavily. Nor were Pickett's brigade and part of Pryor's all of Longstreet's command that were engaged on the 1st of May. It was on Wilcox's front that the firing began early on the morning of the 1st of May, and soon extended to the left, covering Pryor's entire front. These brigades were in line on the left, parallel with the Williamsburg road and facing north, the right of Wilcox's brigade over a

mile to the east of the captured works of the enemy, on the right of the road. These two brigades had been advanced to the front between ten and twelve o'clock the night before. Wilcox's relieved Anderson's brigade about twelve o'clock, and one of his regiments (the Nineteenth Mississippi) that had joined Anderson before the firing ceased was thrown further east on the Williamsburg road three or four hundred yards, on picket, and occupied the most advanced point reached by our troops May 31st. The losses in Wilcox's and Pryor's brigades were light. They were not long under fire, being soon ordered to retire and re-form on the right of the road, near the captured works of the enemy. A part of Armistead's brigade, of Huger's division, and a portion of Mahone's brigade, of the same division, were also engaged for a short time, and to the left of Pryor. Colonel Lomax, Third Alabama, Mahone's brigade, was killed.

Truly, &c.,

C. M. WILCOX.

P. S.—As General Johnston was wounded late in the afternoon of May 31st, and was never again in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, he may not have read all of the official reports of the battle of Seven Pines.

C. M. W.

Review of Bates' Battle of Gettysburg.

[In a brief notice of Bates' history of the battle of Gettysburg, we intimated a purpose of returning to the subject again. The following letter from Colonel Wm. Allan, late Chief of Ordnance of Second Corps, Army Northern Virginia, spares us any further trouble. We happen to know that Colonel Allan is thoroughly familiar with the history of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that some of the most valuable military criticisms that have appeared in late years, have been from his facile pen.]

MCDONOUGH SCHOOL, MARYLAND, April 1, 1876.

Rev. J. W. JONES, *Secretary Southern Historical Society* :

It is to be regretted that at this time, more than ten years after the close of the war, the feelings that were natural enough during its progress have still sufficient force to discolor the facts of history. The book of Dr. Bates, recently published, possesses merit as a clear and readable account of the battle of Gettysburg, and shows labor and research in its compilation, but is wide of the truth in

many of its statements. The errors least excusable, are those in regard to the numbers engaged and the losses sustained.

General Meade stated, under oath, that *his strength on that battlefield* was, "including all arms of the service, a little under 100,000 men, say about 95,000." He thought that General Lee had about 90,000 infantry, 4,000 to 5,000 artillery, and 10,000 cavalry. Now General Meade's estimate of the Confederate force was of course nothing but a guess, but his statement as to his own force actually on the field must be supposed to be substantially correct. Dr. Bates assumes, in the face of General Meade's statement, that the above numbers were those borne on the rolls, and not those "in the field," and on the basis of an estimate of General Doubleday of the strength of the First Corps on July 1st (which shows a decrease of about 25 per cent. from General Butterfield's return of the same corps on June 10th), proceeds to reduce the total strength of the Federal army to 72,000. The infantry corps subsequently engaged in the battle numbered, according to General Butterfield, on June 10th 76,255. Between that date and the battle, he states, new commands joined General Meade, which added 9,500 infantry to his army. Add the cavalry at Dr. Bates' estimate of 12,000, and we have nearly 100,000 men. Deduct rear and train guards, and we see that General Meade's statement is borne out. Does Dr. Bates think it credible that the Federal army, between June 10th and July 1st, without any severe battles or marches, while it was slowly swinging around Washington and Baltimore as a pivot, so as to present a front to General Lee in his Northward march, and while every effort was being made to recruit it and hurry up to the front the absentees, dwindled from 100,000 to 72,000 effectives?

Again, General Meade's official report, as quoted by Dr. Bates, of his losses at Gettysburg, makes them in the aggregate 23,186. The estimates of the Federal infantry corps commanders on July 4th, the day after the battle, give 51,514 (see General Butterfield's testimony) as the effective force of infantry then remaining. This taken from say 85,000 infantry, the force present on July 1st, leaves over 33,000 as the Federal loss. The excess of 10,000 thus shown over the official report, consisted no doubt of the stragglers and absentees, produced by the losses and demoralization of the battle, and who subsequently returned to duty. It was undoubtedly this state of facts which prevented General Meade from attacking General Lee at Gettysburg, and induced the Federal council of war to vote with only two dissenting voices, on July 12th, against attack-

ing him at Hagerstown, where he had an impassable river behind him.

But if Dr. Bates has dealt unfairly with the Federal reports of strength and loss at Gettysburg, he has hardly deigned to notice the Confederate sources of information at all. His estimate of General Lee's force is derived entirely from the guesses of Generals Hooker and Meade. General Hooker says, according to Dr. Bates: "With regard to the enemy's force, I had reliable information. Two Union men had counted them as they passed through Hagerstown, and in order that there might be no mistake, they compared notes every night, and if their counts differed, they were satisfactorily adjusted by compromise. In round numbers, Lee had 91,000 infantry and 280 pieces of artillery; marching with that column were about 6,000 cavalry." He adds that Stuart's cavalry, which crossed the Potomac at Seneca, "numbered about 5,000 men." Such information as this may have been useful to a commander before a battle, who was very anxious not to underrate his enemy, but is altogether valueless to the historian. General Meade's estimate given above, puts General Lee's force at nearly the same. In addition to these estimates, which he assumes as true, Dr. Bates, on the authority of Swinton, reports General Longstreet as saying "that there were at Gettysburg 67,000 bayonets, or above 70,000 of all arms." The only attempt at using Confederate information on a point in regard to which they alone could give accurate information, is thus a second-hand statement from General Longstreet, which conflicts (as will be shown) with all the other Confederate authorities, and is certainly erroneous. The attempt of Dr. Bates to reconcile the estimate of Hooker and Meade, with the alleged statement of Longstreet, leads to an amusing calculation. Having ciphered the Federal army from 95,000 to 72,000, by comparing Butterfield's report of Reynolds' corps for June 10th, and Doubleday's estimate of it on July 1st, he applies the same arithmetic to Lee's army, and states that "we may therefore fairly conclude that Lee crossed the Potomac with something over 100,000 men, and actually had upon the field in the neighborhood of 76,300."

General Lee had crossed the Potomac but ten days before; had marched unopposed and at his leisure through a hostile country into central Pennsylvania; had concentrated his entire force—except Stuart's cavalry (which did not cross the Potomac with the main army) and Imboden's small command—at Gettysburg; and yet under these circumstances was, according to Dr. Bates, able to

bring but three men out of four to the battle-field. Dr. Bates thinks the Confederate commander lost the use of over 20,000 men in this time by straggling! At this rate it was great waste of blood for General Meade to fight at all. Had he allowed General Lee to march about in Pennsylvania for a month longer the whole Confederate army would have melted away, and all the advantages of Gettysburg been won without the sacrifices.

The truth is this: General Lee left Culpeper on his march northward, June 10th, with not over 60,000 effective troops of all arms. He had some severe cavalry fighting east of the Blue Ridge, and dispersed or captured Milroy's force at Winchester. At this last place he was joined by a small body of cavalry, a battalion of infantry and a battery. This addition did not compensate for the losses in battle, the detachment left to guard the prisoners taken from Milroy, and to protect communication to the Potomac. So that General Lee "crossed the Potomac" with under 60,000 men, including his cavalry. From 55,000 to 58,000 (counting all the cavalry) of this number were probably at Gettysburg.

The foregoing accords with General Lee's statement to the writer, since the war, of his forces in the Pennsylvania campaign. It is confirmed by other information.

1. In the *Historical Magazine* of August, 1867, is re-published an article from the *New York Tribune*, containing what purports to be a copy of the returns of the Confederate armies, taken from the captured archives at Washington. Where the returns were defective, the author (Mr. Swinton) has interpolated his own estimates. These are very inaccurate, but the copied returns contain valuable information. In this paper the whole force for duty in the "Department of Northern Virginia" in May, 1863, is given at 68,352. This comprised all the troops under General Lee's command, and embraced, besides the main army lying on the Rappahannock, detached bodies at various points in the State. It would be a very moderate estimate to allow 8,000 or 8,500 men for the number of troops not with the main army of invasion, and yet included in the Department of Northern Virginia.

2. The Confederate army, at the time mentioned, consisted of three corps of infantry, besides artillery and cavalry. The army was divided into these three corps in May, and Longstreet, Ewell and Hill commanded them. They did not differ much in strength. Each corps contained three divisions. General Early commanded one of the divisions of Ewell's corps. In his report of this cam-

paign, published in the *Historical Magazine* for April, 1873, he gives the field return of his division on June 20th. From it we have—

Officers present for duty.....	514
Enlisted men present for duty.....	5,124
Total.....	5,638

He says: "My division, notwithstanding the absence of three small regiments, was fully an average one in our army." This report agrees with my own recollection. My position in the army at that time made it my duty to know the strength of Ewell's corps. It contained on the 1st of June, just before we set out on the campaign *fifteen thousand and a few hundred muskets*. Longstreet's was somewhat stronger, but the difference was slight. This would make the Confederate infantry at the beginning of the campaign about 50,000 men. An addition of 10,000 for artillery and cavalry is liberal.

3. But Dr. Bates has in his own book the refutation of his estimates. It appears, from his roster of the two armies, that there were 239 Union and 163 Confederate regiments of infantry present at the battle. As a unit of organization the regiment was the same in both armies; and it is a well known fact that the Confederate regiments, except when newly formed, were never so full as the Federal ones. This was but the natural result of the more abundant facilities for recruiting on the one side than on the other. Now the Federal regiments—if the above enumeration be correct—must have averaged about 350 men, and the Confederate about 300 men, according to estimates made by each commander of his own force. This is a large estimate of the average strength of the Confederate regiments. But Dr. Bates' estimate would require them to have been over 460 strong (!) and the Federal only 300 (!), a result absurd on its face.

In regard to the Confederate losses, we have fuller data than as to their strength. The reports of Generals Longstreet and Ewell have both been published (though Dr. Bates seems unaware of it, as well as of the publication of General Lee's final report of the battle—*Southern Magazine*, August, 1872). The official report of losses by Longstreet (*Southern Magazine*, April, 1874) is—total killed, wounded and missing (including loss in artillery attached to the corps), 7,515. General Ewell reports his total losses while in Pennsylvania (*Southern Magazine*, June, 1873) at "6,094 aggregate." General Hill's report has not been published (so far as I know), but as

his corps did not suffer more than the others, the average of the above, or 6,800 men, would be a full allowance. The entire Confederate loss did not exceed 21,000 men.

There are many other points deserving notice, but this letter is already too long.

Very truly, yours,

W. ALLAN.

Diary of Robert E. Park, Macon, Georgia, late Captain Twelfth Alabama Regiment, Confederate States Army.

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—The following diary has a value, in that it records the daily experience of the men who followed our distinguished leaders, and gives the impressions made upon the mind of an intelligent young soldier as he discharged his daily duty.]

What is here written was chiefly for my own satisfaction, and in the hope that in coming years its perusal might give pleasure to my relatives and friends. Nothing was intended but a private journal, and no thought of publication was ever intended. It sees the light very unexpectedly. My object in furnishing it is neither ostentatious nor pecuniary, but simply to gratify others who have urged me to have it given a more permanent form. My comrades in the old "Army of the Valley," who followed the varying fortunes of General Early, and the unfortunate sufferers who were in prison with me during the last unhappy months of our valiant but vain struggle for independence, will excuse the numerous personal items so natural to a private diary. It was written while I was quite young—a mere boy; and the indulgent readers of these *Papers* will bear in mind that nothing was written for effect, but all in truth and sincerity, and at the time the events related were fresh in my memory. Style I could not study. My language is—

"Warm from the *heart*, and faithful to its fires,"

the spontaneous utterances of a young soldier's thoughts. The fact that while writing I never dreamed of its ever being published may add to its interest. The pressure of business engagements prevents my copying the diary, and my readers are indebted to the industry of my wife, who has kindly undertaken to prepare it in the proper form for publication.

June 6th, 1864—About eight o'clock Rhodes' division packed up their baggage, and marched down the breastworks near Richmond

half a mile, turning to the left at same point we did on 30th May, and continuing our course nearly a mile under a hot, broiling sun, when coming up with Early's division, under Ramseur, and Gordon's division, we halted a few hours. At two o'clock P. M. we resumed our march towards the right flank of the enemy, going one mile, and then halted until dark. Skirmishing was brisk and cannonading rapid in our front. We expected to be engaged at any moment, but something prevented, and we returned to a pine woods on the Mechanicsville turnpike and remained during the night. A good many straggling Yankees were captured, who reported the enemy moving to their left flank, and say their men are destitute of shoes, deficient in rations, and very tired of fighting, etc. They also report Burnside's negroes at the front. The enemy, unwilling to expose their own persons, not only invoke the aid of Ireland, Germany, and the rest of Europe, but force our poor deluded, ignorant slaves into their ranks. They will prove nothing but "food for our bullets." * * *

June 7th—We remained in camp until evening, when we moved to a more pleasant locality. The enemy have disappeared from our left and left-centre, and gone towards our right, and Early's (lately Ewell's) command enjoys a respite from the heavy and exhausting duties of the past month.

June 8th—Sergeant Aug. P. Reid, of my company ("F," Twelfth Alabama), was this morning appointed acting Second Lieutenant by Colonel Pickens, and assigned to command of Company "D." This was a neat compliment to Gus, and to my intelligent company. The day was again marked by an unusual quiet; cannon and musketry were seldom heard. I seized a moment to write a letter expressing sympathy to Mrs. Hendree, of Tuskegee, at the untimely death of her excellent and gallant son, Edward, who was killed May 5th at the Wilderness while commanding sharpshooters. The first twelve months of the war we were messmates and intimate friends. He was afterwards made First-Lieutenant in Sixty-first Alabama regiment. He was the only son of a widowed mother, and of exceeding great promise.

June 9th—Remained in our bivouac until near six o'clock, when we were ordered to "pack up" and "fall in." Rev. Dr. William Brown, of Richmond, preached to us at four o'clock. Shortly after his sermon concluded, we marched about two miles towards the right of our line, and halted in an old field, near an old Yankee camp, occupied by some of McClellan's troops before his memora-

ble "change of base" in 1862. There we slept until near three o'clock next morning, when we were hurriedly aroused, but, as we soon found out, needlessly. I read through—or rather finished reading—the New Testament to-day, and re-commenced it, beginning with Matthew.

June 10th—Stayed quietly in bivouac all day. There are rumors that Grant is mining towards our fortifications, and attempting his old Vicksburg manœuvres. But he will find he has Lee and Beauregard to deal with now. Mortars are said to be mounted and actively used by both sides on the right of our line. Appearances go to show Grant's inclination to besiege rather than charge General Lee in the future. The fearful butchery of his drunken soldiers—his European hirelings—at Spotsylvania Courthouse, it seems, has taught him some caution. His recklessness in sacrificing his hired soldiery, therefore, seems to me to be heartless and cruel in the extreme. He looks upon his soldiers as mere machines—not human beings—and treats them accordingly. * * *

June 12th—Three years ago to-day my company—"The Macon (county, Alabama) Confederates"—were enlisted as soldiers in the provisional army of the Confederate States, and I became a "sworn in" volunteer. I remember well the day the company took the prescribed oath to serve faithfully in the armies of the Confederate States, and I can truthfully say I have labored to do my whole duty to the cause since then. Then I was a young Georgia collegian, scarcely eighteen years of age, very unsophisticated in the ways of the world, totally unacquainted with military duties, war's rude alarms, and ever-present perils. Now I may be considered something of a veteran; have served nearly one year as a private and two as a lieutenant, having been unanimously elected to that position, and being a larger portion of the time in sole command of my company, composed principally of men much older than myself. I have participated in a great number of hotly contested battles and sharp skirmishes; have marched through hail and snow, rain and sleet, beneath hot, burning suns, and during bitter cold, by day and by night; have bivouacked on bloody battle-fields, with arms in my hands, ready for the long roll's quick, alarming beat; have seen many a loved comrade—whose noble heart beat high with hope and bounded with patriotic love for his dear native Southland—slain by the cruel invader, and lying still in death's icy embrace. But despite the innumerable dangers I have passed through, through God's mercy I am still alive, and

able and willing to confront the enemies of my country. Will I be spared to see another anniversary? The Omniscient One only can tell. This is Sunday, and I have had the privilege of hearing Rev. Dr. L. Rosser, of Virginia, and Rev. Dr. Joseph C. Stiles, of Georgia, preach eloquent sermons. They preached in a pine woods near our bivouac.

June 13th—At two o'clock in the morning my corps took up the line of march, some said to assume its position on the right of the army, and others to the southside of the James; still others thought it was a grand flank movement, in which Grant was to be outgeneraled as McClellan was, and Lee, as usual, grandly triumphant. None of the numerous suppositions proved correct. Battle's Alabama brigade, under Colonel S. B. Pickens, of our regiment (the Twelfth Alabama), led the corps; and we passed through Mechanicsville, crossed the Chickahominy, and entered the Brook turnpike five miles from Richmond. Here we turned towards Louisa Courthouse. I marched about fifteen miles, when I got in an ambulance and rode the remainder of the day, a distance of about five miles. During the afternoon I suffered from a hot fever. We halted about twenty miles from Richmond and rested until next day. This was one of the very few sick days I have had in three years. * * * *

June 15th—Feeling a good deal better, I marched with my company to-day. We passed Louisa Courthouse, and halted near Trevillian's depot, seven miles from Gordonsville. On our route we passed the late cavalry battle-field, where Generals Hampton, Butler and Fitzhugh Lee, defeated Yankee General Sheridan, *et al.* A great many dead and swollen horses were on the ground, and graves of slain soldiers were quite numerous. The fight was wamly contested.

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June 17th—Rhodes' division passed through towards Lynchburg on foot, several regiments of Gordon's and Ramseur's divisions rode on the cars. Lieutenant Long and I got a transfer to private quarters, and drew our rations from the commissary. This is the first time I have ever been sick enough to be sent to a hospital, since I entered the "Army of Northern Virginia," over three years ago. It is a great trial to me. * * * *

June 20th—The monotony of my situation wearies and does not benefit me, and I seek and obtain a transfer to general hospital at Lynchburg. At two o'clock took the cars, reached Lynchburg near sun down, and was sent to College hospital, with Lieutenant Long and Lieutenant B. F. Howard of Tuskegee, Alabama. It is

partly under charge of some Sisters of Charity. Here I heard of the sudden death of Mr. Charles Wright of Sixty-first Alabama, and wrote to his brother, Lieutenant G. W. Wright, of my company, at Loachafoka, Alabama, concerning it. Poor George is now at home suffering from the severe wound in the head, received at battle of Gettysburg, shortly after I was wounded, and near my side.

June 21st—To-day I was initiated in hospital fare and treatment. The fare consisted of cold, sobby corn bread, cold boiled bacon, very fat, and a kind of tasteless tea, called, by some of my companions, "poplar bark tea." The hospital attendants account for our hard fare by saying, that all the commissary and hospital stores were hurriedly removed from Lynchburg, as the vandal General Hunter approached, and to prevent their falling into Hunter's hands. Early's corps is now hotly pressing him towards Liberty and Salem, Virginia, I would I were able to assist in the pursuit. Yankee armies however are seldom caught when they start on a retreat. In that branch of tactics they generally excel. They will run pell-mell, if they think it necessary, prudence, with them, is the better part of valor, and they bear in mind the lines from Butler's *Hudibras*—

"He who fights and runs away
Will live to fight another day;
But he who fights and is slain
Will never live to fight again."

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June 23d—My cough grew worse, and general debility increased, but becoming exceedingly weary of the hospital, I applied for a transfer to a Staunton hospital, in order that I might be ready to join my corps when it reached there. Hospital life has no charms for me, and my first experience has not impressed me favorably.

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June 25th—Visited Lieutenant Wimberly, of Sixth Alabama, wounded in the leg, and who was kindly cared for by the agreeable family of Mr. Mock. Lieutenant Wimberly was in fine spirits, but recovering rather slowly. The good ladies of the house were very attentive to him. Excepting this visit, the day proved very hot, dull and tiresome. Having nothing to read and nothing to do, I am sadly afflicted with *ennui*, and am very anxious to rejoin my command.

June 26th—As I coughed too much to attend church, and was too unwell otherwise, I remained in my room until evening trying to sleep, and thus atone for the night's restlessness. Late in the day

I applied, with Lieutenants Howard and Long and several other officers, for discharge from the hospital. The application was granted, though my immediate surgeon told me I ought not to leave for several days. But I was literally worn out with the dull surroundings and poor fare, and, hearing that General Early intended to invade Pennsylvania, I resolved to accompany him. The very thought is exhilarating, and makes me feel better. * * * *

June 28th—Joined my regiment two miles beyond Staunton, and found the men glad to see me and in excellent spirits after their long, rapid, but fruitless pursuit of Yankee General Hunter. The command is ordered to be ready for rapid marching, and I packed my valise and satchel, retaining only an extra suit of under clothing. In my valise I left my DIARY, kept for two years past, and giving daily brief accounts of all that has happened to myself and my immediate command. It is too large and heavy to carry along with me, and, though I have become very much attached to it—from such constant use and association—I must “make a virtue of necessity,” and entrust it to the keeping of an unknown and perhaps careless quartermaster and teamster. No officers baggage wagons are to be allowed on the expedition in contemplation, and all of us have left the greater portion of our clothing and all our company documents, papers, &c. In the afternoon we passed through Staunton, and bivouacked six miles beyond on the famous Valley turnpike.

June 29th—We marched some distance on the pike, then turned to the right, and halted near a little village called Keezeltown. At night our regimental postmaster brought me fourteen letters—the first mail for some time. Received notice from hospital of death of private Robert P. Wynn, of Auburn, Alabama. Poor Bob! He had been married but a short time to the young sister of Robert F. Hall, lately my orderly sergeant, and soon after he joined us he had an attack of pneumonia, which, together with nostalgia (a species of melancholy, common among our soldiers, arising from absence from home and loved ones) soon brought his young career to an end. I must write Mrs. Wynn of his death. It is a sad duty. Her brother, Sergeant Hall, an old college classmate of mine, and one of the most gallant and intelligent members of my company, is at home, still disabled and suffering from a severe wound received at Seven Pines, 31st May, 1862. Our Valley army, under that heroic old bachelor, lawyer and soldier, Lieutenant-General J. A. Early, is composed of the small divisions of Major-Generals

John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky; Robert E. Rhodes, of Alabama; John B. Gordon, of Georgia; and S. D. Ramseur, of North Carolina. All of them are small—some of the brigades no larger than a full regiment, and some of the regiments no larger than a good company, and many of the companies without a commissioned officer present, and having only a “corporal’s guard” in number of enlisted men. We are all under the impression that we are going to invade Pennsylvania or Maryland. It will be a very daring movement, but all are ready and anxious for it. My own idea has long been that we should transfer the battle-ground to the enemy’s territory, and let them feel some of the dire calamities of war.

June 30th—Returned to the turnpike and marched eighteen miles, half mile beyond New Market. This place was the scene of the Dutch General Siegel’s signal defeat by General Breckinridge. The men who “fit mit Siegels” preferred running to fighting on that occasion.

July 1st, 1864—Marched twenty-two miles to-day—from Newmarket to two miles beyond Woodstock, where we remained for the night. This is the anniversary of the first day’s battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; and one year ago, late in the afternoon, just before my brigade entered the city, I was wounded. I well remember the severe wound in the head received that day by Lieutenant Wright near my side, and his earnest appeal to me to tell him candidly the nature of his terrible wound. And I shall never forget the generous forgetfulness of self, and warm friendship for myself, shown by Captain John J. Nicholson, of Company “I,” when the command was temporarily forced back by overwhelming numbers. I had been wounded; and fearing that I would be captured, hobbled off after my regiment, as it fell back under a very close and galling fire from the rapidly advancing Yankees. Nicholson, noticing my feeble and painful efforts to escape, suddenly stopped, ran to me, and catching my arm, offered to aid me; but, appreciating his well meant kindness, I declined his proffered assistance, and begged him to hurry on, telling him, to induce him to leave me, and save himself, that I would stop unless he went on. Captain N. was once a teacher in Mobile, associated with Major W. T. Walthall, is a native of Annapolis, Maryland, and graduate of Saint Johns College. While on furlough, and recovering from a wound, received at Seven Pines, he married an elegant lady in Amelia county, Virginia. After Captain N. left me, the

enemy fell back again, and I was carried to our brigade hospital, near Gettysburg, and soon joined by Captains A. E. Hewlett and P. D. Ross, and Lieutenants Wright and Fletcher, all wounded officers of my regiment. The last mentioned, a brave young soldier, bled internally, and died during the night.

July 2d—We passed through Middletown and camped at Newtown.

July 3d—Marched through the historic old town of Winchester, and encamped at Smithfield. The Good people of W. received us very kindly and enthusiastically.

July 4th—Declaration of Independence Day, but as we had other business before us, we did not celebrate the day in the old time style. We marched through Halltown and Charlestown, near the old field where that fanatical murderer and abolitionist, John Brown, was hung, and halted under a heavy cannonading at Bolivar Heights, near Harper's Ferry. This place on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and on the Potomac river, surrounded by lofty mountains, was once a United State Arsenal and Government foundry. The Yankee camps had been hastily forsaken, and our men quickly took possession of them and their contents. After dark General Rhodes took his old Alabama brigade (now Battle's) into the town, where a universal pillaging of United States Government property, especially commissary stores, was carried on all night. The town was pretty thoroughly relieved of its stores, and the 4th of July was passed very pleasantly. Corporal A. F. Henderson, while in a cherry tree gathering fruit, was wounded by a minie ball or piece of shell, and carried to hospital in the afternoon. Fuller Henderson is a son of Rev. S. Henderson, D. D., a distinguished Baptist minister of Alabama, and is a true and unflinching soldier.

July 5th—In company with Captain J. P. Smith, A. I. G., Captain R. M. Greene, of Sixth Alabama, and Sergeant A. P. Reid, I returned to town again in the morning, and procured some envelopes, writing-paper, and preserved fruits, etc. The enemy's sharpshooters from Maryland Heights fired pretty close to us repeatedly, and bullets fell so rapidly it was dangerous to walk over the town. But as we were on a frolic, resolved to see everything, we heeded the danger very little. We returned to camp, near Halltown. I was sick and restless during the night.

July 6th—As I was weak from my sickness of the past night, I rode in an ambulance all day. Rhodes' and Ramseur's divisions crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and marched through the

famous town of Sharpsburg. Signs of the bloody battle fought there in September, 1862, between Generals Lee and McClellan were everywhere visible. Great holes, made by cannon-balls and shells, were to be seen in the houses and chimneys, and trees, fences and houses showed countless marks made by innumerable minie-balls. I took a very refreshing bath in Antietam creek, upon whose banks we bivouacked. Memories of scores of army comrades and childhood's friends, slain on the banks of this stream, came before my mind, and kept away sleep for a long while. The preservation of such an undesirable union of States is not worth the life of a single Southerner lost on that memorable battle-field. Lieutenant John Fletcher, of my company, and Captain Tucker, commanding Twelfth Alabama, were killed at Sharpsburg.

July 7th—Left the Antietam and marched through a mountainous country towards Harper's Ferry, where constant cannonading could be heard. Our brigade halted near Rohrsersville, three miles from Crampton's Gap, and the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Twelfth and Sixty-first Alabama regiments, of which the brigade was composed, were sent in different directions to guard roads. The Twelfth Alabama remained on picket all night, leaving outpost for the brigade at three o'clock P. M.

July 8th—Rhodes' division was taken within a short distance of the Ferry, halted for an hour or two, and then marched across the mountain at Crampton's Gap, where General Howell Cobb's brigade of Georgians fought in 1862, and where Lieutenant-Colonel Jeff. Lamar, of Tom Cobb's Legion, was killed. Here Tom Irvine, of Oxford, Georgia, one of my earliest schoolfellows, and a very intelligent and promising youth, was also slain. We passed through Burketttsville and stopped near Jefferson. The sun was very hot indeed to-day, and marching very uncomfortable. The mountain scenery in this section is very beautiful.

July 9th—Marched through and beyond Frederick City, but neither saw nor heard anything of the mythical "Barbara Freitchie," concerning whom the abolition poet, Whittier, wrote in such an untruthful and silly strain. We found the enemy, under General Lew. Wallace, posted on the heights near Monocacy river. Our sharpshooters engaged them, and Private Smith, of Company "D," was killed. General Gordon attacked the enemy with his division and routed them completely, killing a large number. Colonel John Hill Lamar, of Sixtieth Georgia, who had but six months before married the charming Mrs. C——, of Orange county,

Virginia, was killed. There is a report that General Early levied a contribution on Frederick City, calling for \$50,000 in money, 4,500 suits of clothes, 4,000 pairs of shoes, and a quantity of bacon and flour. Battle's brigade was in line of battle all the evening, and marched from point to point, but was not actively engaged. Two divisions of the Sixth Army Corps and some "hundred days men" opposed our advance. The latter were very easily demoralized, and ran away.

July 10th—Marched nearly twenty-five miles to-day on the main road to Washington city, passing through Urbana, Hyatstown and other small places. It was a severe march. We camped near Rockville. My negro cook, Charles, left me; I sent him off to cook a chicken and some biscuits, and he failed to put in an appearance any more. My opinion is that he was enticed away or forcibly detained by some negro worshipper, as he had always been prompt and faithful, and seemed much attached to me.

July 11th—Passed through the neat village of Rockville, and marched under a very hot sun towards Washington city. Halted about two miles from the inner fortifications, where we were exposed to a close and rapid shelling nearly all the afternoon. The men are full of surmises as to our next course of action, and all are eager to enter the city. We can plainly see the dome of the Capitol and other prominent buildings, Arlington Heights (General Lee's old home), and four lofty redoubts, well manned with huge, frowning cannon. Several 100-pound shells burst over us, but only one or two men in the entire division were hurt. All the houses in our vicinity were vacated by their inmates on our approach, and the skirmishers in front were soon in them. Many articles of male and female attire were strewn over the ground. This conduct was against orders, but a few men, led by an Italian, familiarly known as "Tony," who was once an organ-grinder in Mobile and now belonging to the "Guarde La Fayette," Company "A," of my regiment, exerted themselves to imitate the vandalism of Hunter and Milroy and their thieving followers while they occupied the fair Valley of Virginia. Private property ought to be—and is, generally—respected by Confederate soldiers, and any other course is ungentlemanly and unsoldierly. Yankee soldiers are not expected to appreciate such gentility and self-respect. United States Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair's house and farm, called "Silver Spring," were less than a hundred yards from my regiment. General Breckinridge is an old acquaintance of General

Blair, and had placed a guard around it, and forbade any one to enter the house or at all disturb the premises. This course was in great contrast to that pursued by General Hunter when he caused the destruction of the residence of his cousin, Hon. Andrew Hunter, in Virginia. Breckinridge is the very soul of honor, as are all our leading generals. The meanest private in our army would not sanction the conduct of Milroy and Hunter.

July 12th—Some heavy skirmishing occurred to-day, and one of my regiment was wounded. The sharpshooters, and Fifth Alabama, which supported them, were hotly engaged; some of the enemy, seen behind their breastworks, were dressed in citizens' clothes, and a few had on linen coats. I suppose these were "Home Guards," composed of Treasury, Postoffice and other Department clerks.

I went to Roche's and other houses near the picket line, and was shown some very disreputable letters, received and written by young ladies, which had been found in the houses, and which showed how utterly demoralized the people of the North had become. It was a day of conjecture and considerable excitement, in momentary expectation of being ordered "forward." But we were disappointed in our expectations and wishes, and late at night we evacuated our position, and left Washington and its frightened inhabitants. The object of the daring expedition was no doubt accomplished, and Grant was forced to send large reinforcements to the threatened and demoralized Capital from his own army, and thus largely diminish his own force and lessen his ability to act upon the offensive. I believe we could have taken the city when we first reached it, but the delay brought heavy battalions from Grant—ten times our small number—who could have readily forced us to abandon it. About twelve o'clock at night we commenced falling back towards Rockville, and I regret to say, our march was brilliantly illuminated by the burning of the magnificent Blair mansion. The destruction of the house was much deplored by our general officers and the more thoughtful subordinates, as it had been our policy not to interfere with private property. It was set on fire either by some thoughtless and reckless sharpshooter in the rear guard, or by some careless soldier stationed about the house.

July 13th—Marched on our retreat the remainder of the night, passed through the very friendly Southern town of Rockville, and halted near Darnestown. I slept all the afternoon, not having enjoyed any rest the previous night. At dusk we commenced

marching, *via* Poolsville, to White's Ferry on the Potomac river. Did not march over five miles the entire night, though kept awake, and moving short distances at intervals of a few minutes.

July 14th—Recrossed the Potomac, wading it, and halted near the delightful little town of Leesburg. We have secured, it is said, over 3,000 horses and more than 2,500 head of beef cattle by this expedition, and this gain will greatly help the Confederate Government.

July 15th—Rested quietly "under the shade of the trees."

July 16th—We passed through Leesburg, Hamilton and Purserville. At the latter place the Yankee cavalry made a dash upon our wagon train, and captured a few wagons. General Phil. Cook's (formerly Doles') Georgia and Battle's Alabama brigades were double-quickened, or rather *run*, about two miles after them, but, of course, could not succeed in overtaking them. The idea of Confederate infantry trying to catch Yankee cavalry, especially when the latter is scared beyond its wits, is not a new one at all, and though attempted often in the past, and doubtless to be repeated scores of time in the future, I venture to predict will never be realized. Indeed it is a demonstrated fact, that demoralized and retreating Yankee infantry cannot be overtaken even by Confederate cavalry, *vide* battles of Bull Run, Manassas—first and second, etc. A frightened Yankee is *unapproachable*. We finally gave up the pursuit, and marched through Snicker's Gap. The Twelfth Alabama picketed on the mountain top.

July 17th—Left our picket-post and waded across the Shenandoah river. The water rose to our waists and was quite swift, and as the bed of the river was rocky and uneven, we had a good deal of fun. Some practical jokes were indulged in, which all seemed to enjoy. After crossing, we marched within five miles of Berryville and halted. I took dinner at the house of an excellent and very intelligent Virginia lady, Mrs. C——, and met a charming young lady, Miss C——, daughter of mine hostess. Mrs. C—— gave me some interesting facts connected with the treatment of the good people of the Valley of Virginia by that cruel coward and villain, General Milroy, who a short while ago fled before us so fleetly and ignominiously. She had been badly mistreated by him herself. Indeed he appeared to take a peculiar pleasure in annoying and insulting the citizens, particularly the patriotic ladies, who happened unfortunately to be living within his department.

July 18th—Archy W——, a corporal of my company, happen-

ing to be on guard at the house, made an engagement for me to visit Miss C—— in the afternoon at four o'clock; but at the appointed hour Rodes' division was hurriedly ordered out to meet the enemy, who had crossed the Shenandoah at Snicker's Gap, under General Crook; and in an incredible short space of time we were hotly engaged in battle. The fight lasted over two hours, and was quite warmly contested. The Yankee force was three times greater than ours. Private Eberheart, of my company, was instantly killed. We had driven the enemy to the banks of and in the river, and, having halted on a little eminence, were peppering them with bullets as they rushed into and attempted to cross the river. They replied as best they could, but under great disadvantage. A large number remained concealed near the river at the foot of the hill, and did some execution, firing at our men as they exposed themselves. They escaped under cover of darkness. When Eberheart was killed, Private Tom K—— called me earnestly to him, and, amid a heavy shower of bullets, I went to him, and inquired what he wanted. "Nothing," he replied, "I just thought you would like to see Eberheart after he was dead." A rather poor reason, I thought, for causing a man to unnecessarily expose himself to hundreds of death-dealing missiles. I took care of his pocket-book, his wife's ambrotype and bible, and will send them to her at Fredonia, Alabama, the first opportunity. E—— was a brave, uncomplaining, good soldier, sent to my company as a conscript. Private G. A. Ware was severely wounded in the leg. Lieutenant Majors, of Company "E," and two others of the regiment were killed, and ten or fifteen wounded. Lieutenant Majors and I were running near each other in quick pursuit of the enemy, when he exclaimed that he was shot, but continued to run for some distance, and then suddenly fell. I stopped by his side, and offered him some water from my canteen, which he hastily drank, and then sank down and instantly expired. A minnie ball had cut an artery in his leg, but such was his determined courage and eagerness in following the fleeing foe, that he ran on, his life blood all the time gushing from his wound, and stopped only when sheer exhaustion and faintness from such great and rapid loss of blood compelled him, and the grim monster Death claimed him for his own. Majors had been but recently promoted, and was an officer of decided promise. In this action Colonel Pickens commanded our brigade and Lieutenant-Colonel Goodgame the regiment. While the routed and demoralized Yankees were crossing the river, I caused my

company and those adjoining it to fire by rank and by command, as in ordinary manual drill, the only instance of such an event, in my knowledge, during the war. I gave the words of command at request of Colonel Goodgame, and confess I took much pleasure in it. While we were engaged burying our dead comrades under a large tree, near where they fell, General Early and staff rode by, and the old hero spoke to us gently, and kindly suggested that we "dig the graves deep enough." A brave North Carolinian had somehow and somewhere come in possession of a silk ("stove pipe") hat, and had made himself conspicuous by persisting in wearing it, despite the advice and warnings of his companions, and indeed of the whole division, as the men used frequently to tell him, as he passed by, to "come down out of that hat," "I see your feet hanging down from that stove pipe," etc.—all of which he heard with imperturbable good humor, generally making some witty reply. In walking over the battle-field I was pained to see the well-known tall hat, and upon nearing it, to recognize the handsome, good-natured face and manly form of the gallant wearer lying cold in death. He had been shot in the head. His reckless daring reminded me of the hardihood shown, during the battle of Gaines' Mill in 1862, by Captain L'Etoudal, of Company "A," the French company from Mobile. The day was intensely hot, and L'Etoudal was very fat, weighing at least 250 pounds. He got hold of an umbrella, and while we were exposed to a heavy fire, and even while marching preparatory to charging the enemy, he kept the conspicuous article boldly and recklessly elevated over his head, and to repeated cries from the men ordering him to "put down that umbrella, you are attracting the enemy's fire to us," which was really true, he coolly replied, "I won't, it is too much hot," and the brave Frenchman absolutely refused to lower or close it and continued to shield his huge body from the sun's scorching rays, preferring to risk the bullets to the terrible heat. The company laughed at and approved their captain's daring conduct, and did not join in the almost universal request to "haul down that umbrella." The poor fellow died soon after, a victim to disease. He always reminded me of Lieutenant Porgy, a racy character in Wm. Gilmore Simms' interesting novel, "The Partisan." We slept in line of battle, on our arms, ready for action, near the battle-field. Privates W. A. Moore and T. M. Kimbrough came in from hospital to-day.

July 19th—Rested undisturbed in the woods. Private W. F.

Moore returned to camp. After the moon rose Rodes' division marched through Berryville, then halted, cooked rations, and rested from two o'clock until daylight.

July 20th—Marched all day, passing White Post and Newtown, and within one and a half miles of Winchester.

July 21st—Anniversary of the first battle of Manassas. We were drawn up in line of battle at Newtown and Middletown, and ready to repeat the memorable lesson in running taught our enemies at Manassas this day three years ago. But they declined to give us the chance. Three years ago my regiment, officered by Colonel R. T. Jones, of Marion, Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore O'Hara, of Mobile, and Major E. D. Tracy, of Huntsville, with my company, then officered by Captain R. F. Ligon and Lieutenants R. H. Keeling, William Zuber and George Jones, were hurried on the cars from Richmond to Manassas, but reached there only in time to go over the battle-field after the fierce conflict was over. I saw hundreds of Brooklyn Zouaves, in their gay red breeches and gaudily trimmed coats, lying lifeless where they had been slain. Also saw the noble steed of the heroic Bartow lying near the spot where his master fell. Soon after General Beauregard raised his hat, and, in grateful acknowledgment of their splendid valor, exclaimed, "I salute the gallant Eighth Georgia!" The places where General Bee fell and General Jackson won his immortal soubriquet of "Stonewall" were not far distant. We spent the night near a mill on the river, three miles from Strasburg.

* * * * *

July 24th—Suddenly summoned to leave our picket-post for Winchester, marching very rapidly, forming line of battle near Kernstown, and moving quickly after the enemy through Winchester and five miles beyond, being in less than half mile of the routed and flying Yankees almost the whole time. They, in their fright and haste to escape, burned up thirty-five or forty wagons and caissons, and abandoned a few cannon. The entire movement was a very successful one. We marched fully thirty miles during the day. But, as I have said before, it seems to be impossible to catch a running Yankee. They are as fleet almost as race-horses.

July 25th—Rested until four o'clock P. M., and then marched to the little village of Bunker Hill.

July 26th—Marched to Martinsburg, where a large number of Yankee sick and wounded were captured; camped two miles from town.

July 27th—Details were made to tear up and destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; rumor in camp of Hood's fighting Sherman in Georgia, and all are anxious for particulars.

July 28th—Rested all day, and near the spot where, last year, I saw Major A. Proskauer, our gallant German Hebrew Major, from Mobile, and Dr. Adams, our assistant surgeon, eat fried mushrooms ("frog-stools"), a very novel sight to me.

July 29th—Marched to Williamsport, Maryland; where our cavalry crossed the Potomac and captured large quantities of commissary and quartermasters' stores.

August 1st, 2d and 3d, 1864—Remained quietly at Bunker Hill, resting. This rest and quiet of three days, after our continual marching and counter-marching, double-quicking, running, fighting, skirmishing, long-roll alarms by day and by night, loss of sleep by night marches and constant picketing, is genuinely enjoyed by us all.

August 4th—Left our quiet camp for Maryland, and passed through Martinsburg, halting six miles beyond.

August 5th—Waded across the Potomac at Williamsport, and marched towards Boonsboro, halting five miles from Funkstown. General Breckinridge's command crossed at Shepherdstown. The majority of the men took off their shoes, tied them to their knapsacks, and waded through, over the rocks and gravel, barefoot.

August 6th—Breckinridge's corps, consisting of his own and Wharton's small divisions, passed by us, and recrossed the Potomac. General B. was formerly Vice-President of the United States, and is a magnificent looking man, weighing over two hundred pounds. He wears a heavy moustache, but no beard, and his large piercing blue eyes are really superb. Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions also crossed to the Virginia side, wading the river again. We marched to the vicinity of Hedgesville, on a mountain road, and camped for the night.

August 7th—Marched through Martinsburg, and to our former camp at Bunker Hill.

August 8th and 9th—Spent these two days resting, but in momentary expectation of an order to "fall in."

August 10th—Order to "fall in" received, and we left camp, marched six miles towards Winchester, formed line of battle, and slept on our arms all night.

August 11th—Went to Winchester and formed line of battle.

Then Battle's brigade was ordered on picket duty two miles beyond Middletown. Marched over twenty miles during the day.

August 12th—Left the picket-post, marched through Strasburg, and halted at our old camp near Barb's tannery, on the Back road. At night the Twelfth Alabama went again on picket.

August 13th—The brigade was in order of battle in the hot sun all day.

August 14th—Still in line of battle. Rude breastworks of rails were thrown up, but the enemy kept aloof. Although we have thrown up scores of earthworks, we have never been called upon to fight behind them.

August 17th—Left our post for Winchester, and on our route saw where several large barns, loaded with wheat, corn and hay, had been burnt by order of General Sheridan. One large flouring mill, of great necessity to the locality, had also been destroyed. I suppose Sheridan proposes to starve out the citizens, or rather the women and children of the Valley (for the men are in the army), as well as Early's troops. Grant and he have resolved to make this fertile Valley a desert, and, as they express it, cause it "to be so dessolate that the birds of passage cannot find enough to subsist upon." This is a very ungentle and ungenerous return for the very humane manner in which General Lee conducted his Pennsylvania campaign last year, and for the very kind treatment of the citizens of Maryland and Pennsylvania by General Early and his command recently. Such warfare is a disgrace to civilization; but I suppose that Irish-Yankee Sheridan and that drunken butcher and tanner, Grant, have little comprehension of sentiments of humanity or Christianity. Breckinridge and Gordon whipped out the Yankees badly to-day in some severe skirmishing. Rodes, for a wonder, was not engaged. My good mother says Rodes' division is in every battle her papers mention, and that such expressions as "Rodes bore the brunt of the battle," "Rodes begun the action," "Rodes' command suffered severely in killed and wounded," "Rodes' division led the advance," or "Rodes conducted the retreat, serving as rear guard," are constantly in the telegraphic column, and to be found in "Letters from War Correspondents." It is true that our gallant and beloved Major-General is usually foremost at the post of honor and danger. He is ably seconded by his efficient adjutants, Major H. A. Whiting and Major Green Peyton. Reinforcements from Longstreet's corps have reached us, and vigorous work may be expected. Lieutenant-General Anderson is in command.

A Correction of the Incident in Reference to General Pickett.

[The following letter explains itself. We can only say, by way of apology for our error, that the incident in reference to General Pickett was related by one of the speakers at the meeting held in Richmond, soon after his death, to honor his memory; that it had gone the rounds of the papers without contradiction, so far as we had seen, and that this fact, added to our personal acquaintance with the gentleman who related it, satisfied us of its entire accuracy. Let us add that while this correction in no way affects our argument on the prison question, we would make it none the less cheerfully if it did, and that we are at all times ready to correct the slightest inaccuracy of statement into which we may be betrayed.]

TO THE REV. J. WILLIAM JONES,

Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:

Dear Sir—In the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for March, 1876, at page 160, appears an account of some occurrences, in which General George E. Pickett was an actor. Being myself an uncle of General Pickett, I had some acquaintance with the affair, and I saw that there were certainly several material errors in the statement. But I thought it best to communicate with the members of his staff, and to ascertain the facts with precision, before I wrote to you. This has caused the delay of the present communication; but it enables me to write now, supported by their recollections, especially by those of Mr. Harrie Hough, who was General Pickett's confidential clerk, and Major Charles Pickett, who was his brother and adjutant. Captains W. Stuart Symington and Edward R. Baird concur with the other officers, so far as they were acquainted with the facts, but their absence on service at that juncture caused them to be less familiar with all the circumstances.

I will give you a narrative of what actually occurred, condensed from these sources.

When the demonstration was made on Newbern, North Carolina, by the Confederates, and during the engagement, a number of prisoners were captured. Among them was a young lieutenant of artillery, whose name is not remembered, but he was probably from Elmira, New York. A day or two after the engagement, General Pickett received (from General Ord, as it is believed,) a letter by flag of truce, requesting his good offices for this young prisoner, accompanied by a bundle of clothing and a remittance of \$500 in Confederate money. General Pickett sent one of his couriers (not an orderly), who had been with him for a long time and possessed

his entire confidence, with dispatches for Captain Baird, who was at General Pickett's headquarters in Petersburg, and with instructions to go on to Richmond with the money and clothing for the young prisoner, to be delivered to the proper officer for his use. The courier, instead of reporting at headquarters in Petersburg, or going to Richmond, made his way to Ivor Station, on the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. There, having a courier's pass and being well known, he exhibited a letter addressed to a gentleman living beyond the lines, which he said he was instructed by General Pickett to deliver; and by this means he got through the Confederate lines and took refuge with the Federal army.

As soon as General Pickett learned these facts, he sent to the young officer in prison a supply of clothes and \$500 in money. He also wrote to General Ord by flag of truce, acquainting him with all that had happened, and regretting that the receipt of the money and clothes had been delayed. At the same time a demand was made for the surrender of the courier, in view of the facts of the case. To this demand an answer was received from General Butler, declining to surrender the courier, *but, at the same time, refunding to General Pickett the \$500 of Confederate money which he had advanced to the young officer.*

This is all of the story that rests upon any real foundation. General Pickett never received any letter from any gentleman in Boston, and never saw the young officer who was taken prisoner, so far as is known to any member of his staff. He did not give any mortgage on his Turkey Island property for the purpose of raising this money; and his interest in that property still belongs to his widow and his son.

I am sure that you will gladly correct the mistakes into which you have been led in regard to this, seemingly, "well authenticated incident," and which owe their origin, no doubt, to the affection and esteem with which the memory of General Pickett is cherished, and to the belief that he would so have acted under the circumstances supposed.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

ANDREW JOHNSTON.

Richmond, Va., 23d May, 1876.

Address before the Mecklenburg (N. C.) Historical Society.

By General D. H. HILL.

[The distinguished author has kindly furnished us the following address, which we cheerfully publish in full, as every way worthy of preservation, and appropriate to our columns.

General Hill wields, in vindicating the truth of history, a pen as ready as his sword was keen in defending the right.]

Gentlemen of the Historical Society of Mecklenburg :

Our president has appropriately introduced the series of historical lectures with the inquiry, why so few have attempted to preserve the record of the great events in the history of North Carolina, and to embalm the memories of the illustrious actors therein. Perhaps, it may not be amiss in me to pursue the same line of thought. For, if the neglect of our past history be due to the lack of materials, then our organization is in vain, and our time and our labor will be thrown away. The truth, however, is that our materials have been rich and lustrous, and the causes which have led to the neglect of them can only be explained by an examination into the characteristics of our people and those surroundings which have moulded their thoughts and their actions.

We look for an explanation of this neglect, in part, to the influence exerted in the State by the Scotch-Irish population. These people have ever been God-fearing, law-loving, law-abiding, honest, truthful, energetic and courageous ; but they are, to the last degree, unpoetic and averse to hero-worship. They never canonize saints, nor idolize warriors and statesmen. This rugged race bore the brunt of the contest in North Carolina. They fought the battles of freedom for freedom's sake, and when that guerdon was won, they cared not to exalt the merits or the prowess of this or that leader, each conscious of his own equal worthiness. The Scotch-Irish disdained the laudations of heroes as much as their great religious leader, John Knox, disdained "to fear the face of mortal man." Such a people would be slow to build monuments, erect statues and write histories to commemorate deeds of high emprise. Perhaps, this self-reliant, self-asserting and unsentimental people would regard everything that looked like hero-worship as unmanly and contemptible.

This partial explanation of the neglect of history applies only to the two Carolinas, and in looking over the whole Southern field we must seek a more general explanation. Dr. Channing, of Bos-

ton, one of the ablest and fairest of the many gifted men of the North, said thirty-four years ago that the great passion of the South was for political power, while the great passion of the North was for money. We give his language in the contrast which he made between the North and the South: "The South," said he, "has abler politicians, and almost necessarily so, because its opulent class makes politics the business of life. * * * * In the South an unnatural state of things turns men's thoughts to political ascendancy, but in the free States men think little of it. Property is the good for which they toil perseveringly from morning to night. Even the political partisan among us has an eye to property, and seeks office as the best, perhaps only way of subsistence." This is a pretty frank confession from a Northern scholar that Northern politicians seek office mainly in order to make money thereby. It reads very much like prophecy in the revelations of the last few years of Credit Mobilier, Emma Mine Stock, Seneca Stone Contracts, Whisky-Ring Frauds, Pacific Mails Subsidies, and Sales of Sutlers' Posts, etc., etc. But while Dr. Channing gave the distinction in the characteristics of the two sections with great fairness, he did not give the philosophy of that distinction. We might still inquire, Why does the North covet money and the South political power? We think that the solution of the problem is to be found in the density of the population in the one section, and the sparseness of population in the other, with all the modifying influence brought in by this difference of population. The North has devoted itself, from necessity, to commerce and the mechanic arts; the South has devoted itself to a pure agriculture. In rural districts there may be great stinginess and meanness, but greed of money is not a prominent vice, and great wealth is almost unknown. The temptation is wanting, and therefore the vice is not found. Literature and the arts and the sciences are not cultivated to a high point among an agricultural people. These studies require debate, discussion and antagonism. It is true that the great thinkers of the world have generally been born and reared in the country, but it is equally true that they did not become distinguished until their minds had received the attrition of town life. Plodding, pains-taking historians, hard-working students of science, enthusiastic devotees to the arts are not found in the rural districts. The free, fresh air of the country is unfavorable to all that sort of thing. Literary and scientific men, if not born in great centres of trade and commerce, go there to meet congenial spirits,

or to find the appliances of their art. The South has had no literature and no science, because she has always had a sparse population. The ambitious have had but two roads to fame; the one led, in time of peace, to legislative and congressional halls; the other led, in time of war, to the tented field and the battle-ground. There never has been a scientific monthly or weekly published in the South. The only well-sustained review ever attempted here dealt mainly in political questions. This, under the management of Hugh Swinton Legare, had almost the ability of the great English *Quarterlies*, but its discussions were confined almost exclusively to matters of state-craft. After a time it shared the fate of all our Southern magazines—died for want of patronage.

To sneer at an agricultural people for deficiency in literature and science, is just as unfair as to sneer at a commercial people for lack of those qualities which are alone found in farming communities. In the thinly settled South, as has been said, the ambitious found but two high roads to distinction. The character of our people is to be judged, then, by the manner in which they acquitted themselves in the struggle for military and political fame, and not in the struggle for moneyed power or literary and scientific pre-eminence.

Has the South succeeded in furnishing brave soldiers and wise statesmen? This will be my investigation to-night.

The commander-in-chief in the first great rebellion, was the Southern-born Washington. In that contest, the South furnished troops out of all proportion to the numbers of her population. Northern soldiers never came to the relief of the South, but almost all the battle-fields of the North were drenched with Southern blood. At the battle of Brooklyn, a regiment of Marylanders fought so stoutly and checked the British advance so long, that it was virtually destroyed. Half the victors at Trenton and Princeton, who changed the wail of despair of the American people into shouts of victory, were from Virginia. Two future Presidents of the United States, of Southern birth, were in that battle, one of whom was wounded. The only general officer there slain, was from Fredericksburg, Virginia, and he was commanding Southern troops. The retreat at White Plains would have been a terrible disaster, but for the charge of Southern troops that drove back, for a time, the British, flushed with victory. At Germantown, a Southern brigade gained deathless honor, and the life-blood of a North Carolina general was poured out. After the massacre by the Indians in the

valley of Wyoming, 1776, George Rogers Clark, of Virginia, with a brigade of his countrymen, penetrated to the upper Mississippi, chastised the savage butchers, captured the British Governor of Detroit and seized £10,000 sterling, a most seasonable addition to our scanty currency. The Virginia troops bore the brunt of the battle of Brandywine, and stood, while others ran. At Monmouth and on the plains of Saratoga, Southern blood mingled with Northern in the battles of freedom. Morgan's Virginia riflemen greatly distinguished themselves, and their deadly rifles slew the British General Fraser, the inspiring spirit of Burgoyne's army.

On our own soil we find the same heroism. When South Carolina was over-run, the guerrillas, under Sumter, Marion, Pickens, &c., drove the British back, step by step, to Charleston, where they were held in a state of siege until the end came. It is our deliberate opinion that no battles of the Revolution will compare in brilliancy with the defence of Fort Moultrie and the defeat of Ferguson at King's Mountain, fought solely by untrained Southern troops. Our own State had the honor of shedding the first blood in the sacred cause of freedom, of first proclaiming the great principles of independence, and of having on its soil that battle-ground where Cornwallis received from Southern troops the first check in his career of victory—a check which ultimately led to his surrender.

If we come to the war of 1812, Harrison and Jackson, beyond all question, gained the most laurels, as shown by the elevation of both of them to the Presidency for their military prowess. All concede that the brilliant land-fights of that war were in the defences of New Orleans, Mobile, Craney Island and Baltimore, and in these, on the American side, none but Southern troops were engaged. This war was unpopular at the North, and the defection of New England amounted almost to overt treason. Hence, the South furnished again more than her proportion of troops. Again, the Southern volunteers flocked North, while no Northern troops came South. If we read of the bloody battles in Canada, we are struck with the number of Southern officers there engaged, mostly general officers—Wilkinson, Izzard, Winder, Drayton, Hampton, Scott, Towson, Brooke, Gaines, &c. Kentucky, I believe, furnished more troops than any State for the invasion of Canada. On the authority of the *Southern Review*, I state, without investigating the truth of it, that Maryland furnished more of the naval heroes of the war of 1812 than did any other State in the Union. It is very

certain that the South contributed more than her quota of land troops. Not only was the war popular at the South, but the laboring class being slaves, more of the citizen soldiery were able to take up arms. For the same reason, the supplies in the Revolution and in the war of 1812 came largely from the South. Botta's history shows how dependent the army under Washington was for supplies from Virginia and the South.

In the Mexican war the commanders of both American armies were Virginians, one of whom became President and the other an unsuccessful candidate for the Presidency. Two-thirds of the volunteer troops for that war were from the South, and not a single Southern regiment ever behaved badly in action. Two-thirds of the first *brevet* appointments given for gallantry on the field were bestowed upon Southern-born officers. I allude to those first given, and not to the second or third batch, procured through political influence. The volunteer brigadier most distinguished in that war was Lane, of North Carolina. The volunteer regiments that won most *eclat* were Davis' Mississippi and Butler's South Carolina. The naval officers who performed the most dashing feats were Tatnall, of Georgia, and Hunter, of Virginia. In that wonderful campaign from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico the engineer officers most relied upon by General Scott were Alexander Swift, of North Carolina, and Robert E. Lee, of Virginia. That volunteer brigade that was most relied upon in an emergency was the Mississippi brigade under Quitman. But I need not go on. It is a fact that none will controvert, that the South won the laurels of that war.

If we come down to the second rebellion, the President of the so-called United States who conquered the so-called Confederate States was a Southern-born man, and all admit that he conducted the contest with great ability. The commander-in-chief of his army who first organized victory for the Union was a Virginian. Next to Grant and Sherman, the most successful Federal generals, who struck us the heaviest blows, were born at the South—viz: Thomas, Canby, Blair, Sykes, Ord, Getty, Anderson, Alexander, Nelson, etc., etc. General Grant was beaten the first day at Shiloh and driven back to the river, cowering under the protection of the gun-boats. A Kentucky brigade, under General Nelson, checked the shouting, exulting rebels, and saved Grant from destruction. A Kentucky colonel greatly distinguished himself that day. He is now Secretary of the Interior, hated by Grant, whom he then helped to save, and hated by all the whiskey thieves.

At Chickamauga the Federal commander-in-chief gave up all as lost, and abandoned the field early in the afternoon. General Thomas, of Virginia, in the Yankee service, planted his corps on a hill, and there stood, like a rock in the ocean, resisting all assaults until nightfall, when he retired to Chattanooga. His stubbornness on the battle-field, and his persistent holding of the town after defeat, saved East Tennessee to the Union and gave a death-blow to the Confederacy.

Andy Johnson refused to give up Nashville, as Buell directed, when Bragg advanced into Kentucky. The abandonment of Nashville then would have given the whole State over to the Confederacy. These two men—Thomas and Johnson—dug the grave of the Confederacy.

Farragut, of Tennessee, rose to the highest rank in the Federal navy, for his triumphs over his native land. The naval forces at Hatteras were under command of Goldsborough, of Maryland. It is a singular fact that the Southern men in the Federal service were remarkably successful, while the Northern men in our service, though brave and true, brought disaster to our arms. Lovel lost us New Orleans, Pemberton lost us Vicksburg, and Gardner lost us Port Hudson. Through the failure of these three officers the command of the Mississippi was lost, the Confederacy was cut in twain, and the conquest of the South became only a question of time.

Had the South been united, our independence could easily have been established, but unfortunately, the South furnished, probably, as many native troops to the Federal army, as did the vast and populous North. Missouri gave 108,773 soldiers to that army, Kentucky 92,000, Maryland 49,730. Every Southern State contributed in greater or less degree, and in all there were 400,000 native-born Southerners in the Yankee service. In this enumeration, I do not include the 250,000 negro troops, who fought nobly then, as they vote nobly now, and without whom E. M. Stanton, the Yankee Secretary of War, said that "the life of the nation" could not have been saved. Without enlarging farther upon this subject, I have sufficiently established the claim of the Southern people to excellence in the field. They have succeeded in one of the two departments, in which they have sought prominence. Let us look at the other. Have they succeeded in the department of politics?

From Washington's inauguration to Grant's, the Republic had

lasted (after a fashion) eighty years. Then a new element of voting power was introduced not known to the framers of the Constitution, and I therefore only estimate the time up to this Radical change. Of these eighty years, fifty-seven were passed under the Presidencies of Southern-born men, and but twenty-three under Northern Presidents. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and Jackson, served each eight years, forty years in all, just one-half the life of the nation. Tyler, Polk, Lincoln and Johnson, served each four years, and Taylor one. Of the twenty-three years under Northern Presidents, John and John Quincy Adams, Van Buren, Pierce and Buchanan, served each four years, and Fillmore three. The second Adams was not the choice of the people, and was elected by the House of Representatives. Mr. Fillmore was elevated by the death of President Taylor. So up to the period of the new kind of voting, the people had really never elected but four Northern men to the Presidency. It is remarkable, too, that the people have repudiated the administration of every Northern President, not one of them being re-elected, and a different political party always succeeding them in power, save in the case of Mr. Pierce, a Democrat, who was succeeded by Mr. Buchanan, also a Democrat. On the other hand, five Southern Presidents were re-elected, and all of them were succeeded by Presidents of the same political faith, except perhaps Mr. Polk, who was succeeded by General Taylor, running upon a no party platform. The country endorsed Polk's administration and did not repudiate him, as he declined a renomination. Another curious fact is this, that every Northern President had associated with him a Southern man as Vice-President. Thus John Adams had Thomas Jefferson; John Quincy Adams had J. C. Calhoun; Martin Van Buren had R. M. Johnson; Pierce had Wm. R. King; Buchanan had J. C. Breckinridge. On the other hand, Jackson served one term with J. C. Calhoun. Harrison and Tyler, his associates, were both from Virginia, and Lincoln and Johnson were both from the South. Of these same eighty years, the South had a Chief Justice on the Supreme Court Bench for sixty-three years, or more than three-fourths of the time. The purity and wisdom of these Southern Justices made them the pride of the nation.

All the wars, foreign and domestic, have been under the conduct and control of Southern-born Presidents; the war of 1812; the Algerine war; the Black Hawk war; the Seminole war; the Mexican war; the war of the second rebellion.

All the acquisitions of territory have been under Southern Presi-

dents, by which the size of the United States has been doubled—Louisiana, Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, and Alaska. The New England States resisted all these acquisitions except the last.

The political studies of the South all led to freedom, and Southern statesmen have always been on the side of popular rights. Christopher Gadsden, of South Carolina, in a public address at Charleston in 1766, advocated separation from Great Britain, and he was the first man in the American Colonies to propose the establishment of American Independence. The first American Congress met in Philadelphia on the 7th of September, 1774. Peyton Randolph, of Virginia, was chosen President, because of his familiarity with all those questions of state-policy and state-craft that might arise. On the 20th of May, the next year, the Scotch-Irish of this county made the first Declaration of Independence, and on the 12th of April, of the following year, the Provincial Congress of North Carolina took the lead of all the States in passing resolutions of Independence. And when the Congress of all the States met in Philadelphia, it was a Virginian, Richard Henry Lee, who first moved that the States should be FREE and INDEPENDENT STATES. It was a Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the National Declaration of Independence. And when our independence had been won under the leadership of a Southern General, and a Convention was held in order to form a Federal Constitution, the Draft of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, of South Carolina, was accepted by that body. So one Southern statesman had the honor of writing the Declaration of Independence, and another Southern statesman had the honor of writing the Federal Constitution.

I hope that this brief and imperfect sketch has established the point I made at the outset, that the South has excelled in the two departments, war and politics, in which she sought pre-eminence—the only two in which an agricultural people have ever gained renown. The world has never seen finer fighting material than our own ragged rebels. They united the *elan* of the Frenchman with the dogged obstinacy of the Englishman, the careless gaiety of the Italian with the uncomplaining fortitude of the Russian. How cheerfully they bore hunger, thirst, heat, cold and all wretchedness, and how magnificently they moved forward under the storm of shot and shell! An English officer, who had been on Longstreet's staff, witnessed the battle of Sadowa, and gave it as his opinion

that 70,000 of Lee's ragged, barefoot veterans could have swept the 200,000 victors off the field. I have compared, so far as I could, the losses sustained in the great battles of the world since the introduction of fire-arms, and I find only in rare cases have they been so much as a fourth of the troops engaged, and they range from that up to a twentieth. The Confederates thought that battle almost a skirmish in which their losses did not exceed a fourth. The British at Waterloo were pounded for hours by the French artillery, but their loss was but 10,686 out of the 70,000 engaged, or not quite a sixth. At Magenta, the Austrians, out of 125,000, lost but 9,713, or but one-thirteenth; the French, the victors, lost but 6,000 out of 120,000, or one-twentieth. At Sadowa, the Prussians lost but 10,000 out of 200,000 in the battle, or one-twentieth. The Austrians, with an equal number engaged, lost much more heavily, but they were flanked and suffered severely after they were routed. And here I would remark, that to make a comparison fair between the losses in different battles, it should be between the victors and not the vanquished. The loss of the defeated, where cavalry is efficient, or where a flank movement has decided the battle, is always greater after defeat than before it. The true test of the obstinacy of a battle is the loss up to the moment when the shouts of victory rend the sky. Tried by that test, European fighting has been child's play in comparison with Confederate. "I am ashamed for strangers to see my barefoot, ragged boys in camp," said General Lee to an English visitor, "but I would be glad for all the world to see them on the field of battle." This tribute from the great commander is alone sufficient to establish my first point, and I consider it established therefore.

Under the second head, I have shown that Southern statesmen were the first to proclaim the great principles of independence; that Southern-born men have held the Presidential office for nearly three-fourths of the life of the nation; that Southern policy has doubled the area of the United States, and that Southern men have always had, up to the introduction of the new voting element unknown to our ancestors, a controlling influence in the councils of the nation. I will only add now that, up to that time, there never was a stain upon a Southerner, whether as a President, Cabinet officer, Foreign Minister, Congressman, or other employee of the Government. Our Southern statesmen were often rash, hot-headed and intemperate in language, *but they would not steal*, and they could not be bought by a Ring. This Southern leaven leavened the

whole lump. The Supreme Court was incorruptible, and not, as now, a partisan body. The Senate was more dignified than the English House of Lords. Schemes of public plunder were not devised and executed in the House of Representatives. No one was ever charged with selling his vote for money. No Foreign Minister prostituted his office to sell Emma Mine stock or Sally Mine stock. So far as I can remember, only one fraudulent claim on a large scale was ever attempted, and upon its exposure by Colonel Payne, of North Carolina, the fraudulent claimant killed himself with Prussic acid.

The South is gradually getting rid of the ruffian scum, who have so long plundered and disgraced her. The voices of some of her true sons are being heard in the Halls of Congress. We trust that the time may not be far distant when the influence of Southern statesmanship will be felt in the councils of the nation, rebuking bribery and roguery, elevating the public morals and purifying the Government. To effect these great objects, we must send forward our best-men, not fire-eaters and braggarts. We confess that we had a few of that class, but hot shot and shell reversing the order of nature cooled their fiery temperaments. We want not Gascons, but Southern gentlemen, honorable, high-toned men of strict integrity and *straight hair*.

Editorial Paragraphs.

OUR discussion of the prison question in our March and April numbers has excited great attention, and we have been exceedingly gratified at the kind criticisms of our friends, both in the newspapers and in numbers of private letters which we have received. We have been told by those whose opinions are indeed worth having, and whose names, were it proper to give them, would be considered the highest endorsement, that the facts, figures and documents which we have presented are an end to the argument, and place the conduct of the Confederacy in a perfectly impregnable position.

We have seen no attempt on the part of the Northern press to refute our argument, although we took pains to send it to all of the leading papers and magazines.

The New York *Tribune* had a rather ill-natured criticism, in which it virtually admits the truth of what we say, but represents us as disturbers of that peace and good will between the sections which all should now seek to cultivate. And we hear a faint whisper that certain of our esteemed friends are afraid that harm to the South will come out of this defence of our people. We have only to say in reply that *we* did not reopen the question; that we have simply refuted slanders which have been suffered to go so long unanswered that in breaking forth afresh they "run riot over both facts and probabilities;" and that if our calm, temperate reply to these long persisted in attempts to blacken the name and character of our Confederate Government and people shall alienate "friends at the North," it will only prove that their friendship is bound to us by so brittle a thread that it is scarcely worth an effort to preserve it.

If "friends" are alienated by the proof that Confederates were not the cold-blooded murderers, the fiends incarnate that partisan fanatics have represented, then the sooner we get rid of such "friends" the better.

THE demand for our PAPERS on "The Treatment of Prisoners during the War between the States" has induced us to put them in more permanent form, and we hereby announce that we will very soon issue a neatly bound volume with the title "*The Confederate View of the Treatment of Prisoners.*"

By using without alteration the matter in our March and April numbers we will be able to send the book, postage paid, at the following very low rates:

Cloth binding.....	\$1 25
Half Morocco.....	\$1 50
Half Calif.....	\$1 75

We beg that our friends will send in their orders promptly, and that they will exert themselves to circulate the book, and especially to put a copy in public libraries North and South. Let the vindication of our Confederate Government be placed where posterity can see it.

THE continued demand for back numbers has compelled us to reproduce both our January and February numbers, and now our January number is again exhausted. This has compelled us to stereotype hereafter, so that we can furnish back numbers without stint. The stereotyping involves a delay in the issue of this number, which we deeply regret, but our printers promise that it shall not occur again.

IT was the privilege of the Editor to attend at Gordonsville on the 10th of May a reunion of the old Thirteenth Virginia Infantry. General Early, General J. A. Walker, Ex-Governor Wm. Smith, General D. H. Maury, General McComb, Colonel Grigsby, of the old Stonewall Brigade; Colonel Gibson, of the Forty-ninth Virginia; Colonel Goodman and Colonel Crittenden, of the Thirteenth Virginia, a number of other officers and some two hundred and fifty of the veterans of this grand old regiment were present. The speaking was admirable, the banquet was elegant, and the mingling together of old comrades, long separated, delightful. Many facts were brought out illustrative of the history of this regiment, which had a career worthy of its origin, composed as it was of original volunteers, who participated in the capture of Harpers Ferry, April the 18th, 1861, and having as its first field officers Colonel (afterwards Lieutenant-General) A. P. Hill, Lieutenant-Colonel (afterwards Major-General) James A. Walker, and Major (afterwards Brigadier-General) J. E. B. Terrill.

But we have mentioned this Reunion chiefly for the purpose of suggesting that our Confederate regiments generally should have such reunions, and that along with the social they should by all means arrange for detailed histories of the commands.

Book Notices.

Memoirs of General William T. Sherman. By Himself. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

Every intelligent Confederate soldier ought to read this book, and many of them have done so. In spite of the rough, often coarse, and sometimes profane style, it is certainly a very readable book. And as a personal narrative of the commander of one of the principal Federal armies it must always command a certain sort of attention.

But General Sherman's worse enemies could wish him no greater harm, so far as his fame is concerned, than that he should have written *just this book*. He so completely ignores the services of other officers, and takes to himself credit that belongs to his comrades, that his book has been most severely criticised by Federal officers, and General Boynton in his book ("Sherman's Historical Raid") has completely demolished him. General Grant has been reported as saying—on reading the book—"I really thought until I read Sherman's narrative that *I* had something to do with crushing the rebellion."

We do not propose to take sides in this family quarrel, and we are afraid that we could not be prevailed upon to interfere even though the fight should wax

so hot as to approximate the famous "Kilkenny" battle. If military reputations suffer, as the "Saviors of the Union" now turn their artillery on one another, all we have to say is, "It is none of our funeral."

But we shall claim the privilege of making hereafter a few choice extracts from the Memoirs, by way of showing the manner and spirit in which "the life of the nation" was saved. Meantime we would say that the book is gotten up by the publishers in fine style, and is well worth buying for the reasons indicated above.

Dixon's New America.

The publishers (J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.) have sent us (through West & Johnston, Richmond,) a copy of this well gotten up book. An intelligent Englishman gives us a sketchy, gossipy, very readable account of his tour in America, in which truth and fiction mingle lovingly together, and another illustration is furnished of the stubborn fact that one cannot thoroughly know a country by a hasty trip through it.

Life of Stonewall Jackson. By Miss Sarah Nicholas Randolph.

The publishers (Lippincott & Co.) have sent us, through Woodhouse & Parham, Richmond, a copy of this new life of the great Confederate chieftain.

Having read Miss Randolph's "Domestic Life of Jefferson"—one of the most charming books we ever read—we were prepared for an entertaining biography of Jackson, and our expectations have been more than realized. It is really a delightfully told story of the deeds of our hero, and a vivid portrayal of his private character, a book which we would be glad to see widely circulated.

And having said thus much in commendation of the book, it is no harm for us to add our regrets that Miss Randolph has followed others into several historic inaccuracies, and that she has allowed herself to be deceived into copying and endorsing the ridiculous story of General Revere, concerning Jackson's being an astrologer, &c., which General Early so completely exploded soon after its appearance.

But in spite of these defects the book admirably meets the design of its publication, and is a popular biography of Jackson, which deserves to find a wide circle of appreciative readers.

Medical and Surgical Memoirs: Containing Investigations on the Geographical Distribution, Causes, Nature, Relation and Treatment of Various Diseases, 1855-1876. By Joseph Jones, M. D., Professor of Chemistry and Clinical Medicine, Medical Department of Louisiana; Visiting Physician of Charity Hospital; Honorary Member of the Medical Society of Virginia; Formerly Surgeon in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States.

While not competent to judge personally of the merits of this book, our knowledge of the reputation of the distinguished author (the first Secretary of the Southern Historical Society by the way) made us confident that it would prove a work of rare value to the profession.

We have, however, submitted the book to an esteemed medical friend, and he pronounces it one of great ability, and an important contribution to medical literature.

The work will be found also of great historic value, as the Third Volume will embrace more especially the consideration of the diseases and accidents of armies, and such observations on the medical and surgical history of the Confederate army, as the author was able to make himself or to obtain from the Confederate medical officers.

The results of the investigations concerning the nature, relations and treatment of special diseases during the civil war of 1861-1865, will also be found under the appropriate divisions of each monograph, in three volumes, constituting the present series.

It may be obtained by addressing the author, Dr. Jos. Jones, box 1500, New Orleans.

Life of Chief Justice Chase. By J. W. Schuckers. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

As private secretary and intimate friend of Mr. Chase, Mr. Schuckers has brought to his task very full materials which he has woven into a deeply interesting story of the busy life of one of the ablest men this country has ever produced.

Always a leader in the party opposed to the rights of the South, Mr. Chase's record is one which we cannot, of course, endorse. But in his latter days he evinced towards our people a much more kindly spirit, and it is but just to say that his private character always stood fair, and that his correspondence, as presented in this book, evinces a purity of motive and a freedom from the bribery and corruption by which he was surrounded truly refreshing. The book is admirably gotten up, and very readable.

The Civil War in America. By John Wm. Draper, M. D., LL. D. New York: Harper & Brothers.

The publishers have kindly sent us (through West & Johnston, Richmond,) a copy of this work. We are thus enabled to place on our shelves three beautiful volumes, gotten up in the highest style of the book-maker's art, and "intended to be a history of the causes which led to the civil war, and of the events connected with it, considered not in a partisan but in a philosophical and impartial spirit." How far the learned author has succeeded in his avowed purpose is altogether another matter. Indeed it requires only a glance through these volumes to see that instead of writing in "a philosophical and impartial spirit," Dr. Draper is so bitter a "partisan," that it seems simply impossible for him to make accurate statements about even the most trivial matters.

We may take occasion to pay our respects to Dr. Draper more fully hereafter, and to show how his narration of the causes and events of the war is so colored by partisan prejudice as to render it utterly worthless as history.

Books Received.

From the publishers (Jos. H. Coates & Co., Philadelphia,) we have received the second volume of the translation of the History of the Civil War in America, by Comte de Paris.

From Geo. W. Harris, of Albemarle, *The Confederate Soldier*, by Rev. J. E. Edwards.

These books, and any others which may be sent us, shall have due notice.

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

Vol. I.

Richmond, Va., June, 1876.

No. 6.

Seacoast Defences of South Carolina and Georgia.

TO REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,

Secretary Southern Historical Society :

Dear Sir—General Long's sketch in the February number of the "*Southern Historical Papers*," under the pregnant title "SEACOAST DEFENCES OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA," seems to call for some notice at my hands as Chief of Staff, for nearly two years, of the forces that successfully held those defences against all assailants by sea or land, during that period. The whole drift or reach of that sketch is so clearly indicated in the concluding paragraphs that I shall here reproduce them.

"General Lee received an order about the middle of March (1862), assigning him to duty in Richmond, in obedience to which he soon after repaired to that place. The works that he had so skillfully planned were now near completion. In three months he had established a line of defence from Winyan bay on the northeast coast of South Carolina, to the mouth of Saint Mary's river in Georgia, a distance of more than two hundred miles. This line not only served for a present defence, but offered an *impenetrable barrier to the combined Federal forces operating on the coast, until they were carried by General Sherman in his unopposed march through Georgia and South Carolina, near the close of the war.*

"That the importance of these works may be properly understood, it will be necessary to know what they accomplished. In the first place, they protected the most important agricultural section of the Confederacy from the incursions of the enemy, and covered the most important line of communication between the Mississippi and the Potomac.* Besides these material advantages, it produced great moral effect in giving the inhabitants of the Southern States a feeling of security and confidence.

*General Long omits from consideration the particularly great value of Charleston to the Confederate States as a port for the entry of military supplies from abroad, and of exportation of cotton.

"We perceive in this campaign of General Lee in Georgia and South Carolina results achieved by a single genius equal to those which could have been accomplished by an incalculable force."

General Long, as he says, was on the staff of General Lee during the time in question, but was not in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, subsequently, when it was the theatre of great combined naval and land hostile operations. This entire want of personal knowledge of the actual events of that defence, together with engrossing occupations elsewhere, may supply the explanation why he could fall into the wholly erroneous, and I must add, wrongful conclusions which I have cited, that the historical results of the defence of the coast of South Carolina and Georgia were but consequences of premises which he had witnessed and noted. But to accept his conclusions were to blot out of history nearly two years of skillful and courageous achievements, for the right measurement of which must be taken into consideration not only the vast resources of every description of our adversary, and the consummate ability, as well as untiring determination, with which those resources were hostilely handled, but the constant dearth of defensive resources in which that widely extended and most important department was left, and which made its successful defence, for so long a period, in the strictest sense of the words, the creation and work of the engineer and soldier who commanded the department from October, 1862, to May, 1864—General Beauregard.

The story of that brilliant defence I do not propose to relate, but I must assure General Long and his readers, of what can be readily substantiated, that the works and seacoast defences to which he has assigned so all-embracing an importance, absolutely entered, in no material degree, into the defence of South Carolina and Georgia after October, 1862.

That what General Lee did was in character with the ability of that distinguished man, I do not question for an instant; nor may I doubt that he made all proper dispositions to meet and baffle the comparatively small Federal naval and military forces present, in menace, on the coast when he commanded in that quarter. But the truth of history obliges me to state that the defensive resources which Beauregard (relieving Pemberton) found in the department when he entered upon command, instead of being that "impene-trable barrier" which General Long supposes—opposed to the mighty naval forces of Dupont and Dahlgren, acting in co-opera-

tion with the large army commanded by such an engineer as Gillmore, they would have proved almost as slight an obstacle as if they had been built of lath and plaster, and garnished with "culverins."

Pemberton, as I have always understood, had materially departed from General Lee's plan of defensive works for the department. Be that so or not, the system which Beauregard found established upon the approaches to Charleston and Savannah, he radically changed with all possible energy. One material vice of the system was an extension of the lines beyond all possibility of having a force disposable at all adequate to their defence. These lines consequently were reduced and arranged upon a wholly different plan, both at Charleston and Savannah. And so comprehensive were these changes, that had General Long chanced to visit those two places and the intermediate lines about the first day of July, 1863, he would have been sorely puzzled to point out in all the results of defensive engineering skill, which must have met and pleased his eyes in the department, any trace of what he had left there something more than one year before.

For example, the Fort Sumter and works on Sullivan's Island, which fought and defeated the fleet of Admiral Dupont on the 6th of April, 1863, were, in nothing else scarcely than the *terrain* on which they stood, the same works that Beauregard had found constructed. As arranged by him, on that day they encountered a naval onset more formidable, from the character of the vessels engaged and greatness of calibre of the armaments, than any other fortifications have ever been subjected to; and in less than forty minutes five of the nine iron-armored vessels sent against them were placed *hors de combat*. The Battery Wagner, which, on the 18th of July and for fifty days thereafter, so successfully endured a combined naval and land attack of the magnitude that no other single work, of any size or armament, ever had brought to bear upon it, was, in no respect save the *site*, the same work which General Pemberton had left there. As Beauregard prepared it and the supporting batteries, it not only bore the brunt successfully, on the 18th of July, 1863, for eight hours without an instant of cessation, of the Iron Sides and of five or six monitors with their 11 and 15-inch guns and of five unarmored vessels, together with several land batteries, but remained in condition to inflict one of the bloodiest defeats known in history upon the powerful column that General Gillmore sent to storm it. Nor is this all: subjected to an incessant,

daily bombardment from Dahlgren's fleet and Gillmore's breaching batteries and mortars for fifty days, or until the Federal troops had dug their way up to the *glacis* and planted their flag on the very verge of the counter scarps of that work, such was the system that the defence was crowned by an evacuation of Battery Wagner and of Morris' Island, which has no parallel in ancient or modern warfare for its skill. Moreover, the works on James' Island, which enabled Beauregard's small force on the 16th of July, 1863, to defeat so signally the strong column under General Terry, were parts of a wholly different system and of other description than those in existence upon the same island when the battle of Secessionville was fought on the 16th of June, 1862.

A like radical difference characterized the arrangements made for the defence of John's Island, and aided General Wise to inflict a handsome defeat upon the strong Federal column which was pushed out by that way in February, 1864, to strike and break Beauregard's communications with Savannah, and occupy his attention pending the descent of General Seymour's powerful military and political expedition into Florida; and when that skillfully planned expedition was brought to signal disaster at Olustee, on the 20th February, 1864, it was Colquit's brigade, whose opportune appearance on the field on John's Island had been so effective, which, by its precisely timed arrival, contributed even more decisively to the victory over Seymour.

It was under similarly changed or modified dispositions of the defensive resources (*material* and *personnel*) of the department, that Brannan's column of more than 4,000 infantry, with two sections of field artillery and a naval detachment with three boat howitzers, was badly defeated at Pocotaligo in October, 1862, by less than five hundred men and twelve pieces of field artillery. The same may be said of the works at Fort McAllister, when it beat the iron-clad Federal fleet so handsomely, and indeed of the whole defensive system around Savannah.

General Long observes that the Coosawhatchie was the centre of the defensive system of that department as planned by General Lee, who established his headquarters there. Geographically Coosawhatchie may have been the centre, but not in the military sense, which assuredly was that so occupied by Beauregard—the city of Charleston. Nevertheless, the matchless defence of that port, the most salient feature of Confederate operations on that theatre of

war in point of skill and the courage of the troops, was fully equalled at nearly every point in the department assailed.

There was to be defended from serious penetration a coast line of 350 to 400 miles, with such harbors as Bull's and Winyan bays, mouth of Stono river; Port Royal, mouth of Savannah river, and Brunswick—all in possession of the enemy, whose armed fleets and transports swarmed all the waters, while an army generally 20,000 strong could, at any time, with abundant means of water transportation at command, be thrown upon any point left vulnerable, from Georgetown, in South Carolina, to Jacksonville, Florida, with all the material advantage given by the possession of the interior lines in military operations, superadded to freedom from observation, which, with the small force generally at his disposition, made it difficult for General Beauregard to secure the vital points of the long Confederate lines from sudden mortal attack. The successful defence, therefore, of that large department under such circumstances, is one of the most brilliant achievements in war, and must make it an admirable study of the art of defensive war reduced to perfect practice in all its ramifications and details, including a creative military administration.

General Lee's own reputation, which rests solidly upon his own resplendent deeds as commander of the superlative Army of Northern Virginia, cannot possibly be enhanced one particle by the attribution of things that do not belong to him. Were he alive, he would be the first to disclaim such credit for the defence of the seacoast of South Carolina and Georgia as is given by the article of General Long, I doubt not unconscious of the injustice thus done to General Beauregard.

THOMAS JORDAN.

New York, May 1st, 1876.

Strength of General Lee's Army in the Seven Days Battles Around Richmond.

[For obvious reasons, our Confederate generals did not publish during the war detailed statements of the strength of their armies.

The Federal authorities and Federal writers have almost invariably exaggerated our strength, our own people have been in profound ignorance of our real numbers, and there has been among some of our most distinguished leaders honest differences of opinion as to our strength at different periods.

The following discussion, as to General Lee's numbers during the seven days battles, has excited great attention, not only on account of the interest in the questions involved, but also because of the standing of the distinguished soldiers who were parties to it. We have been several times urged, by those whose opinions are entitled to weight, to give the discussion a place in our Papers, in order that it may be preserved. We do so without note or comment, leaving our readers to draw their own conclusions.]

Extract from an Address of Colonel Charles Marshall, Private Secretary and A. D. C. to General R. E. Lee, before the Virginia Division of the Army of Northern Virginia.

It is not fourteen years since our war began, and yet, who on either side of those who took part in it is bold enough to say that he knows the exact truth, and the whole truth, with reference to any of the great battles in which the armies of the North and South met each other?

Was not Mr. Sumner censured by the Legislature of Massachusetts because, prompted in part at least, let us hope, by the love of truth, he renewed in the Senate of the United States after the war a resolution which in substance he had previously brought forward?

*Resolved, That * * * * it is inexpedient that the names of victories obtained over our own fellow-citizens should be placed on the regimental colors of the United States."*

This resolution would erase from the colors of the United States army such names as those of Cold Harbor, Manassas, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, which you have seen inscribed upon captured flags. Now we believe that *we* won those fights, and we wonder why a resolution of Congress should be necessary to blot them from the list of Union victories recorded on the standards of its armies.

We think that we know something about the second battle at Manassas, and yet is not General Fitz John Porter, who fought us so stubbornly at the first battle of Cold Harbor, now in disgrace; because it was proved to the satisfaction of a Federal court-martial that half the Confederate army was not where we all *know it was* on the morning of August 29th, 1862? And on our side, have we not read General Joseph E. Johnston's "Contribution of materials for the use of the future historian of the war between the States," and has any one risen from the perusal of that interesting book, without the conviction that its distinguished author is mistaken as to some of his statements, or that all contemporaneous history is in error?

I will venture to present only two of the perplexities in which "the future historian of the war between the States" will find himself involved when he comes to compare the "material" contributed

by General Johnston with the other "material" contributed by official records and documents, which General Johnston seems not to have seen, or not to have consulted:

General Johnston says—on p. 145 of his "Narrative"—"The authors of Alfriend's life of Jefferson Davis, and some other biographies, represent, to my disparagement, that the army with which General Lee fought in the 'Seven Days' was only that which I had commanded. It is very far from the truth. General Lee did not attack the enemy until the 26th of June, because he was employed from the 1st until then in forming a great army, by bringing to that which I had commanded, *fifteen thousand men from North Carolina, under Major-General Holmes; twenty-two thousand men from South Carolina and Georgia, and above sixteen thousand men from the 'Valley,' in the divisions of Jackson and Ewell*, which the victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic had rendered disposable."

General Johnston states in a note the sources of his information.

He says "General Holmes told me, in General Lee's presence, just before the fight began on the 31st (of May), that he had that force (15,000 men) ready to join me when the President should give the order." He then refers to other evidence, which he says is in his possession, going to show that the reinforcements brought by General Holmes to General Lee, and which took part in the "Seven Days" battles, amounted to 15,000 men.

As to the 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia, General Johnston says:

"General Ripley gave in this number. He brought the first brigade, five thousand men. General Lawton told me that his was six thousand; General Drayton that his was seven thousand. There was another brigade, of which I do not know the strength."

Now the "future historian" ought not lightly to doubt the accuracy of any statement of General Johnston, and upon that high authority he would record that before the battles of the "Seven Days," General Lee received *from three* of the sources mentioned by General Johnston, reinforcements to the number of thirty-seven thousand men, who took part in those engagements which resulted in dislodging General McClellan from his position on the Chickahominy.

And yet how hard the "future historian" will be put to it to reconcile "Johnston's narrative" with the official reports made at the time. In the first volume of the official reports of the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia, published by authority of the Confederate Congress, at page 151, will be found General Holmes' statement of the number of men brought by him to take part in the battles around Richmond during the "Seven Days."

General Holmes there says: That upon crossing the James river he was joined on the 30th June by General Wise with two regiments of seven hundred and fifty-two bayonets and two batteries of artillery, and adds: "The effective force under my orders thus amounted to *six thousand infantry and six batteries of artillery*," being

less by nine thousand infantry than General Johnston's "narrative" assigns to General Holmes. General Johnston says that Ripley's brigade was five thousand strong, and that General Ripley so informed him.

There may have been that number of men borne upon the rolls of the brigade, but we have General Ripley's official report of the number of troops under his command that actually took part in the battles around Richmond.

At page 234, volume 1 of the official report already referred to, General Ripley says:

"The aggregate force which entered into the series of engagements on the 26th of June was *twenty-three hundred and sixty-six*, including pioneers and the ambulance corps."

The "Narrative" puts the force under General Lawton at *six thousand men*, but before the "historian of the war" ventures to make use of this contribution to his materials, he will do well to look at the official reports, at page 270 of the first volume, where he will find that General Lawton gives the force which he carried into the battle of Cold Harbor, on the 27th June, 1862, as *thirty-five hundred men*.

I have not been able to find General Drayton's report of the part taken by his command in the battles around Richmond—if he did take part in them—and therefore cannot compare the number assigned to General Drayton in those engagements by General Johnston's "narrative" with any official documents, but if the reports of Holmes, Lawton and Ripley be correct, they brought less than 11,866 men to participate in those battles, instead of 26,000 as stated by General Johnston.

Ripley and Lawton, according to their reports, had 5,866 men in the "Seven Days" battles, instead of 11,000 according to Johnston's narrative.

It follows, therefore, that Drayton's brigade, and the other, whose strength General Johnston says he does not know, must have made up the rest of the twenty-two thousand men who we are informed came to General Lee from South Carolina and Georgia to aid in driving McClellan from the Chickahominy—that is, those two brigades, Drayton's and the unknown, must have numbered about sixteen thousand men.

General Johnston says that General Drayton told him his brigade was seven thousand strong, so that the unknown brigade must have numbered nine thousand to make up the twenty-two thousand from South Carolina and Georgia.

It may have been so. There may have been a brigade in General Lee's army nine thousand strong, but in speaking about it before you, I think it safer to refer to it as the "unknown brigade." And in this connection let me suggest to the future historian of the war, that before he writes Drayton's brigade down as contributing seven thousand men to the army around Richmond in the "Seven Days" battles, it will be well for him to inquire whether that brigade

joined the army at all until after McClellan had been driven from the Chickahominy, and the army had marched northwards upon a new campaign.

He will find no trace of this brigade in the reports of the Seven Days battle, although they are so much in detail as to include the reports of captains of companies.

A Confederate brigade, seven thousand strong, would probably have taken some part worth reporting, and its name ought to appear in the official account.

Drayton's command will be found mentioned in the official reports of subsequent operations of the army at Manassas and in Maryland.

As to the "unknown brigade," that I think will turn out to be a small command under General Evans, of South Carolina, who did not join the army until after it moved from Richmond.*

**Note.*—It is proper to remark that the army around Richmond received a larger reinforcement from North Carolina than the number given in General Holmes' official report.

General Holmes had under his command in North Carolina four brigades, which afterwards came to Virginia, and which are no doubt the troops referred to by General Johnston as comprising the 15,000 men that joined General Lee after the battle of Seven Pines.

These brigades were commanded by General Branch, General Ransom and General J. G. Walker, and a fourth known as the Third North Carolina brigade was commanded during its service at Richmond by Colonel Junius Daniel.

Of these, Branch's brigade joined the army at Richmond before the battle of Seven Pines. It was engaged with the enemy near Hanover Junction on the 26th May, and afterwards formed part of A. P. Hill's division. General Ransom's brigade consisted of six regiments, one of which, the Forty-eight North Carolina, was transferred to Walker's brigade. Ransom's five regiments numbered about 3,000, though his effective force was somewhat less. It was attached to Huger's division on the 25th June, and is counted in that division.

Walker's brigade, as reported by Colonel Manning, who succeeded General Walker after the latter was disabled on the 1st July, was about four thousand strong, and the third brigade under Colonel Daniel, was about 1,700, according to the latter officer. (See Reports of Army of Northern Virginia, volume 1, p. 322 and 325). These last two commands composed the force mentioned by General Holmes in his report.

General Johnston's statement that fifteen thousand men came from North Carolina, under General Holmes, is therefore calculated to give an erroneous idea of the actual increase of the army under General Lee between the battle of Seven Pines and the battles around Richmond. Branch's brigade should not be included in the troops that came from North Carolina, under Holmes, because that brigade was with the army before General Johnston was wounded, and for the further reason that as it afterwards formed part of A. P. Hill's division, it would be counted twice if to be treated also as part of the troops brought by General Holmes. A similar error would be likely to occur with reference to Ransom's brigade, which is counted as part of Huger's division, and should be excluded from the troops under Holmes.

In fact I have seen an estimate of General Lee's forces in the Seven Days battles, based upon the statement of General Johnston, above referred to, in which General Holmes' command is put down as 15,000 strong, while Ransom's and Branch's brigades are at the same time counted as part of the divisions of Huger and A. P. Hill, thus doubling the strength of those brigades.

It should also be observed in connection with the statement of General Johnston as to the number of troops that came from South Carolina and Georgia, that there is danger of a like error. Among those troops was Lawton's brigade. Now Lawton did not come directly to Richmond from the South.

When he reached Burkeville, on his way to Richmond, General Lee was about to cover the contemplated movement against General McClellan, by creating the impression that Jackson was to be reinforced, so as to resume the offensive in the Valley. For this purpose, Lawton was sent from Burkeville, by way of Lynchburg, to join Jackson near Staunton, and Whiting's division, of two brigades, was detached from the army before Richmond. Both Lawton and Whiting joined Jackson, and formed part of the command with which he came to Richmond and engaged in the Seven Days battle. (See Jackson's Report, volume 1, p. 129, Reports of Army of Northern Virginia, where it will be seen that Lawton was attached to Jackson's division.) This fact should be borne in mind in estimating the strength of General Lee's army, because General Johnston's narrative counts the force under Jackson as composing part of the reinforcements received by General Lee. (See narrative, p. 146.) Lawton must be counted as part of the 22,000, or as part of Jackson's command. Whiting should not be counted among the reinforcements, because he belonged to the army under General Johnston.

GENERAL JOHNSTON'S REPLY TO COLONEL MARSHALL.

SAVANNAH, December 31, 1874

*To the Virginia Division of the Association
of the Army of Northern Virginia:*

In the oration delivered by Colonel Marshall at your fourth annual meeting, I am accused of assailing the fame of General Lee in three passages of a book published by me last spring. As a Virginian by birth, and especially as a Southern soldier who once served in the Army of Northern Virginia, I am not disposed to leave uncontradicted such an accusation, made to such an audience. Press of business and sickness made me unable to defend myself until now.

* * * * *

[General Johnston's reply to two other points made by Colonel Marshall is omitted as not bearing on the discussion concerning General Lee's numbers.]

The third passage assailed by Colonel Marshall is, with the two notes included by him, on pages 145-6—viz:

"General Lee did not attack the enemy until the 26th of June, because he was employed from the first till then in forming a great army by bringing to that which I had commanded *15,000 men from North Carolina, under General Holmes; †22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia, and above 16,000 from the 'Valley,' in the divisions of Jackson and Ewell, which the victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic had rendered disposable."

I made these statements from confidence in General Lee's military wisdom, and on the testimony of the officers enumerated above. Colonel Marshall impugns such authority.

I asserted, and now maintain, that General Lee postponed his attack until June 26th, to strengthen his army to his utmost before doing so, and acted like a wise general in bringing to it the troops enumerated. Colonel Marshall, on the contrary, gives the impression that he was idle almost four weeks, while McClellan was increasing his numbers and fortifying his positions. I assert that General Lee employed the twenty-six days in question like a general, by greatly reducing the enemy's numerical superiority. Colonel Marshall's effort to discredit my statements indicate that General Lee had little object in the delay, or accomplished very little by it.

Colonel Marshall says, on the evidence of subsequent returns,

* General Holmes told me in General Lee's presence, just before the fight began on the 31st, that he had that force ready to join me when the President should give the order. I have also the written testimony of Colonel Archer Anderson, then on General Holmes' staff, that he brought that number into General Lee's army.

† General Ripley gave me this number. He brought the first brigade—5,000 men. General Lawton told me that his was 6,000; General Drayton that his was 7,000. There was another brigade, of which I do not know the strength.

that the troops of Holmes, Ripley and Lawton, amounted to but 11,866 men. This is not evidence to be put against the statements of those officers. And, besides, it is not to be supposed that General Lee permitted two such unwieldy bodies to remain so in an army in which the average strength of brigades did not much exceed 2,500. It is much more probable that their numbers were reduced by transfers to the weaker brigades than that their commanders were grossly ignorant of them. Of the 11,866 men estimated by Colonel Marshall, General Ripley's 2,300, and 3,000 of General Holmes', reached Richmond before General Lee commanded. According to this our zealous and vigorous leader kept his army inactive twenty-six days waiting for 6,500 men, while his enemy was receiving 19,000—(see McClellan's return of June 20th, volume 1, page 337, Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War)—Dix's and McCall's divisions—and covering his front south of the Chickahominy with entrenchments. According to Colonel Marshall's representation the delay to attack was greatly to our disadvantage by enabling McClellan to increase the odds in his favor. According to the obnoxious passage in my narrative, General Lee made that delay advantageous to us by greatly reducing the Federal superiority of numbers, and thus increasing our chances of success.

I claim, then, that it is your orator, not I, who detracts from the just fame of the great Virginian.

Your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

REPLY OF GENERAL J. A. EARLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON.

RICHMOND, February 8, 1875.

Editors of the Dispatch :

Having received from General Johnston a copy of his reply to Colonel Marshall's address, with the request that it be filed along with the address in the archives of the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, I took occasion to write him a communication in regard to the matters in dispute between himself and Colonel Marshall. As the subject is one of much historic importance, and of very great interest to the survivors of the Army of Northern Virginia at least, I send you a copy of my communication to General Johnston, with the request that you publish it in your paper. In a letter to myself, which is published by the Rev. J. William Jones in his recent book, General Lee said: "It will be difficult to get the world to understand the odds against which we fought." And this has proved to be the case. In a late criticism by the London *Times* of the biography of General Lee by Mr. Childe, of Paris, that paper, while speaking very favorably of the biography in other respects, takes occasion to discard as utterly incredible the statement of the numbers of the opposing armies as given by Mr. Childe; and yet I am informed—for I have not

seen his book—that if he errs in that respect it is in overestimating General Lee's numbers. Perhaps it is very natural that officers of the United States army should disbelieve that they were so long baffled by such small numbers as were really opposed to them, and we know that the Government at Washington has invariably refused all access by Confederate officers to the Confederate records and returns on file in the archive office; but there is a very simple process, and that is by the rule of three, by which we can form a correct estimate of the relative strength of the two armies.

The entire white population of all the States that composed the Confederacy, even nominally, was a little more than 7,000,000, but the actual white population upon which the Confederate Government had to depend to fill the ranks of its armies was under 5,000,000, while the Washington Government had a white population of more than 20,000,000 to draw its soldiers from, besides unlimited facilities for recruiting in foreign countries. I take no account of the colored troops, for, notwithstanding we are told they "fought bravely," and though I decidedly prefer the negro to the carpet-bagger or scalawag, "socially, morally, and politically," and "without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude," I do not believe that he "saved the Union."

If, with the means in the power of the two Governments respectively, the Confederate Government was able to raise, arm, equip, and put into the field armies bearing a greater proportion to the population upon which it was dependent than that of the armies of the United States Government to its population, it shows that the former Government displayed much the superior energy and efficiency of the two.

If the army with which General Lee made the attack on McClellan in 1862 was what General Johnston's estimates would make it, then I concede that he and his subordinate commanders were responsible for the failure of our struggle; and I think any survivor of the Army of Northern Virginia would coincide with me. But I believe that the Confederate Government did its duty in our struggle as well as was possible in the condition of the country; and I do know that General Lee did all for the success of our cause that it was possible for mortal man to do with the means at his command. I know that the odds against him were always very large—much larger than many of our own people have believed.

I now challenge the most critical examination of the estimate I have given of the strength of the army which drove McClellan from the siege of Richmond in 1862; and in regard to the figures furnished by General Johnston on the authority of the officers named by him, I am willing to abide the result of a personal appeal to the survivors of them, having already the assurance of one of them that General Johnston misapprehended him, and that his official report (to which I have referred) is right, and shows the effective strength he brought to Virginia.

Disclaiming all purpose of imputing to General Johnston any

unworthy motive in promulgating his estimate of General Lee's strength, and intending in what I have written only to vindicate the truth of history,

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. A. EARLY.

RICHMOND, VA., February 4, 1875.

General—Colonel Marshall's address was delivered before the Virginia Division of the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, of which General Fitz. Lee was then and General Pickett is now president. I am president of the association at large, which has never met since its organization, but there is a provision in the constitution for divisions in each one of the States that had troops in the Army of Northern Virginia. Your reply to Col. Marshall has been filed with his address among the archives of the Southern Historical Society, of which I am president.

* * * * *

You have certainly been led into error in your estimates of General Lee's strength, and of the number of troops brought to the army after Seven Pines. You have either misapprehended the information given you by the officers you mention, or they were themselves greatly mistaken, as I think I can demonstrate to you. In the first place, I must say that we have General Longstreet's official report of the Battle of Seven Pines, which has been furnished to the Southern Historical Society by General E. P. Alexander, who undertook to write the history of Longstreet's brigade, division and corps, at his instance. It is in two forms—first, in his headquarter's book, in which all his reports were copied, and then in a separate copy made from the book; and the following is the statement of the losses sustained by the wing of the army he commanded, as given at the close of the report:

LIST OF KILLED, WOUNDED AND MISSING.

	<i>Officers.</i>	<i>Enlisted Men.</i>	<i>Aggregate.</i>
Killed.....	61	755	816
Wounded.....	209	3,530	3,729
Missing.....	3	293	296
	<hr/> 273	<hr/> 4,578	<hr/> 4,851

Respectfully submitted,

(Signed)

J. LONGSTREET,
Major-General Commanding.

Headquarters Right Wing, June 11, 1862.

To Major Thomas G. Rhett, A. A. General.

You will perceive that he makes the loss in the portion of the troops commanded by him in the battle 1,851 more than you give it in your book. You give the loss in Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions at 3,000; yet General Hill, in his report, which we also have, says: "Appended is a list of killed and wounded. From this it appears that of less than 9,000 taken into action nearly 3,000 were struck down." Take Longstreet's statement of his loss and your statement of G. W. Smith's loss (1,223) and your total

loss appears to have been at least 6,074. It appears from the reports of Pickett and Wilcox, which we also have, that a portion of this loss was sustained on the second day. It also appears from Hill's and Pickett's reports that Mahone and Armistead's brigades, of Huger's division, were seriously engaged on the second day, but whether Longstreet includes Huger's loss in his statement does not clearly appear.

In your book you state that your army at Seven Pines was composed of 27 brigades, and they were as follows: 6 in Longstreet's division, 6 in A. P. Hill's division, 4 in D. H. Hill's division, 6 in Magruder's command (composed of 3 divisions of 2 brigades each), 3 in Huger's division, and 2 in Whiting's division—in all, 27. General Lee had 39 brigades of infantry under his command in the battles around Richmond—to wit: 6 in Longstreet's division, 6 in A. P. Hill's division, 5 in D. H. Hill's division, including Ripley's brigade; 6 in Magruder's command, 4 in Huger's division, including Ransom's brigade from Holmes' command; 3 in Holmes' division, including Wise's small brigade, and 9 under Jackson, including his own division of 3 brigades, Ewell's of 3 brigades, Whiting's 2 brigades, and Lawton's brigade—the twelve brigades added after Seven Pines being Ripley's, Lawton's, Ransom's, J. G. Walker's, Daniel's, Wise's (2 regiments), and the 6 brigades of Jackson and Ewell—making the twelve. All of this appears from the official reports contained in the first volume of the Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia for 1862. Ripley's was the first brigade that arrived, and in his report (page 234) he says: "The aggregate force which entered into the series of engagements on the 26th of June was twenty-three hundred and sixty-six, including pioneers and the ambulance corps." But you suggest that the large brigades may have been divided, and a portion of them distributed in other brigades. Ripley says: "In conclusion, I beg to remark that the troops of this brigade, arriving at Richmond just after the Battle of Seven Pines, were ordered immediately to the front, and performed picket and out-post duty, with slight intermission, until the march towards Mechanicsville. Two of the regiments—the First and Third North Carolina—had been some time in service, but not in action. The Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth Georgia were new troops, and it is perhaps to be regretted, as the whole were engaged for the first time, that some further opportunity could not have been afforded for perfecting their organization and discipline as a brigade."

The fair inference from this statement is, that the four regiments mentioned constituted the whole of his brigade when he brought it to Richmond, and his report shows that the whole of them were still in the brigade. The next brigades that came were Holmes' three—to wit: Ransom's, J. G. Walker's and Daniel's. Ransom says, on page 365: "On the 24th ultimo the brigade left Petersburg for Richmond, with orders to report to General Lee. About 10 o'clock at night I reached Richmond, with the Twenty-fifth

North Carolina volunteers (Colonel Rutledge), the Twenty-fourth, Thirty-fifth and Forty-ninth having preceded, the Twenty-sixth and Forty-eighth being left to follow." This, then, was his whole brigade, and on page 368 he repeats the enumeration of his regiments, stating that the Forty-eighth North Carolina was absent on duty with the brigade of Walker. He says: "The effective force present was about three thousand." He had in some previous skirmishes lost about 130 men in killed and wounded. Taking the average for the strength of the absent regiment, and we make the whole force brought by him about 3,700. On page 325 Colonel Manning, commanding Walker's brigade, says: "The brigade, composed of the Third Arkansas, Thirtieth Virginia, Fifty-seventh Virginia, Twenty-seventh North Carolina and Fifty-sixth North Carolina regiments, and the Second Georgia battalion, Captains French's and Branch's light batteries, and Captain Goodwin's cavalry company—in all amounting to about four thousand men and officers—crossed the pontoon bridge and reached General Huger about 12 o'clock M. on Friday the 27th of June." The Fifty-seventh Virginia was subsequently transferred to Armistead's brigade, and in its place was put the Forty-eighth North Carolina. On page 151, Holmes says the brigade returned to him on the 29th of June, with 3,600 effective men and two batteries. On page 322 Daniel says his brigade, composed of the Forty-fifth, Forty-third and Fiftieth North Carolina regiments, two batteries of artillery and a battalion of cavalry, "in all about seventeen hundred effective men," left Drury's Bluff on the 29th of June and crossed the river at the pontoon bridges.

Holmes says the infantry of Daniel's brigade was 1,570 strong. On page 319 Wise put his infantry at 814 and his artillery at 147—aggregate, 961. This brigade properly belonged or had belonged to Huger's division, and did not constitute a part of the troops brought by Holmes to the army. Holmes says the battalion of cavalry numbered 130 men; and on page 470 is a return by Colonel Deshler, showing in the four batteries with Walker's and Daniel's brigades, an effective force of 296. Taking the foregoing figures—to wit: 3,700 infantry in Ransom's brigade, 3,600 in Walker's, 1,570 in Daniel's, 961 infantry and artillery in Wise's, 130 cavalry and 296 artillerymen, and we have 10,257 as the whole force added to the army from Holmes' command, including Wise's, and without the latter, 9,296. This latter number constituted the whole force brought by Holmes from his department after Seven Pines, even if the cavalry and artillery belonged to it. On page 270, in speaking of the charge of his brigade, the first it had been in, Lawton says: "A continuous line of thirty-five hundred men moving forward in perfect order into the wood, and at once opening fire along its entire length (chiefly armed with Enfield rifles), made a decided impression, and promptly marked the preponderance of musketry sound on our side, as was observed by other commanders on the field." Lawton's brigade was composed of six

regiments, and its organization was never changed. It may have had near six thousand men on paper, but the above is the effective strength with which it came to Virginia. By inquiring of him you will find that I am correct. From the Battle of Sharpsburg it was in the division commanded by me, and it never after that time reached 3,000 men. Drayton's brigade did not come to Virginia until after the battles around Richmond. It was composed of the Fifteenth South Carolina and the Fiftieth and Fifty-first Georgia regiments and Third South Carolina battalion. A part, if not all of it, was engaged in the fight at Secessionville, South Carolina, on the 16th of June, 1862. Its first engagement in Virginia was on the Rappahannock, the 25th of August, 1862. After Sharpsburg it was so small that it was distributed among some other brigades in Longstreet's corps. In a roster of Longstreet's corps, published in the *Banner of the South*, by General Alexander, the history of the regiments composing Drayton's brigade is given. Coming to Virginia after the Seven Days Battles it, of course, had no effect in increasing General Lee's numbers at these battles. There is some strange mistake on your part, or that of General Drayton, about the brigade. If it had 7,000 men in it when it came here, then the three regiments and the battalion composing it must have averaged 1,750 men each. It lost only 93 men at Second Manassas, and 541 at South Mountain and Sharpsburg—in all, 634. Yet it was in a division of six brigades, commanded by D. R. Jones at Sharpsburg, and in his report (page 219, 2d volume, Reports,) he says that in his six brigades there were only 2,430 men on the morning of the 17th of September, 1862. Evans' brigade arrived from South Carolina in July, 1862, and its strength was 2,200. This must have been the brigade which you could not name, as no others than those mentioned came from the South during that summer. There was a new brigade formed after the battles out of some Louisiana regiments, which before were in other brigades. General Lee had forty brigades of infantry at Sharpsburg, Daniel's having returned to North Carolina, Wise's being left near Richmond, and Drayton's, Evans' and the new Louisiana brigade making up the forty. From the foregoing statement it will appear, then, that the troops received by General Lee from the South after Seven Pines, and before the Seven Days Battles, consisted of those brought by Holmes (9,296), Ripley's brigade (2,366), and Lawton's (3,500)—in all 15,162, instead of the 37,000 you make out by your estimate. I must add that five companies of the First North Carolina cavalry, which had previously been with the army, returned from North Carolina after the commencement of the battles.

It remains now to inquire into the strength of the divisions of Jackson and Ewell, which came from the Valley, and which you put at 16,000. There were three brigades in each division—in Jackson's, the Stonewall (Winder's), Taliaferro's, and J. R. Jones's; and in Ewell's, Elzey's, Trimble's, and Taylor's (Louisiana). These brigades had gone through a very active and harassing campaign

in the Valley, Jackson's having fought at Kernstown, McDowell, Middletown, Winchester, and Port Republic, and Ewell's having fought at Front Royal, Middletown, Winchester, Cross Keys, and Port Republic; and all of them having done very rapid and extensive marching. In Jackson's three brigades there were 11 regiments and a battalion, and in Ewell's, including the Maryland regiment, there were 16 regiments and a battalion, equivalent in all to 28 regiments. Your estimate would give an average of more than 2,600 to each brigade, and of about 570 to each regiment. Can you think it possible that those brigades and regiments could have numbered that many in the field after the service they had gone through? Longstreet had six brigades in division, and they had seen nothing like as hard service as Jackson's and Ewell's; yet the report of the strength of his six brigades, including a battery of artillery with each, and the Washington Artillery, as furnished by General Alexander, shows an effective force of only 9,051 on the 26th of June, 1862. Let us see how the facts stand on the reports: Winder, in command of the Stonewall brigade, states, in his report of Port Republic, that "the total strength of the brigade was one thousand three hundred and thirty-four, rank and file." There were five regiments in that brigade, and only six and a battalion in the other two brigades of the division. The loss in the brigade was 199 at Port Republic, leaving only 1,135 in it. That was the largest brigade in Jackson's division, and, indeed, the other two were so small that they were not carried into action around Richmond, though present with the division. In Ewell's division, Elzey's brigade numbered seven regiments. It had lost 243 before Malvern Hill, and when I took command of it on the 1st of July, near Malvern Hill, there were only 1,050 officers and men in it, as reported to me by regimental commanders. One regiment (the Forty-fourth Virginia) had just 44 men present—the precise number of the regiment. Trimble's and Taylor's brigades were smaller than Elzey's, having four regiments each and an extra battalion in Taylor's; though there is a strange inconsistency in General Trimble's reports, which, doubtless, is the result of an error in copying or printing. In his report of Cross Keys, page 80, volume I., he says: "My three regiments [Fifteenth Alabama, Sixteenth Mississippi, and Twenty-first Georgia], counting 1,348 men and officers, repulsed the brigade of Blenker three times." His other regiment (the Twenty-first North Carolina) was not engaged, and his loss was 54. In his report of Cold Harbor, page 311, he says: "The Fifteenth Alabama and Twenty-first Georgia, numbering 1,315 men, stood under a destructive fire for an hour or more," &c.—and: "The Sixteenth Mississippi and Twenty-first North Carolina, numbering one thousand and two hundred and forty-four men, passed under as hot a fire an equal distance in fifteen minutes," &c. If the statements in both reports be true, then, without taking into consideration the loss at Port Republic, there could only have been thirty-five men and officers in the Sixteenth Mississippi, and

there must have been one thousand two hundred and nine in the Twenty-first North Carolina, which would be preposterous. It is evidently a mistake. The latter statement would give two thousand five hundred and fifty-nine in his brigade, and yet when the Sixteenth Mississippi (only thirty-five?) was subsequently taken from him, one of my regiments was taken to supply its place, and make his brigade something like equal to the others, though the largest number I had been able to get together in my brigade was about one thousand eight hundred. The Second Virginia cavalry came with Jackson, and the fact is that the whole command that came from the Valley, including the artillery, the regiment of cavalry, and the Maryland regiment and a battery, then known as the "Maryland Line," could not have exceeded eight thousand men. With Whiting's two brigades, and Lawton's brigade, which came with Jackson, the entire force of the latter may have been in the neighborhood of 16,000; but Whiting's command constituted a part of the army when you left it, and Lawton's brigade has already been counted with the troops brought from the South. So that the whole force received by General Lee from all sources was about 23,000—about 30,000 less than your estimate.

Now, let us see if we cannot arrive at a true estimate of General Lee's strength in another way. Four of Longstreet's brigade commanders give their strength in their reports, and Alexander gives the strength of the whole, including Walton's battalion of Washington Artillery, at 9,051—Alexander's statement corresponds precisely with those of the brigade commanders who give their strength, and he supplies the deficiency as to the other two and the Washington Artillery. General D. H. Hill says in his report, page 187: "The following list of killed and wounded will show that we lost 4,000 out of 10,000 taken into the field." This includes Ripley's brigade.

General Magruder says, on page 190: "I was in command of three divisions—those of Major-General McLaws, Brigadier-General D. R. Jones, and my own, each consisting of two brigades, the numerical strength being about 13,000 men." General Holmes, on page 151, gives his strength of all arms at 6,573. This, of course, is exclusive of Ransom, who was with Huger. Of Huger's division, Ransom gives his strength at 3,000, which, with the 130 previously lost, makes 3,130. Mahone puts his strength (page 371) at 1,800. Armistead only states his strength partially, but shows that after getting the Fifty-seventh Virginia from Walker's brigade, his own brigade was very small. Wright puts his strength at 2,000 (page 385). Give Armistead 2,000, which is a very liberal estimate, and Huger's strength will be 8,930. Of A. P. Hill's division, Pender says (page 255): "The brigade left camp on the evening of the 25th with between twenty-three and twenty-four hundred, including Andrews' battery." Archer says, page 256: "I have the honor to report that on the evening of the 26th of June, by direction of Major-General Hill, I marched my brigade, 1,228 strong, into Me-

chanicsville." The other brigade commanders do not give their strength. Field's brigade was a small one, Gregg's not large, and Anderson's and Branch's were perhaps about the size of Pender's. Give the latter 2,500 each, and Field and Gregg 2,000 each, and we have for A. P. Hill's strength 12,628—say 13,000. Lawton's brigade was 3,500. Whiting's strength is not given, but his brigades were small—give 2,000 for each; and then, with Jackson's and Ewell's 8,000, we will have: Longstreet, 9,051; D. H. Hill, 10,000; Magruder, 13,000; Holmes, 6,573; Huger, 8,930; A. P. Hill, 13,000; Whiting, 4,000; Lawton, 3,500; Jackson and Ewell, 8,000. Aggregate, 76,054.

Stuart had six regiments of cavalry, two small commands called "Legions," and there were five companies of the First North Carolina cavalry. One of the regiments is shown to have numbered only 200 present, and 2,500 would be a large estimate for the whole. Pendleton had four reserve battalions of artillery, the other artillery being counted with the brigades to which it was attached; 1,500 for the reserve artillery would be high. Add the whole together, and we have 80,000, covering the whole of General Lee's strength. This estimate is probably too large by several thousand; and Holmes' division really was of very little avail in the battles.

Let us take another mode of testing the result that has been reached. General Lee's losses in the battles were as follows: In Longstreet's division, 4,429—page 128; in A. P. Hill's division, 3,870—page 179; in Jackson's command, composed of his own division, including Lawton's brigade, Ewell's division, Whiting's division and D. H. Hill's division, 6,727—page 307. [In the statement furnished on the page referred to, the loss in Elzey's brigade (afterwards my own) is put for that in Ewell's entire division. Correcting this according to Ewell's statement on page 189, and then adding the loss in Ripley's brigade at Mechanicsville before Jackson got up, and we have the entire loss in the troops that were under his command as above stated.] In Magruder's command, McLaws gives his loss at 654—pages 160 to 164; D. R. Jones gives his loss at 832—page 172; but Magruder fails to give the loss in his own division; taking the average for it, and it may be put at 750, which will give a total loss of 2,236. In Huger's division, Ransom gives his loss at 630—pages 365 and 370; Wright's was 634, pages 386 and 397, and Mahone's loss was 415, pages 371 to 377. Armistead gives only a partial statement of his loss—taking it at 450 and we will have the loss in Huger's division 2,129. The loss in Holmes' division was 51, in Stuart's cavalry 71, and in the reserve artillery 44. The whole loss sums up as follows: Longstreet's division, 4,429; A. P. Hill's division, 3,870; Huger's division, 2,129; Jackson's command, 6,727; Magruder's command, 2,236; Holmes' division, 51; Stuart's cavalry, 71; reserve artillery, 44. Total, 19,557.

Mr. Swinton, the author of the "History of the Army of the Potomac," examined the Confederate returns in the Archive Office at Washington, and in June, 1876, published an abstract from

them showing the strength of our armies at various times. His statement shows that there were present for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia at the end of July, 1862, 69,559 men and officers. This included not only all the commands which had been at the battles around Richmond, except Daniel's brigade of a little over 1,500 men, which had gone back, but also the brigade of Evans, which had arrived, and Drayton's if it had arrived, as well as the Forty-seventh and Forty-eighth Alabama regiments, which had arrived and been attached to Taliaferro's brigade; Robertson's cavalry brigade of three regiments, which had come from the Valley; all the wounded at Williamsburg, Seven Pines, in the Valley, and the Seven Days battles, who had returned to duty; convalescents returned from hospitals, and prisoners who may have been exchanged under the cartel then recently adopted. Add the effective force for duty the last of July to the killed, wounded, and missing in the battles, and we have an aggregate of 89,116. Certainly General Lee's army, at the beginning of the battles, could not have exceeded this number; and from the various sources mentioned it is very certain that more than 10,000 men had come to the army after those battles.

I think this exhibit ought to establish conclusively, to any candid mind, that General Lee's army, at the beginning of the battles, was under 80,000 effectives. In your reply to Colonel Marshall you say: "Colonel Marshall says, on the evidence of subsequent returns, that the troops of Holmes, Ripley, and Lawton, amounted to but 11,866 men. This is not evidence to be put against the statements of those officers." Now, the returns which Colonel Marshall refers to, which are the same I have cited, are the contemporaneous reports of those officers themselves, made under circumstances which imposed on them the very highest obligations to be accurate. Certainly you must admit that their statements in writing, made when the events were fresh in their minds, are of higher authority than oral statements when they did not speak from the record. The pamphlet copy of Colonel Marshall's address, which I send you, explains, in a note, the facts in regard to Holmes' command, and shows, I think, how you might have been led into error in regard to his force. You are likewise mistaken in assuming that McClellan's army was increased by 19,000 after Seven Pines. His report, page 11, shows that on the 30th of April, 1862, he had 4,725 officers and 104,610 men for duty—in all 109,335; and that on the 26th of June he had 4,665 officers and 101,160 men—in all 105,825 for duty. Dix's command never joined him. It was the same command which Wool had at Fortress Monroe when we were at Yorktown. The only change made in its *status* was the assignment of Dix to the command, on the 1st of June, 1862, in the place of Wool, with orders to report to McClellan; but no part of Dix's command joined McClellan. The only accession McClellan had after Seven Pines and before the battles was McCaul's division, 9,514 strong; and it did not make up for the

losses in battle and by sickness. General Lee certainly received accessions, including Jackson's command, to the extent of about 23,000 men; and when the Seven Days' battles began, the disparity between the forces had been diminished, as well by the decrease of McClellan's army as by the increase of General Lee's.

One strong reason why the attack could not be made sooner, was because Jackson could not be withdrawn from the Valley sooner. He came as soon after Port Republic as was practicable, it being necessary so to baffle and deceive the enemy as to prevent the union of McDowell's force with that of McClellan. In showing, therefore, that the accession to General Lee's army was not as great as you suppose, there can be no imputation upon his capacity as a general. On the other hand, at least one writer has seized hold of your estimate of General Lee's force and endeavored to prove that he was incompetent to command a great army in the field. He assumes from the data given by you that General Lee's army numbered at least 108,000 men, while McClellan had only 105,000. Certainly, if that were true, it would detract very much from the credit generally accorded the great commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, for the relief of the Confederate capital from the siege of 1862. If General Lee had more men than McClellan had, it would be impossible to explain why he did not destroy the army of the latter. Hence it is that we, who were so long connected with that army, feel it incumbent on us to place the real facts before the world whenever they are incorrectly stated. In doing so we feel that we are doing no wrong to any, for the fame of all our armies and their commanders must rest upon their own deeds, and that of none can be enhanced by depreciating others, or diminished by giving credit to those who are deserving of it. Every soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia who has not proved a renegade, feels that he has a personal interest in the fame of its great commander, and when error is propagated in regard to his campaigns and his history, we all feel that we have a right, nay, that there is a solemn duty incumbent on us to challenge it, from however high a source it may come, or by whatever motives it may be prompted. In cherishing such sentiments in regard to him we so long followed, we still can and do feel a just pride in the fame of those who preceded him, and there is no true soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia who would desire to pluck one leaf from the chaplets that adorn the brows of our comrades of the other Confederate armies or their leaders. I accept most readily and cheerfully the assurance given in your reply to Colonel Marshall, as well as in your private letter to me, of your regard for the fame of General Lee and of the absence of all desire to diminish it. I know that he reciprocated most heartily the sentiments of esteem you express, and I am sure that, if among us, he would frown most indignantly upon any effort to enhance his own reputation at the expense of yourself or any one else.

I beg, General, that you will not regard me as one who has offi-

ciously volunteered in a dispute in which he has no interest.

Having, in an address delivered at Lexington on the 19th of January, 1872, undertaken to establish what was the strength of our army around Richmond in June, 1862, and Mr. Jones having done me the honor of promulgating that address to the world (in his "Personal Reminiscences of General Lee"), I have felt that it was incumbent on me to vindicate the correctness of my estimates, which are so much at variance with your own. In doing so I have intended to be entirely respectful and courteous to you, and I trust you will so understand me.

With the assurance of my highest esteem, I am, very respectfully and truly, your obedient servant,

J. A. EARLY.

General Joseph E. Johnston.

History of the Army of the Cumberland.

By Chaplain VAN HORNE.

PUBLISHED BY ROBERT CLARK & CO., CINCINNATI, OHIO.

Review by General D. H. MAURY.

The History of the Army of the Cumberland follows hard upon Sherman's Memoirs of his own life and campaigns, and differs from that work as widely as the character and nature of the commander of the Army of the Cumberland differed from that of "the General of the Army."

The publication of General Sherman is not without its value of a procreative sort. It may be likened to that stimulating fertilizer, from the Chinco Islands, for, unsavory in itself, and yielding no fruit to the toiler after historical truth, yet it draws from all the land rich stores of facts for the future historians of the great struggle for power between the States of the South and the States of the North.

The very vain glory and self conceit which breathe from every line of Sherman's remarkable narrative are eminently provocative of the rejoinders which clever and dignified writers are now preparing and publishing.

Men who bore the brunt of the fierce conflicts, General Sherman so flippantly discusses and so often avoided, are not satisfied that he shall be the historian or the critic of their brave endeavor. They will write *now*, though they could never be brought to do so until "the General of the Army" assumed to be their historiographer. They cannot keep silent after reading their record from his reckless pen.

As a military history, nothing can be more unreliable or less valuable than Sherman's book. It is almost as entertaining as the works of Mark Twain, and reminds us by its vanity of the autobiography of Benevenuto Cellini. But it is a public contribution to the history of his times.

As an attempt to place his own claims to military conduct on a high ground, nothing could have been more futile and inactive, and the only consolation General Sherman should ever derive from his effort at history is, that which he seems to have attained—viz: that he has written a history which will cause other people to write the truth. And the self-complacency with which he claims this merit and readjusts his ruffled plumage, after his soaring flight among the fierce broils of war, is eminently characteristic of the man.

As those who are familiar with Sherman read his character in every line of his book, so will the admirers of General Thomas find in this history of the Army of the Cumberland, a reflex of the sturdy, steadfast, staunch soldier, who never shrank from personal exposure, and who on more than one disastrous day checked the course of a victorious enemy, and even snatched victory from defeat.

General Thomas, like General Sherman, was indecisive as to the course he would pursue on the breaking out of the war. It was only after discussion and consideration that these distinguished soldiers determined to draw their swords on the side of the Union.

Had Sherman continued in the service of Louisiana, or adhered to the resolution he announced to his Louisiana friends and patrons that he would never fight against her—

He would not have been put into so much personal peril and alarm, as he tells us he was, by the Federal soldiers in St. Louis, after they had captured the Confederates in Camp Jackson.

Nor have had to gallop away from his shattered brigade to save himself, as he tells us he did, at the First Manassas.

Nor have been surprised and routed at Shiloh.

Nor defeated at Chickasaw Bluff by one-tenth of his force.

Nor have been repulsed by Hardee at Missionary Ridge.

Nor have been driven out of the Deer Creek country.

Nor have fled from Enterprise to Vicksburg on the defeat of his expedition against Mobile and Selma.

Nor have made his march to the sea.

Nor have said in his official reports and in his testimony before

the claims commission that General Wade Hampton burned Columbia, when he knew he did not.

Nor have written and published his story of all these things.

The Southern army lost nothing when Sherman decided to fight against Louisiana.

Had General Thomas followed his natural inclinations and adhered to his allegiance to Virginia, and accepted the commission of Colonel, which he had procured from Governor Letcher, his native State would have been the better off by one more able and brave Virginian fighting in defence of principles cherished throughout his life, and for his home and for his kindred.

Of all those native-born Virginians who turned their swords against Virginia, there is but one who added strength to the opposing section.

Thomas, alone, of them all, was able and efficient in the armies of those to whom he transferred his allegiance.

And while Virginia holds up to the emulation of her youth the examples of Lee, of Jackson, and of Johnston, she will ever deplore that a son so brave and so able as Thomas was did not fight by their side.

He has now gone to his account. What motives, what influences decided his course, God alone knows. But he was a loss to the Southern army, and a tower of strength to the army of the North.

They had none like that Virginian Thomas.

He was sedate, reflective, calm, self-reliant, resolute.

There was in his demeanor, in the massive proportions of his person, in his clear blue eye, in the kindliness of his countenance and of his manly voice, all that impresses men with that personal magnetism so potent in the crisis of a battle, and when we remember that his whole life does not furnish one act or word of wrong or insult to woman, or one instance of intentional untruth, the personal contrast between General Thomas and "the General of the Army" is completed.

The History of the Army of the Cumberland is certainly worthy of the superficial compliment bestowed upon it by "the General of the Army" "on the handsome style in which this book is printed and bound."

The discussion of the principles which underlay the revolution with which the author opens his subject might have been judiciously omitted, for Chaplain Van Horne does not seem to know that in the South the leaders were behind the people in their pur-

poses and feelings. The vote for secession was carried throughout the South by the greatest popular majority that ever endorsed any national policy. In Virginia, the "leaders" of the people had been opposed to the secession of the State; but when April 14, 1861, Mr. Lincoln called for troops to coerce the seceded States, the Virginia Convention, on the 17th of April, unanimously passed the ordinance of secession, and when it was referred back to the people it was ratified by a majority of 131,000 votes! Less than 1,000 votes were cast against it.

The book is an excellent compilation of the documents within reach of the author. He has bestowed upon it the time and care such a work demands, and has been aided and sustained by the cordial co-operation of many who could efficiently contribute to his success.

The tribute to General Buell (pages 82 to 87) is well expressed and well merited by the illustrious soldier, who was so much undervalued by the politicians of his country.

The fairness of the author's discussion of the capture of Fort Donelson and his vindication of General Albert Sidney Johnston, show a purpose so far as in him lay to "write nothing but the truth."

He discusses the Battle of Shiloh in a frankness conformable with the general spirit of his book. But he is mistaken in thinking General Bragg's lines were repulsed late in the day of the 6th, "when it was only necessary to press back Grant's left flank one-eighth of a mile."

His own record shows that after a day of unchecked success the Confederate army, having surprised and routed Sherman at 7 o'clock in the morning, had constantly pressed on towards Pittsburg landing until three P. M., when "the masses of fugitives huddled in terror under the river's bank, spoke plainly of broken lines and general demoralization." Then Sidney Johnston fell, in the very crisis of the great victory he had planned and almost won, and the disconcertment and arrest of plan and execution usual on such a calamity befell the Confederate army as it did when Jackson fell more than two years afterwards.

Our lines were not repulsed, as Mr. Van Horne thinks, but they did not administer the *coup de grace* to the beaten army of the Union as they might have that evening, and thereby opportunity was afforded Buell to retrieve the disaster of the day and establish the Federal lines in the positions from which they had been driven.

The author pays a handsome and deserved compliment to General Beauregard for his conduct of the battle after General Buell had reinforced General Grant. But he falls into some mistakes as to the conduct of the Confederate army after the Battle of Shiloh. April 7, General Beauregard took position at Corinth, and threw up earth works about the place. During the month of May he moved his army three times out of its works, and offered battle to Halleck, who declined it every time. On one of these occasions we struck a force under General Pope, at Farmington, which withdrew without giving serious battle.

On May 30, Beauregard completed in a masterly manner his evacuation of Corinth. We marched always ready for battle, but were never attacked nor closely followed. We marched about twelve miles per day 'till we reached Tupelo, where Beauregard halted the army in order of battle, and remained unmolested 'till August, when Bragg moved his army to Chattanooga, and Price, in September, moved the Army of the West to Iuka.

The author overestimates the Confederate army at Chickamauga. General Bragg stated his loss in killed and wounded at 18,000 men, and as two-fifths of his whole army, which was less than 50,000 of all arms. Bragg had no reserves, but fought his whole army, including Forest's cavalry, which, to the number of about 6,000, fought on foot. The battle of Chickamauga was the fiercest of the war.

Rosecranz fought stubbornly, as he always did, and Thomas nowhere more signally evinced his best qualities on the battle-field than he did on the close of that disastrous day. There was no especial advantage to either army in the "lay of the ground," and it was throughout a fair stand up fight, at the conclusion of which the Confederate army was completely victorious, but having fought every company in his army, and having 18,000 of his men lying dead or wounded (he lost no prisoners), General Bragg was in no condition to press the beaten army, especially when Thomas still presented a stubborn front and covered the escape of the routed Federals into Chattanooga.

While our author claims abundant glories for his own people, he accords high praise to the valor, constancy and ability of his antagonists. He highly esteems General Joseph Johnston, and makes a fair and strong exposition of his conduct and efficiency.

The crowning success of the book is the contrast presented by the narrative between the characters and conduct of Sherman and

Thomas after Johnston's removal from the command of the Army of Tennessee.

When Hood withdrew his army from Sherman's front and turned towards Tennessee, the great raider debated whether to follow Hood or pursue his raid through Georgia and the Carolinas, thus left open to him. He did not long debate, but selecting such corps and divisions as would make up a well organized army of 65,000 men, he sent the *debris* to Thomas. He even dismounted Wilson's cavalry to furnish the cavalry reserved with his own wing with a better remount, and sent Wilson with his men dismounted to help Thomas to beat Hood, while he marched on his way to the sea with none to make him afraid.

General Lee once said of Sherman's march to the sea: "There was nothing to oppose him, and the only military problem to be solved was a simple calculation as to whether his army could live on the country by taking all the people had."

It was well for Sherman and for his government that the general with whom he dealt so hardly was not of a temper to be appalled by the dangers of the position in which Sherman had thus placed him.

It is charitable to believe that in making these dispositions for his own movements and for the defence of Nashville, Sherman must have estimated the personal resources of General Thomas very highly; the result amply justified such an estimate. The army with which Thomas gained his great victory was largely made up of forces detached for the occasion from other armies, of new levies and of dismounted cavalry, some of whom were remounted in the presence of the enemy, and was therefore ill-fitted to cope with the veteran army of Hood.

So impatient was the Federal Government of the delay of Thomas in attacking Hood, that on the 9th of December he was ordered to be relieved from the command of the army.

The order was, fortunately for Halleck, suspended. Thomas would not attack 'till he was ready. His victory was decisive. But even after that the Washington city generalissimo, Halleck, complained that Thomas did not press Hood's army.

I have never heard anybody who was in Hood's army at that time justify Halleck's complaints on this score. Thomas' own letter, replying to these indiscreet strictures, shows the stuff of which the writer was made.

In calm review of these operations it is but fair to say that in

the whole course of the war there was no finer illustration of generalship exhibited by any Federal commander than General Thomas' defence of Nashville.

We note with pleasure the dignified rebuke with which Mr. Van Horne censures the devastation of South Carolina by General Sherman.

There is a wide difference between the sympathies of Chaplain Van Horne and our own regarding the war and its leading actors, and it will be excused in us to feel that he is sometimes too pronounced in his admiration of his heroes, and that occasionally, as in the cases of Mr. Davis and of General Polk, he shows too strongly his partisan feelings.

But he has brought to the work he has so well accomplished an earnest purpose to write history from the most authentic documents attainable.

He is generally fair in his statements of forces, though he does much overstate ours in the Battle of Chickamauga.

He has adopted the plan throughout the work of having an appendix to every chapter, made up of official letters, orders and dispatches in support of the narrative contained in the chapter, and he generally adopts the statement of our generals as correct regarding the numbers of their forces.

On the whole we heartily approve and commend this book, and if all the generals had historians like Chaplain Van Horne it would be better for their fame, and greatly facilitate the labors of the future historian of the war.

DABNEY H. MAURY,
Major-General late Confederate Army.

Diary of Captain Robert E. Park, Twelfth Alabama Regiment.

[Continued from May Number.]

August 18th, 1864—We marched through Winchester, and were, as usual, warmly greeted. Ladies and children and servants stood in the porches and on the sidewalks, with prepared food of a very tempting kind, and goblets and pitchers of cold fresh water, and sometimes of milk, which they smilingly handed to the tired troops, who, as far as I could observe, seldom declined the proffered kindness. The native Virginians of Winchester and the Valley are as true as steel, and the ladies—God bless and protect them!—are as heroic and self-denying as were the noble Spartan mothers. In-

deed, they are the equals of the highest, truest heroines of the grandest days of the greatest countries. The joy and gladness they evince when we enter their city serves to encourage and inspire us, and the sorrow and pain we see in their fair countenances, and often hear them express, with trembling lips and streaming eyes, as we leave them to endure the cruel and cowardly insults and petty persecutions of Sheridan's hirelings, fill our hearts with indescribable regret. We love to fight for patriotic Winchester and her peerless women. We camped one mile from Winchester, on the Berryville pike, and cooked our rations. Lieutenant-General Anderson, with Kershaw's infantry and Fitz. Lee's cavalry division, arrived from Lee's army. Their ranks are much depleted, but a very small reinforcement will greatly encourage and help our sadly diminished command.

August 19th—Marched to our familiar looking old camping ground at often-visited Bunker Hill.

August 20th—Twenty-four hours of rest and quiet.

August 21st—Marched through Smithfield, and halted about two miles from Charlestown, where "old John Brown's body" once "was mouldering in the ground." Our gallant division sharpshooters, under Colonel J. C. Brown, of North Carolina, those from our brigade under Major Blackford, of Fifth Alabama, and our regiment under Lieutenant Jones, of Mobile (Company "I"), skirmished vigorously the rest of the day. The firing was fierce and continuous.

August 22d—The Yankees fell back towards Harper's Ferry, and we promptly followed, passing their breastworks and through Charlestown, encamping in a woods near where Honorable Andrew Hunter's beautiful residence recently stood. His splendid mansion had been burnt by order of General (Yankee) Hunter, his cousin. A very affectionate and cousinly act, surely!

August 23d—Quiet in camp,

August 24th—A sharp skirmish took place in front of our camp, which we could see very plainly. It was a deeply interesting sight to watch them advancing and retreating, firing from behind trees and rocks and clumps of bushes, falling down to load their discharged muskets, and rising quickly, moving forward, aiming and firing again—the whole line occasionally running rapidly forward, firing as they ran, with loud "Rebel yells," and the Yankee hirelings retreating as rapidly and firing as they fell back. It is so seldom we have an opportunity to look on, being generally inte-

rested combatants ourselves, that the exciting scene was very enjoyable. After dark the Twelfth Alabama relieved the brigade sharpshooters and took the outer picket post.

August 25th—At sun up we were relieved in turn, and had to vacate the rifle pits under the fire of the enemy. General Anderson, with General Kershaw's division, took our place, and General Early, with the rest of the little Army of the Valley, marched towards Shepherdstown, on the Potomac. We met the enemy's cavalry beyond Leetown, but they fell back quickly, and, except a few shells thrown at us, our advance was not opposed. We marched through Shepherdstown after dark, making the air ring with joyous shouts. Many ladies welcomed us with waiving handkerchiefs and kind words as we passed through the streets. Lieutenant J. P. Arrington, A. D. C. to Major-General Rodes, was severely wounded in the knee, and Colonel ———, of Louisiana, commanding Hays' brigade, was killed in a skirmish to day.

August 26th—Slept until three o'clock P. M., then marched to near Leetown and halted.

August 27th—Went into camp two miles from our old stamping ground, Bunker Hill.

August 28th (Sunday)—I heard two excellent sermons from our regimental chaplain, Reverend Henry D. Moore. We have been "on the wing" so much recently, the "Parson" has had little opportunity to preach to us.

August 29th—A convention of Yankee politicians is to be held at Chicago to-day. I reckon they will spout a good deal about the "gal-lorious Union," the "best government the world ever saw," the "stars and stripes," "rebels," "traitors," *et id omne*. Our entire corps was in order of battle all day, and General Breckinridge drove the enemy some distance from his front. The Twelfth Alabama went on picket at night.

August 30th—Very quiet. The Yanks made no advance.

August 31st—Another reconnoissance by Rodes' division. General Rodes received orders to drive the Yankees out of Martinsburg, and taking his division of Battle's Alabama, Cook's Georgia, Cox's North Carolina, and Lewis' (formerly Daniel's) North Carolina brigades, started on his errand. Battle's brigade was in front, and was shelled severely. General Rodes seems to think his old brigade of Alabamians entitled to the post of honor, and usually sends them to the front in times of danger. About two miles south of the town, the brigade was deployed, and ordered forward. We

marched in this way through Cemetery Hill into town, running out the Yankee cavalry and artillery under Averill.

At night we returned to our old camp, having made twenty-two miles during the day. These reconnoissances may be very important and very interesting to general and field officers, who ride, but those of the line, and the fighting privates, wish they were less frequent, or less tiresome this sultry weather. We have walked this pike-road so often, that we know not only every house, fence, spring and shade tree, but very many of the citizens, their wives and children.

September 1st—A day in camp.

September 2d—Marched towards Winchester, and when about five miles distant, met our cavalry, under General Vaughn of Tennessee, retreating in disorder, the Yankees in pursuit. We quickly formed line, and moved forward, but the enemy retired, declining further battle. Camped six miles from Bunker Hill.

September 3d—Went to our well known resting point, Bunker Hill. A few shell were fired, and one wounded our skillful and popular Surgeon, Dr. George Whitefield, from Demopolis, Alabama, in the arm. His absence will be a great loss to us.

September 4th (Sunday)—Marched towards Berryville, passing Jordan Springs, a well known watering place, and halted at 12 o'clock, one and a half miles from Berryville. Deployed to the left of the town, where we could see the enemy and their breast-works very plainly. At night retired one mile.

September 5th—Our division again passed Jordan Springs, and soon after heard the skirmishers firing in front, were hastily formed into line, and ordered forward to support our cavalry, marching parallel with the pike. We pursued the enemy about four miles, during a heavy, drenching rain, amidst mud and slush, across corn-fields, fences, ditches and creeks, but were unable to overtake them, and halted about three miles from Bunker Hill. It rained incessantly during the night, and prevented our sleeping very soundly.

September 6th—No change of position to-day.

September 7th—We hear heavy skirmishing on the Millwood road, and are ordered to be ready for action. Adjutant Gayle and Sergeant-Major Bruce Davis keep busy carrying such orders from company to company. The Richmond papers bring us the sad news of the fall of Atlanta. It grieves us much. Atlanta is between us and our homes. It is only seventy miles from where my

dearly loved mother and sisters live, and all mail communication with them is now cut off. It pains and distresses me to think that La Grange and Greeneville, Georgia, may be visited by raiding parties, and my relatives and friends annoyed and insulted by the cowardly and malicious Yankees, as the noble and unconquered people of the Valley have been.

September 8th—I received my pay as first lieutenant during months of June, July and August, amounting to \$270. Am daily expecting my commission as captain, as Captain McNeely has been retired on account of the wound he received at Chancellorsville, May 3rd, 1863, nearly eighteen months ago, and since which time, except when on wounded leave of absence for twenty-five days, after the battle of Gettysburg, I have been in constant command of my company, being the only officer "present for duty." My commission will date from time of issuance of Captain McNeely's papers of retirement, some months since. Lieutenant-Colonel Goodgame left for Alabama to-day on leave of absence. His name is an exceedingly appropriate one, as he is a gallant, unflinching officer and soldier. His "game" is unquestionably "good."

September 9th—Company "F" was on picket to-day. I took tea with the family of Mr. Payne, near Stevenson's depot. They are true Southerners. Our entire army is getting its supplies of bread by cutting and threshing the wheat in the fields, and then having it ground at the few mills the enemy have not yet destroyed. The work is done by details from different regiments. It shows to what straits we have been reduced. Still the men remain cheerful and hopeful.

September 10th—Rodes' division, preceded by our cavalry, under Generals Fitzhugh Lee and Rosser, went as far as Darksville, returning to Bunker Hill at night. Our brigade acted as the immediate support of the cavalry. As it rained, without cessation, during the night, we had a very damp time of it. I slept on half, and covered with the other half of my oil-cloth, one I captured from the Yankees when I captured my sword. The drops of rain would fall from the leaves of the large tree under which I lay, drop on my head and face, and trickle down my back occasionally. Notwithstanding these little annoyances, I managed to get a pretty good night's rest. A stone served as my pillow.

September 11th—I am almost barefoot, and was glad to pick up and substitute for one of mine, an old shoe which I found thrown away on the road side. It, in its turn, may have been thrown away

for a better one, or perhaps the wearer may, in some of the numerous skirmishes in this vicinity, have been wounded and lost his leg, thus rendering this shoe no longer necessary to him. Or, probably, the gallant wearer may have been slain, and is now sleeping his last sleep in an unmarked and unknown soldier's grave. Nearly all of my company are barefoot, and most of them are almost destitute of pants. Such constant marching on rough, rocky roads, and sleeping on the bare ground, will naturally wear out the best of shoes and thickest of pants. While anxious for some attention from our quarter-masters, the men are nevertheless patient and uncomplaining. We returned at night to our camp near Stevenson's depot.

September 12th—Welcome rest.

September 13th—In obedience to a singular order, we marched from our camp two or three miles in the direction of Winchester, and then marched back again. At night my company ("F.") went on picket outpost. This continual moving to and fro indicates that a decisive action is imminent. Sheridan is reported to have large reinforcements from Grant. Our own ranks are thinner than at any time since we entered service. My company is one of the largest in the Twelfth Alabama, and numbers less than thirty present for duty. The entire regiment, including officers, will not number two hundred, and the brigade is not more than a thousand strong, if so much. It is said that Early has, including infantry, cavalry and artillery, less than 8,000 men for duty. General Anderson, with his infantry and artillery, has left us, and returned to Richmond, leaving only Fitz. Lee's small force of cavalry. On the contrary, rumor says Sheridan has fully 40,000 well equipped, well-clad and well-fed soldiers. If Early had half as many he would soon have sole possession of the Valley, and Sheridan would share the fate of Millroy, Banks, Shields, Fremont, McDowell, Hunter and his other Yankee predecessors in the Valley command. Sheridan's lack of vigor, or extra caution, very strongly resembles incompetency, or cowardice.

September 14th—This is the anniversary of the Battle of Boonsboro', Maryland, where I had the ill-luck to be taken prisoner in September, 1862, and kept nineteen days before exchanged. We had just reached the scene of action, met the dead body of the gallant General Garland, when an order from General D. H. Hill, through General Rodes to Colonel B. B. Gayle, of the Twelfth Alabama, directed that skirmishers should be deployed in front, and

while our precise adjutant, L. Gayle, was looking over his roster of officers, to detail one in his regular turn, Colonel Gayle hurriedly exclaimed, "detail Lieutenant Park to command the skirmishers," and I immediately reported for orders. Was directed to carry my squad of forty men, four from each company, to the foot of South Mountain, and "keep the enemy back as long as possible." I hastily deployed the men, and we moved down the mountain side. On our way down we could see the enemy, in the valley below, advancing, preceded by their dense line of skirmishers. I concealed my men behind trees, rocks and bushes, and cautioned them to aim well before firing. We awaited, with beating hearts, the sure and steady approach of the "Pennsylvania Bucktails," who were in front of us, and soon near enough to fire upon. The men fired almost simultaneously, and we drove back the skirmishers to their main line. The solid, well drilled line advanced steadily forward, and my small party, as soon as they were near enough to make their aim sure, fired again, and nearly every leaden messenger sped to its intended destination, and buried itself in some one of the approaching foe. At least thirty men must have been killed or wounded. But they continued to advance, their officers cursing loudly, and earnestly exhorting them to "close up" and "forward." My men slowly fell back, firing from everything which served to screen them from observation. Several of them were wounded, and six or eight or more became completely demoralized by the unbroken front of the rapidly approaching enemy, and, despite my commands, entreaties and threats, left me, and hastily fled to the rear. Brave Corporal Myers, of Mobile, adopting a suggestion of mine, aimed and fired at an exposed officer, receiving a terrible, and, no doubt, mortal wound in the breast as he did so. I raised him tenderly, offering him water, and was rising to reluctantly abandon him to his fate, when a dozen muskets were pointed at me, and I ordered to surrender. There was a ravine to our left, and the Third Alabama skirmishers having fallen back, the Yankees had got in my rear, and at same time closed upon me in front. If I had not gone to Myers when he fell, I might have escaped capture, but I was mortified and humiliated by the necessity of yielding myself a prisoner. Certain death was the only alternative. One of the men who ran away early in the action reported that I had been killed, and my name was so published, and my relations mourned me as one dead until I was regularly exchanged and reached Richmond. The enemy pushed forward, after my

capture, and soon came upon Colonel Gayle and the rear support. He was ordered to surrender, but drawing his pistol and firing in their faces, he exclaimed: "We are flanked, boys, but let's die in our tracks," and continued to fire until he was literally riddled by bullets, and surrendered up his pure, brave young spirit to the God who gave it. Colonel Gayle was originally from Portsmouth, Virginia. The gallant Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Pickens was severely wounded also, and the regiment fell to the command of Captain Tucker, who was killed at Sharpsburg, three days afterwards.

Thoughts of that day's conflict bring to mind the names and faces of many of my noble company, very few of whom are still with me. I am grateful that such gallant spirits as Sergeants T. H. Clower, R. H. Stafford, A. P. Reid, J. H. Eason, W. M. Carr and A. G. Howard, and Privates Chappell, Tobe Ward, Lester, Moore, Attaway and others are still spared as my faithful comrades and as true soldiers of the Confederacy. I am proud of them all, and regret much that I can do so little for their comfort. All are worthy of commissions, and some would fill high positions most worthily.

Late in the afternoon of to-day we were relieved from picket and returned to camp, where I have written down these thoughts of the stirring incidents of this day two years ago. Captain Dan. Partridge is now our excellent brigade ordnance officer, and is ably assisted by Sergeant A. G. Howard, a disabled soldier.

September 15th and 16th—Many "grape-vine" telegraphic reports are afloat in camp. None worthy of credence; but those of a cheerful nature exert a good influence over the tired soldiers.

September 17th—Rodes' and Gordon's divisions, with Braxton's artillery, marched to Bunker Hill.

September 18th—Gordon's division, with Lomax's cavalry, moved on to Martinsburg, and drove Averill's cavalry division out of town, across the Opequon, and then returned to Bunker Hill. The Twelfth Alabama went on picket after dark. By referring to previous pages of this *Diary*, I find we have camped at Bunker Hill July 25th and 31st, August 1st, 2d, 3d, 7th, 8th, 9th, 19th, 20th, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th; September 3d, 10th and 17th. It seems to be a strategic or objective point.

Grant is with the ruthless robber, Sheridan, to-day, and we expect an early advance. His forces have been largely increased, while ours have been greatly diminished.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Attack on Fort Gilmer, September 29th, 1864.

By CHARLES JOHNSTON.

[The following letter to the President of the Southern Historical Society was endorsed by him as follows: "The young gentleman who furnishes this narrative—a private soldier in Huff's, afterwards Griffin's battery, I believe—is a gentleman by birth and education, being connected with highly respectable families, and there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of his statements. J. A. EARLY."]

SALEM, ROANOKE COUNTY, VIRGINIA.

General J. A. EARLY:

As the "Southern Historical Society" has lately called upon all soldiers and officers of the Confederate army for any incidents of the late war that would be of general interest, I have presumed upon the fact of having been for four years a private soldier in that army, and upon the interest that I know you take in everything connected with the cause which you so earnestly, so honestly and so bravely defended, to call your attention to some facts connected with the fight known by the troops engaged in it as the Battle of "Fort Gilmer," which was fought on the 29th day of September, 1864.

My attention was called to this subject by a letter lately published in the *Norfolk Landmark*, in which the writer refers to a speech made by B. F. Butler on the Civil Rights Bill. The writer in the *Landmark* says that what Butler says about riding over a battle-field below Richmond, and looking into the brown faces of the dead negroes, and making a vow to revenge them, is a piece of imagination on his part. He then goes into an account of the fight, but from his account it would appear that the affair was a very slight one indeed, whereas the truth was that upon that same 29th September, Richmond came nearer being captured, and that, too, by negro troops, than it ever did during the whole war, and but for the devotion and bravery of two decimated brigades, Bushrod Johnson's old Tennessee brigade and the Texas brigade, consisting of about three hundred (300) men each, the Yankees must have carried everything before them and captured Richmond.

I shall try now to give you as correct an account as I can of this fight, in which I was myself engaged, though in a very humble position—that of a private soldier. However, I saw the whole of it, and more than once during the engagement was a witness to acts of

daring and heroism on the part of those Texans and Tennesseans that surpassed anything I had ever heard of. And I write for no purpose of attracting your notice to myself or to my company, but to do what I can to perpetuate the memory of the bravest men I ever saw under fire.

With this much of an introduction, I leave my account with you to use as you think proper. I write from memory, and do not profess to be positively accurate; but my statements can be verified by Major W. J. Dance, Powhatan Courthouse, Virginia; Lieutenant Wm. M. Read, Augusta Georgia, and Lieutenant H. E. Blair, of Roanoke.

On the 29th September, 1864, there were on the north side of James river, in the neighborhood of "Chaffin's Bluff," about two thousand (2,000) men, consisting of what remained of Bushrod Johnson's Tennessee brigade (300 strong), commanded by a colonel whose name I *think* was Johnston; the Texas brigade, also commanded by a colonel whose name I do not remember; the "City Battalion," some battalions of "Department troops" (made up of clerks and attaches of the different departments of the Government); Gary's brigade of cavalry, the "Louisiana Guard Artillery," "Hardaway's battalion" of artillery, consisting of four batteries, four guns each; the "Rockbridge Artillery," Captain Graham; "Third Company Richmond Howitzers," Lieutenant Carter; the "Powhatan Artillery," Captain Dance, and the "Salem Artillery," Captain Griffin. These commands included *all* the troops engaged during the whole day, *I think*. The whole force was commanded by Lieutenant-General Ewell, either as commander of the Richmond defences, or of that part of General Lee's army on the north side of James river, I do not now remember which, but at any rate he was in command in person, and by his cool courage and presence wherever the fight was hottest, contributed as much to the victory gained as any one man could have done.

The Yankees landed near "Deep Bottom," some ten or twelve miles below Richmond, and consisted of two entire army corps, (supposed at that time to have ten thousand men each). At "Deep Bottom" they came upon a picket composed of one battery of Hardaway's battalion and some infantry, and by the suddenness of their attack (which was between daybreak and sunrise) drove back our pickets, and continued to drive them until they reached "Fort Harrison," a fort containing several heavy cannon, but with

not more than forty or fifty men to man them. This fort the Yankees captured and kept possession of. "Fort Harrison" was one of a series of forts running from "Chaffin's Bluff" almost entirely around Richmond, and connected by earthworks for infantry, with a redoubt for field artillery wherever the nature of the ground admitted. This line of earthworks was laid out by regular engineers, and (as far as I was a judge) showed that the men who built them understood their business.

After the capture of "Fort Harrison," our troops were formed upon the same line of works, but of course a new line had to be formed in front of "Fort Harrison." "Fort Gilmer" was the next fort in the line, which had some five or six heavy cannon, and was manned by about forty men (of what command I never knew). Between Forts "Harrison" and "Gilmer," a distance of nearly half a mile, were stationed Hardaway's batteries, Dance's being the nearest to "Fort Harrison," Griffin's next, and Carter and Graham to their left, supported by the Texans and Tennesseans, with the "City Battalion" deployed as skirmishers. General Ewell was with the skirmish line, constantly encouraging them by his presence and coolness. I remember very distinctly how he looked, mounted on an old gray horse, as mad as he could be, shouting to the men, and seeming to be everywhere at once. I do not remember at what time in the day the attack was made, but it commenced by the Yankees making a furious charge upon Dance's battery, and they came in such numbers and so rapidly that they got within forty yards of Dance's guns before our fire told upon them. Here it was that the Tennesseans did such glorious work. They had trotted (or rather run) from another part of the line when the attack first began, and by the time they reached Dance's guns the Yankees were almost there, but the colonel in command of the brigade leaped across the works, followed by his men, and after an almost hand to hand fight drove the Yankees back. Too much praise cannot be given to this colonel (I wish I could remember his name), for I was told by one of Dance's men that he had never seen a man so entirely free from fear, and that in front of his men he discharged every barrel of his pistol right into the Yankees' faces. I do not now remember the loss in this charge, but Captain Dance and a good many of his men were wounded, and several of the men killed.

Almost immediately after the enemy retired from Dance's front, an attack was made upon another part of the line to the left, and

the same Tennesseans again double-quickened to the point of attack, and again the Yankees were forced to retire before their fire and the canister of the artillery.

I love to think of those men, how bravely and cheerfully they rushed from one point to another, and at every point doing such good work. They passed me several times during the day, and I did not see one man of them straggling or getting away, but all were firm, and seemed to be on fire with fight, calling to us as they passed: "Stick to them, artillery, we'll come back and help you when we get through up here." I have never seen one of them since, but I shall always remember those two little hands-full of men—the one Texans, the other Tennesseans—as the bravest, truest men I ever saw; and I only wish that our whole army had been made of the same stuff that was in them.

After this last repulse, the Yankees did not renew the attack for some time (if I remember rightly not for several hours), and when they did come, it was away off to the left and in front of "Fort Gilmer." They advanced in three lines, one behind the other, the first line composed of negroes. Some said that the second line was also negroes, but I cannot speak positively of that, but the rear line was of white troops.

"Fort Gilmer" was on a hill, with quite an extensive flat in front, from which the trees had all been cut, and most of the trees were lying on the ground with their branches still attached. The "Louisiana Guard Artillery" on the left, and "Salem Artillery" on the right of the fort, occupied redoubts so constructed that each had an enfilade fire upon the Yankees as they advanced. The enemy came rather cautiously at first, but finally they came with a rush, our artillery firing shrapnel at first, but they soon begun to load with canister, and the way those negroes fell before it was very gratifying to the people on our side of the works. But the Yankees came on until they got to the ditch in front of "Fort Gilmer"—a dry ditch about ten (10) feet deep and twelve (12) feet wide. Into this ditch a great many of the negroes jumped, and endeavored to climb up on each other's shoulders, but were beaten back by our infantry, and almost all of them killed. One negro, who was either drunk or crazy, crawled through a culvert which ran from the inside of the fort into the ditch, and was shot on the inside. No great number of negroes got into the ditch, and the rest of the attacking column having no shelter from the fire of both artillery and infantry, were forced to give way and retire.

Thus ended the battle of "Fort Gilmer," and there was no more fighting done on this part of the line where we were that day, though I think the part of the line occupied by Gary's cavalry was attacked, but I never knew anything about that fight.

General Lee arrived from Petersburg during the night of September 29th, with Field's Virginia and Hoke's North Carolina divisions, and upon the 30th both those divisions charged "Fort Harrison," but after a desperate fight they were forced to retire, and the "Stars and Stripes" waved over "Fort Harrison" until Richmond fell. Another line of works was built around the old line, and several batteries of mortars were placed there, which kept up a pretty constant fire upon the Yankees during the rest of the war.

Fort Gilmer is about four miles below Richmond, very near the farm then owned by Mrs. Gunn, and from the nearest point of this fight to the capitol could not have been more than three miles.

Had our troops given way upon that day (and I think if the Yankees had known how near they were to Richmond we must have been beaten), there was nothing between us and the city, and instead of being burned by our men, as it afterwards was, Richmond must have fallen into the hands of "Beast Butler" and drunken negroes, though to give the devil his due, we were told by prisoners that Butler was not in the fight at all, but was on the top of his big observatory at City Point, looking at the fight through a long telescope.

Pardon me, General, for having intruded so long upon your time; you may probably have material from which to write an account of this affair much better than this letter, and if you have I shall not be offended that no notice is taken of my effort in that direction.

You know better than I can tell you how few opportunities a private has of knowing what is going on around him, but I have written what I remember seeing at the time and hearing the officers talk about it.

With very great respect for yourself, not only on account of your career in the army, but for the stand you have since taken, allow me to write myself, your comrade,

CHAS. JOHNSTON.

**Memoir of a Narrative Received of Colonel John B. Baldwin, of Staunton,
Touching the Origin of the War.**

By REV. R. L. DABNEY, D. D.

[The following paper from the able pen of Rev. Dr. R. L. Dabney will be read with deep interest, and will be found to be a valuable contribution to the history of the origin of the war.

It may be worth while in this connection to recall the fact that when soon after the capture of Fort Sumter and Mr. Lincoln's proclamation, a prominent Northern politician wrote Colonel Baldwin to ask: "What will the Union men of Virginia do now?" he immediately replied: "*There are now no Union men in Virginia.* But those who *were* Union men will stand to their arms, and make a fight which shall go down in history as an illustration of what a brave people can do in defence of their liberties, after having exhausted every means of pacification."]

In March, 1865, being with the army in Petersburg, Virginia, I had the pleasure of meeting Colonel Baldwin at a small entertainment at a friend's house, where he conversed with me some two hours on public affairs. During this time, he detailed to me the history of his private mission, from the Virginia Secession Convention, to Mr. Lincoln in April, 1861. The facts he gave me have struck me, especially since the conquest of the South, as of great importance in a history of the origin of the war. It was my earnest hope that Colonel Baldwin would reduce them into a narrative for publication, and I afterwards took measures to induce him to do so, but I fear without effect. Should it appear that he has left such a narrative, while it will confirm the substantial fidelity of my narrative at second hand, it will also supersede mine, and of this result I should be extremely glad. Surviving friends and political associates of Colonel Baldwin must have heard him narrate the same interesting facts. I would earnestly invoke their recollection of his statements to them, so as to correct me, if in any point I misconceived the author, and to confirm me where I am correct, so that the history may regain, as far as possible, that full certainty of which it is in danger of losing a part by the lamented death of Colonel Baldwin. What I here attempt to do, is to give faithfully, in my own language, what I understood Colonel Baldwin to tell me, according to my best comprehension of it. His narration was eminently perspicuous and impressive.

It should also be premised, that the Virginia Convention, as a body, was not in favor of secession. It was prevalently under the

influence of statesmen of the school known as the "Clay-Whig." One of the few original secessionists told me that at first there were but twenty-five members of that opinion, and that they gained no accessions, until they were given them by the usurpations of the Lincoln party. The Convention assembled with a fixed determination to preserve the Union, if forbearance and prudence could do it consistently with the rights of the States. Such, as is well known, were, in the main, Colonel Baldwin's views and purposes.

But Mr. Lincoln's inaugural, with its hints of coercion and usurpation, the utter failure of the "Peace-Congress," and the rejection of Mr. Crittenden's overtures, the refusal to hear the commissioners from Mr. Davis' Government at Montgomery, and the secret arming of the Federal Government for attack, had now produced feverish apprehensions in and out of the Convention. Colonel Baldwin considered Mr. Wm. Ballard Preston, of Montgomery county, as deservedly one of the most influential members of that body. This statesman now began to feel those sentiments, which, soon after, prompted him to move and secure the passage of the resolution to appoint a formal commission of three ambassadors from the Convention to Lincoln's Government, who should communicate the views of Virginia, and demand those of Mr. Lincoln. [That commission consisted of Wm. B. Preston, Alex. H. H. Stuart and Geo. W. Randolph. We will refer to its history in the sequel.] Meantime Mr. Preston, with other original Union men, were feeling thus: "If our voices and votes are to be exerted farther to hold Virginia in the Union, *we must know* what the nature of that Union is to be. We have valued Union, but we are also Virginians, and we love the Union only as it is based upon the Constitution. If the power of the United States is to be perverted to invade the rights of States and of the people, we would support the Federal Government no farther. And now that the attitude of that Government was so ominous of usurpation, we must know whither it is going, or we can go with it no farther." Mr. Preston especially declared that if he were to become an agent for holding Virginia in the Union to the destruction of her honor, and of the liberty of her people and her sister States, he would rather die than exert that agency.

Meantime Mr. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, sent Allen B. Magruder, Esq., as a confidential messenger to Richmond, to hold an interview with Mr. Janney (President of the Convention), Mr. Stuart, and other influential members, and to urge that one of them should come to Washington, as promptly as possible, to con-

fer with Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Magruder stated that he was authorized by Mr. Seward to say that Fort Sumter would be evacuated on the Friday of the ensuing week, and that the Pawnee would sail on the following Monday for Charleston, to effect the evacuation. Mr. Seward said that secrecy was all important, and while it was extremely desirable that one of them should see Mr. Lincoln, it was equally important that the public should know nothing of the interview. These gentlemen held a conference, and determined that as each of them was well known in Washington by person, the required secrecy could not be preserved if either of them went. They therefore asked Colonel Baldwin to go, furnished with the necessary credentials to Mr. Lincoln. He at first demurred, saying that all his public services had been to Virginia, and that he knew nothing of Washington and the Federal politics, but they replied that this was precisely what qualified him, because his presence there would not excite remark or suspicion. Colonel Baldwin accordingly agreed to the mission, and went with Mr. Magruder the following night, reaching Washington the next morning by the "Acquia Creek route" a little after dawn, and driving direct to the house of Mr. Magruder's brother. [These gentlemen were brothers of General J. B. Magruder of Virginia]. These prefatory statements prepare the way for Colonel Baldwin's special narrative.

He stated that after breakfasting and attending to his toilet at the house of Captain Magruder, he went with Mr. A. B. Magruder, in a carriage, with the glasses carefully raised, to Seward, who took charge of Mr. Baldwin, and went direct with him to the White House, reaching it, he thought, not much after nine o'clock A. M. At the door, the man who was acting as usher, or porter, was directed by Colonel Baldwin's companion, to inform the President that a gentleman wished to see him on important business. The man replied, as Colonel Baldwin thought, with an air of negligence, that he would report the application of course, but that it would be useless, because the President was already engaged with very important personages. Some card, or such missive, was given him, and he took it in. He soon returned with a surprised look, and said that the gentleman was to be admitted instantly. Colonel Baldwin accordingly followed him and Mr. Seward into what he presumed was the President's ordinary business room, where he found him in evidently anxious consultation with three or four elderly men, who appeared to wear importance in their aspect. Mr. Seward whispered something to the President, who at once arose

with eagerness, and without making any movement to introduce Colonel Baldwin, said bluntly, in substance: "Gentlemen, excuse me, for I must talk with this man at once. Come this way, sir!" (to Colonel Baldwin). He then took him up stairs to quite a different part of the house, and into what was evidently a private sleeping apartment. There was a handsome bed, with bureau and mirror, washstand, &c., and a chair or two. Lincoln closed the door and locked it. He then said: "Well, I suppose this is Colonel Baldwin, of Virginia? I have heard of you a good deal, and am glad to see you. How d' ye, do sir?" Colonel Baldwin presented his note of credential or introduction, which Lincoln read, sitting upon the edge of the bed, and spitting from time to time on the carpet. He then, looking inquiringly at Colonel Baldwin, intimated that he understood he was authorized to state for his friends in the Virginia Convention the real state of opinion and purpose there. Upon Colonel Baldwin's portraying the sentiments which prevailed among the majority there, Lincoln said querulously: "Yes! your Virginia people are good Unionists, but it is always with an *if*! I don't like that sort of Unionism." Colonel Baldwin firmly and respectfully explained, that in one sense no freeman could be more than a conditional Union man, for the value of the Union was in that equitable and beneficent Constitution on which it was founded, and if this were lost, "Union" might become but another name for mischievous oppression. He also gave Mr. Lincoln assurances, that the description which he was making of the state of opinion in Virginia, was in perfect candor and fidelity, and that he might rest assured the great body of Virginia, in and out of the Convention, would concur in these views, viz: That although strongly opposed to a presidential election upon a sectional, free-soil platform, which they deplored as most dangerous and unwise, Virginia did not approve of making that, evil as it was, a *casus belli*, or a ground for disrupting the Union. That much as Virginia disapproved it, if Mr. Lincoln would only adhere faithfully to the Constitution and the laws, she would support him just as faithfully as though he were the man of her choice, and would wield her whole moral force to keep the border States in the Union, and to bring back the seven seceded States. But that while much difference of opinion existed on the question, whether the right of secession was a constitutional one, all Virginians were unanimous in believing that no right existed in the Federal Government to coerce a State by force of arms, because it was expressly withheld by the Con-

stitution; that the State of Virginia was unanimously resolved not to acquiesce in the usurpation of that power, as had been declared by unanimous joint resolution of her present Legislature, and by the sovereign Convention now sitting, according to the traditionary principles of the State; that if Virginia remained in the Union, the other border States would follow her example, while, if she were driven out, they would probably go with her, and the whole South would be united in irreconcilable hostility to his Government; and that the friends of peace desired to have a guarantee that his policy towards the seven seceded States would be pacific, and would regard their rights as States; without which guarantee the Convention could not keep the people in the Union, even if they would.

Lincoln now showed very plainly that this view was distasteful to him. He intimated that the people of the South were not in earnest in all this. He said that in Washington he was assured that all the resolutions and speeches and declarations of this tenor from the South were but a "game of brag," intended to intimidate the administration party, the ordinary and hollow expedient of politicians; that, in short, when the Government showed its hand, there would "be nothing in it but talk." Colonel Baldwin assured him solemnly that such advisers fatally misunderstood the South, and especially Virginia, and that upon the relinquishment or adoption of the policy of violent coercion, peace or a dreadful war would inevitably turn. Lincoln's native good sense, with Colonel Baldwin's evident sincerity, seemed now to open his eyes to this truth. He slid off the edge of the bed, and began to stalk in his awkward manner across the chamber, in great excitement and perplexity. He clutched his shaggy hair, as though he would jerk out handfuls by the roots; he frowned and contorted his features, exclaiming: "I ought to have known this sooner! You are too late, sir, *too late!* Why did you not come here four days ago, and tell me all this?" turning almost fiercely upon Colonel Baldwin. He replied: "Why, Mr. President, you did not ask our advice. Besides, as soon as we received permission to tender it, I came by the first train, as fast as steam would bring me. "Yes, but you are too late, I tell you, *too late!*" Colonel Baldwin understood this as a clear intimation that the policy of coercion was determined on, and that within the last four days. He said that he therefore felt impelled, by a solemn sense of duty to his country, to make a final effort for impressing Lincoln with the truth.

"Never," said he to me, "did I make a speech on behalf of a client, in jeopardy of his life, with such earnest solemnity and endeavor." "And," he added, "there was no simulated emotions; for when he perceived from Lincoln's hints, and from the workings of his crafty and saturnine countenance, the truculence of his purpose, his own soul was filled with such a sense of the coming miseries of the country, and of the irreparable ruin of the Constitution, that he felt he would willingly lay down his life to avert them." He endeavored to make the President feel that Providence had placed the destiny of the country in his hands, so that he might be forever blessed and venerated as the second Washington—the savior of his country—or execrated as its destroyer. What policy, then, did the Union men of Virginia advise? We believe, answered Colonel Baldwin, that one single step will be sufficient to paralyze the secession movement, and to make the true friends of the Union masters of the situation. This was a simple proclamation, firmly pledging the new administration to respect the Constitution and laws, and the rights of the States; to repudiate the power of coercing seceded States by force of arms; to rely upon conciliation and enlightened self-interest in the latter to bring them back into the Union, and meantime to leave all questions at issue to be adjudicated by the constitutional tribunals. The obvious ground of this policy was in the fact that it was not the question of free-soil which threatened to rend the country in twain, but a well grounded alarm at the attempted overthrow of the Constitution and liberty, by the usurpation of a power to crush States. The question of free-soil had no such importance in the eyes of the people of the border States, nor even of the seceded States, as to become at once a *casus belli*. But, in the view of all parties in the border States, the claim of coercion had infinite importance. If, as Mr. Lincoln had argued, secession was unconstitutional, coercion was more clearly so. When attempted, it must necessarily take the form of a war of some States against other States. It was thus the death-knell of constitutional Union, and so a thorough revolution of the Federal Government. It was the overthrow of the reserved rights of the States, and these were the only bulwark of the liberty of the people. This, then, was the real cause of alarm at the South, and not the claim of free-soil, unjust as was the latter; hence, all that was necessary to reduce the free-soil controversy to harmless and manageable dimensions, was to reassure the South against the dreaded usurpation of which free-soil threatened to be

made the pretext. This, Colonel Baldwin showed, could easily be done by a policy of conciliation, without giving sanction to what Mr. Lincoln's administration chose to regard as the heresy of secession! The Government would still hold the Union and the Constitution as perpetual, and the separate attitude of the seceded States as temporary, while it relied upon moderation, justice, self-interest of the Southern people, and the potent mediation of the border States to terminate it. "Only give this assurance to the country, in a proclamation of five lines," said Colonel Baldwin, and we pledge ourselves that Virginia (and with her the border States) will stand by you as though you were our own Washington. So sure am I, he added, "of this, and of the inevitable ruin which will be precipitated by the opposite policy, that I would this day freely consent, if you would let me write those decisive lines, you might cut off my head, were my life my own, the hour after you signed them."

Lincoln seemed impressed by his solemnity, and asked a few questions: "But what am I to do meantime with those men at Montgomery? Am I to let them go on?" "Yes, sir," replied Colonel Baldwin, decisively, "until they can be peaceably brought back." "And open Charleston, &c., as ports of entry, with their ten per cent. tariff. *What, then, would become of my tariff?*" This last question he announced with such emphasis, as showed that in his view it decided the whole matter. He then indicated that the interview was at an end, and dismissed Colonel Baldwin, without promising anything more definite.

In order to confirm the accuracy of my own memory, I have submitted the above narrative to the Honorable A. H. H. Stuart, Colonel Baldwin's neighbor and political associate, and the only surviving member of the commission soon after sent from the Virginia Convention to Washington. In a letter to me, he says: "When Colonel Baldwin returned to Richmond, he reported to the four gentlemen above named, and to Mr. Samuel Price, of Greenbrier, *the substance of his interview with Lincoln substantially as he stated it to you.*"

I asked Colonel Baldwin what was the explanation of this remarkable scene, and especially of Lincoln's perplexity. He replied that the explanation had always appeared to him to be this: When the seven Gulf States had actually seceded, the Lincoln faction were greatly surprised and in great uncertainty what to do; for they had been blind enough to suppose that all Southern opposition to a sectional president had been empty bluster. They were

fully aware that neither Constitution nor laws gave them any right to coerce a State to remain in the Union. The whole people, even in the imperious North, knew and recognized this truth. The New York *Tribune*, even, admitted it, violent as it was, and deprecated a Union "pinned together with bayonets." Even General Winfield Scott, the military "Man Friday," of Federal power, advised that the Government should say: "Erring Sisters, go in peace." So strong was the conviction, even in the Northern mind, that such journals as Harper's *Weekly* and *Monthly*, shrewdly mercenary in their whole aim, were notoriously courting the secession feeling. New York, the financial capital of America, was well known to be opposed to the faction and to coercion. The previous Congress had expired without daring to pass any coercive measures. The administration was not at all certain that the public opinion of the American people could be made to tolerate anything so illegal and mischievous as a war of coercion. [Subsequent events and declarations betrayed also how well the Lincoln faction knew at the time that it was utterly unlawful. For instance: when Lincoln launched into that war, he did not dare to say that he was warring against States, and for the purpose of coercing them into a Federal Union of force. In his proclamation calling for the first seventy-five thousand soldiers, he had deceitfully stated that they were to be used to support the laws, to repossess Federal property and places, and to suppress irregular combinations of individuals pretending to or usurping the powers of State Governments. The same was the tone of all the war speakers and war journals at first. They admitted that a State could not be coerced into the Union; but they held that no State really and legitimately desired to go out, or had gone out—"the great Union-loving majority in the South had been overruled by a factious secession minority, and the Union troops were only to liberate them from that violence, and enable them to declare their unabated love for the Union." No well informed man was, at first, absurd enough to speak of a State as "committing treason" against the confederation, the creature of the States; the measure was always spoken of as "Secession," the actors were "Secessionists," and even their territory was "Secesia." It remained for an ecclesiastical body, pretended representative of the Church of the Prince of Peace, in their ignorant and venomous spirit of persecution, to apply the term "treason" first to the movement in favor of liberty.] The action of the seven States, then, perplexed the Lincoln faction excessively. On the

other hand, the greed and spite of the hungry crew, who were now grasping the power and spoils so long passionately craved, could not endure the thought that the prize should thus collapse in their hands. Hence, when the administration assembled at Washington, it probably had no very definite policy. Seward, who assumed to do the thinking for them, was temporizing. Colonel Baldwin supposed it was the visit, and the terrorizing of the "radical governors," which had just decided Lincoln to adopt the violent policy. They had especially asserted that the secession of the seven States, and the convening and solemn admonitions of State conventions in the others, formed but a system of bluster, or, in the vulgar phrase of Lincoln, but a "game of brag;" that the Southern States were neither willing nor able to fight for their own cause, being paralyzed by their fear of servile insurrection. Thus they had urged upon Lincoln, that the best way to secure his party triumph was to precipitate a collision. Lincoln had probably committed himself to this policy, without Seward's privity, within the last four days; and the very men whom Colonel Baldwin found in conclave with him were probably intent upon this conspiracy at the time. But when Colonel Baldwin solemnly assured Lincoln that this violent policy would infallibly precipitate the border States into an obstinate war, the natural shrewdness of the latter was sufficient to open his eyes, at least partially, and he saw that his factious counsellors, blinded by hatred and contempt of the South, had reasoned falsely; yet, having just committed himself to them, he had not manliness enough to recede. And above all, the policy urged by Colonel Baldwin would have disappointed the hopes of legislative plunder, by means of inflated tariffs, which were the real aims for which free-soil was the mask.

Thus far Colonel Baldwin's narrative proceeded. The conversation then turned upon the astonishing supineness (or blindness) of the conservatives, so-called, of the North, to the high-handed usurpations of their own rights, perpetrated by Lincoln and Seward, under pretext of subduing the seceded States, such as the suspension of *habeas corpus*, the State prisons, the arrests without indictment, and the martial law imposed, at the beck of the Federal power, in States called by itself "loyal." I asked: "Can it be possible that the Northern people are so ignorant as to have lost the traditionary rudiments of a free government?" His reply was, that he apprehended the Northern mind really cared nothing for

liberty; what they desired was only *lucrative* arrangements with other States.

The correctness of Colonel Baldwin's surmises concerning the motives of Lincoln's policy receives these two confirmations. After the return of the former to Richmond, the Convention sent the commission, which has been described, composed of Messrs. Wm. B. Preston, A. H. H. Stuart, and Geo. W. Randolph. They were to ascertain definitely what the President's policy was to be. They endeavored to reach Washington in the early part of the week in which Fort Sumter was bombarded, but were delayed by storms and high water, so that they only reached there via Baltimore, Friday, April 12th. They appeared promptly at the White House, and were put off until Saturday for their formal interview, although Lincoln saw them for a short time. On Saturday Lincoln read to them a written answer to the resolutions of Convention laid before him, which was obviously scarcely dry from the pen of a clerk. "This paper," says Mr. Stuart, "was ambiguous and evasive, but in the main professed peaceful intentions." Mr. Stuart, in answer to this paper, spoke freely and at large, "urging forbearance and the evacuation of the forts, &c." Lincoln made the objection that all the goods would be imported through the ports of Charleston, &c., and the sources of revenue dried up. "I remember," says Mr. Stuart, "that he used this homely expression: 'If I do that, what will become of my revenue? I might as well shut up house-keeping at once!' But his declarations were distinctly pacific, and he expressly disclaimed all purpose of war." Mr. Seward and Mr. Bates, Attorney General, also gave Mr. Stuart the same assurances of peace. The next day the commissioners returned to Richmond, and the very train on which they traveled carried Lincoln's proclamation, calling for the seventy-five thousand men to wage a war of coercion. "This proclamation," says Mr. Stuart, "was carefully withheld from us, although it was in print; and we knew nothing of it until Monday morning, when it appeared in the Richmond papers. When I saw it at breakfast, I thought it must be a mischievous hoax; for I could not believe Lincoln guilty of such duplicity. Firmly believing it was a forgery, I wrote a telegram, at the breakfast table of the Exchange Hotel, and sent it to Seward, asking him if it was genuine. Before Seward's reply was received, the Fredericksburg train came in, bringing the Washington papers, containing the proclamation."

The other confirmation of Colonel Baldwin's hypothesis was pre-

sented a few weeks after the end of the war, in a curious interview with a personal friend and apologist of Seward. The first volume of my life of Jackson had been published in London, in which I characterized the shameless lie told by Seward to the commissioners from Montgomery, through Judge Campbell, touching the evacuation of Sumter. This friend and apologist of Seward said that I was unjust to him, because when he promised the evacuation, he designed and thought himself able to fulfil it; but between the making and breaking of the pledge, a total change of policy had been forced upon the administration, against Mr. Seward's advice, "by Thad. Stevens and the radical governors." Seward, abolitionist, and knave as he was, still retained enough of the statesman-like traditions of the better days of the republic, to know that coercion was unlawful, and that a war between the States was, of course, the annihilation of the Union. It suited his partisan and selfish designs to talk of an "irrepressible conflict," and to pretend contempt for "effeminate slavocrats;" but he had sense enough to know that the South would make a desperate defence of her rights, and would be a most formidable adversary, if pushed to the wall. Hence, Mr. Seward, with General Scott, had advised a temporizing policy towards the Montgomery government, without violence, and Mr. Lincoln had acceded to their policy. Hence, the promises to Judge Campbell. Meantime, the radical governors came down, "having great wrath," to terrorize the administration. They spoke in this strain: "Seward cries perpetually that we must not do this, and that, for fear war should result. Seward is shortsighted. War is precisely the thing we should desire. Our party interests have everything to lose by a peaceable settlement of this trouble, and everything to gain by collision. For a generation we have been 'the outs;' now at last we are 'the ins.' While in opposition, it was very well to prate of Constitution, and of rights; but now *we* are the government, and mean to continue so; and our interest is to have a strong and centralized government. It is high time now that the government were revolutionized and consolidated, and these irksome 'States' rights' wiped out. We need a strong government to dispense much wealth and power to its adherents; we want permanently high tariffs, to make the South tributary to the North; and now these Southern fellows are giving us precisely the opportunity we want to do all this, and shall Seward sing his silly song of the necessity of avoiding war? War is the very thing we should hail! The Southern men are rash, and now profoundly ir-

ritated. Our plan should be, by some artifice, to provoke them to seem to strike the first blow. Then we shall have a pretext with which to unite the now divided North, and make them fly to arms. The Southerners are a braggart, but a cowardly and effeminate set of bullies; we shall easily whip them in three months. But this short war will be, if we are wise, our sufficient occasion. We will use it to destroy slavery, and thus permanently cripple the South. And that is the stronghold of all these ideas of 'limited government' and 'rights of the people.' Crush the South, by abolishing slavery, and we shall have all we want—a consolidated government, an indefinite party ascendancy, and ability to lay on such tariffs and taxes as we please, and aggrandize ourselves and our section!"

These, Mr. Seward's apologist declared to me, were the reasons which, together with their predictions and threats of popular rage, converted Lincoln from the policy of Seward to that of Stevens. Hence the former was compelled to break his promise through Judge Campbell, and to assist in the malignant stratagem by which the South Carolinians were constrained "to fire on the flag." The diabolical success of the artifice is well known.

The importance of this narrative is, that it unmasks the true authors and nature of the bloody war through which we have passed. We see that *the Radicals provoked it, not to preserve, but to destroy the Union*. It demonstrates, effectually, that Virginia and the border States were acting with better faith to preserve the Union than was Lincoln's Cabinet. Colonel Baldwin showed him conclusively that it was not free-soil, evil as that was, which really endangered the Union, but coercion. He showed him that, if coercion were relinquished, Virginia and the border States stood pledged to labor with him for the restoration of Union, and would assuredly be able to effect it. Eight slave-holding border States, with seventeen hireling States, would certainly have wielded sufficient moral and material weight, in the cause of what Lincoln professed to believe the clear truth and right, to reassure and win back the seven little seceded States, or, if they became hostile, to restrain them. But coercion arraigned fifteen against seventeen in mutually destructive war. Lincoln acknowledged the conclusiveness of his reasoning in the agony of remorse and perplexity, in the writhings and tearings of hair, of which Colonel Baldwin was witness. But what was the decisive weight that turned the scale against peace, and right, and patriotism? It was the interest of a sectional tariff! His single objection, both to the wise advice of

Colonel Baldwin and Mr. Stuart, was: "Then what would become of my tariffs?" He was shrewd enough to see that the just and liberal free-trade policy proposed by the Montgomery Government would speedily build up, by the help of the magnificent Southern staples, a beneficent foreign commerce through Confederate ports; that the Northern people, whose lawless and mercenary character he understood, could never be restrained from smuggling across the long open frontier of the Confederacy; that thus the whole country would become habituated to the benefits of free-trade, so that when the schism was healed [as he knew it would be healed in a few years by the policy of Virginia], it would be too late to restore the iniquitous system of sectional plunder by tariffs, which his section so much craved. Hence, when Virginia offered him a safe way to preserve the Union, he preferred to destroy the Union and preserve his tariffs. The war was conceived in duplicity, and brought forth in iniquity.

The calculated treason of Lincoln's Radical advisers is yet more glaring. When their own chosen leader, Seward, avowed that there was no need for war, they deliberately and malignantly practiced to produce war, for the purpose of overthrowing the Constitution and the Union, to rear their own greedy faction upon the ruins. This war, with all its crimes and miseries, was proximately concocted in Washington city, by Northern men, with malice prepense.

Official Correspondence of Governor Letcher, of Virginia.

The following letters are of interest and value as illustrating the history of the times. Their originals, kindly presented to the Society by Governor Letcher, constitute a valuable addition to our collection of autographs.

Upon a request of Governor Letcher that Lieutenant-Colonel Hardee, United States Army, be allowed to come to Richmond to drill the Virginia cavalry then encamped at the Fair Grounds, General Scott wrote the following letters.

General Hardee complied with the request, and drilled the cavalry several days.

NEW YORK, October 22, 1860.

His Excellency JOHN LETCHER, *Governor of Virginia*:

My Dear Sir—I have caused a copy of your letter to be forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Hardee, who is, I think, still at West Point, though relieved from duty there. It is not competent for a

senior to order a junior of the army on any service whatever, not strictly within the line of his official duties, but I think it probable Colonel Hardee will take pleasure in meeting the wishes of your Excellency. With great respect,

I have the honor to remain,

Your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
NEW YORK, October 22, 1862.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. HARDEE, *First United States Cavalry* :

Sir—By direction of the Lieutenant-General commanding the army, I send you the enclosed copy of a letter received by him from the Governor of Virginia. I am also instructed by the General to say, that as you have been authorized to delay proceeding to join your new post until the first of February next, you are, of course, at liberty to accept or to decline Governor Letcher's invitation to visit the encampment of cavalry, as you may think proper.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

E. D. KEYS,

*Lieutenant-Colonel United States Army,
Military Secretary to Lieutenant-General Scott.*

The following from Honorable George W. Summers, and the reply of Governor Letcher, are important:

KANAWHA COURTHOUSE, May 3d, 1861.

JOHN LETCHER, ESQ., *Governor, &c.* :

My Dear Sir—So far, the population on either side the Ohio remain quiet. Our former relation of good neighborhood continues. The boats in the Cincinnati trade from this Valley yet make their trips, but have had difficulty in some instances in procuring freights, especially in the provision line. The people of Ohio profess to desire peace and commerce with us; but it is not to be denied that the public mind is in a sensitive condition, rendering it easy for the worst men on either side the border to produce difficulties which might become widespread. To avoid this, I learn that the good and substantial men on both sides have taken measures, by committees of safety, &c., to watch and suppress any outbreak. I doubt very much the expediency of Virginia sending any troops to the western border, at least for the present. The appearance of troops at Wheeling, Parkersburg, Point Pleasant, or any places on the Ohio river, would serve to irritate and invite aggression. You could not send enough to do much good, if they chose to invade *from the other side*. They can concentrate on Wheeling 50,000 men from the other side in twenty-four hours by

the various railroads leading to that point; so at Parkersburg, but in less numbers. The Ohio is fordable in the summer and fall at many points, and the whole river, from Sandy to the end of Hancock, easily crossed. We have here, and in all the counties, volunteer companies, home guards, &c. Our mountains are full of rifles, and if invaded, we shall give a good account of ourselves. The question with us is, whether we are not better off, left to ourselves, than to have a small and inadequate force sent to us, which might merely serve as an excuse for an outbreak. What we need is guns in the hands of our own companies.

Whether it might be well to have some troops in the interior, at long distance from the river—such a point as Grafton or Piedmont, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad—might be worthy of consideration.

Troops in any of the counties on the rivers would most probably cut off every supply from below, both for the army and the resident population.

I have ventured to throw out these suggestions, not formally, as to the commander-in-chief, but in the freedom of private friendship, knowing your anxiety to do your whole duty in this crisis, and your wish to obtain information from every part of the State.

I found on reaching home a member of my family in a critical condition (the main cause of my return); this still continues. I had expected the Convention to have adjourned before this time, but I could not have returned to Richmond ere this, for the reason mentioned.

I am well aware that your whole time is occupied with public affairs, but if in the midst of your official duties and burdens you can snatch a moment for a line to me, it would afford me the utmost pleasure. Is this likely to be a general war of invasion, or are the stupids at Washington to attempt a scheme of blockade and border foray, starvation, &c., by cutting off commerce?

I need not say that it will afford me the utmost pleasure to be of any service to you in this part of the State, and I hope you will not hesitate to call upon me. Your communications, when necessary, shall be held as strictly confidential. My best respects for Mrs. L., if she is with you.

With high esteem,

Your obedient servant,

GEO. W. SUMMERS.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, May 10th, 1861.

My Dear Sir—Your favor of May 3d has been received. Deeming it important that the suggestions you have been kind enough to make should be made known to General Lee, who has been entrusted with the defence of the State, I have taken the liberty of submitting your letter to him.

General Lee concurs fully with you in the views you have pre-

sented, and the steps taken by him for the protection and defence of your section of the State coincide almost exactly with the course you have advised me to pursue. He agrees with you that it would be impossible for us to raise a force at this time sufficiently strong to resist the large bodies of troops in the States of the Northwest, at the command of the Federal Government, and that it is inexpedient and unwise to invite an invasion by the concentration of troops among you. But he thinks it important to guard your section from the lawless bands which may be tempted to make raids upon you if they found that the volunteer force is not organized and ready for service. He has therefore instructed the officers placed in command to gather a volunteer force at Grafton, the point designated by you, from the surrounding counties, and hold it in readiness to be employed at any point where its services may be required.

Arms have been sent to the volunteer companies, but no troops have or will be sent from this part of the State. While this line of policy is suggested by our comparative weakness, and by the difficulty of collecting, in any short time, an organized force in Northwestern Virginia, sufficient to meet a large body of troops coming against us, it is also called for by the distracted and divided state of our own people; and I know of no better way of establishing unity of feeling and of securing a hearty co-operation on the part of all our citizens, in the support of the State, in the position it now occupies, than by placing arms in the hands of men known to be loyal and true, to be used in their own defence.

I shall be glad to hear frequently from you upon the subject of your letter, and to receive any suggestions you may be pleased to make.

I remain, most respectfully yours, &c.,

JOHN LETCHER.

Hon. Geo. W. Summers, Charleston, Kanawha County, Va.

The two following letters from President Davis are of interest:

RICHMOND, June 7, 1861.

Dear Sir—I have the honor to acknowledge yours of yesterday, covering the letter of General Floyd and its enclosure, to wit: three captains' commissions, which had been regularly issued by you. Permit me to express my regret, that in the effort to organize a brigade for the defence of Southwestern Virginia, and the important line of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, that there should have been any interference with your unquestionable authority and commendable efforts to increase the military power of Virginia. The apprehension of a movement by the enemy towards East Tennessee, renders it necessary, at the earliest practicable period, to have—say two regiments embodied in the Southwestern District of Virginia; and, if you can consistently do so, I would be glad that the companies in question should be left in that

region until General Floyd can complete the organization of his brigade, and, if you please, that these companies should form a part of it.

Enclosed please find a copy of the letter this day addressed to General Floyd, and believe me to be,

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

To His Excellency John Letcher, Governor of Virginia.

RICHMOND, June 7th, 1861.

General JOHN B. FLOYD:

Dear Sir—Governor Letcher has sent me yours of the 4th instant, covering the commissions of four captains, and a statement to the effect that those officers were duly commissioned and regularly in the service of the State of Virginia, and could not therefore rightfully transfer their companies to another service.

Please find enclosed a copy of my reply to him. Should he be pleased to transfer the companies to your brigade, the difficulty will thereby be removed, otherwise you will not fail to perceive they cannot be incorporated into the command you are authorized to organize and muster into service. The good temper exhibited by the Governor induces me to hope that he will thus aid you in the formation of your brigade, and you will permit me in friendly spirit to assure you that he has manifested none other than the best wishes for yourself personally, and for the success of the service entrusted to you.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully yours,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

The letters which follow are interesting illustrations of what Virginia was enabled to do in assisting to arm the troops of other States as well as her own:

RICHMOND, September 20th, 1861.

To his Excellency Governor JOHN LETCHER:

Sir—I am happy to be the vehicle of communication of the enclosed resolutions of the Committee of Safety for the town of Wilmington, in which your Excellency will perceive that your kindness to the citizens of Wilmington in their moment of danger is duly and highly appreciated. With the sincere assurance that your Excellency's kindness will always by us be remembered with gratitude, I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

WM. S. ASHE.

WILMINGTON, N. C., September 17th, 1861.

At a meeting of the Committee of Safety for the town of Wilmington, the following proceeding was adopted:

Honorable Wm. S. Ashe having reported that he had procured from Governor Letcher, of Virginia, an eight-inch columbiad and a supply of muskets—

“*Resolved*, That the thanks of this Committee are eminently due and are hereby most earnestly tendered to his Excellency John Letcher, Governor of Virginia, for the promptness with which he has responded to the application for arms by this Committee.

“*Resolved*, That a copy of the foregoing resolution be handed to Mr. Ashe, with the request that he will communicate the same to Governor Letcher.”

S. D. WALLACE, *Secretary*.

RICHMOND, VA., September 21st, 1861.

Honorable WM. S. ASHE:

Dear Sir—I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, enclosing resolutions adopted by the Committee of Safety for the town of Wilmington, expressive of their thanks for the arms which it was in my power to furnish for their defence. In the distribution of the arms, &c., at my disposal, it has afforded me pleasure to provide, as far as possible, for the defence, not only of my own State, but of all the Confederate States, engaged as we are in a common cause for the maintenance of rights and institutions dear to us all.

I return to the Committee my acknowledgments for their resolutions, and many thanks to you for the kind terms which you have employed in communicating them to me.

I am, truly,

JOHN LETCHER.

RICHMOND, VA., October 9th, 1862.

My Dear Governor—I have the honor to present to you Mr. Edmund Turner, of my staff, and to say that you will place me under the greatest of obligations by delivering to him the order for the arms which you were kind enough to offer me day before yesterday, and by informing him how and where they are to be obtained.

Please let me have as many as you can spare.

I shall thus be made by you doubly welcome to my new command, and in the use of these arms promise to justify your kindness.

I am engaged this evening with a part of my family, who have just arrived from the country, and will leave to-morrow morning.

Under no other circumstances would I have failed to call upon you and thank you for the prompt and efficient manner in which

you have always acted in support of my humble efforts to serve our cause, and for your present kindness in offering me the means to do so, where they are so much needed.

Doctor Mayo informs me that you will leave for the salt works to-morrow morning, and as I may not meet you for a long time, allow me to express my high appreciation of your great and eminent services to our noble, suffering and uncomplaining State, now afflicted by the direst calamities, and threatened with the most formidable dangers that can befall a gallant and virtuous people.

God grant you, and all who labor in her cause, the success which such efforts justly merit.

With sentiments of the highest regard,

I remain, Governor,

Very faithfully, your friend and servant,

J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST KENTUCKY BRIGADE,
BOWLING GREEN, KENTUCKY, November 30th, 1861.

Colonel—The muskets, I am informed, have reached Nashville. I am in receipt of your communication of November 12th, and am under the greatest obligations for your kindness and attention in the matter. Very truly yours,

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE.

Will you be good enough to express my warm thanks to Governor Letcher, to whom I will write in a few days? The guns shall be distributed in his name to my ill-armed brigade.

J. C. B.

Col. Charles Dimmock, Chief of Ordnance Department, Richmond, Va.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
RICHMOND, December 9, 1861.

My Dear Sir—With the thanks of Governor Pickens and myself for your prompt and considerate response to our request for arms for South Carolina, I herewith send you a receipt of the Governor for the same. Very truly yours,

C. G. MEMMINGER.

His Excellency Governor Letcher, present.

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, December 3d, 1861.

Received from Governor Letcher, of the State of Virginia, five hundred muskets, altered to percussion, as a loan to the State of South Carolina, through Mr. Henry Spannack, as special agent for the State of Virginia.

W. G. EASON,
Assistant Ordnance Officer, South Carolina.

The following letter from General R. E. Lee will be read with interest, as showing that at an early day he appreciated and sought to provide against the danger of the disorganization of the volunteer forces of the Confederacy:

COOSAWHATCHIE, SOUTH CAROLINA, December 26th, 1861.

His Excellency JOHN LETCHER, *Governor of Virginia*:

Governor—I have desired to call your attention to the necessity of making provision for replacing the Virginia regiments transferred to the Confederate States for twelve months previous to the limitation of their present term of service. I hope the late law of Congress will induce them to re-enlist. But should it not, I tremble to think of the different conditions our armies will present to those of the enemy at the opening of the next campaign.

On the plains of Manassas, for instance, the enemy will resume operations, after a year's preparation and a winter of repose, fresh, vigorous and completely organized, while we shall be in the confusion and excitement of reorganizing ours. The disbanding and reorganizing an army in time of peace is attended with loss and expense. What must it be in time of active service in the presence of the enemy prepared to strike? I have thought that General McClellan is waiting to take the advantage which that opportunity will give him. What is then to stand between him and Richmond? I know of no way of ensuring the re-enlistment of our regiments, except by the passage of a law for drafting them "for the war," unless they volunteer for that period. The great object of the Confederate States is to bring the war to a successful issue. Every consideration should yield to that; for without it we can hope to enjoy nothing that we possess, and nothing that we do possess will be worth enjoying without it.

I have also wished to speak of one of our best officers. Colonel Carter L. Stevenson. He has been and still is in Western Virginia, acting as Adjutant-General of General Loring. He ought to be at the head of a regiment. He is a faithful, energetic officer, and at this time I should suppose not wanted in his present position. Cannot he get a Virginia regiment, with Lieutenant-Colonel S. Bassett French as Lieutenant-Colonel, and be sent out here? I want troops badly, and want them *for the war*. I fear Colonel French will get sick if he remains longer in Richmond, and you would be obliged to give him up then.

Our enemy here is very strong, and his fleet all-powerful in these waters. As yet he has effected but little, and if he will leave his big floating guns, that sweep over the lowlands like a scythe, I hope he will not have everything his own way.

With my best wishes, my dear Governor, for your health and happiness, and kind regards to all around you, I remain with high respect, truly and sincerely yours,

R. E. LEE.

Editorial Paragraphs.

THIS NUMBER closes the first volume of our *Papers*, and we feel constrained to thank our friends for their cordial support, and to congratulate the Society on the marked success which has thus far attended our venture.

When we issued our first number in January, it was a doubtful experiment; now the enterprise is an assured success. Our subscription list is steadily increasing, we have from every quarter evidence of the highest appreciation of the value of our publications, and we feel encouraged to begin the new volume with redoubled zeal and a renewed purpose to make our *Papers* of real interest and value to all who desire to know and to propagate the truth concerning our great struggle for Southern Independence.

But we would not have our friends conclude that we are now in a position to get along without their co-operation. We need to retain all of the subscribers we now have and to greatly increase their number, and to this end we ask that each one shall make some personal effort to extend our circulation.

THE CONFEDERATE ROSTER, which we are now publishing, seems to us much more complete and accurate than could have been expected under the obvious difficulties which surround its preparation. But the author is exceedingly anxious to make it as complete as possible, and would esteem it a special favor if any one detecting mistakes or omissions would at once communicate the desired corrections.

WE propose to begin in our next volume the publication of a *summary* of the principal events of the war, which shall be a mere connecting link between the more important official reports, which we shall publish in chronological order. Some of these reports have been already published, but in a form not accessible to many who desire to see and use them; others have never been in print.

OUR BOOK—“*Confederate View of the Treatment of Prisoners*”—will be ready in a few days, and we beg that those desiring it will at once send their orders, accompanied with the money, that we may know how many copies to issue.

Our friends would do a valuable service by placing this vindication of the Confederacy on the shelves of every public library in the country. We will mail the book (postage paid) at the following very low prices:

Cloth binding.....	\$1 25
Half Morocco	1 50
Half Calf	1 75

WE will be able to furnish bound copies of the first volume of "*Southern Historical Papers*" at the following rates:

Cloth.....	\$2 00
Half Morocco.....	2 25
Half Calf.....	2 50

The volume will make a really beautiful book of about 500 pages. Orders must be accompanied with the cash to secure attention.

TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS are a nuisance, with which, to do our excellent printers justice, we have been but seldom troubled. Two, however, crept into General Wilcox's letter in our last number, which are of sufficient importance to be corrected. Colonel *Sydenham* Moore was printed *Nydenham* Moore, and the date of the battle of Seven Pines was twice printed *1st of May*, instead of the *31st of May*.

VALENTINE, our Southern artist, has just completed, at his studio in Richmond, a superb bust of General Albert Sidney Johnston.

It was never our privilege to meet this great man, but it is a very accurate likeness of the portrait from which it is modeled, and we learn that Colonel William Preston Johnston pronounces it the best likeness of the original extant, and proposes to have the engraving for his forthcoming memoir of his father made from this bust.

There clusters around the name of Albert Sidney Johnston the highest admiration for his exalted genius, the warmest affection for his purity of character, and the tenderest memories and saddest regrets for his early fall. It will be a source of double joy to admirers of genius, virtue and patriotism everywhere to learn that we will soon have the story of this noble life from the facile pen of his accomplished son, and that Valentine's plastic, skillful touch has so perfectly delineated his noble features in plaster, and will soon make them seem to breathe and speak in the pure marble. And we are exceedingly fortunate in having at the South an artist whose busts of Lee, Jackson, Stuart, Maury, Johnston, and others of our great leaders, display genius of the highest order, whose recumbent figure of Lee has scarcely an equal and no superior in any work of art in this country, and whose studio has become a Mecca for all true Confederates.

May Valentine be spared to complete, and may Southern patriotism enable him to complete, many more such works, which shall hand down to posterity the form and features of our noble leaders.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARCHIVES OF THE SOCIETY continue to come in. We have space to acknowledge only the following recent contributions. From—

Judge Thomas C. Manning, Alexandria, Louisiana.—The Journal and Ordinances of the Secession Convention of Louisiana.—Special message of the Governor of Louisiana, in December, 1860, commonly known as the

"Secession Message."—Proclamation of the Governor of Louisiana of May 24th, 1862, on hearing of the celebrated order of General Butler, issued in New Orleans, directing that the ladies of that city should be, under certain circumstances, treated as "women of the town."—Reports of T. C. Manning and other commissioners appointed by the Governor of Louisiana upon the atrocities committed by the Federal troops under General Banks during the invasion of Western Louisiana in 1863 and 1864.—Copy of a newspaper printed in Louisiana in October, 1862, on wall paper, showing the shifts journalists had to resort to thus early.

John F. Mayer, Richmond, Virginia.—Report of the Secretary of War, November 6th, 1863.—Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December 7th, 1863.—Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, May 2d, 1864.—Report of the Secretary of War, April 28th, 1864.—Report of the Secretary of War, November 3d, 1864.—Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, November 7th, 1864.—Message of President Davis, November 7th, 1864.—Report of the Agent of Exchange of Prisoners, November 18th, 1864.—Report of the Agent of Exchange of Prisoners, December 3d, 1864.—Copy of Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry relative to the fall of New Orleans, February 18th, 1863.—Pamphlet, "Evidences taken before the Committee of the House of Representatives, appointed to inquire into the Treatment of Prisoners at Castle Thunder," April 1863.

Colonel C. T. Crittenden.—Lot of Confederate newspaper slips.—Battle flag of the Thirteenth Virginia Infantry.—Richmond *Examiner's* account of the presentation ceremonies.

General D. H. Maury, Richmond, Virginia.—Private Diary, "Recollections of the War," &c.—Copies of the proceedings of a court of inquiry held at Abbeville, Mississippi, on charges preferred by Brigadier-General John S. Bowen, P. A. C. S., against Major-General Earl Van Dorn, P. A. C. S., November, 1862.—Judge-Advocate Holt's account of the execution of Mrs. Sur-ratt.—Letter of Colonel S. L. Lockett on the Defence of Mobile.—Various newspaper slips of importance.—Private Journal of Samuel H. Lockett on Defence of Mobile.

Creed T. Davis, Richmond, Virginia.—A Record of Camps, Marches and Actions of Second Company Richmond Howitzers, campaign 1864.

Rev. C. H. Corey, Richmond.—Journal of the Secession Convention of the people of South Carolina, 1860 and 1861.

Mrs. Mikel, Charleston, South Carolina.—Lot of Miscellaneous Confederate Documents.

Judge John F. Lay.—Confederate newspapers 1861 and 1862.—Map of Virginia used on the retreat from Richmond.—Map of the Seat of War in South Carolina and Georgia.

Major Norman S. Walker, Liverpool.—Five bound volumes of the London *Index*, from May 1st 1862, to August 12th 1865.

E. V. Fox, Esq.—"Fox's Mission to Russia in 1866."

Mrs. Henry Pye, Richmond, Virginia.—MSS. of General Lee's final and full Report of the Pennsylvania Campaign (dated January 1864), copied by Michael Kelly, Clerk to General S. Cooper.

R. S. Hollins, Baltimore, Maryland.—One bound file of Baltimore *Sun*, from October, 1860, to December 31st, 1865.—T. Ditterline's sketch of the battles of Gettysburg.—M. Jacobs' Invasion of Pennsylvania and Battle of Gettysburg.

John McRae, Camden, South Carolina.—Complete file of *Charleston Courier* from May 1856 to February 1865.—Complete file of *Richmond Dispatch* from April 1861 to April 1864.

James T. Bowyer, Fincastle, Virginia.—Lot of miscellaneous Confederate newspapers.

Miss Kate McCall, Louisiana, through Colonel G. W. Terrell, New Orleans.—Five Scrap Books filled with clippings from newspapers printed during the war.

Cassius F. Lee, Jr., Alexandria, Virginia.—1 volume Confederate Battle Reports of 1861 and 1862.—Report of Major-General John Pope, U. S. A., of his campaign in Virginia.—Majority and Minority Report U. S. Senate on John Brown's Harpers Ferry Invasion.—Preliminary Report of the United States Census of 1860.—Message of the President of the United States and Diplomatic Correspondence for 1862.—Message of the President of the United States and accompanying documents December, 1863.—"View of Slavery by Bishop Hopkins."—"My Diary, North and South," by William Howard Russell.—"McClellan, who he is and what he has done."—Message of "Governor" F. H. Pierpont, December 7th, 1863.—The Tribune Almanac for 1862, 1863 and 1865.—General McClellan's Official Report.—Old Franklin Almanac for 1864.—Speeches of Honorable Henry May, of Maryland, in Federal Congress.—"Three Months in the Southern States, from April to June, 1863," by Colonel Fremantle, of the British Army.—Lot of newspaper clippings from papers of 1864 and 1865.—Lot of newspapers published during the war.—Seventeen Scrap Books, containing newspaper clippings extending over the whole period of the war, carefully arranged in chronological order and indexed.

It will be seen at a glance that the above contributions are very valuable. And are there not scattered all through the homes of our people similar, or even more valuable material, which they might send us? Remember that where our friends have valuable material which they are unwilling to give us, we would be very glad to receive it *as a loan*, promising to carefully preserve and return it whenever desired.

We are especially desirous of securing reports of the campaign of 1864, as our archives are more defective for that period than any other, owing to the fact that the Confederate Government made few publications of battle reports after Chancellorsville. And even where we have reports or other documents, it is important for us to secure duplicates, which we can always use to advantage.

We are desirous of securing even odd numbers of newspapers published during the war, to enable us to complete our files. And we would be especially pleased to secure files of our Southern Religious papers, sermons, tracts, &c., as we desire to put the Confederacy right on the record as to the character of our leaders, soldiers, and people, and the spirit in which they entered upon and conducted the war.

OUR book notices are crowded out.

A ROSTER
OF
GENERAL OFFICERS,
HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS,
SENATORS, REPRESENTATIVES,
MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, &c., &c.,
IN
CONFEDERATE SERVICE DURING THE WAR
BETWEEN THE STATES.

BY
CHARLES C. JONES, JR.
Late Lieut. Colonel of Artillery, C. S. A.

RICHMOND, VA.:
SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY.
1876.

PREFATORY NOTE.

In consequence of the general loss and destruction of Confederate records, and a refusal on the part of the War Department to permit free access to such as have been preserved at Washington, the preparation of the following Roster was environed with no inconsiderable difficulty. The accompanying pages embody the result of much toil and inquiry. Fortunately many important war documents, original returns and official reports still exist in private hands, and from them material aid has been derived. In not a few instances the necessary information touching the commissions and commands of general officers has been obtained either from the officers themselves or from the friends of such as fell in the Confederate struggle, or have since died. While perfectness cannot be claimed for it, this Roster may nevertheless be accepted as nearly complete. No labor like the present having been as yet attempted, it is offered in the hope that it will supply an existing deficiency and prove a convenient roll of the Confederate Dramatis Personæ of the greatest of modern Revolutions—of which, in the language of Phinius Minor, it may be truthfully affirmed, *Si computes annos, exiguum tempus; si vices rerum, ævum putes.*

CHARLES C. JONES, JR.

New York City, May 1st, 1876.

CONFEDERATE ROSTER.

THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

His Excellency Jefferson Davis, Mississippi, President of the Confederate States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, Georgia, Vice President of the Confederate States and President of the Senate.

THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY FAMILY.

Colonel Joseph R. Davis, Mississippi, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry ; in 1863 entered the field as Brigadier-General.

Colonel G. W. Custis Lee, Virginia, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry ; subsequently entered the field and rose to the grade of Major-General.

Colonel Joseph C. Ives, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry.

Colonel Wm. Preston Johnston, Kentucky, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry.

Colonel Wm. M. Browne, Georgia, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry ; subsequently entered the field and rose to the grade of Brigadier-General.

Colonel John Taylor Wood, Louisiana, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry.

Colonel James Chestnut, Jr., South Carolina, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry ; subsequently entered the field and rose to the grade of Brigadier-General.

Colonel Francis R. Lubbock, Texas, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry ; also a Confederate Governor of Texas.

Robert Josselyn, Mississippi, Private Secretary to the President during the Provisional Government.

Burton N. Harrison, Mississippi, Private Secretary to the President during the Permanent Government.

Colonel John M. Huger, A. D. C., with rank of Colonel of Cavalry.

Colonel John B. Sale, Military Secretary, with rank of Colonel of Cavalry, to General Braxton Bragg, who was assigned to duty at the Seat of Government at Richmond, and, under the direction of the President, was charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy. See General Orders, No. 23, A. and I. General's office, Richmond, Virginia, February 24th, 1864. Colonel Sale was thus brought into intimate relationship with the President's military family.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Hon. Robert Toombs, Georgia, First Secretary of State; subsequently entered the Confederate army with the rank of Brigadier-General; also a Delegate to Provisional Congress.

Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, Virginia, succeeded General Toombs as Secretary of State; Delegate to Provisional Congress and Confederate Senator from Virginia.

Hon. Judah P. Benjamin, Louisiana, succeeded Mr. Hunter as Secretary of State.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

Hon. Judah P. Benjamin, Louisiana, first Attorney General.

Hon. Thomas Bragg, North Carolina, second Attorney General.

Hon. T. H. Watts, Alabama, third Attorney-General; subsequently elected Governor of Alabama.

Hon. George Davis, North Carolina, fourth Attorney-General; Delegate to Provisional Congress, Senator from North Carolina, &c.

Hon. Wade Keys, Assistant Attorney-General.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

Hon. Charles G. Memminger, South Carolina, first Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. George A. Trenholm, South Carolina, second Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. E. C. Elmore, Alabama, Treasurer.

Hon. Philip Clayton, Georgia, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

Lewis Cruger, South Carolina, Comptroller and Solicitor.

Bolling Baker, Georgia, First Auditor.

Robert Tyler, Virginia, Register.

WAR DEPARTMENT.

Hon. Leroy P. Walker, Alabama, first Secretary of War; afterwards entered the army with the rank of Brigadier-General.

Hon. Judah P. Benjamin, Louisiana, second Secretary of War; also Secretary of State and Attorney-General.

Hon. George W. Randolph, Virginia, third Secretary of War; at one time in the army with the rank of Brigadier-General.

Hon. James A. Seddon, Virginia, fourth Secretary of War; Delegate from Virginia to Provisional Congress.

Major-General John C. Breckinridge, Kentucky, fifth Secretary of War; summoned from the field [where he was serving with the rank and command of a Major-General] to discharge the duties of this office.

Albert Taylor Bledsod, LL. D., Virginia, Assistant Secretary of War.

Hon. John A. Campbell, Louisiana, Assistant Secretary of War.

General Samuel Cooper, Virginia, Adjutant and Inspector General.

Colonel A. C. Myers, first Quartermaster-General.

Brigadier-General A. R. Lawton, Georgia, second Quartermaster-General; summoned from the field, where he was serving with the rank and command of Brigadier-General, to discharge the duties of this office.

Colonel L. B. Northrup, South Carolina, first Commissary-General.

Colonel L. M. St. John, second Commissary-General; afterwards promoted to the grade of Brigadier-General.

Colonel Josiah Gorgas, Virginia, Chief of Ordnance; afterwards promoted to the grade of Brigadier-General.

Colonel T. S. Rhett, in charge of the Ordnance Bureau.

Colonel J. F. Gilmer, North Carolina, Chief of the Engineer Bureau; afterwards promoted to the grade of Major-General.

Colonel S. P. Moore, M. D., South Carolina, Surgeon-General; afterwards promoted to the grade of Brigadier-General.

Colonel John S. Preston, South Carolina, Chief of the Bureau of Conscription; afterwards promoted to the grade of Brigadier-General.

Colonel T. P. August, Superintendent of the Bureau of Conscription.

Brigadier-General John H. Winder, Maryland, Commanding Prison Camps and Provost Marshal General.

Colonel Robert Ould, Virginia, Chief of the Bureau of Exchange.

Colonel Richard Morton, Chief of the Nitre and Mining Bureau.

Colonel R. G. H. Kean, Chief of the Bureau of War.

Lieutenant-Colonel I. H. Carrington, Virginia, Assistant Provost Marshal General, on duty at Richmond, Virginia.

Colonel Thomas L. Bayne, Louisiana, Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Supplies.

NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Hon. Stephen R. Mallory, Florida, Secretary of the Navy.

Captain French Forrest, Virginia, Chief of the Bureau of Orders and Detail.

Commander John M. Brooke, Florida, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT.

Hon. John H. Reagan, Texas, Postmaster-General; Delegate from Texas to the Provisional Congress.

H. St. George Offutt, Virginia, Chief of Contract Bureau.

B. N. Clements, Tennessee, Chief of Bureau of Appointment.

J. L. Harrell, Alabama, Chief of Finance Bureau.

Colonel Rufus R. Rhodes, Mississippi, Commissioner of Patents.

GENERALS CONFEDERATE STATES

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
1	Samuel Cooper.....	Virginia	Aug. 31, 1861.	May 16, 1861.
2	Albert S. Johnston....	Texas.....	Aug. 31, 1861.	May 30, 1861.
3	Robert E. Lee.....	Virginia	Aug. 31, 1861.	June 14, 1861.
4	Joseph E. Johnston....	Virginia	Aug. 31, 1861.	July 4, 1861.
5	Gustav. T. Beauregard.	Louisiana..	Aug. 31, 1861.	July 21, 1861.
6	Braxton Bragg.....	Louisiana..	Apl. 12, 1862.	Apl. 12, 1862.

GENERAL PROVISIONAL ARMY

1	Edmund Kirby Smith..	Florida....	Trans-Miss. Dept.....	Feb. 19, 1864.	Feb. 19, 1864.
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GENERAL WITH

1	John B. Hood.....	Texas.....	July 18, 1864.	July 18, 1864.
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NOTE.—At the times of their resignations from the United States army in 1861, five of the above named officers held the following ranks respectively:

General Joseph E. Johnston was Quartermaster-General U. S. A., with the rank of Brigadier General.

General Samuel Cooper was Adjutant-General U. S. A., with the rank of Colonel.

ARMY, IN ORDER OF RANK.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
Aug. 31, 1861, and Apl. 23, 1863. Aug. 31, 1861.	}	Adjutant and Inspector-General. Killed at the Battle of Shiloh; assigned by Special Order No. 149, A. & I. G. O., Sept. 10, 1861, to the command of Department Number 2, embracing Tennessee and Arkansas, that part of Mississippi west of the N. O. J. & G. N. R. R. and the G. N. & C. R. R., and the military operations in Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian country west of Missouri and Arkansas, &c., &c.
Aug. 31, 1861, and Apl. 23, 1863.	}	Nominated and confirmed as "General-in-Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States of America" January 31, 1865; at first appointed Major-General of the military forces of Virginia; in command of the operations in the Trans-Alleghany region; in the winter of 1861 in command of the South Carolina and Georgia coast; from the spring of 1862 to the close of the war in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, &c., &c.
Aug. 31, 1861, and Apl. 23, 1863.	}	At first Major-General of Virginia State forces; assigned by President Davis to command at Harper's Ferry; at Manassas; in command, on the Peninsula, of the Department of Northern Virginia; June 9, 1863, assigned to command of forces in Mississippi; December 18, 1863, assigned to command of the Army of Tennessee; February 23, 1865, again in command of the Army of Tennessee in North Carolina and of all troops in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, &c., &c.
Aug. 31, 1861, and Apl. 23, 1863.	}	Assigned to command at Charleston, S. C.; at Manassas; in command of the District of the Potomac; March 5, 1862, assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi; subsequently in command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, of North Carolina and South Virginia, &c., &c.
Apl. 12, 1862.	Assigned to duty at the Seat of Government, and, under the direction of the President, charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy; see General Orders No. 23; A. & I. General's office, Richmond, Va., February 24, 1864; had previously commanded Department of the West, Army of Tennessee, Second Corps, Army of the Mississippi, &c., &c.

CONFEDERATE STATES.

.....	Commanding District of Louisiana, occupied by Taylor's [afterwards Buckner's] corps, consisting of Walker's and Polignac's divisions and Green's cavalry brigade; the District of Texas, defended by Magruder's corps, consisting of Forney's, McCulloch's and Wharton's divisions; the District of Arkansas, held by Price's corps, consisting of the divisions of Price and Churchill and the brigades of Fagan, Shelby and Marmaduke, and the district of the Indian Territory—the whole constituting the Trans-Mississippi Department.
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TEMPORARY RANK.

.....	Commanding Army of Tennessee.
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General Albert S. Johnston was Colonel of the Second cavalry U. S. A. with the rank of Brevet Brigadier-General.

General Robert E. Lee was Colonel of the First cavalry U. S. A.

General G. T. Beanregard was Captain and Brevet Major Corps of Engineers U. S. A.

See Official Army Register for September, 1861, page 61

LIEUTENANT-GENERALS,

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
1	James Longstreet.....	Alabama...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Oct. 11, 1862.	Oct. 9, 1862.
2	E. Kirby Smith.....	Florida	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Oct. 11, 1862.	Oct. 9, 1862.
3	Leonidas Polk.....	Louisiana..	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Oct. 11, 1862.	Oct. 10, 1862.
4	Theophilus H. Holmes.	N. Carolina		Oct. 13, 1862.	Oct. 10, 1862.
5	William J. Hardee.....	Georgia....	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Oct. 11, 1862.	Oct. 10, 1862.
6	Thomas J. Jackson....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Oct. 11, 1862.	Oct. 10, 1862.
7	John C. Pemberton..	Virginia ...	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Oct. 13, 1862.	Oct. 10, 1862.
8	Richard S. Ewell.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	May 23, 1863.	May 23, 1863.
9	Ambrose P. Hill.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	May 23, 1863.	May 24, 1863.
10	Daniel H. Hill.....	N. Carolina		July 11, 1863.	July 11, 1863.
11	John B. Hood..	Texas.....	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Feb. 11, 1864.	Sept. 20, 1863.
12	Richard Taylor.....	Louisiana..	Gen. E. K. Smith....	May 16, 1864.	April 8, 1864.
13	Stephen D. Lee.....	S. Carolina.		June 23, 1864.	June 23, 1864.
14	Jubal A. Early.....	Virginia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	May 31, 1864.	May 31, 1864.

IN ORDER OF RANK.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
Oct. 11, 1862.		In command of 1st corps, Army of Northern Virginia, &c., &c. At the Battle of Fredericksburg, in November, 1862, General Longstreet's corps was composed of the divisions of Anderson, Pickett, Ransom, Hood and McLaws, and the artillery battalions of Colonels Alexander and Walton; in October, 1863, commanding corps in the Army of Tennessee, composed of the divisions of McLaws, Preston, Walker and Hood, and the artillery battalions of Alexander, Williams, Leyden and Robertson; Pickett's division belonged to this corps.
Oct. 11, 1862.		Promoted General P. A. C. S. February 19, 1864; commanded Department of East Tennessee and Kentucky, North Georgia and West North Carolina, with infantry divisions of Stevenson, McCown and Heth, and the cavalry brigades of Forrest, Morgan, Scott and Ashby; also in command of Trans-Mississippi Department.
Oct. 11, 1862.		Killed, June 14, 1864, on Pine Mountain, near Marietta, Georgia; at the time of his death in command of the Army of Mississippi, co-operating with the Army of Tennessee, both under command of General Joseph E. Johnston; commanded corps Army of Tennessee, composed of the divisions of Cheatham, Withers and McCown; commanded Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga, August, 1863; also, in 1863 and 1864, commanded Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana; assigned to command of Trans-Mississippi Department.
Oct. 13, 1862.		In command, August, 1863, of the paroled prisoners of Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri, Texas and Louisiana, recently forming part of the garrisons of Vicksburg and Port Hudson.
Oct. 11, 1862.		In command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida; his corps, in the Army of Tennessee, composed of the Divisions of Cheatham, Cleyburne, Stevenson and Walker; subsequently Stevenson's division was exchanged for Bates' division; in command of the Army of Tennessee at Dalton, Georgia, December 21, 1863.
Oct. 11, 1862.		Died May 10, 1863; commanding Second corps Army of Northern Virginia. At the Battle of Fredericksburg this corps was composed of the divisions of A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Early and Taliaferro. Colonel Brown's regiment of artillery and numerous light batteries.
Oct. 13, 1862.		Resigned May 13, 1864; assigned to the command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.
Feb. 2, 1864.		Commanding Second corps Army of Northern Virginia, the Department of Richmond, &c.
Jan. 15, 1864.		Killed in front of Petersburg, Va.; commanding Third corps Army of Northern Virginia, &c., composed of the divisions of Anderson, Heth and Pender.
.....		In October, 1863, commanding corps, Army of Tennessee, composed of the divisions of Cleburne and Stewart; corps afterwards composed of the divisions of Cleburne and Breckinridge.
Feb. 11, 1864.		Promoted General with temporary rank July 13, 1864; commanding corps in the Army of Tennessee, composed of the divisions of Hindman, Stevenson and Stewart.
May 16, 1864.		Commanding Department of Alabama, Mississippi and West Tennessee.
.....		Assigned to the command of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, East Louisiana and West Tennessee; subsequently in command of Hood's old corps, Army of Tennessee, composed of the divisions of Hill, Stevenson and Clayton.
May 31, 1864.		Commanded Second corps Army of Northern Virginia, composed of the divisions of Rodes, Gordon and Ramseur, and three battalions of light artillery under command of Brigadier-General Long.

LIEUTENANT-GENERALS, IN

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
15	Richard H. Anderson..	S. Carolina.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	June 1, 1864.	May 31, 1864.
16	Ambrose P. Stewart...	Tennessee.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	June 23, 1864.	June 23, 1864.
17	Nathan B. Forrest.....	Tennessee.	Gen. Beauregard.....	Feb. 23, 1865.	Feb. 23, 1865.
18	Wade Hampton.....	S. Carolina.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..
19	Simon B. Buckner.....	Kentucky..1865.
20	Joseph Wheeler.....	Georgia....	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Feb. 23, 1865.	Feb. 23, 1865.
21	John B. Gordon.....	Georgia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....1865.

ORDER OF RANK—CONTINUED.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
June 1, 1864.	Commanded Longstreet's corps while he was disabled by wounds encountered in the Battle of the Wilderness.
.....	Corps composed of the divisions of French, Loring and Walthall, Army of the West.
March 2, 1865.	Command composed of the cavalry divisions of Chalmers, Jackson and Buford, McCulloch's Second Missouri cavalry regiment as a special scouting force, and the Mississippi militia; Army of the West.
.....	Commanding cavalry in General Joseph E. Johnston's army during General Sherman's march through the Carolinas, and Butler's division of cavalry from the Army of Northern Virginia.
.....	Commanding District of Louisiana.
.....	Commanding cavalry divisions of Allen, Humes and Dibbrell, composed of the brigades of Allen, Anderson, Breckinridge, Crews, Dibbrell, Ferguson, Harrison, Iverson and Lewis; again, commanding cavalry corps, Army of Tennessee, composed of the divisions of Martin, Kelley and Humes, and at another time a cavalry division in the Army of Tennessee, composed of the brigades of Hagan, Wharton and Morgan.
.....	Commanding Second Army Corps, Army of Northern Virginia; at the time of General Lee's surrender, General Longstreet was in command of one wing of the Army of Northern Virginia and General Gordon of the other.

MAJOR-GENERALS,

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
1	David E. Twiggs.....	Georgia....	May 22, 1861.	May 22, 1861.
2	Leonidas Polk.....	Louisiana..	June 25, 1861.	June 25, 1861.
3	Braxton Bragg.....	Louisiana..	Sept. 12, 1861.	Sept. 12, 1861.
4	Earl Van Dorn.....	Mississippi.	Sept. 19, 1861.	Sept. 19, 1861.
5	Gustavus W. Smith....	Kentucky..	Sept. 19, 1861.	Sept. 19, 1861.
6	Theophilus H. Holmes.	N. Carolina	Oct. 7, 1861.	Oct. 7, 1861.
7	William J. Hardee....	Georgia....	Oct. 7, 1861.	Oct. 7, 1861.
8	Benjamin Huger.....	S. Carolina.	Oct. 7, 1861.	Oct. 7, 1861.
9	James Longstreet.....	Alabama...	Oct. 7, 1861.	Oct. 7, 1861.
10	J. Bankhead Magruder.	Virginia	Oct. 7, 1861.	Oct. 7, 1861.
11	Mansfield Lovell.....	Maryland..	Oct. 7, 1861.	Oct. 7, 1861.
12	Thomas J. Jackson....	Virginia	Oct. 7, 1861.	Oct. 7, 1861.
13	E. Kirby Smith.....	Florida	Oct. 11, 1861.	Oct. 11, 1861.
14	George B. Crittenden..	Kentucky..	Nov. 9, 1861.	Nov. 9, 1861.
15	John C. Pemberton..	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Feb. 23, 1862.	Jan. 14, 1862.
16	Richard S. Ewell.....	Virginia	Jan. 24, 1862.	Jan. 24, 1862.
17	William W. Loring....	Florida	Maj. Gen. Huger.....	Feb. 15, 1862.	Feb. 15, 1862.
18	Sterling Price.....	Missouri...	March 6, 1862.	March 6, 1862.

IN ORDER OF RANK.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
Ang. 29, 1861.	Died July 15th, 1862; in command, at New Orleans, of the Military Department of Louisiana.
Ang. 29, 1861.	Promoted Lieutenant-General October 10, 1862; commanding First corps, Army of the Mississippi, composed of the divisions of Clark and Cheatham, and Maxey's detached brigade; originally assigned to command of Department No. 2, comprising the defences of the Mississippi river; also in command of the Armies of Mississippi and Kentucky on the retreat from Kentucky.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Promoted General C. S. A. April 12, 1862; commanding Army of Tennessee, &c., &c.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Commanding Army of the District of the Mississippi.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Resigned February 17, 1863; assigned to the command of the Second corps Army of the Potomac; afterwards in command of the First division in General J. E. Johnston's Army of Virginia; subsequently relieved General Holmes of the command at Fredericksburg; at Yorktown commanded division composed of the brigades of Whiting, Hood, Hampton, Pettigrew and Hatton, &c., &c.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Promoted Lieutenant-General October 10, 1862; assigned to the command of Confederate forces in North Carolina; subsequently in command of the District of Arkansas, &c., &c.; at one time in command of Daniel's, Walker's and Wise's brigades, Army of Northern Virginia.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Promoted Lieutenant-General October 10, 1862; commanding Third corps, Army of the Mississippi, composed of the brigades of Leddell, Cleburne, Wood, Marmaduke and Hawthorne.
Dec. 13, 1861.	In command at Norfolk, Virginia; division in the field near Richmond, Va., composed of the brigades of Mahone, Wright, Blanchard and Armistead.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Promoted Lieutenant-General October 9, 1862; commanding First corps Army of Northern Virginia, &c., &c.; division composed of the brigades of Kemper, Pickett, Wilcox, Anderson, Pryor and Featherston; Army of Northern Virginia.
Dec. 13, 1861.	On duty on the Peninsula; subsequently in command of the District of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.
Dec. 13, 1861.	In command of New Orleans, &c., &c.; afterwards in command of First division, Army of the District of Mississippi, composed of the brigades of Rust, Villepique and Bowen.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Promoted Lieutenant-General October 10, 1862; assigned to the command of the Army of the Monongahela; later command consisted of the divisions of A. P. Hill, Ewell, Rodas, and Jackson's old division.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Promoted Lieutenant-General October 9, 1862; commanded reserve division, Army of the Potomac, consisting of Trimble's, Taylor's and Elzey's brigades.
.....	Resigned October 23, 1862; commanding military operations in East Tennessee and East Kentucky.
Jan. 13, 1862.	Promoted Lieutenant-General October 10, 1862; assigned to the command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida.
Jan. 24, 1862.	Promoted Lieutenant-General May 23, 1863; commanding Department of Richmond; division composed of the brigades of Elzey, Trimble and Taylor.
Feb. 15, 1862,	Commanding Department of Western Virginia; subsequently commanded division in Jackson's corps, and afterwards a division in the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana.
and Feb. 17, 1864.	
March 6, 1862.	Major-General commanding Missouri State Guard, and received with that rank into Confederate service; commanding District of Arkansas, Trans-Mississippi Department; in 1862 in command of the Army of the West; in 1864 division composed of the brigades of Drayton, Churchill, Tappan and Parsons.

MAJOR-GENERALS, IN

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
19	Benjamin F. Cheatham	Tennessee.	Mch. 14, 1862.	Mch. 10, 1862.
20	Samuel Jones.....	Virginia	Mch. 14, 1862.	Mch. 10, 1862.
21	John P. McCown.....	Tennessee.	Mch. 14, 1862.	Mch. 10, 1862.
22	Daniel Harvey Hill....	N. Carolina	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Mch. 26, 1862.	Mch. 26, 1862.
23	Jones M. Withers.....	Alabama...	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Aug. 16, 1862.	April 6, 1862.
24	T. C. Hindman.....	Arkansas ..	Gen. Beauregard.....	Apl. 18, 1862.	Apl. 14, 1862.
25	John C. Breckinridge..	Kentucky..	Gen. Beauregard.....	Apl. 18, 1862.	Apl. 14, 1862.
26	Lafayette McLaws....	Georgia....	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	May 23, 1862.	May 23, 1862.
27	Ambrose P. Hill.....	Virginia ...	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	May 26, 1862.	May 26, 1862.
28	Richard H. Anderson..	S. Carolina.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	July 14, 1862.	July 14, 1862.
29	J. E. B. Stuart.....	Virginia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	July 25, 1862.	July 25, 1862.
30	Richard Taylor.....	Louisiana..	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	July 28, 1862.	July 28, 1862.
32	Simon B. Buckner.....	Kentucky..	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Aug. 16, 1862.	Aug. 16, 1862.

ORDER OF RANK—CONTINUED.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
Mch. 14, 1862.	Division composed of the brigades of Maney, Smith, Wright and Strahl; in January, 1864, in command of Hardee's corps; division afterwards composed of the brigades of Maney, Wright, Strahl and Vaughan; at another time, of the brigades of Jackson, Maney, Smith, Wright and Strahl; Army of Tennessee.
Mch. 14, 1862.	In 1864 in command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida; in 1862 commanding Second corps, Army of the Mississippi, composed of the brigades of Anderson, Richard and Walker; again in command of the Department of West Virginia and East Tennessee.
Mch. 14, 1862.	Commanding Army of the West, composed of the divisions of Little, McCown and Maury; again, in command of a division in Polk's corps, Army of Tennessee, composed of the brigades of Ector, Vance and McNair.
Mch. 26, 1862.	Division composed of the brigades of Deas, Manigault, Shoup and Brantley; also commanding division, Army of Northern Virginia, composed of the brigades of Dotes, Iverson, Ramseur, Rodes and Colquitt.
Sept. 26, 1862.	Commanding reserve corps, Army of the Mississippi, composed of the brigades of Gardner, Chalmers, Jackson and Manigault; also commanded division in Polk's corps, Army of Tennessee, composed of the brigades of Deas, Chalmers, Walthall and Anderson.
Apl. 18, 1862.	Division composed of the brigades of Deas, Walthall, Manigault and Anderson, Polk's corps, Army of Tennessee; at one time in command of a corps in the Army of Tennessee, composed of the divisions of Hindman, Breckinridge and Stewart; again, division composed of the brigades of Tucker, Deas, Manigault and Walthall.
Apl. 18, 1862.	Afterwards Secretary of War; division composed of the brigades of Helm, Dan'l W. Adams and Stovall; in 1862 commanding division, Van Dorn's Army, District of Mississippi; in December, 1862, commanding cavalry division, Polk's corps, Army of Tennessee, composed of the Brigades of Hanson, Palmer and Walker; in 1863 division composed of the brigades of Helm, Preston, Brown and Adams.
Sept. 26, 1862.	Division composed of the brigades of Kershaw, Wofford, Humphreys and Bryan; in 1864 in command of the District of Georgia; at the battle of Chancellorsville, division composed of the brigades of Wofford, Kershaw, Barksdale and Semmes.
Sept. 26, 1862.	Promoted Lieutenant-General May 24, 1863; commanding division in Army of Northern Virginia.
Sept. 26, 1862.	Promoted Lieutenant-General shortly after the battle of Spotsylvania; division composed of Mahone's, Wright's, Armistead's and Martin's brigades; Posey's, Wilcox's and Pryor's brigades were subsequently added; all attached to the Army of Northern Virginia; at the battle of Fredericksburg his division was composed of the brigades of Perry, Featherston, Wright, Wilcox and Mahone.
Sept. 26, 1862.	Died of wounds May 12, 1864; division composed of the brigades of Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee; Chief of Cavalry Army of Northern Virginia; succeeded Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill in command of the Second corps, Army of Northern Virginia, during battle of Chancellorsville.
Sept. 26, 1862.	Promoted Lieutenant-General April 8, 1864; commanding Department of Louisiana; also District of Western Louisiana.
Sept. 26, 1862.	Promoted Lieutenant-General 1865; command composed of the division of Major-General A. P. Stewart, consisting of the brigades of Johnson, Brown, Bate and Clayton, and the division of Brigadier-General Wm. Preston, consisting of the brigades of Gracie, Trigg and Kelly, and of three battalions of light artillery; Army of Tennessee.

MAJOR-GENERALS, IN

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
32	S. G. French.....	Mississippi.	Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith	Oct. 22, 1862.	Aug. 31, 1862.
33	C. L. Stevenson.....	Virginia ...	Lt. Gen. E. K. Smith.	Oct. 13, 1862.	Oct. 10, 1862.
34	George E. Pickett.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Oct. 11, 1862.	Oct. 10, 1862.
35	John B. Hood.....	Texas.....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Oct. 11, 1862.	Oct. 10, 1862.
36	D. R. Jones.....	Georgia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Oct. 11, 1862.	Oct. 11, 1862.
37	John H. Forney.....	Alabama...	Oct. 27, 1862.	Oct. 27, 1862.
38	Dabney H. Maury.....	Virginia ...	Lt. Gen. Pemberton..	Nov. 4, 1862.	Nov. 4, 1862.
39	M. L. Smith.....	Florida	Lt. Gen. Pemberton..	Nov. 4, 1862.	Nov. 4, 1862.
40	John G. Walker.....	Missouri...	Lt. Gen. T. H. Holmes	Nov. 8, 1862.	Nov. 8, 1862.
41	Arnold Elzey.....	Maryland..	Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith	Dec. 4, 1862.	Dec. 4, 1862.
42	Frank Gardner.....	Louisiana..	Lt. Gen. Pemberton..	Dec. 20, 1862.	Dec. 13, 1862.
43	Patrick R. Cleburne....	Arkansas ..	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Dec. 20, 1862.	Dec. 13, 1862.
44	Isaac R. Trimble.....	Maryland..	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Apr. 23, 1863.	Jan. 17, 1863.
45	D. S. Donelson.....	Tennessee.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Apr. 22, 1863.	Jan. 17, 1863.
46	Jubal A. Early.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Apr. 23, 1863.	Jan. 17, 1863.
47	Joseph Wheeler.....	Georgia....	{ Gen. Command'g } { Army of Tenn. }	Feb. 4, 1864.	Jan. 20, 1863.
48	W. H. C. Whiting.....	Mississippi.	Lt. Gen. Longstreet..	Apr. 22, 1863.	Feb. 23, 1863.
49	Edward Johnson.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Apr. 22, 1863.	Feb. 23, 1863.

ORDER OF RANK—CONTINUED.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Commanding Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, with defensive line from the mouth of the Appomattox to Cape Fear river.
Oct. 13, 1862.	Division composed of the brigades of Brown, Cumming, Pettus and Reynolds, and the light batteries of Anderson, Rowan, Corput and Carne; at another time, of the brigades of Pettus, Palmer and Cumming.
Oct. 11, 1862.	Commanding Department of North Carolina in 1864; commanded division in Longstreet's corps, Army of Northern Virginia, composed of the brigades of Garnett, Armistead, Kemper and Jenkins, to which Corse's brigade was subsequently added.
Oct. 11, 1862.	Promoted Lieutenant-General September 20, 1863; General with temporary rank, July 18, 1864; division composed of the brigades of Robertson, Law, Benning and Jenkins; at the Battle of Fredericksburg, division composed of the brigades of Law, Toombs, Robertson and Anderson.
Oct. 11, 1862.	Commanding division, Longstreet's corps, Army of Northern Virginia, composed of the brigades of Toombs, Anderson, Drayton, Kemper, Garnett and Jenkins.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Division consisted at first of Hebert's and Moore's brigades, and, subsequently, of the brigades of King, Waterhouse, Waul and McLain; at another time General Forney commanded a division composed of the brigades of Cockrell and Green, Army of the Mississippi.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Commanding Department of the Gulf; previously in command of the Third division, Army of the West.
Apl. 30, 1863.	In command of the Second District, Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Division composed of Hawes', McCulloch's and Randall's brigades.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Commanding brigade, Army of Northern Virginia; also in command of the Department of Richmond, Virginia.
June 10, 1864.	In command at Mobile, Alabama, &c., &c.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Killed at the Battle of Franklin, Tennessee; division composed of the brigades of Polk, Wood and Deshler, and the light batteries of Calvert, Semple and Douglass; division afterwards composed of the brigades of Polk, Lowry, Govan and Granberry, and again of the brigades of Wood, Johnson, Liddell and Polk; Army of Tennessee.
Apl. 23, 1863.	Commanded Stonewall Jackson's old division, of the Second corps, Army of Northern Virginia; at the Battle of Chancellorsville, division composed of the brigades of Colston, Paxton, Nicholls and Jones.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Died April 17, 1863; in command of the First division of the right wing of the Army of the Mississippi, composed of the brigades of Savage, Stewart and Maney.
Apl. 23, 1863.	Promoted Lieutenant-General May 31, 1864; division composed of Early's, Hays', Lawton's and Trimble's brigades; at the Battle of Chancellorsville, division composed of the brigades of Hays, Gordon, Hoke and Smith, Army of Northern Virginia.
Feb. 4, 1864.	Promoted Lieutenant-General February 28, 1865; commanding cavalry in Tennessee, consisting of the divisions of Wharton, Martin and Kelly, and the brigades of Roddy and Morgan.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Commanding at Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1864; division composed of the brigades of Hood and Law, and the light batteries of Reilly and Balthis.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Commanding division in Ewell's corps, Army of Northern Virginia, composed of the brigades of Walker, Stuart and J. M. Jones.

MAJOR-GENERALS, IN

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
50	R. E. Rodes.....	Alabama...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	May 7, 1863.	May 2, 1863.
51	William H. T. Walker.	Georgia....	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	May 27, 1863.	May 23, 1863.
52	Henry Heth.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	May 23, 1863.	May 24, 1863.
53	John S. Bowen.....	Missouri ...	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	May 29, 1863.	May 25, 1863.
54	Robert Ransom, Jr....	N. Carolina	Lt. Gen. D. H. Hill....	May 27, 1863.	May 26, 1863.
55	W. D. Pender.....	N. Carolina	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	May 27, 1863.	May 27, 1863.
56	A. P. Stewart.....	Tennessee.	Gen. B. Bragg.....	June 5, 1863.	June 2, 1863.
57	Stephen D. Lee.....	S. Carolina.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Aug. 3, 1863.	Aug. 3, 1863.
58	Cadmus M. Wilcox....	Tennessee.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Aug. 13, 1863.	Aug. 3, 1863.
59	J. F. Gilmer.....	N. Carolina	Gen. Beauregard.....	Aug. 16, 1863.	Aug. 16, 1863.
60	Wade Hampton.....	S. Carolina.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Sept. 3, 1863.	Aug. 3, 1863.
61	Fitzhugh Lee.....	Virginia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Sept. 3, 1863.	Aug. 3, 1863.
62	William Smith.....	Virginia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Aug. 13, 1863.	Aug. 12, 1863.
63	Howell Cobb.....	Georgia....	Sept. 19, 1863.	Sept. 9, 1863.
64	John A. Wharton.....	Texas	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Nov. 12, 1863.	Nov. 10, 1863.
65	William T. Martin.....	Mississippi.	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Nov. 12, 1863.	Nov. 10, 1863.
66	Nathan B. Forrest.....	Tennessee.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Dec. 4, 1863.	Dec. 4, 1863.
67	Charles W. Field.....	Kentucky..	Lt. Gen. Longstreet..	Feb. 12, 1864.	Feb. 12, 1864.
68	J. Patton Anderson....	Florida	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Feb. 17, 1864.	Feb. 17, 1864.
69	W. B. Bate.....	Tennessee.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	March 5, 1864.	Feb. 23, 1864.
70	Robert F. Hoke.....	N. Carolina	Apr. 23, 1864.	Apr. 20, 1864.

ORDER OF RANK—CONTINUED.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Killed at Winchester, Va., 19th Sept., 1864; division composed of the brigades of Doles, Battle, Daniel and Ramseur.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Killed in the battle around Atlanta, Georgia; division composed of the brigades of Liddell, Walthall, Ector and Wilson; division afterwards composed of the brigades of Mercer, Jackson, Gist and Stevens; in October, 1863, division composed of the brigades of Gregg, Gist and Wilson.
Feb. 17, 1864.	Division composed of Pettigrew's, Archer's, Davis', Cook's and Brockenborough's brigades, Army of Northern Virginia.
.....	Died July 16, 1863, from disease contracted during the siege of Vicksburg; commanded division known as the Missouri division, composed of the brigades of Cockrell and Green.
Feb. 17, 1864.	Commanding Department of Richmond, in 1864; at the Battle of Fredericksburg, division composed of the brigades of Ransom and Cook.
.....	Died July 18, 1863, from wounds received at Gettysburg; division composed of his old brigade and the brigades of McGowan, Lane and Thomas, Army of Northern Virginia.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Promoted Lieutenant-General June 23, 1864; division composed of the brigades of Brown, Johnson, Strahl and Clayton; afterwards, of the brigades of Brown, Bate, Clayton and Stovall; subsequently of the brigades of Stovall, Clayton, Gibson and Baker; Army of the West.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Promoted Lieutenant-General June 23, 1864; assigned to the command of all the cavalry in the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, East Louisiana and West Tennessee.
Feb. 17, 1864.	Division composed of the brigades of Generals Lane, Scales, McGowan and Thomas.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Chief of the Engineer Bureau.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Promoted Lieutenant-General; division composed of the cavalry brigades of Young, Butler, Rosser and Gordon, Army of Northern Virginia.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Division composed of Wickham's and Lomax's brigades; subsequently in command of the cavalry corps, Army of Northern Virginia, composed of the divisions of W. H. F. Lee, Rosser and Munford.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Resigned December 31, 1863, because elected Governor of Virginia; consequently, did not assume command of a division or remain in the field.
Jan. 25, 1864.	In 1864 in command of the reserve forces of Georgia.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Commanding division in Wheeler's cavalry corps, Army of Tennessee.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Commanding cavalry corps in East Tennessee, under General Longstreet; subsequently a division in Wheeler's cavalry corps, composed of the brigades of Morgan and Iverson.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Promoted Lieutenant-General February 28, 1865; assigned to the command of all cavalry in West Tennessee and North Mississippi, consisting of those of his own brigade and those of Chalmers, McCulloch, Richardson, Bell and Jeffrey Forrest; Lyon's brigade was afterwards added; the whole was organized into two divisions, commanded respectively by Chalmers and Buford.
Feb. 12, 1864.	Division composed of Jenkins', Law's, Benning's, Anderson's and Gregg's brigades, Army of Northern Virginia.
Feb. 17, 1864.	In 1864 assigned to the command of the District of Florida.
May 11, 1864.	Division composed of the brigades of Tyler, Lewis and Finley, and of the light batteries of Slocum, Cobb and Mebane; Army of Tennessee.
May 11, 1864.	Commanding in North Carolina; division in General Beauregard's army composed, May, 1864, of the brigades of Martin, Hagood, Clingman and Colquitt; Army of Northern Virginia.

MAJOR-GENERALS, IN

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
71	W. H. F. Lee.....	Virginia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Apl. 23, 1864.	Apl. 23, 1864.
72	John B. Gordon.....	Georgia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	May 14, 1864.	May 14, 1864.
73	Bushrod R. Johnson...	Tennessee.	Gen. Beauregard....	May 26, 1864.	May 21, 1864.
74	J. B. Kershaw.....	S. Carolina.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	June 2, 1864.	May 18, 1864.
75	C. J. Pollnac.....	France....	Lt. Gen. E. K. Smith..	June 13, 1864.	Apl. 8, 1864.
76	J. F. Fagan.....	Arkansas..	Lt. Gen. E. K. Smith..	June 13, 1864.	Apl. 25, 1864.
77	William Mahone.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Aug. 3, 1864.	July 30, 1864.
78	S. D. Ramseur.....	N. Carolina	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	June 1, 1864.	June 1, 1864.
79	E. C. Walthall.....	Mississippi.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	June 10, 1864.	June 6, 1864.
80	H. D. Clayton.....	Alabama...	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	July 8, 1864.	July 7, 1864.
81	John C. Brown.....	Tennessee.	Gen. J. B. Hood.....	Aug. 4, 1864.	Aug. 4, 1864.
82	L. L. Lomax.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Aug. 10, 1864.	Aug. 10, 1864.
83	Henry W. Allen.....	Louisiana..1864.1864.
84	J. L. Kemper.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Mch. 1, 1864.	Mch. 1, 1864.
85	J. S. Marmaduke.....	Missouri...	Gen. E. K. Smith.....1864.1864.
86	A. R. Wright.....	Georgia....	Gen. Beauregard....	Nov. 23, 1864.	Nov. 23, 1864.
87	John Pegram.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....1864.1864.
88	Pierce M. B. Young...	Georgia....	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Dec. 12, 1864.	Dec. 12, 1864.
89	M. Calvin Butler.....	S. Carolina.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..1864.1864.
90	T. L. Rosser.....	Texas.....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....1864.1864.
91	G. W. Custis Lee.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Jan. 1, 1865.	Jan. 1, 1865.
92	William Preston.....	Kentucky..	Gen. E. K. Smith....	Jan. 1, 1865.	Jan. 1, 1865.
93	William B. Taliaferro..	Virginia ...	Gen. Wm. J. Hardee..	Jan. 1, 1865.	Jan. 1, 1865.
94	Bryan Grimes..	N. Carolina	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Feb. 23, 1865.	Feb. 23, 1865.

ORDER OF RANK—CONTINUED.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
June 9, 1864.	Division composed of the cavalry brigades of Chambliss, Barringer and Roberts, and of two batteries horse artillery, Captain McGregor, Army of Northern Virginia.
May 14, 1864.	Lieutenant-General in the spring of 1865 by promotion at the hands of General R. E. Lee; division composed of the brigades of Evans, Terry and York, Army of Northern Virginia.
May 26, 1864.	Oct. 13, 1862.	Division was composed of Ransom's, Johnson's, Wise's, Elliott's and Gracie's brigades, and the Sixty-fourth Georgia regiment, Army of Northern Virginia.
June 2, 1864.	Division composed of the brigades of Conner, Wofford, Humphreys and Bryan, Army of Tennessee.
June 13, 1864.	Division composed of the Second Texas brigade and Mouton's brigade.
June 13, 1864.	Commanding District of Arkansas.
.....	Oct. 13, 1862.	Assigned to command of Anderson's old division, composed of the brigades of Generals Wright, Weisiger, Saunders, Harris and Finnegan, Army of Northern Virginia.
June 1, 1864.	Assigned to the command of General Early's old division, at that time composed of the brigades of Pegram, Johnston and Godwin, Army of Northern Virginia.
June 10, 1864.	Division composed of the brigades of Canty, Reynolds and Quarles, Army of Tennessee; again, of the brigades of Quarles, Shelley and D. H. Reynolds, Stewart's corps, Army of Tennessee.
.....	Division composed of the brigades of Stovall, Baker and Henry R. Jackson; at another time, of the brigades of M. A. Stovall, R. L. Gibson, A. Baker and J. T. Holtzelaw; Army of Tennessee.
.....	Division composed of Govan's and Smith's brigades, Army of Tennessee.
.....	Division composed of the cavalry brigades of Johnson, Jackson, Imboden, Vaughn and McCausland, Army of Northern Virginia.
.....	Commanding division in Trans-Mississippi Department.
.....	In command of the reserve forces of Virginia.
.....	Division composed of the brigades of Clarke and Harrison.
Febr'y, 1865.	Commanding division during the siege of Savannah in December, 1864, composed of the brigades of Mercer and John K. Jackson.
.....	Killed in action at Hatcher's Run; commanding Early's old division, Army of Northern Virginia.
Dec. 22, 1864.	Division composed of the cavalry brigades of Lewis, Ferguson and Hannon, Wheeler's corps.
.....	Division composed of the cavalry brigades of Wright and Logan, Army of Northern Virginia.
.....	Division composed of the cavalry brigades of McCausland and Dearing, and subsequently of the brigades of Payne and Mumford, Army of Northern Virginia.
.....	In command of local brigade and reserves for the immediate defence of Richmond, Virginia.
.....	Assigned to the command of the division of Major-General Polignac, after his return to France; in October, 1863, in command of a division, Longstreet's corps, Army of the Tennessee, composed of the brigades of Gracie, Twiggs and Kelly.
.....	Commanding division of mixed troops after the evacuation of Charleston; previously in command of James Island, South Carolina.
Feb. 23, 1865.	Division composed of his old brigade and the brigades of Battle, Cook and Cox, Army of Northern Virginia.

MAJOR-GENERALS, IN

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
95	William W. Allen.....	Alabama...	Gen. Jos. Wheeler....	March, 1865.	March, 1865.
96	W. Y. C. Humes.....	Tennessee.	Gen. Jos. Wheeler....	March, 1865.	March, 1865.
97	Harry T. Hays.....	Louisiana..	Gen. E. K. Smith....	April, 1865.	April, 1865.
98	E. M. Law.....	Alabama...	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	April 9, 1865.	April, 1865.
99	M. W. Gary.....	S. Carolina.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....1865.1865.

ORDER OF RANK—CONTINUED.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
.....	Commanding cavalry division composed of the brigades of Crews and Hagan; Brigadier-General Robert H. Anderson's cavalry brigade was subsequently added.
.....	Commanding division in Lieutenant-General Wheeler's cavalry corps, composed of the brigades of Ashby, Harrison and Williams.
.....	On special duty in Trans-Mississippi Department.
.....	Commanding General Hampton's old cavalry division.
.....	Division assigned, but never concentrated, consisting of his old brigade and Robert's brigade of North Carolina cavalry.

BRIGADIER-GENERALS OF THE CONFEDERATE

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
1	Adams, Charles W.....	Arkansas..	Maj. Gen. Price.....1862.1862.
2	Adams, Daniel W... ..	Louisiana..	Gen. Beauregard.....	May 23, 1862.	May 23, 1862.
3	Adams, John.....	Tennessee.	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	May 23, 1863.	Dec. 29, 1863.
4	Adams, Wirt.....	Mississippi.	Gen. Wm. J. Hardee..	Sept. 28, 1863.	Sept. 25, 1863.
5	Alcorn, J. L...
6	Alexander, E. Porter..	Georgia... ..	Lt. Gen. Longstreet..	Mch. 1, 1864.	Feb. 26, 1864.
7	Allen, Henry W.....	Louisiana..	Gen. E. K. Smith.....	Aug. 19, 1863.	Aug. 19, 1863.
8	Allen, William W.....	Alabama... ..	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Mch. 1, 1864.	Feb. 26, 1864.
9	Anderson, C. D.....	Georgia....	Gen. G. W. Smith. .	May, 1864.	May, 1864.
10	Anderson, George B... ..	N. Carolina	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	June 9, 1862.	June 9, 1862.
11	Anderson, George T... ..	Georgia....	Gen. Longstreet.....	Nov. 1, 1862.	Nov. 1, 1862.
12	Anderson, Joseph R... ..	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Sept. 3, 1861.	Sept. 3, 1861.
13	Anderson, J. Patton... ..	Florida	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Feb. 10, 1862.	Feb. 10, 1862.
14	Anderson, R. H.....	S. Carolina.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	July 19, 1861.	July 19, 1861.
15	Anderson, Robert H... ..	Georgia....	Gen. J. B. Hood.....	July 26, 1864.	July 26, 1864.
16	Anderson, Samuel R... ..	Tennessee.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	July 9, 1861.	July 9, 1861.
17	Archer, J. J.....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	June 3, 1862.	June 3, 1862.
18	Armistead, L. A.....	Virginia ...	Gen. Huger.....	Apl. 1, 1862.	Apl. 1, 1862.
19	Armstrong, Frank C... ..	Arkansas..	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	Apl. 23, 1863.	Jan. 20, 1863.

STATES ARMY, ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED.

Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
.....1862.	Commanding brigade in Major-General Price's army.
Sept. 30, 1862.	Commanding Mississippi brigade, General Breckinridge's division, Army of Tennessee, composed of the 13th, 20th, 16th, 25th and 19th Louisiana and 32d Alabama regiments, Austin's battalion of sharp-shooters and Slocumb's light battery.
Feb. 17, 1864.	Killed at Battle of Franklin; commanded brigade in Loring's division, Stewart's corps, Army of Tennessee, composed of the 6th, 14th, 15th, 20th, 23d and 43d Mississippi regiments.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Brigade composed of Colonel Wood's regiment, the 11th and 17th Arkansas regiments consolidated, the 14th Confederate regiment, the 9th Tennessee battalion and King's light battery.
.....	Commanding a brigade of Mississippi State troops at Columbus, Kentucky.
May 28, 1864.	In command of the artillery attached to the 1st corps (Longstreet's), Army of Northern Virginia.
Jan. 25, 1864.	Promoted Major-General; resigned January 10, 1864; elected Governor of Louisiana.
June 9, 1864.	Oct. 13, 1862.	Promoted Major-General in the spring of 1865; brigade at first composed of the 1st, 3d, 5th and 10th Confederate regiments, and subsequently of the 1st, 3d, 4th, 9th, 12th and 51st regiments Alabama cavalry, Army of the West.
May, 1864.	Held commission in Georgia State forces; commanding the 3d Georgia brigade, composed of the 7th, 8th and 9th regiments.
Sept. 30, 1862.	Died October 16, 1862, from the effect of wounds received at Sharpsburg; brigade composed of the 2d, 4th, 14th and 30th North Carolina regiments, D. H. Hill's division, Jackson's corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Brigade composed of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Georgia regiments and the 1st Kentucky regiment; the 59th Georgia regiment was afterwards substituted for the 1st Kentucky, whose term of service had expired; all of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Brigade composed of the 14th, 35th, 45th and 49th Georgia regiments and the 3d Louisiana battalion, Army of Northern Virginia; resigned July 19, 1862.
Feb. 10, 1862.	Promoted Major-General February 17, 1864; brigade composed of the 1st Florida, 17th Alabama and the 5th and 8th Mississippi regiments; subsequently in command of Major-General Hindman's division, Polk's corps, Army of Tennessee.
Aug. 29, 1861.	Promoted Major-General July 14, 1862; brigade composed of Colonel Gladden's 1st Louisiana Regular infantry, Colonel Anderson's 1st Florida regiment, Colonel Jackson's 5th Georgia regiment, the 7th and 8th Mississippi regiments, and Colonel Tyler's battalion of marines; brigade afterwards composed of the 4th, 5th and 6th South Carolina Volunteers and the 2d South Carolina Rifles, Longstreet's corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
.....	Brigade composed of the 5th Georgia and the 1st, 3d 5th and 10th Confederate regiments cavalry, Army of Tennessee.
Aug. 29, 1861.	Resigned May 10, 1862; brigade was composed of the 1st, 7th and 14th Tennessee regiments and one company of cavalry.
Sept. 30, 1862.	Brigade composed of the 1st, 14th and 7th Tennessee regiments, the 13th Alabama regiment and the 5th Alabama battalion, Heth's division, A. P. Hill's corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
Apl. 1, 1862.	Killed in action at Gettysburg; brigade composed of the 9th, 14th, 38th, 63d and 57th Virginia regiments, Army of Northern Virginia.
Apl. 23, 1863.	Commanding brigade in Chalmer's division, Forrest's cavalry corps, Army of the West.

BRIGADIER-GENERALS

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
20	Ashby, Turner.....	Virginia ...	Gen. T. J. Jackson....	May 23, 1862.	May 23, 1862.
21	Bagby, Arthur P.....	Texas	Lt. Gen. Buckner....	March, 1864.
22	Baker, Alpheus.....	Alabama...	Gen. J. E. Johnston..	March 7, 1864.	Mch. 5, 1864.
23	Baker, Lawrence S....	N. Carolina	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	July 30, 1863.	July 23, 1863.
24	Baldwin, Wm. E.....	Mississippi.	Gen. Van Dorn.....	Oct. 3, 1862.	Sept. 19, 1862.
25	Barksdale, William....	Mississippi.	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Aug. 12, 1862.	Aug. 12, 1862.
26	Barnes, James W.....	Texas.....
27	Barringer, Rufus.....	N. Carolina	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	June 1, 1864.	June 1, 1864.
28	Barry, William S.....	Mississippi.
29	Barton, Seth M.....	Virginia ...	Gen. E. K. Smith.....	Mch. 18, 1862.	Mch. 11, 1862.
30	Bartow, Francis S.....	Georgia....	Gen. Beauregard.....	July, 1861.	July, 1861.
31	Bate, William B.....	Tennessee.	Gen. B. Bragg.....	Oct. 3, 1862.	Oct. 3, 1862.
32	Battle, C. A.....	Alabama...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Aug. 25, 1863.	Aug. 20, 1863.
33	Baylor, John R.....	Texas.....
34	Beale, Richard L. T....	Virginia ...	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Febr'y, 1865.	Febr'y, 1865.
35	Beall, W. N. R.	Arkansas ..	Gen. Van Dorn.....	Apl. 17, 1862.	Apl. 11, 1862.
36	Beauregard, G. T.....	Louisiana..	{ Commanding Charleston Harbor. }	Mch. 1, 1861.	Mch. 1, 1861.
37	Bee, Barnard E.....	S. Carolina.		June 17, 1861.	June 17, 1861.
38	Bee, Hamilton P.....	Texas.....	Gen. P. O. Hebert....	March 6, 1862.	March 4, 1862.
39	Bell, Tyree H.....	Tennessee.	Maj. Gen. Forrest....	Nov., 1863.	Nov., 1863.
40	Benning, Henry L.....	Georgia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.....	Apl. 23, 1863.	Jan. 17, 1863.
41	Benton, Samuel.....	Mississippi.	Gen. J. B. Hood.....	July 26, 1864.	July 26, 1864.

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Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
.....	Killed June 6th, 1862, near Harrisonbnrg, Virginia; command composed of twenty-six companies; subsequently constituting Robertson's brigade, and organized into the 6th, 7th and 11th Virginia regiments, and the 16th Virginia battalion, Colonel Funsten.
.....	Brigade composed of Texas cavalry; in autumn of 1864 commanded a division composed of his old brigade and the brigades of DeBray and Brent.
May 11, 1864.	Brigade composed of the 37th, 40th, 42d and 54th Alabama regiments.
Feb. 16, 1864.	Commanding Second Military District, Department of North Carolina and South Virginia.
Oct. 3, 1862.	Died February 19, 1864; commanding brigade, District of Mobile; brigade, at the capture of Fort Donelson, consisted of the 20th and 26th Mississippi and the 26th Tennessee regiments.
Sept. 30, 1862.	Killed in action at Gettysburg; brigade composed of the 21st, 13th, 17th and 18th Mississippi regiments, McLaw's division, Longstreet's corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
June 1, 1864.	Brigade composed of the 1st, 2d, 3d and 5th North Carolina cavalry regiments, Major-General W. H. F. Lee's division, Army of Northern Virginia.
Mch. 18, 1862.	Commanding brigade, Army of the Mississippi.
.....	Commanded brigade, Army of Northern Virginia, composed of the 9th, 14th, 38th, 53d and 57th Virginia regiments.
.....	Killed at the Battle of First Manassas July 21, 1861; commanding brigade, Army of the Potomac, composed of the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments.
Oct. 3, 1862.	Promoted Major-General February 23, 1864; brigade composed of the 2d, 10th, 15th, 20th, 30th and 37th Tennessee and the 37th Georgia regiments, and the 4th battalion Georgia sharpshooters; Army of Tennessee.
Feb. 17, 1864.	Brigade [formerly Rodde's] composed of the 3d, 5th, 6th, 12th, 26th and 61st Alabama regiments, infantry.
.....	Commanding brigade, Trans-Mississippi Department; also in command of Confederate forces in Arizona.
.....	Commanding brigade in Major-General W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division, Army of Northern Virginia, composed of the 9th, 10th and 13th Virginia cavalry regiments; the 14th Virginia cavalry regiment was subsequently added; General Beale succeeded General Chambliss in command of his brigade.
Apl. 17, 1862.	Commanding Second Sub-District, District of Mississippi.
Mch. 1, 1861.	Promoted General Confederate States Army July 21, 1861; commanding at Charleston, South Carolina, and afterwards at Manassas.
Aug. 29, 1861.	
.....	Killed at Manassas July 21, 1861; commanding brigade, Army the Potomac, composed of the 2d and 11th Mississippi, the 6th North Carolina and the 4th Alabama regiments.
Mch. 6, 1862.	Brigade composed of DeBray's, Buchell's, Wood's, Terrell's, Gould's and Likin's Texas regiments.
.....	Commanding 12th Tennessee regiment and acting Brigadier-General; brigade composed of the regiments of Colonels Russell, Greer, Newsom, Wilson and Barteau; afterwards promoted Brigadier-General, and assigned to command of a brigade in Jackson's division, Forrest's cavalry corps.
Apl. 23, 1863.	Brigade composed of the 2d, 15th, 17th and 20th Georgia regiments, Hood's division, Longstreet's corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
.....	Died of wounds, received in action at Atlanta, Georgia, July 28, 1864; commanded a brigade composed of the 27th, 29th, 30th and 34th Mississippi regiments.

BRIGADIER-GENERALS

	NAME.	STATE.	TO WHOM TO REPORT.	Date of Appointment.	Date of Rank.
42	Blanchard, A. G.	Louisiana..	Gen. Huger.	Sept. 21, 1861.	Sept. 21, 1861.
43	Boggs, William R.	Georgia....	Lt. Gen. E. K. Smith..	Nov. 4, 1862.	Nov. 4, 1862.
44	Bonham, M. L.	S. Carolina.	Gen. Beauregard.	Apl. 23, 1861.	Apl. 23, 1861.
45	Bowen, John S.	Missouri...	Gen. Beauregard.	Mch. 18, 1862.	Mch. 14, 1862.
46	Bowles, Pinckney D. ...	Alabama...	Brig. Gen. Walker....	Apl. 2, 1865.	April 2, 1865.
47	Bragg, Braxton.	Louisiana..	{ Commanding at } { Pensacola, Fla. }	Mch. 7, 1861.	Mch. 7, 1861.
48	Branch, L. O. B.	N. Carolina	Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill....	Nov. 16, 1861.	Nov. 16, 1861.
49	Brandon, Wm. L.	Mississippi.	Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill..	June 18, 1864.	June 18, 1864.
50	Brantly, W. F.	Mississippi.	Gen. J. B. Hood.	July 26, 1864.	July 26, 1864.
51	Bratton, John.	S. Carolina.	Gen. R. E. Lee.	June 9, 1864.	May 6, 1864.
52	Breckinridge, John C. .	Kentucky..	Gen. A. S. Johnston..	Nov. 2, 1861.	Nov. 2, 1861.
53	Brent, Joseph L.	Louisiana..	Lt. Gen. S. B. Buckner	October, 1864.	October, 1864.
54	Brown, John C.	Tennessee.	Gen. B. Bragg.	Sept. 30, 1862.	Aug. 30, 1862.
55	Browne, Wm. M.	Gen. A. R. Wright....	Dec'r, 1864.	Dec'r, 1864.
56	Bryan, Goode.	Georgia....	Gen. R. E. Lee.	Aug. 31, 1863.	Aug. 29, 1863.
57	Buckner, Simon B.	Kentucky..	Gen. A. S. Johnston..	Sept. 14, 1861.	Sept. 14, 1861.

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Date of Confirmation.	Date of Acceptance.	REMARKS.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Brigade composed of the 3d, 4th and 22d Georgia regiments, the 3d Alabama regiment, 3d Louisiana battalion and Colonel Williams' North Carolina battalion, Girardey's Louisiana Guard artillery, Grimes' Portsmouth artillery, and the Sussex cavalry.
Apl. 22, 1863.	Oct. 13, 1862.	Chief of Staff to General E. Kirby Smith, commanding Trans-Mississippi Department.
Aug. 29, 1861.	Resigned; reappointed October 21, 1861; brigade at first composed of the 7th, 2d, 3d and 8th South Carolina Volunteers, infantry, constituting First brigade, First corps, Army of the Potomac; upon reappointment, ordered to the command of the 1st, 2d and 3d regiments South Carolina cavalry and Lieutenant-Colonel Trenholm's battalion South Carolina cavalry.
Mch. 18, 1862.	Promoted Major-General May 25, 1863; commanding 14th, 16th, 17th and 18th Arkansas regiments, Adams' Arkansas infantry regiment, and Jones' Arkansas infantry battalion; assigned, in 1861, to the command of the 4th division, Western Department, embracing the brigades of Martin and Bonham; again in command of the 3d brigade, 1st division, Army of the District of Mississippi.
.....	Brigade composed of the 21st Virginia battalion, the 2d and 6th Virginia reserves, and the 1st and 2d Confederate [mixed] regiments, Walker's division.
Mch. 7, 1861.	Promoted Major-General September 12, 1861; assigned to command at Pensacola, Florida, of the troops there assembled, consisting of the brigades of Colonels Chalmers, Clayton and Gladden, and the troops under Major Bradford.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Killed at Sharpsburg; brigade composed of the 7th, 18th, 28th, 33d and 37th North Carolina regiments, A. P. Hill's division, Army of Northern Virginia.
.....	Assigned to the command of a brigade of cavalry in Mississippi.
.....	Brigade composed of the 24th, 27th, 29th, 30th and 34th Mississippi regiments.
June 9, 1864.	Brigade composed of the 1st regiment South Carolina Volunteers [Hagood's], the 2d regiment South Carolina Rifles, the 5th and 6th regiments South Carolina Volunteers, and the Palmetto Sharpshooters, Longstreet's corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Promoted Major-General April 14, 1862; afterwards Secretary of War.
.....	Brigade composed of the 2d, 5th, 7th and 8th regiments Louisiana cavalry, Bagby's division, Army of West Louisiana, Lieutenant-General Buckner commanding.
Sept. 30, 1862.	Promoted Major-General August 4, 1864; brigade composed of the 18th, 26th, 32d and 45th regiments Tennessee infantry and Nemman's battalion Tennessee infantry, Stewart's division, Army of Tennessee; to these the 3d regiment Tennessee infantry was subsequently added.
.....	Commanding brigade under General H. W. Mercer at the siege of Savannah, in December, 1864; served previously as A. D. C. to President Davis, with rank of Colonel.
Feb. 17, 1864.	Brigade composed of the 53d, 55th, 50th and 10th Georgia regiments infantry, McLaw's division, Longstreet's corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
Dec. 13, 1861.	Promoted Major-General August 16, 1862; commanding division at Bowling Green, Kentucky, and subsequently at Fort Donelson.

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